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Ahetrart 
EU Member States are being confronted with a range of varied and complex issues 
within their energy markets, which require considerable effort and ingenuity to 
mitigate. Theses issues and problems are particularly apparent in the European natural 
gas market. Natural gas has become one of the key elements of the energy mix in a 
number of EU Member States and continues to develop rapidly in newly emerging gas 
markets. A lack of significant natural gas resource endowments in much of the EU 
means that many Member States have become highly dependent on gas imports, 
particularly from non-EU countries. 
Despite the European Commission's long held objective of bringing about both a 
harmonised and a liberalised EU gas market, this aim remains far from being reached. 
This is attributable to a discernible reluctance within some Member States and various 
gas industry stakeholders to work on the creation of such a market and, in so doing, to 
simultaneously address the increasingly important issue of security of supply. Within 
this context, and as individual markets continue to liberalise ahead of full market 
opening in July 2007, it becomes increasingly apparent that existing EU legislation is 
often insufficient to establish a harmonised and fully liberalised single European gas 
market that also supports security of gas supply. 
This thesis addresses the question of what conditions are required to create a more 
harmonised, liberalised and secure EU gas market. This analysis is undertaken in the 
following manner. First, the issue of security of supply is discussed in the context of 
the currently changing legal and regulatory structure across the EU. It then analyses 
existing EU legislation, guidelines and Commission decisions and examines how 
these documents support the establishment of a liberalised and harmonised single 
European gas market that addresses security of supply issues. Following this 
discussion the thesis then undertakes case studies of three key and pivotal European 
gas markets - The Netherlands, Austria and Germany - to analyse (with specific 
reference to individual gas market characteristics) whether national legislation will 
serve to improve overall EU gas market harmonisation and liberalisation efforts. 
Finally, this thesis concludes with specific recommendations on what is necessary to 
create a more harmonised and liberalised EU gas market that also supports security of 
gas supply. 
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Gts Gas Transport Services (Dutch transmission system operator) 
GWG Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (Austrian Gas Act) 
II-Gas High calorific value gas 
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IA(s) Interconnection agreement(s) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IUK Interconector between Belgium and the UK 
L-Gas Low calorific value gas 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
Marathon American oil company (<http: //www. marathon. com>) 
Mcm Million cubic meter (gas) 
MEA Ministry of Economic Affairs 
NAM Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (exploration company of the 
Dutch Gronningen field) 
National Grid Great Britain's natural gas transmission system operator (formerly 
known as `Transco', <http: //www. nationalgrid. com>) 
NBP National Balancing Point (UK) 
NMa Nederlandse Mededingings-autoriteit (Dutch competition authority) 
N. V. Naamloze Vennootschap (private law joint stock company in The 
Netherlands) 
OBA(s) Operational balancing agreement(s) 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFGEM Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK energy regulator) 
OMV Austrian gas company (<http: //www. omv. at>) 
OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OPEX Operation expenditure 
OTC Over the counter 
RegTP Bundesregulierungsbehörde für Elektrizität, Gas, 
Telekommunikation und Post (German Regulatory authority for 
Gas, Electricity, Telecommunication and Post, now called `BNA') 
RWE German gas and power company (<http: //www. rwe. com>) 
SSO Storage System Operator 
UIOLI Use-it-or-lose-it 
TAG Trans-Austrian-Gasleitung (high pressure pipeline that crosses 
Austria) 
TENs-E Trans-European energy networks 
TPA Third Party Access 
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TSC Transmission Service Conditions (used by Dutch transmission 
system operator) 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
TTF (Gas) Title Transfer Facility (The Netherlands) 
Thyssengas German gas company owned by RWE 
(<http: //www. thyssengas. de>) 
VIK Verband der Industrielen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (German 
association for large industrial energy users) 
Wingas German gas company (<http: //www. wingas. de>) 
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Chapter A: Introduction 
European Union and Member State policy and legislation for the creation of a 
harmonised, liberalised, secure and single EU gas market is one of the fields in which 
there have been major and persistent conflicts of interest between the European 
Commission, Member Governments and the European gas industry. In this context the 
role of EU Member Countries and former national incumbent' has always been very 
strong and dominant. This is due to the fact that gas - as one of the most important 
energy sources in the EU - has significant impacts on local and national governments, 
industry, consumers and the environment. 
The following paragraphs of this chapter will firstly summarise the EU legislation and 
policy process for the creation of a liberalised, harmonised and secure EU gas market. 
Following this discussion it will analyse the challenges facing EU gas markets. 
Finally, the thesis will lay a `roadmap' for the subsequent chapters by outlining what 
needs to be done to reduce the current risks associated with creating such a market 
structure as well as illustrating how the overall research question of this thesis will be 
addressed. 
1 `Incumbents' are companies holding a monopolistic position prior to and often after market 
liberalisation. 
20 
ChapterA - Introduction 
I. EU legislation and policy to create a single, liberalised, harmonised 
and secure EU gas market - current state of the market 
A harmonised and liberalised European gas market began to emerge in 1996 with the 
adoption of the first electricity Directive, followed by the First Gas Directive in 1998 2 
This first EU energy legislation "package" had a number of aims, including liberalising 
and harmonising the energy sector, increasing overall interoperability of EU energy 
networks, reducing energy costs to consumers, improving energy efficiency and 
security of supply, and increasing employment within the energy industry. These 
objectives formed part of the wider aim of increasing the overall competitiveness of the 
European Union economy and also to increase overall security of supply. As a result of 
the EU energy Directives the majority of EU Member States changed their national 
energy legislation in order to meet EU policy objectives. 
In the process of implementing and adopting the first EU energy legislation "package" it 
became apparent that more detailed market rules needed to be developed at EU level in 
order to create a real cohesive EU gas and electricity market. This referred in particular 
to tariffs and cross border issues. In this respect the Commission stated3 "In order to 
create a fully functioning market it is also necessary to promote the development [... ] of 
common technical and commercial standards regarding electricity and gas networks, 
and common trading rules and systems. " The EU Commission therefore initiated, 
together with the energy industry, network users and energy consumer associations the 
`Florence Forum' for electricity issues in 1998 and the `Madrid Forum' for gas related 
issues in 1999. Since then both Forums have met at least once a year. 
The objectives of the Madrid Gas Forum were the "exchange of experience concerning 
the establishment for a competitive internal market of natural gas" and also "to provide 
2 Directive 96/92/EC (OJL 147/37) concerning a common market in electricity. Followed by Directive 
98/30/EC (OJL 204/1) concerning a common market in natural gas. 
3 European Parliament on the development of Energy Policy for the enlarged European Union, its 
neighbors and partner countries, 13 May 2003, COM (2003) 262 final, p. 22. 
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voluntary [gas market] guidelines. "4 In this context it was argueds that the introduction 
of the Forum meant in practice that the Commission pursues a dual-track strategy. "On 
the one hand, the [Madrid] Forum, on the basis of professional expertise and 
stakeholder involvement, informally develops the rules necessary for an integrated 
energy market. On the other hand, if the consensus-based Forum engine should splutter 
or compliance becomes a problem the Commission can" use other legislative 
instruments in order to achieve its objectives. 6 
Even though these efforts and strategies were pursued, the first two EU Commission's 
benchmark reports? on the implementation of the first electricity and gas Directives8 
illustrated that there had been improvements within the EU energy markets towards 
achieving the aforementioned EU policies but that there had also been significant 
shortfalls - particularly in the gas markets. Although many Member States had 
theoretically either fully or partially opened their national gas markets to competition 
there was little or no effective competition. Efforts made toward creating the 
harmonised, single EU energy market were also minor. 
These continuing shortfalls were recognised by the EU Commission, European Council, 
European Parliament and Member State Governments. During the 2000 Lisbon 
European Council meeting9, and the 2002 Barcelona European Council meeting1°, it 
4 Conclusions of the Ist meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, September 30th and 
October V, 1999, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. l. 
5 Eberlein, B., Regulation by Cooperation: The 'Third Way' in making Rules for the Internal Energy 
Market, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New 
Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 79. 
6 Ibid. 
7 European Commission, First report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market, 3 
December 2001, SEC (2001)1957; European Commission, Second Benchmarking Report on the 
implementation of the internal electricity and gas market, 2 October 2002, SEC (2002) 1038. 
8 The Electricity and Gas Directives require the EU Commission to produce a benchmark report on their 
implementation. 
9Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000, No. 17, 
<http: //www. bolonga-berlin2003. de/pdf/PRES IDENCYCONCLUSIONS 
_Lissabon. 
pdf>. 
10 European Council - Presidency Conclusion, Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 March 2002, Part. 
I No. 36-38, Part III. No. 27 
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was emphasised that far more needed to be done to fully liberalise the EU power and 
gas markets. 
As one of the steps toward improving overall competitiveness of Europe's gas market, 
the 5th Madrid Forum adopted the first non-legally binding voluntary "Guidelines for 
Good Third Party Access Practice" (GGP I) in 2002.11 The GGP I dealt with more 
precise gas market rules, which were not covered by the first Gas Market Directive. 
However, a particular shortfall was still recognised in the compliance with the GGP I12 
and led the EU legislators to discuss further legislation. 13 
Following these revelations and debates new EU energy legislation on full market 
opening and harmonisation has been passed and is due to be incorporated by Member 
States. The core legislation includes the 2003 second electricity and gas Directives 
("second package"), which were implemented by Member States in July 2004.14 The 
new legislation is focused on achieving a fully liberalised, competitive, harmonised and 
single electricity and gas market across the whole EU - as envisaged by EU energy 
policy - by July 2007. 
Although these initiatives were taken, the 2004 EU Commission benchmark report on 
the implementation of the Directives highlighted - particularly in the EU gas markets - 
11 The first version of the Guidelines of Good Third Party Access Practice (GGP) were adopted during the 
5`h European Regulatory Forum, see Conclusions of the 5th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory 
Forum, Madrid, 7-8 February 2002, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>; the most recent version of the GGP can be 
found in the Annex of the Conclusions of the 7'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, 
Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
12 European Commission, Guidelines for good practice - gas TPA - compliance overview, prepared by 
DGTREN of the European Commission for discussion at the 6th meeting of the Madrid Forum on 30-31 
October 2002,1' draft of 12 September 2002 - for discussion at Madrid Forum JWG meeting 20 
September and subsequent completion, p. 3. 
13 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning rules for the internal markets in electricity and 
natural gas, 13 March 2001, COM (2001) 125 final; European Commission, Amended proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC 
concerning rules for the internal markets in electricity and natural gas, 7 June 2002, COM (2002) 304 
final. 
14 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC; Directive 
2003/55/EC (OJL 176/57) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC. 
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that little improvements towards the creation of a competitive and single EU energy 
market had been achieved. 15 
Further attempts to improve the gas market conditions were undertaken. In July 2004 
the 7th Madrid Forum passed a revised version of the "Guidelines for Good Third Party 
Access Practice" (GGP II), which include more detailed and precise rules on the 
harmonisation of tariffs and cross border transportation procedures inter alia. '6 
However, it soon became apparent that some participants in the Madrid Forum were not 
willing to implement and obey the GGP I and II, which led then to the adoption of the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to 
the gas transmission networks in the summer of 2005.17 The new regulation accepted 
some core elements of the GGPs. 18 
Although some improvements have been made toward the required aims in Europe's 
power markets, considerable shortfalls still remain in gas markets. The fourth EU 
Commission Benchmark report 19 on the implementation of the second gas and power 
Directives again identifies numerous shortfalls in the gas market arena. Inter alia, it 
states "gas markets remain subject to significant rigidities in many cases, usually as a 
result of the continuing lack of integration between national markets. °'2° It highlights 
further that there are still a number of significant differences between Member States' 
energy market laws, regulation, structures and policy strategies. 21 
15 European Commission, Third Benchmarking Report on the implementation of the internal electricity 
and gas market, 01. March 2004. 
16 Conclusions of the 7'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. p. 6. 
17 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the gas 
transmission networks, COM(2003) 741 final, 2003/0302 (COD), 2005. 
18 This survey will analyse in more detail the different sections of the new regulation in Chapter C. As far 
as electricity is concerned the European Parliament and the Council adopted, in some respects, similar 
regulation for cross-border electricity issues; see Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity (OJL 176/1). Nevertheless this survey will also analyse this legislation in Chapter 
C. 
19 European Commission, Report from the Commission, annual report on the Implementation of the Gas 
and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863 final, SEC(2004) 1720, Brussels, 5. January 2005. 
20 European Commission, Report from the Commission, annual report on the Implementation of the Gas 
and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863 final, SEC(2004) 1720, Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 8. 
21 Ibid. 
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There is limited or no competition in many Member States, which is based on the fact 
that "gas markets remain very concentrated at the national level and this forms a severe 
obstacle to the development of competition and an open market. "ZZ 
Many Member States - in particular two of the largest Member States France and 
Germany - had failed to fully implement the second Gas and Electricity Directives by 
2004. These significant shortfalls in the implementation process mean, from the 
Commission's point of view, that the goals of the internal energy market Directives 
could be missed and other market obstacles could arise or already exist. 23 These views 
were also mirrored in the fifth EU Benchmark report 24, published in 2005. It states inter 
alia "The most important persistent shortcoming is the lack of integration between 
national markets. [... ] Sufficient cross-border competition has not yet developed [... ]. " 
Furthermore, most specific problems in implementation of the Directives and the EU 
gas liberalisation endeavours remain in the following areas: 
- Unbundling25: As energy network facilities are subject to monopoly activities 
there is an obvious conflict of interest if a network company owns a network 
that its competitors have to use. During the Madrid Gas Regulatory Forum 
debate26, it was further expressed that "a clearer separation of the functions of 
[... ] transmission system operation of integrated companies would be necessary 
[for] a fully functioning internal [gas] market. " 
This survey fully agrees with the above comments and believes that without 
coherent implementation and enforcement of the unbundling provisions those 
22 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 35. 
23 Ibid., Conclusions of the 6'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 30-31 October 
2002, p. 1, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>; Dow Jones & Reuters, EU/Energy: Commission urges Member 
States to do more to open energy markets, 11 January 2005, 
<http: //global. factiva. com/en/arch/print-results. asp>. 
24 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, November 2005; 
European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, SEC(2005), 30 September 
2005. 
25 For more detailed analysis and explanation of the issue of balancing see C 11.2. b). 26 Conclusions of the 3rd meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 26-27 October 2000, 
p. 2, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
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companies that are not obliged to fully unbundle and do not operate on a 
transparent basis, have competitive advantages and continue to be able to cross- 
subsidise their operations. The latest OECD report on Germany highlights in 
particular the cross-subsidisation aspect in a large integrated company as a major 
factor for the delay in competition in the German energy market. 7 
Further disadvantages can be seen in not strictly unbundled companies that do 
not have so-called "Chinese walls"28, where they exchange crucial market data 
information, which is not accessible to third parties. 
However, the 2005 EU benchmark report 29 stresses, "that significant progress 
still remains to be made for full compliance with the provisions of the 
Directives. " This is from the Commission's point of view particularly true for 
the gas sector where "Member States [... ] appear unwilling to implement legal 
unbundling of distribution companies at this stage. "30 Therefore persistent doubt 
remains as to whether fair and non-discriminatory third party access can be 
ensured. 
- Network access31: Europe's energy networks are subject to monopoly activities. 
In order to create a competitive energy network third parties need to access the 
networks on a cost-reflective32, fair and transparent basis. This represents an 
underlying principle and decisive factor for the creation of a harmonised and 
competitive EU energy market. In this respect the benchmark report also 
highlights that it is essential for regulatory authorities to ensure "network 
operators do not earn excessive profits" and "that network access charges are 
27 OECD, OECD-Prüfungen im Bereich Regulierungsreform, Deutschland, Konsolidierung der 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Erneuerung, Paris 2004, p. 166. 
28 The term `Chinese walls' is defined as "a mechanism for the separation of transmission from supply 
and other functions within a vertically-integrated undertaking to preserve the confidentiality of 
commercially sensitive information obtained by a system operator when carrying out its business, 
especially with respect to taking decisions on network access. " See Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 526. 
29European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 26. 
30 Ibid. 
31 For more information and analysis on the issue of network access see C 11 2. d). 
32 `Cost-reflective' means that transmission system operators are obliged to set tariffs that reflect 
efficiently incurred costs of network operation rather than costs actually incurred. 
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cost reflective and do not contain hidden cross subsidies, which would 
discriminate against third parties. 33 
In both the electricity and gas sector it is stated34 that network tariffs "show a 
significant degree of divergence" and that "Member States appear to have 
[costly] network tariffs significantly above the average. " It is also said35, "the 
lack of coherence between the charging structures of individual transmission 
system operators has also prevented competition. " 
- Trends in wholesale energy markets: A key factor to harmonised, liberalised and 
competitive energy markets is the access to liquid markets. Successful 
competitive in retail markets must allow all market participants to have access to 
liquid wholesale energy markets as well as access to transportation facilities. 
The Commission's benchmark report indicates36 that some progress has been 
made in the electricity wholesale market but "due to the very unfavourable 
market structure" there has been slow progress in the gas sector, which has 
stopped new entrants from entering the market and making the necessary 
investments to enhance competition. It is further said37, in the gas sector 
"considerable regulatory barriers [remain] which are retarding unnecessarily the 
development of the European gas market. " 
"European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 26. 
34 Ibid., p. 10,26 
3s European Commission, Report form the Commission, Annual Report on the Implementation of the Gas 
and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863 final, Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 7. 
36 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 33. 
37 Ibid., p. 35 
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- Balancing38: The EU Commission's benchmark report points out39, "balancing 
rules are one of the most important aspects of whether granted third party access 
is effectively non-discriminatory and whether a given market/region offers 
realistic opportunities for market participants. " Although there has been good 
progress in the electricity sector there are substantial differences in Europe's 
electricity and gas balancing rules, which are set by national transmission and 
distribution system operators 40 
- High degree of market concentration: Before market liberalisation 
measurements were introduced, all of the EU energy markets were subject to 
monopolistic or oligopolistic industry structures and therefore subject to high 
degrees of market concentration. In this context the EU benchmark report41 
states, "The introduction of competition at an EU level was intended to put an 
end to this situation by exposing companies to EU-wide competition. This has 
not yet been achieved in most markets. Concentration in many markets remains 
high and industry has been further consolidating since market opening started. In 
the case of gas, there is still a lack of liquidity in the market, largely to the 
limited access to gas supplies for new entrants as well as the limited scope for 
moving gas around the European network. [... ] In addition to the high level of 
concentration in national markets, an increasing number of cross-border 
acquisitions can be observed. " 
- Lack of cooperation between national regulatory authorities: There are - as will 
be discussed later on in this thesis - many attempts to coordinate and provide 
incentives for national regulatory authorities to cooperate. Nevertheless, it is 
39'Balancing' means the process of physically regulating quantities of gas in a pipeline system by making 
injections to or withdrawals from the system equal to a predetermined volume. Balancing may be 
required on an hourly, daily, monthly or seasonal basis, with penalties often imposed on shippers not 
operating within the required balancing thresholds. For more information and analysis on the issue of 
balancing, see C 11.2. d) aa) (iv) and 111.2. e). 
39 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from the 
Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 29. 
40 Ibid., p. 28. 
41 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, November 2005, p. 6. 
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inter alia argued42 that "National regulators are bound by national frameworks 
of duties and powers. " It is further argued43 that there is often insufficient 
cooperation between national regulatory authorities, which would be essential in 
the current state of market liberalisation and harmonisation. 
These shortfalls in the implementation process led the Commission to express concern 
that the goals of the internal energy market Directives could remain unfulfilled and 
other market obstacles could arise, or already exist. 44 The benchmark report concludes 
by observing45, , one thing that is certain is that in the new global environment of higher 
primary energy prices it is more important than ever for the Community to live up to its 
commitment to a competitive market. " 
This survey agrees with the Commission's remarks and with the aforementioned 
commentators that the resistance of Member States to implementing the Directive in the 
same way will result in a market with less competition and market integration that will 
have also consequences for the overall security of supply situation across the EU gas 
markets. 
Therefore this survey concludes that different implementation policies in Member 
States have created a risk to the creation of a single, harmonised, liberalised and secure 
European Gas Market. 
However, the ]0`h Madrid Forum46 "stressed the need for consolidating the rapid 
progress following the implementation of Directive 2003/55/EC on a broad range of 
issues relating to the creation and operation of a fully operational and integrated internal 
42 NMa, Annual Report of The Netherlands Office of Energy Regulation (DTe) to the European 
Commission, 10 August 2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org>, p. 3. 
43 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Roadmap for a competitive single gas 
market in Europe, An ERGEG Discussion Paper for Public Consultation, 21 November 2005, 
<http: //www. ergeg. org/>. 
44 Dow Jones & Reuters, EU/Energy: Commission urges Member States to do more to open energy 
markets, 11 January 2005, <http: //global. factiva. com/en/arch/print_results. asp>. 
as European Commission, Report form the Commission, Annual Report on the Implementation of the Gas 
and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863 final, Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 10. 
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gas market. " It was also highlighted47 by some Forum participants of the Forum "that 
there is a strong need to accelerate the progress in developing a competitive European 
gas market [... ]. " There was also "emphasised the need for strict and accurate 
implementation of the existing legislative framework, where non-discriminatory and 
third party access to the network is key. " 48 
The 2006 Commissions Green Paper49 also identifies that the the EU needs to complete 
the internal gas and electricity markets that also gurantees security of supply. 
The 2006 Brussels European Council Conclusions50 took a similar stance and stressed 
that there is a greater need for co-operation among EU Member States when it comes to 
energy policy, particularly regarding the liberalisation, harmonisation and improved 
security of supply situation across the EU. 51 It was inter alia stressed52 that EU Member 
States should ensure "full, effective and transparent implementation of existing 
legislation. This implementation should be in line with public service obligations, 
ensuring that liberalisation is also beneficial in terms of affordable access to energy. " 
Nevertheless the aforementioned 2006 Brussels Conclusions are often not precise 
enough as to how the overall implementation process of the Directive and co-operation 
amongst Member States can be improved in order to speed up the overall liberlaisation 
and harmonisation process as well as provide enhanced security of supply standards 
across the EU-nations. 
46 Conclusions of the 10th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 15-16 September 
2005, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 1 
47 Ibid., p. 2. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, COM(2006) 105 final, Brussels, 8.3.2006, p. 12. 
so Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 23/24 March 2006,7775/06, Brussels, 24 
March 2006. 
51 See also BBC News, EU agrees to energy co-operation, 24 March 2006 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/business/4839950. stm>. 
52 Ibid., p. 31. 
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II. Challenges and risks for not fully liberalised and non-harmonised 
EU gas markets 
The question of why the EU needs a harmonised and liberalised gas market is very 
much connected to the current and future challenges and risks that EU gas markets are 
facing due to the changing regulatory and industrial structure. 
In this context it is frequently argued53 that the EU is confronted with several risks, 
which have a substantial influence on further liberalisation and structural development 
within all European gas markets and which further impact on industry and society as a 
whole. 54 In this respect the next section will discuss the following risks and challenges: 
- The risk of gas supply dependency from non-EU countries 
- The risks of possible physical supply interruptions 
- The risks of physical shortages due to limited availability of pipeline capacities 
- The risk of gas price volatility 
- The problems of network interoperability. 
1. The high risk of gas dependence within the EU - The current and future 
situation of the role of gas as a main energy source for the European Union 
Currently, the EU economy is mainly dependent upon fossil fuels, which represent four- 
fifths of an energy consumption; two-thirds of these fuels comes from non-EU 
countries. 55 In this respect the future dependency on gas for the EU and its Member 
States is subject to much speculation and debate. 
53 See for instance Stem, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - The impact of import dependence 
and liberalisation, July 2002, p. 12-15. 
54 See on the social impacts: Egenhofer, C. et a!, Market-based Options for Security of Energy Supply - 
Summary and Conclusions, INDES Working Papers, No. 1, March 2004, <http: //www. ceps. be>, p. 18-20. 
55 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, The internal market in energy: Coordinated measures on the security of energy supply, 
COM(2002) 488 final, 6-7; see also Cornot-Gandolphe, S., Natural Gas supply and demand in Europe - 
the importance and changing nature offlexibility, ZfE 27 (2003), p. 100-102. 
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It is forecasted that gas vulnerability and dependency will become more critical in the 
future due to rising energy imports, set to increase to 70% of total requirement in 30 
years'; or even up to 90% for oil, if nothing is done to reverse this trend. 56 Natural gas is 
already seen as the main energy source for the future. 57 This applies in particular to the 
generation of electrical power within many EU Member States. 58 The reasons for this 
preference are based on the following factors: 
- Although some Member States such as the UK are debating59 whether or not to 
continue using, or expanding the use, the role of nuclear energy as one of the 
main sources for the production of electricity, several Member States or their 
citizens60 are critical about the continued use of nuclear power. Therefore the 
future role of this energy source remains far from clear and therefore subject to 
significant regulatory risk. 61 
This aside some Member States have already decided to phase out of nuclear 
energy. 62 
State aid for hard and brown coal63 could potentially terminate within the next 
20 years. 64 
56 Ibid. 
57 Adolf, J., Erdgas: Energieträger des 21. Jahrhunderts - Schlussfolgerungen für die deutsche 
Energiepolitik, ZfE 29 (2005) 3, p. 181. 
5B Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Final report on the 
Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply", COM(2002) 321 final, 
p. 40-41; lEA, Security of Gas Supply in open Markets, LNG, Power at a Turning Point, p. 119; 
IIandelsblatt, Energiewirtschaft setzt stärker auf Erdgas, 16. /17. Januar 2004. 
59 Dti, Energy Review -A secure and clean energy fu' ture, 29 November 2005, 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/energy-reviewýress_notice. pdf>. 
60 After the announcement that the British Government was considering expanding the role of nuclear 
power, strong concerns were voiced by the British public; see for instance: BBC News, Nuclear protest 
hits Blair speech, 29 November 2005, <http: //news. bbc. co. uk>; BBC News, Poll shows opposition to 
nuclear power, 16 May 2005, <http: //www. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/programmes/newsnight/4552177. stm>. 
61 See for instance Dow Jones, E. ONsees new UK nuclearpowerjar in the future, 23 August 2005. 
62 Germany has announced plans to phase out nuclear energy by 2020-2025; see the German Government 
decision to phase out of nuclear power by 2020, see Bundesregierung, Vereinbarung zwischen der 
Bundesregierung und den Energieversorgungsunternehmen vom 14. Juni 2000, 
<http: //www. bundesregierung. de>. 
63 Also known as `lignite'. 
64Dickel, R., International Energy Agency, The global position of coal 2000-2030 - some results of WEO 
2002, November 2002, <http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>; see also Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, Wir können Kohle ohne Staatshilfe fördern, 12 June 2005; Welt, Subventionsabbau 
kommt kaum voran, 18 August 2005. 
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- Apart from this, the benefits from renewable projects such as wind power, that 
were designed to increase energy independence and to reduce the carbon 
emissions substantially for some Member States, now seem dubious. Recent 
reports in Germany have shown that wind energy is too expensive and the cost 
disproportionate to the energy savings made. Additionally, the carbon emission 
reduction is seen as being of minimal benefit given that similar environmental 
results can be achieved at far lower costs by, for instance, upgrading existing gas 
fired power stations. 65 Also other environmental implications of wind farms are 
still subject to many problems. 66 Nevertheless power generation from wind 
turbines remains an important strategy to overcome climate change problems 
and has partly been in success in countries like the UK. 67 However, overall it is 
unrealistic to expect that the total electricity generation requirement within the 
EU Member States can be met by wind or other renewable energy sources, based 
on the fact that renewables are not always available when needed. Therefore gas 
will be even more important. 
This in particular because gas also has lower greenhouse emissions level than oil 
and coal, which helps Member States to reduce their emissions as agreed under 
the Kyoto Protocol. 68 
Forecasts on the needed future of gas supplies reflect these aspects above already. 69 
What is problematic is that these future gas requirements have to be met by imports 
65 Deutsche Energie-Agentur (dena), Energiewirtschaftliche Planung für die Netzintegration von 
Windenergie in Deutschland an Land und Offshore bis zum Jahre 2020, Berlin 23. February 2005; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Weiter Wirbel um die Windenergie, 25. Februar 2005. 
66 See for instance: Focus, Rotierende Schwerter, 23/2005, p. 98. 
67 See for instance: Financial Times, Biggest wind farm could power one in four London homes, 8 June 
2005; The Guardian, Wind power 'a must'to beat climate change, 19 May 2005, 
<http: //www. guardian. co. uk/renewable>. 
68 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, September 2002. The text and 
the status of ratification can be found under <http: //www. unfccc. de>; for an analysis of the Koyoto 
Protocol Mechanism with respect to emissions savings, see Vrolijk, C., ed., Climate Change and Power - 
Economic Instruments for European Electricity, p. 16 following. 
69 See International Energy Agency, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets - LNG and Power at a 
turning point, OECD/IEA, 2004, p. 120. 
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from non-EU countries because the EU does not have sufficient gas reserves. 70 Some 
argue that gas from these sources is easily accessible by the EU. 71 Furthermore, it is 
argued that gas reserves are more widespread around the world and therefore provide 
more flexibility, diversity and accessibility than oil does. 72 
These arguments are difficult to support since many gas-producing countries have 
relative volatile political environments. 73 Transportation from these sources is often 
problematic. The gas is transported via gas pipeline routes that cross several borders. In 
some cases the pipeline routes have either limited capacities or pass through politically 
unstable terrain. However, the issue of gas transportation interruptions - including the 
January 2006 transmission gas supply suspension between Russia and the Ukraine will 
be subject to detailed analysis in the subsequent paragraph as well as Chapter B. 
It is further argued that the current and future gas availability to the EU will not meet 
their growing demand. 74 As briefly mentioned before, this argument is mainly based on 
the fact that the existing pipeline capacities are not sufficient to meet future demand. 75 
The EU is competing with other consumer markets over the access to these gas 
resources. This is particularly true of the access to liquefied natural gas sources (LNG) 
because its transportation is more flexible than natural gas, and can be transported by 
existing shipping methods and not pipelines. 76 
In conclusion, the points made above on the overall gas dependency within the EU, it 
must be stated that Europe will be the largest gas market in the world in the next 15 
70 Ibid., p. 122,123. 
71 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Final report - 
Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply", Technical Paper 
COM(2002) 321 final, p. 27. 
72 Steeg, H., Risiken in der Energieversorgungssicherheit - Ursachen und Strategien zu ihrer Minderung, 
RdE 9/2002 p. 239. 
73 For instance the current crisis surrounding the Russian Oil Company Yukos and its battle with the 
Russian government illustrate the instability of the Russian energy market, see for instance: Argus - 
Power in Europe, What ifRussia cut exports?, Vol. IV, 9,20 May 2004, p. 1; the political risks that are 
connected to gas supply risks will be also subject of subsequent sections of this chapter. 
74 Butler, N., Energy Security: A new Agenda for Europe, October/November 2004 - CER Bulletin, Issue 
38, p. 1, <http: //www. cer. org. uk>. 
75 For further information on the pipeline availability see the subsequent paragraph. 
76 Seeliger, A., Die Europäische Erdgasversorgung im Mandel, EWI Working Paper Nr. 04-2, February 
2004, p. 15. 
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years and that gas demand must be met by significant imports from non-EU countries, 
which involve uncertainty and risks for all parties involved.?? These potential supply 
risks will be the subject of the following paragraphs. 
2. The risk of possible physical gas supply interruptions 
The most recent78 gas supply interruptions that threatened EU security of gas supplies 
took place in Belgium and on the transportation route between Russia and the EU79. 
Both incidents had economic and social implications within the EU and highlighted 
some of the structural weaknesses of Europe's gas markets raising many questions and 
fears among EU Member States. 80 These concerns arose not only because Europe's gas 
markets are dependent on each other, but also because gas markets are not fully 
liberalised and harmonised and because fully secure energy markets are based on many 
different factors. 81 
Particularly Russia's decision to suspend transmission of gas to the Ukraine, which then 
had a knock-on effect on EU gas markets such as Germany, served as proof that greater 
cooperation amongst Member States is necessary to improve internal security of supply 
standards which should go alongside the liberalisation and harmonisation process. 
77 The International Energy Agency for instance has warned Germany not rely too much on gas supplies 
from Russia, see Platts, Germany: IEA warns German against reliance on Russian gas, EU Energy, Issue 
96,3 December 2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
78 Le Monde, Dix-sept morts, don't trois Francais, dan V explosion d'un gadoduc en Belgique, 
31.07.2004, <http: //www. lemonde. fr>; Fluxys, Press release - Information complementaire sur base de 
la conference de presse du 31 juillet 2004 concernant /'accident de Ghislenghien, 01. August 2004, 
<http. www. fluxys. net>, The Heren Report, Explosion on Belgium to France transit pipelines leaves 
several dead, ESGM 10.147, p. 9; The Heren Report, Belgian explosion coincided with increase in 
Finepipe volumes - Fluxys, ESGM 10.148, p. 9; BBC News, EU seeks to solve Russia gas row, 3 January 
2006, <http: //newsvote. bbc. co. uk/>. 
79 Andris Piebalgs, EU Energy Commissioner, Speaking Notes welcoming the agreement between 
Gazprom and Naftogaz, Brussels, 4 January 2006, <http: //europa. eu. int/>; Euracative, Gas crisis resolved 
but lack of EU energy policy remains problem, 4 January 2006, 
<http: //www. euractiv. com/Article? tcmuri=tcm: 29-151227-16&type=News>; BBC News, EU seeks to 
solve Russia gas row, 3 January 2006, <http: //newsvote. bbc. co. uk/>. 
80 Ibid. As a result of the Belgium blast the Dutch Government reviewed their security of supply situation 
and concluded that the system for exchanging information on work which may affect underground 
pipelines and cables is not working well, see Platts, The Netherlands: Blast prompts review of 
underground transmission systems, EU Energy, Issue 96,3 December 2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
81 See Appendix 2: Structure of security of supply. 
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Taking into account overall import needs and the forecasts of future gas requirements 
from non-EU countries, you could argue that at this stage the EU gas and oil industry 
and therefore overall EU industry and society are susceptible to major physical supply 
interruptions. This argument could inter alia be based on the aforementioned supply 
suspension between Russia and the Ukraine. 
On the other hand, it is claimed82 that the EU has never really experienced a major gas 
interruption. 
The latter claim is questionable since the EU has experienced numerous interruptions 83 
although these interruptions never caused major market disruptions. It is not known or 
proven whether serious gas pipeline interruptions were avoided because of the co- 
operation between Member States' transmission system operators. Also, the oil crisis in 
197384 and gas supply incidents between 1980 and 2001,85 recent gas flow interruptions 
between Russia and Germany because of political turmoil between Belarus, Ukraine and 
Russia or other political reasons, 86 an explosion in an Algerian LNG terminal87 or the 
pipeline explosion in Belgium88 illustrate the vulnerability of EU energy markets as 
well as what impact energy interruption could mean for Europe's economy and society. 
Further to this the newly emerging threat of terrorism has to be recognised and is seen 
as a serious potential threat to European gas supplies. 89 
82 Luciani, G., Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets - What is it and what is it not?, p. 3, 
<http: //www. ceps. be>. 
83 See for instance Stem, J., UK gas security: time to get serious, Energy Policy 32 (2004), p. 1973-1974; 
NERA, Security in Gas and Electricity Markets, Final Report for the Department of Trade and Industry, 
21 October 2002, p. 81/82. 
84 See The Economist, Still holding customers over a barrel, Special report OPEC, October 25`h 2003, p. 
85; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The internal 
market in energy: Coordinated measures on the security of energy supply, see supra note, p. 7. 
85 Stem, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - The impact of import dependence and 
liberalisation, July 2002, p. 16; Eurogas, Security of Supply of Natural Gas in Western Europe, December 
1997, p. 16-17; Ofgem, Security of supply April to September 2003 - Six month retrospective report, 
February 2004, p. 23, <http: //www. ofgem. co. uk>. 
86 BBC News, EU seeks to solve Russia gas row, 3 January 2006, <http: //newsvote. bbc. co. uk/>; Dow 
Jones, Naftogaz Ukrainy stoppt Gasexporte nach Deutschland, 07 September 2005; Ileren Energy, 
Russian Gazprom stops flows to Belarus, European Gas Markets Issue 11.02.2,27 February 2004, p. 1,6, 
<http//: www. heren. com>. 
87 Platts, Algerian LNG blast kills 27, slashes export, International Gas Report, Issue 492,30. January 
2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
88 See for more information below. 
89 See below discussion about security supply in the German Gas market. 
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It is argued that the political instability in some of the gas producing countries raises 
some security of supply concerns. 90 
Others oppose this and argue91 the likelihood of supply interruptions because of 
political instability in some producing countries is limited. The main reason for this 
argument lies in the revenue dependence of gas exporting countries such as Russia and 
Algeria. 
The latter argument is valid but the likelihood of interruptions because of operational 
and political threats still remains. The aforementioned supply crisis and the current 
developments surrounding the Russian oil company Yukos and the largest gas company 
of the world, Gazprom of Russia, demonstrate how much some oil and gas producing 
countries wish to be in control of their national energy companies. They are also not too 
concerned about threatening to freeze their assets or stopping gas flows to EU gas 
markets. 92 
Additionally, the recent explosion of the gas pipeline in Belgium proved that 
operational problems could occur at any time, even if they are not politically driven. 
Taking all these aspects into consideration, the physical risk of supply interruptions 
remain, which - as will be discussed later on - need to be dealt with at EU-level. 
90 Seeliger, A., Die Europäische Erdgasversorgung im Wandel, EWI Working Paper Nr, 04-2, February 
2004, p. 19-20; Finacial Times Deutschland, Risiken für die Energieversorgung wachsen, 27. October 
2004, p. 15. 
91 Stern, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - The impact of import dependence and 
liberalisation, July 2002, p. 18-19. 
92Financial Times, Gazprom to bid for production unit of Yukos, December 1,2004; Financial Times, 
Deutsche Bank advises Gazprom to take oil companies into state control, 30. November 2004; 
Handelsblatt, Yukos kündigt Drosselung der Fördermengen an, 2. September 2004; The Heren Report, 
Ukraine proposes transit hige, EGM 12.03.2,31 March 2005; see also Dow Jones, Naftogaz Ukrainy 
stoppt Gasexporte nach Deutschland, 07 September 2005. 
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3. The risk of physical shortage due to limited available pipeline capacity 
The rise in future gas demand also raises the question whether there is enough gas 
network capacity to meet this need. 
In this context it is already argued that the increase in gas demand in the coming years 
will make further investment in the EU and Non-EU pipeline network absolutely 
necessary. 93 It is further questioned whether there is enough pipeline volume available 
to allow third party pipeline access and competition to develop. 94 
However, it must be noted that many pipeline extensions and new construction projects 
are underway, 95 which could overcome the concerns raised. Moreover further pipeline 
projects have been planned but not yet executed. 96 It remains questionable whether 
these new gas network facilities will meet the future gas demand. 97 This point of view is 
supported by others98 who claim that congestion as well as security of supply issues are 
significant. This aside, it is also questionable whether some of the new pipeline 
construction will be executed because of political differences between some of the gas 
producing countries such as Iran and Western Nations. 99 
93 Seeliger, A., Die Europäische Erdgasversorgung im Wandel, EWI Working Paper Nr, 04-2, February 
2004, p. 11; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Final 
report on the Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply", COM(2002) 
321 final, p. 41. 
94 See for an overview of this view Moen, K. B.; The Gas Directive and Third Party Transport rights - 
TVhat Pipeline Volumes are Available?, JENRL 21/2004, p. 49-84. 
95 For instance Gasunie announced to plans to build a new interconnector between The Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom (the so-called BBL-Line), see Gasunie, BBL Pipeline Project, September 18 2003, 
<http: //gasunie. nl/bbl/index. htm>; Eon and Gazprom have signed a memorandum of understanding to 
build a new undersea pipeline (so called North European Gas Pipeline - NEGP) connecting Siberia and 
Germany, see Eon, E. ONand Gazprom deepen business relationship, 8. July 2004, <http: //www. eon- 
ag. com/eon4721062104>; Khaleej Times, Iranian pipeline gas to diversem Europe supply, 24 August 
2004, <http: //www. khaleejtimes. com/DisplayA. rticl. asp? xfile=data/business/2004/business>. Further 
more the Belgium network operation started a market consultation into the expansion of its transit 
capacity through Belgium, see Fluxys, Expansion of transit capacity through Belgium, Information 
Memorandum, June 2005. 
96 Seeliger, A., Die Europaeische Erdgasversorgung im Mandel, EWI Working Paper Nr, 04-2, February 
2004, p. 11-19. 
97 Cayrade, P., Investments in gas pipelines and LNG infrastructure - Which impact on security of 
supply?, Workshop on Insuring against Disruptions of Energy Supply, Amsterdam, 6/7 May 2003. 
98 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Energy Dialogue with Russia - Update on 
progress, SEC(2004) 114, p. 10; European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), Access to Transit Lines, 
September 2004, <http//www. efet. org>. 
99 See for instance Handelsblatt, Pipelineprojekt mit Iran ist in Gefahr, 25 August 2005. 
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The European Parliament and the Council also recognise the necessity of constructing 
new gas networks to meet future gas demand growth and have specifically expressed 
this in their Decision No 1229/2003/EC where numerous gas network projects of 
common interest to Member States are identified. '°° 
Interestingly only a few of these projects are actually planned or under construction. 
This might be inter alia based on the fact that there is no legislation in place that 
directly entitles companies to receive (financial) support for multi-billion Euro 
investments for these much needed gas networks. Only the Second Gas Directive 
2003/55/EC allows - as an investor incentive under Art. 22 - an exemption of third 
party access for new investments in major pipeline infrastructures. This exemption 
provides a certain degree of investment protection for investors. 101 
Further risks still exist for the investor because there is no EU legislation in place to 
oblige existing transmission system operators (TSOs) to connect these new or planned 
infrastructures to their networks. Obviously no company would invest in multi-billion 
Euro gas infrastructure projects if the connection to the existing network were not 
guaranteed. Even if the network connection is assured, questions arise over whether the 
extension of the network could unbalance the entire gas network system. It is unknown 
whether the existing network is capable of balancing or transporting extra volumes from 
new networks. For instance, in the UK the gas network operator - National Grid' 
02 is 
already facing difficulties in connecting new gas facilities to its network, ' 03 which really 
underscore the magnitude of the above problems of connecting new infrastructures with 
`old' ones. 
1°°Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down a series of 
guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision No1254/96/EC, see Appendix for 
projects, p. 25-28; European Commission, Green Paper - Towards a European Strategy for the Security 
of Energy Supply, Technical Paper, p. 61-68. 
101 Further explanation on the exemption clauses in the Gas Directive will be provided in Chapters C and 
D. 
102 National Grid Transco was renamed in 2005 and is now called `National Grid'. 
103 Platts, UK's National Grid fears delays to pipeline build are growing, 5. September 2005. 
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On an EU-wide level there is no legislation in place to deal with this particular matter, 
which could lead to higher operational risks across the European gas networks. 
Taking account of the foregoing, it must be concluded that, on the one hand there is a 
capacity shortage to meet future gas demand while on the other hand there are risks 
involved for those encouraged to provide new investment. 
4. The risk of gas price volatility 
The shortage of available network capacities will have an impact on the overall gas 
price in EU gas markets. Gas demand will be met by the limited capacity available on 
transportation routes, which will have an influence on overall gas prices. 
Another important driver for gas prices in Europe is the world oil price. In Europe the 
majority of gas supply contracts are usually linked (indexed) to the world oil price, i. e. 
if the oil prices rise or fall the gas price will react accordingly. 104 This oil price linkage 
is controversial and is being questioned by many parties. '°5 
Currently, the world oil markets and prices are determined by two main factors: On the 
one hand the decisions of the oil cartel OPEC and on the other hand the political 
developments in the oil producing countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Russia 
and South/North America. 106 Both factors are unpredictable and create a very volatile 
oil price market. This has an immediate knock on effect on gas prices in the European 
gas markets, which for instance, caused numerous price increases in 2004 and 2005.107 
104 For more information on the price linkage between oil and gas see for instance: Däuper, 0., 
Gaspreisbildunp-und europäisches Kartellrecht. p. 2-3,38,53,288; Handelsblatt, Gasversorger läuten 
Preiserhöhungsrunde ein, 27. /28. /29. August 2004; Wirtschafts Woche, Energiepolitik, Vol. 36,26. 
August 2004, Burgenland, Wahrnehmung des Rechungshofes, Teilgebiete der Gebahrung des Landes 
Burgenland, Rechnungshof ZI 001.501/076-E1/04, <http; //www. rechnungshof. gv. at>, p. 16. 
105K1ag, N. D., Die Liberalisierung des Gasmarktes in Deutschland, p. 127; Däuper, 0., supra note, p. 65- 
70. 
106See The Economist, Still holding customers over a barrel, Special report OPEC, 25 October 2003, p. 
85. 
107 See for instance Süddeutsche Zeitung, Allianz der Kassierer, 2. September 2004. 
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Oil and gas producers usually have no desire to change the price linkage of both 
commodities because it usually guarantees a high return, but more importantly it limits 
and avoids both commodities competing more directly with each other. 108 
However, the European Commission109 believes that there is no justification for the 
linkage and believes that both commodities should be disconnected because "the natural 
gas market has little in common with the oil market. " The Commission emphasises 
further that "this cannot happen until a genuinely integrated [EU] internal gas market is 
established which is not restricted to the liberalisation of national markets. " 110 
Apart from this important EU policy, this survey concludes that an essential step to 
remove the linkage with oil prices is that Member States' governments must intervene 
and disconnect both commodity prices. This has partly been enacted in the US and in 
the UK. ' 11 However, it has been only partly successful in these countries because most 
oil producers are often also gas producers and because of the US and UK dependency 
on the world energy markets. Due to these facts, the UK and US were not able to fully 
disconnect their gas market from the oil market. 
If the US and the UK experience difficulties achieving a separation in commodity 
markets so will the EU. Therefore Europe's gas prices will continue to be dependent on 
the volatile world oil prices and this will impact the overall security of supply risk. 
108 Däuper, 0., supra note, p. 2; for more information on the US gas markets and is price mechanisms see 
MacAvoy, P., The Natural Gas Market: Sixty Years of Regulation and Deregulation (Yale University 
Press, 2001), p. 57-75. 
109 European Commission, Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply, 
29 November 2000, COM (2000) 769, p. 44. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Däuper, 0., supra note, p. 37-38. 
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5. Gas network interoperability among Europe's gas networks - theory or reality? 
As mentioned above the European gas market is highly intermeshed. 112 In this respect a 
high degree of interoperability would significantly improve integration, security, 
network safety and in particular market opening. ' 13 However, there are greatly varying 
technical, contractual and communication standards and contractual terms and 
conditions among all European gas networks. 114 These differences refer to many fields 
such as different gas qualities across EU networks, different billing and metering 
standards, different nomination procedures, different definition and units of 
measurements, no existing operational balancing agreements among transmission 
system operators, and different contract conditions, among others. The Madrid Gas 
Regulatory Forum also acknowledged this problem and highlighted the need for further 
efforts in this area. ' 15 
Due to the current limited existence of interoperability among Europe's gas networks, it 
has been argued that these factors present one of the remaining substantial barriers to 
competition and the efficient and safe usage of Europe's gas networks. 116 For instance, 
gas quality issues are identified as posing a restriction on free gas trade at cross-border 
points. 117 
In this respect the European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas 
(EASEE-Gas), which was founded as a result of the Madrid Gas Regulatory Forum in 
2002, has undertaken activities to introduce some harmonisation. "8 These activities 
referred in particular to voluntary common business practices that deal with technical 
1 12 See map Appendix 1: European Gas Market. 
113 See International Energy Agency, Regulatory Reform: European Gas, Energy Market Reform, Paris, 
OECD 2002, p. 21-22. 
114 For a detailed overview of the technical and chemical characteristics of natural gas and natural gas 
transportation see Medici, M., The Natural Gas Industry, p. 60-77 and p. 140-173. 
"Conclusions of the 7'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, p. 5, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
116 See for instance: Conclusions of the 3rd meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 26- 
27 October 2000, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 3. 
117 Conclusions of the 8th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 4-5. 
1 IS European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), Background, 
<http: //www. easee-gas. org/background/>. 
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interoperability issues such as nomination/matching processes and gas quality as well as 
communication protocol. ' 19 
However, as the 8`h Madrid Regulatory Forum points out, there has been only partial 
success of the EASEE-Gas activities since the voluntary business rules have not been 
obeyed or implemented by numerous transmission system operators. This refers in 
particular to the gas quality issue. The Forum stresses in this respect that "in order to 
create a fully operational and integrated gas market, it recommended that the parties 
concerned should implement the necessary measures as soon as possible, with a view to 
moving to harmonised quality specifications at cross-border points. "120 It is further 
argued'2' that Member States should take necessary measures to enable the 
implementation of the EASEE-gas harmonisation proposals. 
Due to the lack of legal validity, it is unlikely that the EASEE-gas harmonisation rules 
will increase EU gas market interoperability. Therefore barriers to gas trade and 
shipping will continue to exist and competition and efficient network use will continue 
to be purely theoretical. 
1 19 See European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), Common Business 
practice - Harmonisation of Units, 27 August 2003, <http: //www. easee-gas. org/>; European Association 
for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), Common Business practice - Harmonisation of 
Natural Gas Quality, 3 February 2005, <http: //www. easee-gas. org/>. 
120 Conclusions of the 8th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 4-5. 
121 European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), Madrid Forum 8/9 
July 2004, <http: //www. easee-gas. org/>. 
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III. What needs to be done? 
To mitigate these risks the introduction of a number of steps are both necessary and 
important. All gas networks between Member States need to be more closely 
harmonised and integrated. This can only be achieved if Member States introduce 
common market rules, laws and regulations for cross border and domestic gas 
transportation and trading. This will then create a harmonised single gas market where 
Member States do not need to rely solely on indigenous production, supply or storage 
capabilities. Such a market will produce synergies in terms of optimising national 
strategic reserve supplies whilst at the same time achieving overall security of gas 
supply. 
Aside from these factors the harmonisation of cross-border and domestic transportation 
and trading rules and laws will bring with it more competition within the EU. At this 
point it is noteworthy that this survey believes that competition means that more than 
the former incumbents compete with each other and that other new market players have 
a real chance to enter the market and to compete with the `old' monopolistic companies. 
Increased competition will result in higher levels of investment that will in turn lead to 
new sources of supply, greater flexibility, potentially lower energy prices and increased 
security of supply. 
IV. Research methodology and question 
This thesis will analyse the current EU gas market to identify what conditions are 
required to create a harmonised, liberalised and secure EU gas market. The benchmark 
for this survey is to develop and propose legislative and policy suggestions that provide 
market tools that will support the creation a more harmonised and liberalised EU gas 
market at the same time considering the different characteristics of the gas markets in 
Member States as well as supporting and improving overall internal EU security of 
supply standards. This thesis is of the opinion that more liberalised and harmonised EU 
gas markets will have positive impact on the internal security of supply situation. 
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The analysis of this thesis will be undertaken with the following research methodology: 
(1. )This survey will first analyse how secure Europe's gas markets are at a time where 
the regulatory and legal structure has changed significantly. Such an analysis is of 
great relevance to this survey as it is often argued that the introduction of energy 
liberalisation has brought considerable risks to overall EU internal security of gas 
supplies. Therefore this thesis will analyse whether this is indeed the case. 
Nevertheless, the thesis analysis will only concentrate on internal EU security of 
supply standards i. e. it will concentrate on the question of can EU security of supply 
be improved while the EU regulatory and legal structure is changing. 
(2. )This study will then analyse the EU rules and laws regarding the harmonisation and 
liberalisation of the European gas markets. The analysis will be done by identifying 
which of the EU Treaties, Directives, decisions of the European Commission and 
EU Energy Papers have contributed to the harmonisation and liberalisation of the 
European gas market or whether these are lacking important aspects. This survey 
will, in particular, analyse the following legislation and voluntary guidelines: 
- EU Treaties; 
- The not fully ratified EU Constitution; 
- Energy Charter Treaty; 
- The Second Gas Directive; 
- Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for 
access to the gas transmission networks; 
and 
- the Madrid Forums' Guidelines for Good Third Party Access Practice and 
the Guidelines for access to storage facilities. 
Apart from this EU legislation this survey will also analyse decisions made by the 
EU Commission, in particular: 
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- the out of court settlement in the so-called "Marathon" procedures; 
- proceedings with regard to destination clauses; 
122 and 
- the 2005 EU Commission sector inquiry. 
This survey will also examine the EU gas roadmap proposals made by the European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas ('ERGEG'). 
This preliminary analysis is important in order to provide an understanding of why 
there are differing levels of harmonisation and liberalisation across different 
Member States gas market's and also why there is a need for further harmonisation. 
(3. )This survey will then examine the different legal and industrial structures of the 
Dutch, German and Austrian gas markets. This country comparison is of particular 
interest because of their importance in Europe's gas markets. 
The Dutch gas market is of special interest to this survey, as it is the only EU 
Member State that is equipped with enough indigenous gas resources (through its 
Groningen field) to be self sufficient in gas, which allows The Netherlands to be a 
significant gas exporter to the northern-western European Gas markets. Besides 
providing liquidity to some of Europe's gas markets, the Dutch gas market is also 
going through significant market structure changes, which - from this survey's point 
of view - could have a marked impact on the future of many EU gas markets. 
The Austrian gas market is an important gas transit country for Italy and Germany. 
Both countries depend on the Austrian gas transit routes as both countries receive 
large gas volumes to meet their gas consumption needs. 
122 During the last 50 years many EU gas suppliers have signed long term contracts with non EU gas 
producers that included so-called `destination clauses'. These clauses contain a contractual obligation on 
the gas purchaser forbidding them to resell the gas outside of its supply territory. At the same time the gas 
seller is obliged to seek the permission of the gas buyer if he wants to re-sell the purchased gas to a third 
party located in his supply territory. For further information see B I. 5. 
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The German gas market is not only of interest to this survey because it is the second 
biggest gas market in Europe and because its entire energy market is by far the 
largest in the EU, but more because of its highly complicated gas industry structure 
and the difficulties in moving towards harmonisation and competition in its 
domestic gas market. The German gas market is also of importance as it is going 
through a considerable change in its national energy legislation, which could have 
significant impact on the overall industry structure. 
Apart from their domestic importance, these three Member States are very 
interconnected and depend on each other but also have widely varying energy 
legislation and industrial structures. At the same time these countries lack proper 
cross-border harmonisation rules as well as lacking competition within the 
individual gas markets themselves and between national markets. The comparative 
study will concentrate on different elements of the three Member States: 
- This survey will first discuss how the Dutch market can act as a non- 
discriminatory, transparent, liquid and efficient gas sourcing point for its 
neighbouring countries. This example aims to illustrate how gas sourcing 
could be managed in some of the EU Member Sates in order to facilitate 
incentives for trade and competition. The study will also examine the recent 
Dutch movements on ownership unbundling in the Dutch energy sector. In 
this context it will be discussed whether these movements could provide a 
positive example for the rest of the European gas market. 
- Following the foregoing analysis the survey will discuss how transit within 
the Austrian Market could be improved in order to provide more market 
based elements to enhance, and to make cross border gas transportation more 
efficient. The outcome will then illustrate how gas transit transportation in 
the rest of the European gas markets could be improved. The survey will 
also examine the development of gas hub and discuss whether the hub could 
have the potential to be one of Europe's leading interconnection points 
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between Eastern and Western Europe, allowing gas sourcing and 
competition to flourish. 
- Finally this study will discuss the question whether the implementation of 
the German energy legislation of July 2005 could exercise more internal gas 
market harmonisation that would benefit competition, security of supply and 
GDP. 
Apart from these aspects this comparative analysis will also demonstrate the current 
difficulties that these Member States and national transmission operators are 
experiencing in implementing existing EU harmonisation laws and market rules. In 
addition, it will show that further steps are necessary in order to create a harmonised 
European gas market and to meet the Commission's energy policy objectives. 
(4. )Finally, the thesis will conclude with a proposed regulatory framework to create a 
more harmonised, liberalised and secure European gas market by presenting a menu 
of options, recommendations and strategies to bring about a single market and allow 
the Commission and Member States to meet the aim of increasing security of supply 
and delivering advanced gas competition and harmonisation within the EU. The 
analysis will include insights from the experiences of other Gas Markets such as the 
United Kingdom so as to provide sound justification and rationales for the 
recommendations. The analysis will be useful for the European Commission, 
Member States, gas companies and other interested groups in order to develop a 
framework for a single gas market and to assist in the preparation of a smooth 
enlargement process. 
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of gas supply in non-harmonised and non- 
competitive European gas markets: The 
dependence on gas supply within EU Member 
States. 
In Chapter A it was highlighted that security of gas supply is an important issue for 
EU energy and gas markets. This became particularly apparent during the 
aforementioned gas transmission suspension from Russia to the Ukraine which also 
had negative impacts on EU gas markets. 123 
Interestingly the debate on security of supply has long been neglected among Member 
States, the Commission, the Energy Industry and other interest groups. 124 But as 
pointed out125 security of supply has to be seen as a sensitive issue that could upset the 
vision of a dramatically expanding and changing European Energy Market. 
126 
Currently, all EU Member States have different approaches to security of gas 
Supply. 127 Until recently Member States did not see a reason to coordinate and 
harmonise their security of supply regimes with each other. This, however, has 
changed in recent years. 
This shift in policy is illustrated by the publication of the Commissions' Green Paper 
on security of supply in 2002,128 the EU-communication paper'29 and the EU- 
123 See Chapter A 11.2. 
124 See for instance: House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, Energy supply: How 
secure are we?, Session 2001-02 14th Report, 12. February 2002, p. 13; European Commission, The 
internal energy market: Improving the security of energy supplies, Memo, 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/energy/home/intemal_market/oil_gas/doc/memo2002_eu. pdf. 
125 Stern, J., Third party access in European Gas Industries - Regulation-driven or Market-led?, p. 17. 
'26 See also Dti, Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS), Fourth report, May 2004, 
<http: //www. ofgem. gove. uk/temp/ofgeni/cache/crosattachl7366_jessreport4_juneO4. pdf>; Appendix 1 
- Understanding the interaction in security of supply. 127European Commission, Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply" COM(2000) 769 final, p. 10-11,68-69,80-8 1. 
128 European Commission, Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply" COM(2000) 769 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
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Directive on security of supply, 130 and by the debate on the energy crisis in the United 
States' 31, Western Europe'32 and the 2006 supply suspension of gas transmission 
between Russia and the Ukraine. 133 Also, remarks that were made by world largest 
gas producer - Gazprom of Russia - over the European gas market liberalisation 
process in April 2006 and the potential threat by Gazprom to seek other alternatives to 
the European gas markets proved the vulnerable position of EU energy markets. 134 In 
the course of these debates it became clear that there are many views and immense 
disagreement on how the issue of security of supply in changing market should be 
addressed and solved. 
A clear shift in awareness and policy has to be made which from this survey's point of 
view lies in the following aspects: 
- Most importantly, energy market liberalisation, non-harmonisation of energy 
legislation and the different implementation stages of liberalisation measures 
are partly understood to be a threat to security of supply. 
- Furthermore the in the introduction mentioned energy crisis, which was 
partly blamed on the liberalisation endeavours across Europe, has increased 
awareness among the EU community, policy makers and parts of the entire 
industry as to how secure vital energy supplies are for our economies and 
Parliament, Final report on the Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply", COM(2002) 321 final. 
129 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The internal 
market in energy: Coordinated measures on the security of supply, COM(2002) 488 final; followed by 
the Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply, 26 
13Aril 
2004. 
European Parliament and the Council, Proposal for a Directive concerning measures to safeguard 
security of natural gas supply, COM(2002) 488 final, 2002/0220 (COD). 
13'Here in particular the California energy crisis and the massive power failure in the New York State 
area. See here for instance: Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), Beyond Californias's 
Power Crisis: Impact, Solutions, and Lessons, 2001, <http: //www. cera. com>; Platts, USA- 
Canada/Power-Politics, Blackouts spotlights energy bill, Issue 482,12. September 2003, International 
Gas Reports, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
132 Particularly in Scandinavia (Denmark) and Italy. Platts, Sweden, Denmark hit by massive blackout, 
Issue 69,26. September 2003, EU Energy, <http: //www. platts. com>; Platts, Italy: GRTN, ETRANS 
continue to differ, Issue 413,10.11.2003, Power in Europe<http: //www. platts. com>, 133 See Chapter A Il. 2. 
134 Financial Times, Gazprom attacks EU gas market plans, 26 April 2006; Financial Times 
Deutschland, Gasprom droth Europa im Energiesektor, 20. April 2006. 
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daily lives. 135 As a result of this shift in perception the question has been 
raised on how secure Europe's energy markets are. Furthermore it is widely 
believed that dependence on gas and oil and its supply from Non-EU 
countries will become more important for the EU in the next decade and that 
the EU should overcome and limit this dependency. '36 
- Finally, the debate on security of supply is also driven by parts of the gas 
industry, in particular the former incumbents, because these companies do 
not want to take the same roles and responsibilities as they had before the 
markets were open to competition. 
The following section of this chapter will examine the issues raised above, in the 
following way: 
(1. ) Firstly, different approaches on how to define security of supply will be 
discussed. Secondly, the requirements of the 2°d Gas Directive and the 
Directive on security of supply will be analysed from the perspective of 
whether this legislation will increase security of supply under competitive 
market conditions. 
(2. ) Furthermore, it will be discussed whether the introduction of liberalisation 
measures are a serious threat to security of supply. 
(3. ) The survey will then conclude with a case study of the UK and the 
German/Austrian gas markets and how these markets deal with security of 
gas supply in a changing market environment. 
115European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament concerning measures to 
safeguard security of natural gas, COM(2002) 488final, p. 43; European Commission, Green Paper 
"Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply", Technical Document, COM(2000) 
769 final, p. 14; Egenhoffer, C. et al, Insuring against disruptions of Energy supplies -A market- 
compatible approach to making security ofsupply operational, INDES Working Paper No. 1, March 
2004, p. 19-21, <httpJ/www. ceps. be>; Constantini, V., Gracceva, Social Costs of Energy Disruptions, 
INDES Working Paper No. 6, March 2004, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 
136 European Commission, Energy, Let us overcome our dependence, 2002. 
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I. What is security of supply? - How to define security of supply in 
open markets. 
It is often argued that a discussion about security of supply in changing and non 
harmonised/liberalised markets requires a common approach and definition of the 
concept from which to start. 137 This survey fully agrees with this view, especially 
where so if markets are changing, and are well intermeshed and dependent on each 
other. 
Over the last few years the EU Commission, its Member States, international 
organisations and other interest groups have all worked on different definitions and 
concepts of security of energy supplies in changing markets. 
138 The discussion 
highlighted the problems that all involved parties had (and still have) in finding a 
common approach to security of supply. These difficulties are not only based on the 
fact that the involved interest groups represented differing views but also because of 
the complexity of the security of supply concept in changing markets under unstable 
political conditions in many gas and oil producing countries. 
The subsequent section will analyse some example definitions and will then draw 
conclusions about what these definitions mean for changing EU gas markets and 
whether these definitions lead to more harmonised security of supply rules for EU gas 
markets. It will conclude with a suggested approach on how to define security of 
supply within the EU. 
137 Egenhofer, C., et al, Market-based Options for Security of Energy Supply - Summary Conclusions, 
INDES Working Paper, p. 2, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 
138 This survey will only provide some explicit examples on how the concept on security of supply was 
defined. However, an extensive definitional discussion can be found in International Energy Agency, 
The IEA Natural Gas Security Study, Paris, OECD, 1995. 
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1. The Commission's definition of security of supply 
The Commission's Green Paper on a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply139 stresses that "energy supply security must be geared to ensuring [... ] the 
proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability [... ] at a 
price which is affordable [... ]. Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy 
self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such 
dependence. [... ]. " 
These words do not lay a legal basis for a definition of security of supply but highlight 
the Commission's main aims for the concept of security of supply: 
- Proper functioning of the economy in a security of supply incident; 
- Uninterruptible physical availability at an affordable price; 
- Reduce risks of dependency. 
These three points can be found in many EU policy papers and legislative approaches 
that relate to the topic of security of supply. However, as it will be discussed later in 
this chapter, none of the EU political positions and legislative approaches implement 
those aspects by giving detailed guidance to Member States and all gas market players 
on how to implement policies aimed at meeting supply security. This is subject to 
various interpretations by each Member State, which creates a risk to EU wide 
security of supply. 
139 European Commission, Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply" COM(2000) 769 final, p. 2. 
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2. Definition of `security' in the 2 °d Gas Directive 
The 2nd Gas Directive 2003/55/EC140 states in Art. 2 No 32 that "security means both 
security of supply of natural gas and technical safety". This definition does not 
provide any practical tools when a security of supply incident occurs. It only specifies 
that security can mean both physical supply and operational issues. 
3. Definition of a "major supply disruption" under the Council Directive 
2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply 
The Council Directive 2004/67/EC14' concerning measures to safeguard the security 
of natural gas supply (Art. 2 (2. )) defines a "major supply disruption" as "a situation 
where the Community would risk losing more than 20% of gas supplies from third 
countries and the situation at Community level is not likely to be adequately managed 
with national measures. " 
Interestingly the definition refers only to 20% of the overall Community and not to 
the security of supply situation in one or two Member States. This has to be identified 
as a shortfall in the Directive because it does not take into account the overall security 
of supply situation within each Member State. 
If, for instance, the German gas market looses about 20% of its gas supplies for a 
longer period (i. e. more than a month) this could trigger a difficult supply situation for 
some market players in neighbouring EU countries. This would not necessarily mean 
an overall EU physical shortfall of gas but gas prices could increase significantly 
across Europe since the markets are interconnected. 
140 Directive 2003/55/EC (OJL 176/57) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC. 
141 Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply, 26 
April 2004. 
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Therefore this survey believes that the definition should refer to the supply situation in 
one and/or more Member States, rather than focusing only on the entire EU. 
4. International Energy Agency's concept of security of supply 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) 142 refers to security of supply in liberalised 
markets as: "In open gas markets, supply and demand can usually be balanced by the 
market. The challenge of security of supply is to make sure that the market can always 
clear supply and demand. [... ] Governments in open gas markets play a different role 
to ensure secure and reliable gas deliveries from the production/import point to the 
final customer. Instead of managing the sector, they have to set clear policy objectives 
all along the gas chain to manage the geopolitical implications of increasing import 
dependence and impact on the environment, and to ensure the working of markets to 
deliver reliable gas supplies. " 
Analysing IEA theory on security of supply, it has to be concluded that the IEA 
concept focuses on the fact that Governments need to create "clear policy objectives" 
that lay down guidance for security of supply issues. Although this survey agrees with 
this approach, it has to be noted that these "clear policy objectives" - in particular in 
the EU - must be coordinated between neighbouring countries that are dependent on 
each other when it comes to gas deliveries and transportation routes. In the EU for 
instance, one Member State can have clear national security of supply rules that can 
have an immense impact on neighbouring countries. Therefore if policy rules on 
security of supply are developed, they have to be coordinated between neighbouring 
countries in order to avoid counterproductive rules on this sensitive issue. 
142 International Energy Agency, Security of Gas supply in Open Markets - LNG and Power at a 
Turning point, p. 19. 
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5. Key findings - how to define and develop a concept of security of supply 
Looking back at the above attempts to define a common concept of security of supply 
the following has to be considered. All concepts note that security of supply has to be 
seen globally. Also, that security of supply needs to distinguish between long-term 
security of supply and short-term (network) reliability. Furthermore a distinction must 
be made between defining the concept of security of supply and actually defining 
what a security of supply incident within the EU means. 
In the context of agreeing a concept of security of supply, it is argued143 that under 
competitive market conditions Member States "need to make cost and risk judgments, 
and create a transparent security framework of standards and obligations [... ]. " These 
judgments should be based on a number of factors specifically related to security of 
supply incidents, which are: 
- To define obligations for market players to provide a minimum of supply and 
capacity service in such an incident. 
- To allocate the costs that are associated with this. 
'44 
Others argue that a further distinction between the different kinds of risks needs to be 
made related to what kind of security of supply incident occurs. 145 
All of these are important factors when analysing what security of supply is and at the 
same time they illustrate the difficulties that all involved parties have in agreeing a 
common and harmonised security of supply approach among Member States, one 
which also supports competition across European gas markets. 
143 Egenhofer, C. et al, Market-based Options for Security of Energy Supply - Summary Conclusions, 
INDES Working Paper, p. 3, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 144 Ibid, p. 3-4. 
145 Stem distinguish between a number of factors such as weather, operational problems etc, See Stem, 
J., Security of European Natural Gas Supplies - The impact of import dependence and liberalization, 
July 2002, p. 6. 
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This survey suggests in this respect that a major security of supply incident should be 
defined as "a situation when one or more Member States declare that they are at risk 
of losing more than 20% of their gas supplies for a period exceeding one month". This 
definition takes some of the above analysis on the Council Directive 2004/67/EC 
concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply into account, where a 
security of supply must be seen not only at the EU level but also for a single Member 
State, as supply insecurity can have a massive impact on neighbouring countries. The 
definition also takes into account a certain time period (here one month). 
Quite often, security of supply problems can be solved within a month (e. g. by having 
enough storage back up facilities until a pipeline is fixed or coordinated measures 
among the Transmission System Operators takes effect). Member States have also 
enough time to assess the situation and can be flexible in reacting. However, this kind 
of definition refers only to short-term reliability. Long-term security of supply is 
subject to companies' investment plans and Member State policies. These long-term 
security of supply plans and the roles and responsibilities of both the Member State 
Governments and the market players will be considered by the conclusion of this 
survey. 146 
146 See Chapter E. 
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II. The Second Gas Directive - does it provide effective tools to 
improve the EU-wide security of supply standards? 
The main aim of the 2 °d Gas Market Directive was to introduce more competition 
whilst ensuring proper short- and long-term security of gas supply across all Member 
States. 147 
The Directive contains numerous security of supply tools. The subsequent analysis 
will examine whether the security of supply tools of the Directive will improve the 
overall supply standards in changing and non-harmonised markets. 
1. Definition of security 
As mentioned above148 the Directive does not provide a clear definition of security of 
supply, it only states that "security means both security of supply of natural gas and 
technical safety" (Art. 2 No 32). As it will be seen later, this is a shortfall in the 
Directive because it allows various interpretations when there is a security of supply 
incident. 
2. Security of supply as part of public service obligations and customer 
protection 
Art. 3 of the Directive contains security of supply duties as part of public service 
obligations and customer protection. 
Art. 3 (2. ) states that "[... ] Member States may impose on undertakings operating in 
the gas sector, in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may 
147 European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning rules for the internal markets in 
electricity and natural gas COM(2002) 304, p. 7. 148 See above. 
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relate to security, including security of supply [... ]. " The weak legal wording of this 
clause is striking, because it does not oblige Member States - if they were to impose 
public service obligations that inter alia relate to security of supply - to coordinate 
those standards with other Member States. This could lead to difficulties and possible 
unfair market conditions in Member States. 
Contrary to this the Commission argues149 that Member States that introduce public 
service obligations relating to security of supply should in particular observe Article 
86 of the Treaty, where the obligations should only affect "the development of trade 
and competition only in the least possible manner. "150 
However, the risks remains that some Member States introduce a variety of public 
service obligations where others introduce none. Some public service obligations may 
relate to security of supply but as the Directive does not explicitly say what security of 
supply is, what the standards should be or when to impose them, the potential 
combination of differing standards has implications for every Member State. The 
Directive has missed the fact that Europe's gas markets are intermeshed and 
dependent upon each other. 
3. Monitoring, reporting of security of supply and security of supply 
measurements 
Arts. 5 and 31 of the Directive refer to the monitoring and reporting roles of both 
Member States and the EU Commission when it comes to security of supply issues. 
Art. 5 states that "Member States shall ensure monitoring of security of supply issues. 
[... ]. " To monitor the overall supply situation has to be identified as an important 
security of supply measures, unfortunately the wording of Art. 5 does not strictly 
oblige Member States to undertake these monitoring duties because the legal wording 
149 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in electricity and natural gas - security of supply provisions for gas, 16. January 
2004, p. 2-3. 
150 Ibid. 
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is not binding ("shall ensure monitoring"). This has to be seen as a shortfall in 
particular because the Commission can undertake its reporting obligations under Art. 
31 Nr. I d) and e). Pursuant to this Article the Commission must report on inter alia, 
the EU-wide security of supply situation. But it is a question how the Commission 
should undertake this duty if not all Member States report on their supply situation. 
Under Art. 26 Member States "may temporarily take the necessary safeguard 
measures" that are required because of security of supply incidents. Although it is 
correct that this article lays some obligations on Member States, it does not require 
them directly to act over a security of supply incident. This becomes clear when 
looking at the legal wording of the article ("may"). 
There is the possibility that Member States have different interpretations of the 
articles, which can have an effect on the overall security of supply imbalance in the 
intermeshed EU gas markets. For instance, one Member State can decide in a security 
of supply incident to cut off transit routes first and not consider what impact that 
might have on its neighbours. In such a case Art. 26 (3. ) requires Member States to 
communicate any measures to the affected Member States and to the Commission. 
Both have the right to ask the acting Member State "to amend or abolish such 
[security of supply] measures, insofar as they distort competition and adversely affect 
trade [... ]. " However, it is unclear what legal basis Member States and the 
Commission can ask the acting Member State to stop its actions. It is also unclear 
what grounds the involved parties have must cite for evidence that competition and 
trade is affected. This usually cannot be done contemporaneously; in most cases the 
effects are known months and/or years later. Again, this loophole leaves uncertainties 
for the market and could lead to (unnecessary) lawsuits because of the ambiguous 
legal language and unclear basis for a legal claim. 
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4. Exemption of third party access because of new network facilities that 
improve overall security of supply 
The Directive allows under Art. 22 a third party access exemption, if a major new gas 
infrastructure facility improves the overall security of supply situation and enhances 
competition in gas supply and/or "enables the development of new sources of gas 
supply. " Art. 22 further identifies three major new infrastructures, which are 
interconnectors between Member States, LNG and storage facilities. 
The Commission' 51 argues that all these major infrastructures will increase the overall 
supply base of the EU market. 
Although this opinion is fully supported by this survey the Directive is missing the 
important obligation on TSOs and DSOs that they are obliged to connect the new 
infrastructure to their existing infrastructure. An example where a multi million Euro 
pipeline project is still not connected to a transmission network can be found on the 
German-Dutch border in Bunde/Oude. At this point major European pipelines are 
connected to three Norwegian pipelines. In the nineteen-eighties Wingas of Germany 
built a pipeline in order to connect their system with these Norwegian pipelines as 
well as to other network systems. However, to date the Norwegians pipeline operators 
have not connected their system with the Wingas pipeline. 152 
A connection could have increased security of supply because more capacity would 
have been available and the gas supplies could have been transported more easily. 
This example shows that it is necessary to have a legal obligation on TSOs and DSOs 
to connect new infrastructures to their existing networks. 
'51 Ibid, p. 6. 152 There is no official document available on why the pipeline was not connected to the terminals. 
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5. Refusal of third party access because of security of supply risks 
Art. 21 (1) states that "Natural gas undertakings may refuse access to the system on 
the basis of lack of capacity or where the access to the system would prevent them 
from carrying out the public service obligation referred to in Article 3(2) [... ]. " One 
of the public service obligations under Art. 3 (2) is to ensure security of supply. This 
means that a TSO can refuse new third party access requests if this endangers the 
overall security of supply. Although the clause seems useful, it is not clear what 
happens to already existing network users that have to be disconnected if a gas 
shortfall occurs, which could prevent the TSO from further undertaking its public 
service obligations. 
6. Provisional results 
Given the above analysis it becomes clear that the Directive consists of a number of 
loopholes as far as security of supply measurements and obligations are concerned. 
More consistency should be required from the Member States in implementing 
coordinated and harmonised security of gas supply standards in order to avoid any 
disadvantages to the market and in particular to the end-consumer. 
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III. Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard 
security of natural gas supply - will this legislation create more 
harmonised and secure European gas markets? 
In addition to introducing the 2°d Gas Market Directive, the EU-legislator passed 
Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural 
gas supply, which came into force on April 16th, 2004. The Directive has to be 
implemented by Member States by May 19th, 2006. 
The objectives of the Directive are to introduce certain security of supply standards 
across the EU whilst ensuring that the functioning of the internal market is not 
disturbed. 153 
The following section will discuss whether this Directive will actually support or 
create more secure and more harmonised EU gas markets. This will be done by 
analysing the main parts of the Directive, which aim to support overall security and 
the harmonisation of security of supply standards. 
1. Definitions of security of supply roles and responsibilities 
Pursuant Art. 3 (1., 2. ) of the Directive, Member States are to define the roles and 
responsibilities of market players in order to ensure an appropriate level of security of 
supply. Apart from the very broad and vague language, the Directive does not contain 
any further explanations or definitions on what is meant by this; only Art. 8 mentions 
that "Member States shall prepare in advance and, if appropriate [... ] national 
emergency measures [... ]. " 
This wording leaves uncertainty for all involved parties. Even if Member States start 
to define the roles and responsibilities it will be very likely that each individual 
1 53 According to Art. I this Directive aims to have "an adequate level of security of gas supply" across 
the EU with clear definitions on who is responsible for security of supply and at the same time to serve 
a "proper functioning of the internal market". 
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Member State does it differently and without collaboration. This will not create more 
security for Europe's gas markets. 
As mentioned above, already Member States have very different security of supply 
standards that are not aligned with their neighbouring countries. Up to now there are 
no movements among Member States Governments and industry associations to 
change this. Therefore it is almost certain that the current uncertainties will remain 
and that the objective of this Directive will not be achieved. One could further argue 
that the uncertainties will increase, in particular when it comes to cross border gas 
transportation issues where two or more Member States have very different 
approaches and legislation on how to deal with security of supply incidents. For 
instance Member States can differ in which order customers should be cut off and 
how TSOs are supposed to cooperate at borders in the event of an interruption. 
2. Protection of end-customers 
According to Art. 4 of the Directive Member States shall in a security of supply 
incident prioritise supply protection of households under specific conditions as laid 
down in the Art. 4. 
Whereas on the one hand, this Article aims to bring some form of standardised rules 
for a supply interruption, on the other hand the legal language of Article 4 leaves 
space for different ways of implementation and understanding of this clause. 
Again, this creates market uncertainties and will not increase overall security of 
supply standards. 
3. Cooperation with other Member State Governments 
Pursuant to Art. 4 (5. ) Member States "may take the appropriate measures in 
cooperation with another Member State [... ] if an adequate level of interconnection is 
available. " According to this article Member States can engage in bilateral agreements 
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in order to cooperate each other's security of supply standards. It is interesting that the 
Directive does not require ("may" instead of "must") Member States to cooperate 
when it comes to security of supply. By wording this article in this format it is not 
ensured that interconnected Member States harmonise their security of supply 
standards, which could lead to serious difficulties, as will be discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
4. Community mechanism in a security of supply incident 
According to Art. 7 the Directive establishes a so-called "Gas Coordination Group" 
(hereinafter "Group"), which aims to establish the proper coordination of security of 
supply measures. The Group, which is going to consists of representatives of each 
Member State, has no legal authority but pursuant to Art. 9 can assist and advise 
Member States and the Commission in a supply interruption. 
The establishment of such a Group has to be seen positively. However, its role is 
rather limited since it has no authority on security of supply issues. The lack of (legal) 
power limits the Group's ability to augment security of supply standards. It is again 
down to each individual Member State to decide which security of supply standards 
shall apply to its security of supply regime. 
5. Monitoring and reporting 
According to Arts. 5 and 6 Member States and the Commission have monitoring and 
reporting responsibility for the effects of the implementation of the Directive and the 
future demand for gas in the EU. Furthermore according to Art. 8 (1. ) Member States 
have to publish their security of supply standards. 
Whereas these steps are important to identify problems, the Directive does not provide 
the proper tools to overcome problems as they arise. 
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6. The role of storage as an important security of supply tool 
Storage has to be identified as an important security of supply tool in a supply 
incident because it can help to overcome a period of gas shortage and increase the 
independence of the storage holding country. Currently there is a debate within the 
EU concerning whether or not Member States should hold gas stocks to respond to 
gas supply interruptions. 154 Currently IEA Member countries are required to hold oil 
stocks sufficient to meet demand for up to 90 days. 155 The Council Directive, has 
similar measures to safeguard security of supply, stating in Article 4 (4): "Member 
States [... ] may also take the necessary measures to ensure that gas storage facilities 
located within their territory contribute to an appropriate degree to achieve the 
security of supply standards. " The Directive further refers to storage in Article 6 No 1 
(c) where it says, "The Commission shall monitor [... ] the level of working gas and of 
the withdrawal capacity of gas storage". 
Interestingly the Directive does not raise the issue of an EU-wide coordinated storage 
level. This could for instance, require that Member States support each other with 
storage back up gas in a security of supply incident. It is argued'56 that European gas 
markets differ considerably and are not comparable to the oil market. From the 
commentator's point of view, this relates in particular to the fact that transportation of 
gas is via pipelines and because some Member Sates have enough indigenous gas 
production, where others need to import large quantities. Most of these arguments are 
valid, nevertheless it is not clear why Member States should not coordinate their back 
up storage facilities and organise action plans. If, for example, one Member State is 
affected, neighbouring Member States could provide support. This could be a further 
duty of the Group and this would create more synergies. 
154 International Energy Agency, Security of gas supply in open markets - LNG and power at a turning 
point, p. 294. 
iss Ibid. In Germany for instance this is achieved through the "Oil Stocking Association" which is a 
corporation under public law. See in detail Erdölbevorratungsverband, www. ebv-oil. org. 156 International Energy Agency, supra note, p. 294-295. 
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7. Provisional conclusions 
Given these considerations, the following must be concluded. The Directive aims to 
increase overall security of supply, without clear definitions of roles and 
responsibilities will not be achieved. The Directive does not provide proper tools to 
increase overall security of supply in the EU because it fails to harmonise, standardise 
or coordinate EU wide security of supply measures. Therefore it must be stated that 
existing uncertainties will remain with many questions about who will be liable for 
what in a security of supply incident. 
IV. Are different liberalisation and harmonisation levels a risk to 
overall security of supply within the EU? 
The following section will discuss whether different liberalisation and harmonisation 
levels are a risk to overall security of supply within the EU. This analysis is of 
importance as it illustrates important aspects of the pro and anti liberalisation and 
harmonisation debate. 
The argument that liberalisation and specifically the different liberalisation and 
harmonisation stages are a threat to overall security of supply within the EU, is based 
on the fact that before liberalisation steps were introduced within the EU gas markets. 
Usually - with the exemption of Germany157 - one single company was placed 
directly in charge of securing the overall gas supply. 158 National incumbents signed 
long term supply contracts that ensured delivery of the necessary gas volumes, mostly 
with production companies, some of which were not located within the EU. '59 
157 In contrast to all other European Member States' Germany was (and still is) dominated by about five 
major fully integrated gas companies, whereby E. ON Ruhrgas is the overall market leader. 
158 Stem, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - The impact of import dependence and 
liberalization, July 2002, p. 22. 
159 As stated above most of the gas that is consumed in the EU comes from Russia and Norway. As also 
said above the gas price was (and still is today) indexed to the oil price due to the fact that gas is the 
main competitor to oil in the end-consumer market. 
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Therefore security of supply was mainly a technical issue. In most instances, none of 
the national incumbents had clear and transparent measures for a supply emergency 
incident. This was due to the fact that most Member States did not - and still do not - 
provide clear regulation and legislation on security of supply. Apart from this, 
incumbents were able to pass on all extra costs, which were incurred by security of 
supply measures, to their end-consumers. 160 
Besides this, there were and still are no standardised EU-wide political and industry 
mechanisms16' for how to react to a supply crisis as outlined above. From a political 
and industry stand point, it could be argued that there was no real need to have these 
measures. In the past, European incumbents have worked closely together in 
emergency incidents that led to supply interruptions or cross-border operational 
problems and had a good record of preparedness to deal with these incidents. 162 
However, since the introduction of liberalisation and competition to Europe's gas 
markets this has significantly changed, because no single company feels responsible 
for the overall security of supply. 163 
The EU Commission and the Member State Governments believe, in this respect, that 
real security of supply comes from fully liberalised and deregulated markets. 164 
160 Luciani, G., Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets - What is it and what is it not?, p. 3, 
<http: //www. ceps. be>. 
161 Stem, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - The impact of import dependence and 
liberalization, July 2002, p. 22. 
162 International Energy Agency, Regulatory Reform: European Gas, Energy Market Reform, p. 50; Dti, 
Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS) third Report, November 2003, p. 
I0, <http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/jess>; EUROGAS, Security of supply of natural gas in Western 
Europe, December 1997, p. 16-17 unpublished document on file. 
163 This will be illustrated in the subsequent analysis of the Austrian gas market and its security of 
supply tools. See below. 
164 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, The internal market in energy: Coordinated measures on the security of energy supply, 
COM(2002) final, 11 September2002, p. 8-11; Dti, Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future - 
Creating a Low Carbon Economy, paras 1.32-1.34,6.6 and 7.23, <http: //www. dti. gov. uk>; Dti, The 
Energy Review, Cabinet Ojce, Performance and Innovation Unit Report, February 2002, p. 56-57; E- 
control, Versorgungssicherheit - Wie sicher ist die Stromversorgung in 
Osterreich?, E-control 2004, 
<http: //www. econtrol. at>, p. 9. 
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Numerous commentators support this view. 165 It is argued'66 that the introduction of 
competition means energy suppliers have to pay more attention to their customers 
needs, in particular referring to prices. For instance, large customers that have to pay a 
large security of supply premium are able, under competitive market conditions, to 
negotiate interruptible gas contracts at a cheaper price but would risk being cut off in 
the case of gas shortfalls. It is further argued167 that "competitive markets lead to a 
differentiation of offers and a wider range of providers, as well as to more liquid and 
deeper associated markets with graduated mechanisms for reduction and transfer of 
risk [... ] " 
However, it is also claimed168 that the slow implementation of liberalisation measures 
could increase security risks. 169 Additionally it is stated 170 that "arguably a long 
transition could expose continental Europe to the worst of all security worlds: 
disappearance of the old certainties of the traditional markets, combined with 
uncertainty as to how the emerging market players will be obliged and equipped to 
cope with security problems. " In other words, the slow and inconsistent pace of 
liberalisation could mean an unbalanced security of supply situation and make the 
overall security of supply problem more complex. 
Contrary to these arguments, it is possible that the overall security supply issues 
remain the same no matter whether a competitive market exists or not. 
165 See for instance: lEA, Energy Policies of lEA Countries, 2002 Review, p. 55-56,72; Austvik, O. G., 
Security-of-Gas-Supply; Norway, Russia and the EU, 18 June 2002, p. 3, 
<http: //www. kaldor. no/energy/berlin2002O6l8. html>. 
166Lieb-Doczy, E. et al, Who Secures the Security of Supply? European Perspectives on Security, 
Competition and Liability, The Electricity Journal 2003, p. 14-15. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Stern, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - The impact of import dependence and 
liberalization, July 2002, p. 25. 
169 It is also argued that the concept of fully liberalised gas markets has to be seen globally. Interaction 
between the gas producing countries, which are usually not liberalised/deregulated and are located 
outside the EU, and the EU countries which are increasingly dependent on gas supplies from these 
producing countries, will increase in the next 10-20 years. For further information on this situation see 
Ilouse of Lords, Gas: Liberalised Markets and Security of supply, 17`h Report of Session 2003-04, p. 
10. 
170 Stern, supra note, p. 25. 
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Some commentators 171 claim that under liberalised market conditions, new market 
players might try to have a "free-ride on the security provided by the incumbent 
suppliers and the `heat of competition' may push operators to play down security and 
prioritise cost-cutting. " Other's point out that some Member States do not have any 
legislation in place to deal with the potential scenario where a new supplier goes 
bankrupt and no entity ensures that customers will continue to be supplied . 
172 
The Commission's Green Paper on security of supply contradicts these points and 
puts forward, "that the gradual completion of the internal [energy] market "has 
brought no disadvantages to security of supply. 173 This wording could mean that the 
aforementioned comments are misleading. However, the Paper highlights, in this 
respect, that major obstacles to security of supply under competitive market 
conditions remain. Due to the strong hold of former monopolies, limited intra 
Community trades, and the continuation of major bottlenecks at EU and transmission 
system operators' borders, market access for new entrants is limited . 
174 These 
arguments are backed by others175 who stress that new entrants find it difficult to 
ensure secure deliveries to their customers because of the lack of sufficient access to 
gas production and the inadequate, non-cost-reflective and non-transparent access to 
transportation routes and storage facilities. 
171 Luciani, G., Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets - What is it and what is it not?, p. 3, 
<http: //www. ceps. be>; see also Johnston, A., The EC Energy Law 1999: Reciprocity and the Gas and 
Electricity Directive, The CEPMLP Journal, Volume 4-9, 
<http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/main/html/articl4-9. htm>, p. 11. 
172 Knops, H. P. A., Securing Dutch Electricity Supply, Towards a Supplier of Last Resort?, in 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report I, p. 235. 173European Commission, Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply" COM(2000) 769 final, p. 58/59. 
174 Ibid., p. 59-60. 
'75 See supra note; Some good examples on how new entrants see the current gas market conditions on 
the European Continent can be found in the Deloite & Touche Flame 2003 and 2004 Delegate Survey 
Results; also the Second Benchmark Report by the Commission, see supra note, illustrates major lacks 
of implementation of the First Gas Directive, see here page 5. 
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It is also argued176 that under the current stage of liberalisation and the insecurity, 
companies are refraining from making the necessary investment in energy 
infrastructure. Apart from the fact that the construction of new pipelines is connected 
to legal risks, many companies are concerned in particular with the political and 
commercial risks. For instance, it is uncertain what kind of access regime will apply 
to a new infrastructure investment, what rate of return companies can expect if 
markets are open to competition and what security of supply role they will be require 
to take. '77 
These arguments can only be supported partially. 
Recently a number of companies have announced that they are planning to invest in 
major pipeline infrastructure projects. ' 78 Also, the Second Gas Directive 2003/55/EC 
allows under Article 22 an exemption of third party access for new investments in 
pipeline infrastructures. The main criteria for an exemption is - as said before - that 
the new investment enhances competition (Art 22 a), or if the "level of risk attached 
to the investment is such that the investment would not take place unless an 
exemption was granted" (Art. 22b). 179 Therefore the argument that companies will 
refrain from making investments is from this survey's point of view not valid. This 
view is supported180 by the fact that "large companies cannot afford capacity 
shortages or reduced security" because that will put them in difficult market positions 
as well as under the scrutiny of their shareholders. 
176 See for instance The Economist, Energy - Europe's power struggle, July 3`d 2004, p. 67-68; others 
have argued that it is an investor friendly environment needs to be created in order to allow companies 
to invest in new infrastructures, see here: lEA, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets, LNG and 
Power at a Turning Point, Annexes - Governments and other Stakeholders' views, p. 83,88,167 177 For a detail analyse on what kind of risks new pipeline constructions are facing please see Stein, 
S. W.; Introduction to the Financing of Cross-Border Gas Pipelines in Emerging Markets, JENRL 
21/2003, p. 280-284. 
178 For instance Gasunie announced plans to build a new interconnector between The Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom (the so-called BBL-Line), see Gasunie, BBL Pipeline Project, 18 September 2003, 
<http: //gasunie. nl/bbi/index. htm>; Eon and Gazprom have signed a memorandum of Understanding to 
build a new undersea pipeline (so called North European Gas Pipeline - NEGP) connecting Siberia and 
Germany, see Eon, E. ON and Gazprom deepen business relationship, 8,. July 2004, <http: //www. eon- 
ag. com/eon4721062104>. 
179 Other exemption criteria can be found in Art. 22 of the Directive 2003/55/EC. 180 Lieb-Doczy, E. et al, supra note, p. 15. 
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However, a key question remains; namely what are the roles and responsibilities of all 
parties to undertake gas production, gas transportation, gas distribution, gas supply 
and trading, and supervisory tasks? 
The Commission as well as the Madrid Gas Regulatory Forum stress in this respect 
that changing markets require a new definition of all parties involved. This new 
definition not only refers to security of supply but also to other market elements. 
According to both, the re-definition is necessary because the Gas Directive requires 
unbundling. 181 
Others' 82 support this point of view. From their perspective, this is essential, in 
particular, in rapidly changing markets. They state: "lack of clarity with regard to 
security of supply will in itself increase the risk of a supply crisis". 183 
Apart from this, the introduction of liberalisation and competition, and the changes in 
the market structures means no single player will take over the role of maintaining the 
overall security of supply of the market. This is mainly because assets such as storage 
or back-up capacity bookings that were traditionally used to ensure security of supply, 
are, in a competitive/liberalised environment, `stranded assets' and goods, which will 
now be used commercially rather than just as a security of supply tool. 184 
The Commission argues that Member States and the Commission have a duty to 
ensure that all market players take minimum security of supply measures. ' 85 The 
conclusion of the 5`h Madrid Forum stresses that the operational responsibilities 
should continue to lie with the gas industry. 186 Furthermore "network users are 
181 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, The internal market in energy: Coordinated measures on the security of energy supply, 
COM(2002) 488 final, p. 5. 
182 See GTE's and EUROGAS's view in European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council concerning measures to safeguard security of supply, 
COM(2002) 488 final, p. 45. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Stem, J., supra note, p. 23-24; EUROGAS, supra note, p. 32. 
185 Ibid. 
186 See Conclusions of the 5`h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, supra note, p. 9- 
10. 
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responsible for commercial balancing of gas in-put and off-take from the system in 
accordance with the prevailing contractual specifications, technical rules and agreed 
procedures. " 187 Apart from defining the responsibilities of the network users the 
Madrid Conclusions fail to provide more detail on what is meant by the "gas 
industry". There are no legal and technical explanations; it can mean various things 
and can be interpreted differently. 
The Council Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas 
supply 2004/67/EC188 does not provide a clear answer to this question either. As it 
was stated above Art. 3 (1. ) states only that "Member States shall define the roles and 
responsibilities of the different gas market players [... ] and specify adequate 
minimum security of supply standards that must be complied with by the players on 
the gas market of the Member State in question. " 
Other guidance about how to define the roles and responsibilities of the market 
players cannot be found. It is up to each Member State to define those roles and 
responsibilities. 
As far as the issue of what are the roles and responsibilities for Member States in the 
context of security of supply, in a liberalised and competitive market the Commission 
argues that Member State Governments have a duty to safeguard stability by ensuring 
that the "market is working efficiently and giving true signals to guide the participants 
in interpreting and managing change while maintaining the appropriate level of 
security of supply. "189 What "safeguard tools" means is not explained nor defined, 
and therefore is left open to various interpretations. The Commission's Green Paper 
requests "a new form of government intervention" and further unbundling in order to 
create a single European energy market with a high degree of security of supply. 190 
187 Ibid. 
188 Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply, 26 
April 2004. 
18 Ibid, p. 46. 
190 See Green Paper, supra note, p. 61. 
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But the paper does not state what this means and what the implications are for 
Member States and the overall energy industry. 
It has been argued19' that the Second Gas Directive should have given explicit 
obligations for Member States to enhance overall security of supply. This view is 
difficult to support as some correctly argue192 that "security of supply does not have 
the status of a priority aim of the [Gas] Directives, but rather is an issue to be 
monitored where there are apparent threats. " 
The Council Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of supply provides 
some duties for the Member States. 193 These responsibilities lie in the priority 
protection of household consumers in a security of supply incident. These 
requirements are not standardised for all Member States because the Directive leaves 
to Member States the task of further defining how the protection and the overall 
market organisation in such an incident should operate. This may mean that enormous 
risks exist for the highly intermeshed European Gas markets. If, for instance, Member 
States have different security of supply measures194 the entire European security of 
supply system will be unbalanced. With more co-ordinated rules unbalanced risks 
might be mitigated. 195 Beyond that, the Directive does not provide any real authority 
191 Jones, C., EU Energy Law -The Internal Energy Market, Volume 1, Chapter 2- Creating a 
common electricity and gas wholesale market, 6.11-6.14, p. 122-123. 
192 Lieb-Doczy, E. et al, supra note, p. 14. 
193 Under Art. 4 Member States are obliged to ensure that supplies 
for household customers inside 
their territory are protected to an appropriate extend at least in the event of. (a) a partial disruption of 
national gas supplies during a period to be determined by Member Sates taking into account national 
circumstances; (b) extremely cold temperatures during a nationally determine peak period; (c) periods 
of exceptionally high gas demand during the coldest weather periods statistically occurring every 20 
years. " 
Art. 5 requires Member States report to the Commission what the impact of security of supply 
standards under Art. 4 are for competition, what the levels of storage capacity are, extend of long term 
contracts, which have been signed by companies and whether the Member State' regulatory framework 
provide adequate incentives for new investments. 
94 E. g. in one Member State transit gas will be cut off first in order to prevent a gas shortage to 
domestic gas customers; this will obviously have an impact on the neighbouring markets. Other 
Member States will cut off so called interruptible customers first and will continue shipping gas to 
neighbouring customers as long as it is booked on a firm basis. 
195 E. g. all Member States have the obligation to cut off interruptible customers first, no matter whether 
or not they affect transit or domestic markets. 
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for the Commission in the context of introducing overall uniform security of supply 
standards; the Commission has a monitoring role rather than enforcement. 196 
The not fully ratified EU Constitution 197 does not bring any more clarification in this 
context. Articles 111-256,1. (b) and 2. of the proposed EU Constitution states, "Union 
policy on energy shall aim to ensure security of energy supplies in the Union. 2. 
Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Constitution, the 
objectives in paragraph I shall be achieved by measures enacted in European laws of 
framework laws. [... ]. " The currently non-binding text of the EU Constitution does 
not give any real powers to the Union to enact the policy aim. This clause is left open 
to the different interpretations of the Member States. 
As the issue of who is responsible for security of supply in the changing market is left 
open, it must be concluded that the introduction of liberalisation may mean a threat to 
the security of supply; this in particular as Member States' markets are in different 
"liberalisation" phases and many have not implemented the Directive into national 
legislation. As a consequence of the different implementation processes and the lack 
of clear definition, it must also be concluded - as has been argued198 - that the 
different implementation process are the greatest threat and challenge to Europe's 
security of supply. 
196 Art. 6 of the Directive gives the Commission a pure monitoring role. 
197 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/1,16.12.2004. 
198 European Federation of Energy Traders, Views on the EU Commission proposal of 11/09/02 for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council concerning measures to the safeguard security 
of gas supply, <http//www. efet. org>, October 2002, p. 1; EUROELECTRIC, Comments on the 
Proposal for a Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of supply and Comments on the 
Proposal for a Directive concerning the alignment of measures with regard to security of supply for 
petroleum products, <http//www. euroelectirc. org>, p. 1-2. 
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V. The abolition of destination clauses in long-term gas supply 
contracts -a loss of real investment incentives and security of gas 
supply? 
Over the last 50 years many European gas suppliers signed long term contracts with 
non EU gas producers, which included so-called "destination clauses". 199 These 
clauses contain a contractual obligation where the gas purchaser is not allowed to 
resell gas bought from outside the supply territory. At the same time the gas seller 
(gas producer) is obliged to seek the permission of the gas buyer if he wants to re-sell 
the purchased gas to a third party located in the gas buyers "territory". In the past 
destination clauses found their origin in the fact that energy markets were divided into 
horizontal and vertical elements, which are believed200 to stop competition and 
integration. In the traditional EU gas market, gas producers usually did not supply gas 
directly to end-customers while at the same time gas wholesalers restricted their 
market activities to specific geographical areas, mostly where they were in control of 
transmission and/or distribution networks. 201 
These destination clauses can be found in many longer-term gas supply contracts (i. e. 
usually more than ten years), e. g. those signed between Russian Gazprom and large 
European Gas companies such as ENI of Italy, Gasunie of The Netherlands or E. ON 
Ruhrgas of Germany. The long-term contracts in conjunction with the destination 
clauses were seen as an important element of investment and security of supply. 
It has been argued202 that the destination clauses are "incompatible with European 
competition law and undermine the ongoing creation of a European gas market. " The 
European Commission, who took the view that these clauses were in breach of Arts. 
199 Some call them also "territorial restrictions". 
200 Nyssens, 11. et al, The territorial restrictions case in the gas sector: a state of play, Competition 
Policy Newsletter, Number 1,2004, p. 48. 
201 ibid. 
202 Nyssens, 11. et al, supra note, p. 48. 
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81 and 82 of the EC Treaty supported this view. 203 The Commission took the view 
that these clauses are a breach of European competition law as they hinder cross- 
border trade and undermine the on-going creation of a single European gas market. 
This survey. agrees with this standpoint as Arts. 81 and 82 are designed to prohibit 
anti-competitive agreements. Particularly Art. 81 (1) prohibits agreements that 
appreciably restrict competition if the agreement may haven an appreciable effect on 
competition in the EU and if it may restrict trade between EU Member States. The 
destination clauses are indeed in breach with this Article as they limit market players 
to sourcing their gas within the European Union. 
As will be discussed in more detail later in this survey, 204 an EU Commission 
investigation resulted in some of the destination clauses being abolished in 2003 205 
In this context the inquiry by the German Cartel Authority206 into the duration of 
long-term contracts needs to be mentioned, as may change the structure of the current 
supply contracts. 207 The German Cartel Authority has concluded that long-term 
contracts that exceed a period of four years contravene existing competition 
legislation 208. Although some commentators 209 support this view, others21° have 
claimed that the legal arguments of the German Cartel Authority are not valid and that 
the German Cartel Authority decision seriously threatens security of supply and long- 
term investments, for instance in pipeline networks. 
Whether this inquiry into the design of long-term contracts will have any further 
impact on the market will be the subject of more detailed analysis in Chapter D. 2 1 
203 Egenhofer, C., Gialoglou, K., Rethinking the EURegulatoryStrategy for the Internal Energy 
Market, Report of a CEPS Task Force, Report No. 52, December 2004, p. 35; Schnichels, D.; 
Marktabschottung durch langfristige Gaslieferverträge, EuZW 6/2003, p. 171-175. 
204 See C V. 2. 
205 See in detail analysis in Chapter C V. 2. 
206 Bundeskartellamt, Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 8. 
Beschlussabteilung, B8- 113/03, Bonn, 25.01.2005, <http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
207 v. Hammerstein, C.; Langfristige Lieververträge /Bundeskartellamt, emw 1/05, p. 67-68. 
208 See Bundeskartellamt, supra note, p. 3-11. 
209 Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), Stellungnahme zu den 
Kartellrechtlichen Beurteilungsgrundsätzen zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 28. February 2005, 
<http: //www. vik. de>. 
210 Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW), Kartellrechtliche 
Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 21. February 2005, <http: //www. bgw. de>. 211 See Chapter D 1115. 
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However, this leads to the question of how future gas supply to Europe will be 
guaranteed if the destination clauses and the current structure of long-term contracts 
are abolished. One could argue that companies will not sign long-term contracts if 
tools such as the destination clause disappear, increasing risk in particular with regard 
to investments. Under this scenario, the overall long-term security of supply may 
decrease. This view is supported, 212 supply companies may refrain from signing long- 
term supply contracts because of price uncertainties under competitive market 
conditions. It could be argued that the long-term security of supply stability is 
endangered because companies are only buying gas on a short-term basis. This could 
mean that if shortages arise, prices could go up so much that gas suppliers might not 
be able to supply their customers. Additionally, if prices go down, producer countries 
like Russia may refrain from making new exploration investments. 
Contrary to these arguments, it is possible that with the abolishment of the destination 
clauses competition may flourish and thus the market alone will provide enough 
investment incentives and security of supply. 
This survey concludes - once destination clauses are fully abolished - that gas 
companies with a high number of end-customers will continue to sign long-term 
contracts, transportation companies will make further investment in their networks, 
and gas producers will continue to sell gas on a long-term basis. 
This is the case in the UK213 where contracts signed between Danish gas companies 
DUC and DONG acknowledged the fact that the clauses were in breach of EU 
competition law. 214 Others such as the Norwegian oil and gas companies Norsk Hydro 
and Statoil adopted this view as well. 215 In this context it is argued216 that "the 
212 Jones, C., EU Energy Law -The Internal Energy Market, Volume 1, Chapter 2- Creating a 
common electricity and gas wholesale market, 6.12, p. 122; Platts, Prices set to fall in years ofplenty 
after 2007, Issue 257,19. March 2004. 
213 See list of long term contracts in: Wybrew-Bond, I., "hat does the Future hold for the European 
Gas Business? in Mabro, R.; Wybrew-Bond, I., (eds. ), Gas to Europe - The Strategies of Four Major 
Suppliers, p. 263; Platts, UK-Norway/Trade-Companies: Centrica/Shell inkflexi deal, Issue 497,8. 
March 2004. 
214 Schnichels, D.; Valli, F., Vertical and horizontal restraints in the European gas sector - lessons 
from the DUC DONG case, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2,2003, p. 60. 215 Ibid. 
216 Nyssens, H. et al, supra note, p. 49. 
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commitments confirm that non-EU producers can successfully market their gas in the 
Union without making use of these [destination] clauses. In other words, these 
producers can achieve sufficient revenues from the sale of gas in the EU while 
respecting competition rules. " This survey agrees with the latter arguments and 
concludes that the abolishment of destination clauses will not result in non-investment 
and only short-term contracts. 
VI. Can different liberalisation stages within the EU endanger 
security of supply within a fully unbundled and liberalised gas 
market? -A case study of the UK gas market. 
Following the above analysis, that different levels of liberalisation and the non- 
definition of roles and responsibilities can be a threat to security of supply, it is useful 
to look at the question of whether security of supply within a fully liberalised gas 
market can be endangered by the limited liberalisation standards within other EU gas 
markets. 
This case study will be undertaken by examine the UK gas market and its 
interconnection and dependency upon other European markets. First, this section will 
provide a brief overview of the UK gas market, as it is essential for the subsequent 
analysis. This survey will then debate how much the UK gas market is dependent on 
the liberalisation and harmonisation movements within other EU Member States. 
Finally this survey will concluded with an analysis of what would happen if a physical 
gas supply interruption were to occur between the UK gas market and its continental 
supply routes. 
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1. Current state of the UK gas market 
For the last 20 years the UK gas market - Europe's largest gas market - has been self 
sufficient in gas and has exported gas to the Continent currently via the Bacton- 
Zeebrugge Interconector (also referred to as `IUK'), as well as to Ireland. 
At the same time as gas consumption was growing, the regulatory structure changed 
dramatically into a fully liberalised and very competitive market. 217 
In the beginning of 2004 the UK started to be a gas net importer. UK gas demand is 
also expected to rise substantially in the next 10-20 years. Indigenous production will 
decrease rapidly by 2007218 Additionally, gas fired UK power stations (capacity) are 
expected to grow from 40% (2000) to approximately 50% in 2010 and 60-70% by 
2020219 The demand for future gas imports will increase dramatically. 
2. Is the UK gas market dependent on the gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
movements in continental gas markets? 
As the UK increasingly (net) imports gas it is expected that this will have a significant 
impact on all UK gas market players, raising many questions and concerns. One key 
element of this debate is the question as to whether security of supply within the fully 
liberalised and competitive UK gas market will be endangered because of this import 
dependency and the lack of liberalisation in its surrounding markets. 
217 At this point this survey will not analyse how the market restructuring was organised/governed. It 
will purely focus on the question of what impact the overall market reforms have or will have on UK 
security of supply conditions. For an overview on the UK gas market and its development see Cavill, 
II., The development of the UK Gas Market, ZfE 27 (2003), p. 109-115. 218 Ofgem, Securing Britain's gas supply, <http: //www. ofgem. com>, p. 2; IEA, Security of Gas Supply 
in Open Markets - LNG and Power at a turning point, IEA report 2004, p. 392-394. 219 Stem, J., Security of Natural Gas Supply, Response to Consultation Document: Energy policy: Key 
Issues for Consultation, DEFRA, dti, DTLR, May 2002, 
<http//: www. dti. gov. uk/energy/developep/royal_ins-of int_affairs. pdfy, p. 5. The rapid growth in gas 
fired power stations is caused by three main factors: Coal has become a less important energy source 
for the UK power generation industry. Also, the UK government's commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol have proven to be difficult to meet and one main way to reach these commitments is to 
increase use of environmentally friendly gas fired stations and to invest more in renewables. 
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In this respect the UK Government and others claim that the future of UK security of 
gas supply will increasingly depend on further developments in the liberalisation 
process within the EU. 220 It is further argued221 that as gas demand grows across 
Europe in the next decade, the UK and other European countries will compete over 
the access to gas supplies in non-EU countries. But as markets are not as open on the 
Continent as in the UK, this will potentially lead to higher gas prices or a shortage in 
the UK. 222 Moreover it is claimed223 that the UK gas market cannot protect itself from 
price trends on the Continent and that it is essential for maintaining the liquidity of the 
UK gas market that a proper pan-European network be developed. 
As mentioned above, liberalisation endeavours on the have been limited. Therefore it 
possible that the different liberalisation stages across the EU could jeopardise UK 
security of supply. 
This argument is questioned by Stern224 who asserts that the lack and level of 
liberalisation on the Continent does not threaten UK security of supply because of the 
higher numbers of gas storage facilities on the Continent, which can back up the UK 
gas market. He states further, "it is more persuasive to argue that lack of liberalised 
networks would mean that such supply would be more expensive to obtain; and that 
British companies would object to entering into long-term contractual arrangements to 
obtain supplies in emergency circumstances at prices which they might not consider 
reasonable. " 
220 Dti, Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon Economy, paras 1.32-1.34 
and 6.6, <http: //www. dti. gov. uk>; Dti, The Energy Review, Cabinet Office, Performance and 
Innovation Unit Report, February 2002, p. 56-57; Dti, Social, Environmental and Security of Supply 
Policies in a Competitive Energy Market -A Review of Delivery Mechanisms in the United Kingdom, 
May 2001, p. 24; Kemp, A. G.; Stephen, L., Prospect of gas supply and demand and their implications 
with special reference to the UK, in: Robinson, C., (ed. ), Competition and Regulation in Utility 
Markets, p. 116-117; Smith, S., Game over?, Utility week 12 November 2004, p. 20-21. 221 Brown, C., Keep the home fires burning, Utility week, 11 June 2004, p. 17. 222 Ibid. 
223 Brown, C., supra note, p. 17. 224 Stern, J., UK gas security: time to get serious, Energy Policy 32 (2004), p. 1973-1974. 
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Stern's argument is partly supported by others who maintain that the slow pace of 
liberalisation measures cost UK customers approximately Euro 4.5 billion 225 Some 
have claimed that the costs could exceed GBP 10 billion 226 
Contrary to this one could argue227 that UK energy policy in the last 20 years has set 
the wrong priorities given that gas resources were exploited to maximum potential 
coupled with a strong movement towards energy market liberalisation but with few 
incentives to encourage new pipeline projects to be built or to secure long-term gas 
supply to the UK as had been done in most other European markets. Apart from this 
one could further say that gas companies and the UK government incorrectly 
calculated how long the domestic gas resources will last 228 
The problems within the UK gas market became particularly apparent throughout the 
winter of 2005, during which there was a considerable gas shortage leading to 
temporary supply interruptions to some industrial gas users and soaring gas prices. 229 
As result of this market development Ofgem, the UK Energy Regulator, wrote to the 
EU Competition Directorate (DG COM) expressing concerns about record high gas 
prices in Great Britain during November and December 2005.230 Ofgem were 
concerned that with such high prices the Zeebrugge-Bacton Interconnector (IUK) was 
only operating at between 60% and 75% of capacity and that the new LNG terminal at 
the Isle of Grain had only received four shipments since July 2005. 
Ofgem recognised that the lack of beach availability of gas from UK gas fields might 
be a contributory factor and together with the UK Department of Trade and Industry 
225Energy Markets, Slow Pace of Reform is Costing European Gas Consumers £15 billion a year, 2004, 
<http: //www. energymarketes. eu. com/BrianPressRelease. php>. 
226 Platts, Closed European gas market could cost UK $ 18-bil in 2006 - study, 5 September 2005. 227 Süddeutsche Zeitung, Heimlicher Triumph für deutsche Gas-Manager, 22 November 2005 
228 This conclusion could be drawn by the National Grid, Gas Transportation Ten Year Statement 2005, 
33, <http: //nationalgrid. com>. 
29 The Times, Surge in gas price forces further factory cuts, 22 November 2005; Financial Times, 
Problems that could restrict flow of gas, 23 November 2005. 230 Mogg, J., Letter to Philip Low Esq, Competition Directorate General, 25 November 2005, 
<http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
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(Dti) were trying to reassure themselves that "all available gas is flowing to the GB 
Market". Ofgem identified three concrete actions, which could be initiated: 
- An analysis of whether there was gas and transportation capacity available to 
deliver more gas to the UK at the time and in the future; 
- An investigation into various problems within European gas markets; 
-A review of newly passed potentially distorting rule changes in the gas market. 
Ofgem also published an open letter to the Isle of Grain LNG Terminal owners raising 
concerns about the lack of transparency of "use-it-or-lose-it-capacity" (also referred to 
as `UIOLI') at the terminal. 231 If their concerns were not addressed they suggested 
reviewing the Grain exemption from regulated third party access arrangements. 32 
In this context it was also argued233 that it is not is not certain or known whether 
Continental storage back-up and transportation facilities are available in a security of 
supply incident and if so, at what price. 
This concern is partly based on the fact that in the future UK gas suppliers will need 
to source and transport more gas across numerous national boundaries by using 
different and limited available pipeline networks. Due to the fact that Continental 
European gas markets are often dominated by non-transparent and discriminatory 
behaviours, some UK shippers could therefore face disadvantageous market 
conditions which could make access to gas infrastructure more difficult to obtain and 
lead to higher prices which will ultimately be borne by UK consumers. 234 If, however, 
in the case of a security of supply incident (for instance on the way to the UK), a UK 
shipper could find it even more difficult to use an alternative route to the UK quickly. 
This is on the one hand partly caused by limited transparency about the real available 
231 Ofgem, Letter to Grain LNG, 21 November 2005, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
232 In addition Ofgem have published a fact sheet explaining gas price rises in which they also suggest 
they have asked Interconnector UK to provide information on who holds capacity this winter. Ofgem, 
Wholesale gas prices rises explained, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
233 Wybrew, J., in: Towards an Energy Policy, Helm, D. (ed. ), p. 211. 
234 Something that is partly argued by Stephen, L., Prospect of gas supply and demand and their 
implications with special reference to the UK, in: Robinson, C., (ed. ), Competition and Regulation in 
Utility Markets. p. 117. 
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capacity in the network system and their non-transparent conditions of the Continental 
gas markets. 235 On the other hand, as the overall gas demand and dependency is 
growing in the EU, 236 the overall gas infrastructure is not expanding to meet this 
demand; hence the overall physical availability of pipeline capacity is restricted. 
Some have already argued237 that capacity will not be sufficient to fulfill forecasted 
increases in world gas demand. 238 In this respect the previously made comments about 
UK energy policy failure become relevant. It could be correctly argued that UK 
energy policy failed to encourage investment in new infrastructure for a considerable 
period and created insufficient incentives to sign long-term supply contracts amongst 
energy utilities and suppliers. Recently developed infrastructure projects will take 
some time before they exert a considerable influence on the supply situation within 
the UK. Also, there are a number of regulatory and legal risks connected to these 
projects as it is not clear how the UK's network operator `National Grid' (Transco) 
will integrate those projects into its network planning. 239 
The UK will in particular be hit by this factor since (at this point) there is only one 
interconnection between the UK and the Continent. 240 This may cause supply 
interruptions to the UK, which will not only result in higher gas prices but also in 
overall gas shortfalls. A worse scenario could be that in an emergency on the 
Continent all gas flows through the Zeebrugge-Bacton Interconector are reversed and 
the UK gas market is left substantially short of gas, which will not only result in 
higher gas prices but also negative impact on the overall industry. The Directive 
concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supplies could worsen this 
235 This was particularly argued by UK's regulatory authority see, Ofgem, Winter 200/2006 - 
Experience to date, 21 March 2006, p. 4, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 236 Ibid.; see also, Seeliger, A., Angebotsoptionenfuer den europaeischen Erdgasmarkt: Augewählte 
Ergebnisse des Modells EUGAS bis 2025 - EWI-Working paper 1/2003, p. 13. 237 lEA, Security of Gas Supply in open Markets, LNG, Power at a Turning Point, Annexes - 
Governments & Other Stakeholders' Views, p. 232. 238 This view is supported by Wybrew, J., in: Towards an Energy Policy, Helm, D. (ed. ), p. 213-214 239 National Grid, Gas Transportation Ten Year Statement 2005, p. 53, <http: //nationalgrid. com>. 240 Currently the UK Gas Market is connected via the Bacton-Zeebrugge Interconnector; a further 
interconnected will be built between The Netherlands and the UK and will be fully operational by 
2006/2007, for further information see Gasunie, BBL Pipeline Project, September 18 2003, 
<http: //gasunie. nl/bbl/index. htm>. Even if there are going to be more interconnections to the UK this 
argument remains valid, as will be discussed further in this section of the survey. 
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situation. Under Art. 4 Member States are to protect their end-customers first before 
they deliver their gas elsewhere; Le. if a UK gas company is buying gas from 
Germany or The Netherlands and a security of supply incident occurs in one or both 
of these countries, according to the Directive, the gas selling companies must serve 
domestic customers first before they are allowed to deliver gas to other counterparties, 
located outside their domestic market. 
3. Provisional results: Physical gas supply interruption between the UK and the 
continental gas markets -a realistic scenario? 
Considering the above analysis, the following conclusion must be drawn: UK security 
of supply is, to a certain degree, limited because of the lack of liberalisation and 
harmonisation measures on the Continent as well as the lack of clear definition of the 
roles and responsibilities of gas market players and Member State Governments. But 
it also has to be acknowledged that UK energy policy did not take into consideration 
the fact that, once the UK became a net gas importer, more infrastructure and different 
gas procurement strategies would be needed. This misjudgment has now exerted a 
negative impact on consumer gas prices. 
However, it is further noteworthy - as argued241 - that a physical gas supply 
interruption between the UK and the Continental gas markets is unlikely to happen 
within the next few years because there are enough projects underway to secure 
supplies to UK gas markets. Nevertheless, there are - as outlined above - regulatory 
risks connected to these new projects due to the fact that it is not clear how these 
projects shall be integrated in the UK transportation system. Nevertheless Stem 
241 Stem, J., Security of Natural Gas Supply, Response to Consultation Document: Energy policy: Key 
Issues for Consultation, DEFRA, dti, DTLR, May 2002, 
<http//: www. dti. gov. uk/energy/developep/royal_ins_of int affairs. pdf>, p. 2. 
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claims that these projects are too numerous in relation to the limited demand, i. e. there 
will be an oversupply within the UK gas market in the coming years. 242 
Therefore it may be expected that there will be no serious gas shortfalls within the UK 
gas market but that prices will be higher compared to the Continent if a security of 
supply incident happens. From a UK perspective therefore, an overall equal level of 
liberalisation, harmonisation and security of supply must be reached across the EU. 
However, it must also be said that the aims of the first and Second Gas Directives 
were not to have one country, which fully liberalises its market, to pay for the limited 
liberalisation endeavours of the other countries. In other words one-sided liberalised 
markets do not work if markets are interconnected and depend upon each other. 
242Stern, J.; Ilonore, A.; Large Scale Investments in Liberalized Gas Markets: The Case of UK, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies - Gas Research Programme, CGEMP - OME Workshop, 16 June 2004, 
working paper and presentation, <http: //www. oxfordenergy. org/gasprog. shtml>. 
86 
Chapter B- Security of gas supply in EU gas markets 
VII. Security of supply in the German and Austrian Gas Markets - 
an illustrative analysis of security of supply laws and possible 
problems in a supply incident. 
The above analysis leads to the subsequent query about how the security of supply 
measures in some Member States work and whether Member State legislation, market 
practice and EU legislation lead to more security within and between Member Sates. 
This survey will look at the German and Austrian security of gas supply regimes 
because both markets are dependent on each other, connected via two important 
pipelines, and both are major gas importing countries from Non-EU Member 
States. 243 A failure of one of these aforementioned pipelines could have a substantial 
influence on both markets and possibly other Member State markets. Therefore it is 
relevant to this survey to analyse these Member Sates' security of gas supply 
standards and to elaborate whether the existing standards are harmonised enough to 
limit or/and prevent possible security of supply incidents. 
The legislation on security of supply in both countries will be analysed and discussed 
to see whether these rules allow the resolution of a security of supply incident 
between both countries. This examination will be followed by a discussion as to 
whether Council Directive 2004/67/EC could improve the current regime in both 
Member States. 
243 See Map of Germany and Austria, Appendix 3. The two connecting pipeline points are: a) WAG 
(Austria) - Burghausen (border point) - Penta West (Germany); b) WAG (Austria) - Oberkappeln 
(border point) - MEGAL (Germany). 
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1. Security of supply in Germany 
Security of energy supply has been on the political agenda in Germany for many 
decades. The oil crisis in the seventies, the reunification in 1990 and the introduction 
of liberalisation measures in the energy markets in 1998 lead to changes in the 
security of supply legislation in Germany. 244 
Energy legislation in Germany referring to security of supply rests on numerous laws. 
This legislation can be categorised in three main areas: 
- security of supply with regard to oil, 
- security of supply with regard to coal, and 
- security of supply with regard to electricity and gas. 
Legislation245 relating to security of gas supply, can be found in: 
- the Energy Security Act of 1975246 (Energiessicherungsgesetz, hereinafter 
'EnSG'); and 
- the Energy Act of 2005247 (Energiewirtschafisgesetz, hereinafter 'EnWG') 
The following section will analyse existing legal framework and draw conclusions 
about the security of supply mechanisms within Germany and its neighbouring 
countries. 
244 See for instance a government policy paper: Bundesregierung, Energiepolitik für das vereinte 
Deutschland, 11 December 1991, Bundestags Drucksache 12/1799; Bundesregierung, Perspektiven für 
Deutschland - Unsere Strategien fuer eine nachhaltige Entwicklung, p. 162, 
<http: //www. bundesregierung. de/Anlage658805/Gesamtentwurf pdt>. 
245 This survey however will focus on security of supply legislation that relate to gas. For a full 
description of all security of supply legislations see: Lippert, M., Energiewirtschaftrecht: 
Gesamtdarstellung fuer Wissenschaft und Praxis, p. 675-695; Corino, C., Energy Law in Germany, p. 
10,24,53,81. 
246 Gesetz zur Sicherung der Energieversorgung bei Gefährdung oder Störung der Einfuhr von Erdöl, 
Erdölerzeugnissen oder Erdgas (Energiesicherungsgesetz 1975), vom 20. Dezember 1975, BGBl. 1974 
13681. 
247 Zweites Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 7. Juli 2005, BGBl. Jahrgang 
2005 Teil I Nr. 42, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 12. Juli 2005. 
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a) Security of supply regulations under the En WG 
A definition of "security of supply" within the German energy legislation can be 
found in section 1 of the Energy Act - EnWG - where it is stated that the act aims 
inter alia to make the supply of electricity and gas via supply lines "as secure as 
possible". It is unclear what the wording of section 1 means. It could mean both long- 
term security and/or short-term network reliability. However, the law itself does not 
define security of supply as the Council Directive 2004/67/EC does in Art. 2(2 . ). 
248 A 
hint on what the term might mean is given in the justification 249 for the former 
German Energy Act of 1998250 it is stated that security means "at first a sufficient 
supply for consumers. " Therefore this survey believes that the 2005 EnWG intends to 
protect the consumer when it comes to security of supply issues. 251 This is also reflect 
in section 53a of the EnWG where in a security of supply incident energy supply 
companies are obliged to continue supply to their end-customers as long it is 
"economical feasible". It is not explained what the term `economical feasible' means, 
which can obviously result in different interpretations of the law and therefore 
uncertainties in particular in moments where an actual security of supply incident 
occurs. Nevertheless, the law itself does provide some form of end-consumer 
protection, which is in line with the analysed security of supply Directive. 252 
Another consumer protection clause with reference to security of supply can be found 
in section 4 (2) of the EnWG. Under this provision the permit to supply customers can 
be refused inter alia if the supplier cannot guarantee a secure supply. 253 The basis for 
248 See above. 
249 BT-Drucksache 13/7274, IL 4. zu Paragraph 1. 250Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 24. April 1998, BGBI. 1998 1739, BGBI. 
200112785. 
251 Tettinger, P. J., Zum Theman Sicherheit" im Energierecht, 
RdE 9/2002, p. 226. 
252 fiere Art. 4 of the Security of Supply Directive. 
253 Secure supply is not further defined in the German Energy Act. However, according to Article 2 No 
7 of the 2nd Gas Directive 2003/55/EC supply means "the sale, including resale, of natural gas, 
including LNG, to customers. " 
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not granting a supply license may be technical, financial or economic. 254 Indeed this 
clause has to be identified as a consumer protection clause. But this article would not 
help in a real security of supply incident because usually such an event can only 
happen if a permit was already issued. Nevertheless, it is argued that under this 
section supply permission could be withdrawn if a supplier proved to be unreliable 
during or after a security of supply incident. 255 However, this would only partially 
protect the end-customer and the law does not regulate all the operational, legal and 
economic issues that relate to a security of supply incident. For instance, it is not clear 
whether the transmission system operator must continue supply the end-customer, if a 
supplier has lost its supply licence because he has become bankrupt, for example. 
Section 7 (2) EnWG, which deals with the general duty to connect and supply 
customers, does not deal with this scenario either. A right to be supplied by another 
supply company cannot be deduced from section 36 or 38 because these provisions 
only apply to electricity and do not deal directly with issues such a bankruptcy of a 
supplier. An obligation to continue supplying cannot be found in section 15 (3) due to 
the fact that it deals only with technical maintenance of the networks, which falls 
under the obligations of the network system operator. Therefore significant 
uncertainty remains for cases as described above which can create situations where 
customers could be left without gas supplies, which happened in the Dutch power 
market in 2003.256 
However, as briefly mentioned above the EnWG puts numerous obligations on the 
German network operators that aim to ensure the security of supply. These security of 
supply `duties' are defined in the following areas: 
254 For more explanation on the reasons for not grating a supply licensee see Büdenbender, U., 
Schwerpunkte der Energierechtsreform 1998, p. 228-230. iss Tettinger, supra note, p. 228. 
256 In August 2003 an independent Dutch power supplier `EnergyXS' went bankrupt and left its 
customers without a supplier and, most importantly, without a supply-programme for a couple of days; 
for more information see Knops, H. P. A., Securing Dutch Electricity supply: Towards a supplier of last 
resort?, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report I, p. 243. 
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- According to section 15 (1) EnWG transmission system operators are 
nationally and internationally required to ensure through cooperation that 
overall security of supply in their network is supported and ensured. As far as 
the domestic networks are concerned transmission system operators have to 
engage in cooperation contracts where the actual transportation is harmonised 
and coordinated. Therefore these duties can be inferred from this survey's 
point of view, to the general obligation on transmission system operators to 
support the overall security of supply. Nevertheless as far as the international 
obligations are concerned there is no further references to security of supply 
obliges, which from this survey's point of view is a shortfall of this legislation 
as the security of supply is an important issue for the majority of Member 
States and therefore must to be coordinated on a pan-European basis. 
- However, if a domestic security of supply incident, for instance, was to occur 
the transmission system operators can inter alia use `network related 
measures' in order to overcome the situation . 
257 The law does not explain any 
further what these measures shall include nor how the organisation with other 
non-German network operators should be undertaken. Again, the pan- 
European impacts of security of supply in conjunction with gas transportation 
were not acknowledged. 
- Network operators also have a reporting obligation to the regulatory 
authorities about any security of supply incidents that occurred over the year 
under section 52 of the EnWG. 
Given the above security of supply standards it is uncertain whether the provisions 
will allow Germany to deal properly with a real security of supply incident. 258 Some 
commentators assert that the legislation endorses security of supply guarantees 
2571Iere section 16 (2) 1. 
2 8König, C. et a!., Versorgungssicherheit im Wettbewerb - Ein Vergleich der 
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen, französischen und deutschen Energierechtsordnungen, ZNER 1/2003, p. 9. 
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(partly) through competition. 259 It is difficult to follow this argument. We have seen 
that at this stage the majority of Member States cannot deliver security of supply 
purely by competition. It has been argued that competition may have negative impacts 
on overall security of supply. 
Other commentators argue260 that the EnWG provides a further security of supply 
instrument under section 50 No. lb. Under this provision the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology - with the approval of the upper house ("Bundesrat") - 
can issue decrees under which companies are inter alia obliged to hold necessary 
stocks of gas for 30 days, in order to fulfill their commitment to deliver gas to their 
customers or for their own needs. 
Section 50 No. lb does however not address a sudden and unpredicted interruption, as 
we have seen in the aforementioned supply transmission suspension between Russia 
and the Ukraine which had a knock-on effect on the supply and transmission situation 
in several EU Member States. 261 In such a case the measures under section 50 No. lb 
would not be useful because the necessary decrees are not passed within hours, days 
or weeks. Even if a decree were to be passed quickly, the instruments under section 50 
No. lb would most likely not overcome a sudden security of supply incident. If, for 
instance, a major pipeline explosion happens, the entire market would be short of gas 
due in particular to transport in capacities. 262 Therefore the shortages of gas could not 
even be matched easily by back up gas sources because there is limited transport 
capacity or no capacity available. Further more section 50 No. lb does not allow the 
Federal Government to deal with and regulate the pipeline capacity shortages. 
Also, section 50 No. lb does not provide any detail on what the role of all market 
players shall be in such an incident. This creates uncertainties for all market players 
and could cause chaos and difficulties in the management of the network system 
during a security of supply incident. Section 50 No. lb would only work in security of 
259 Koenig, C. et al, supra note, p. 8. 
260 Lippert, M., supra note, p. 680. 
261 See above. 
262 Particularly at times when, as stated above, most of Europe's gas networks are already short of 
pipeline capacity. 
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supply scenarios that are more or less foreseeable, such as uprising tension or 
conflicts between nations. Another possible scenario is imaginable in that case where 
the national regulatory authority - as part of its monitoring obligation263 - has 
forecasted possible future security of supply problems. 
In summary, the EnWG does not provide precise regulation on how to deal with a 
sudden and unforeseen security of supply incident. It does not contain sufficient 
legislative detail on the roles and responsibilities of market players nor the 
government. Therefore the market is left with many uncertainties that relate to 
security of supply incidents. 
References to any intra-community security of supply measures are completely 
absent. 
Overall this legislation is unable to provide incentives or measures to adequately 
manage a security of supply incident. 
b) Security of supply regulations under the EnSG 
Other legislative instruments, which relate to security of gas supply within Germany, 
can be found in the Energy Security Act ("EnSG"). The EnSG governs where imports 
of oil, oil products or gas are at risk and when "market measures" are not sufficient 
enough to overcome these risks (section 1(1) EnSG). The law, which used to deal 
only with import supply issues has - after September, 11 - been extended to include 
domestic security of supply incidents. " In the case of import and domestic incidents, 
the Federal Government can pass decrees that allow legislative instruments to 
overcome these import shortfalls. These instruments refer not only to storage facilities 
but also to transportation networks as well as to the roles of TSOs. 
However, it is essential to look at the factual elements of section 1, which requires 
that on the one hand, the energy supply is at immediate risk or already interrupted and 
263 Here Section 51. 
264 Tettinger, supra note, p. 230. 
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on the other hand, the risks or interruption cannot be dealt with by appropriate market 
measures. 
Neither the clause itself nor other sources define and explain what the triggering 
elements - such as "immediate risks, "already interrupted" or "market 
measurements", mean. Lippert 265 argues that a pure supply risk or some supply 
interruptions do not always fulfill the elements of an "immediate risk". Further 
explanations however are missing. Section 1 EnSG creates loopholes and leaves room 
for interpretation. A definition is crucial in the context of a security of supply incident 
because it is uncertain when the Federal Government is entitled or obliged to step in 
to take the necessary measures to overcome a security of supply incident. 
With this wording, the law makes it difficult for third parties to prove possible 
liabilities and responsibilities where the government has not reacted quickly enough to 
a security of supply incident. The law, for instance, could have defined at what 
percentage of the overall market supply constitutes a shortfall. It should have also set 
standards for what actions are required by market players. 
Even if the Federal Government sets out rules in an immediate security of supply 
incident it is not clear whether all market players will be able to implement a 
government decree. To ensure that the situation is handled properly a constant 
exchange of information and consultation between all involved parties is essential. 
But the law is missing any requirements on the government and market players to 
communicate with each other and provide essential market information such as 
pipeline capacities, congestion points, storage availability etc in contrast to the 
Mineral Oil Data Act ("Mineralöldatengesetz")266. This is essential information 
during a security of supply incident. The lack of communication and flow of 
information between the Government and all market players has to be identified as a 
265 Lippert, supra note, p. 684 
2 Gesetz über die Erhebung von Meldungen in der Mineralölwirtschaft - Mineralöldatengesetz 
(MinOlDatG), vom 20.12.1988 (BGBI. I S. 2353), zul. geändert durch das Gesetz vom 10. November 
2001 (BGBI. I 2992). The law sets minimum standards regarding what oil producers, transporters and 
suppliers have to report to the government. As Tettinger argues these standards mean that the Federal 
Government can ensure a certain level of information necessary is provided during a supply incident. 
Tettinger, supra note, p. 229. 
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shortfall in the law and leaves the market with uncertainties. This is particularly true 
for the involved market players, because it is unclear what kind of role they might 
have during a security of supply incident. They cannot prepare for an incident because 
the law is missing any minimum and harmonised standards. 
Looking at the question of whether the Federal Government is asked to cooperate or 
to seek cooperation with neighbouring Member States, the law leaves this issue 
untouched. This has to be identified as another weakness in the legislation because 
pipeline failures can lead to major supply problems not only in the domestic but also 
in neighbouring countries, to give one example. This even more so because the 
European pipeline networks are so intermeshed and dependent on each other. The 
above case study of the UK and its dependency on the development in the Continental 
gas markets illustrates this fact. 
Apart from this, the law is not flexible enough to act quickly on a sudden and 
unforeseen security of supply incident because decrees are not passed quickly enough 
to react immediately to any kind of incident. This argument is based on the fact that 
the law does not provide for any precise actions in a security supply incident. Usually 
supply interruptions will cause complex supply scenarios where the supervisory body 
(here the government) needs access to all the relevant market information. But as 
mentioned above, the provision for exchange of information is missing. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that the EnSG does not provide appropriate tools to 
deal quickly and efficiently with a sudden and unpredicted security of supply incident. 
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2. Security of gas supply in Austria 
The following section will examine the security of supply legislation and situation in 
the Austrian gas market. 
The dependency on gas has increased significantly in Austria over the last decades. 267 
Most of the needed gas has to be imported from outside Austria. 268 Austria is also 
important for gas transit to Germany and Italy. 269 
Therefore the issue of security of supply is important for the Austrian legislator, the 
gas industry and its neighbouring countries. 
Contrary to Germany, Austria had and has a different approach to dealing with 
security of supply issues in the legislative context. 
a) Voluntary emergency agreement before the introduction of energy liberalisation 
Before the introduction of the Austrian Gas Act270 in 2000, which set the cornerstone 
for the liberalisation of the Austrian Gas Market, the shareholders of the Austrian gas 
company AFG27' signed a voluntary emergency gas supply agreement 
("Notversorgungsplan") with the producer and storage operators OMV AG and RAG 
AG in 1970.272 
The aim of the voluntary agreement was to "continue to maintain security of gas 
supplies of all users during a problem of gas sourcing. , 273 It was unclear what "all 
267 E-control, Methodik der Erdgasbilanz, Erdgasbilanz 2003, Analyse und Diskussion von 
Datenmodell und Ergebnissen, Wien, September 2004, <http: //www. e-control. at>, p. 11,23,32 
268 Ibid. 
269 See Map and chart - Appendix 3. 270 Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (GWG), 121 Bundesgeset: Energieliberalisierungsgesetz, Jahrgang 2000, 
ausgegeben am 1. Dezember 2000, Teil 1. 
271 AFG refers to Austrian Ferngas, which was founded in 1962 as a coordination point between the 
state gas companies. Because of the introduction of liberalisation measurements AFG no longer exists 
in this role. 
272 E-Control, Erdgasversorgungssicherheit in Österreich - Rahmenbedingungen und 
I landlungsempfehlungen, November 2003, <http: //www. e-control. at>, p. 38. 
273 Ibid., p. 40-41. 
96 
Chapter B- Security of gas supply in EU gas markets 
users" meant, i. e. did this mean only domestic or also international gas users that were 
dependent on Austrian gas supplies. From the content and structure of the agreement 
"users" only referred to domestic (Austrian) users. 
The voluntary agreement included three different steps to deal with gas supply 
emergencies. 274 However, the voluntary agreement focused on domestic security of 
supply tools only and did not take coordinating and communicating with 
neighbouring gas markets into consideration. This is a shortfall of the agreement 
because - as mentioned above - security of supply tools in one Member State can 
have - if used - an effect on neighbouring gas markets. This is particularly true for 
Austria since it a supply route for the German and Italian gas markets. 
Through the introduction of liberalisation measures the participants of the voluntary 
emergency supply agreement decided not to continue with their arrangement because 
they no longer felt responsible for organising the overall security of supply situation. 
The agreement terminated at the end of 2002. 
b) Security of supply under the Austrian Natural Gas Act - GWG 
The Austrian Natural Gas Act (hereinafter "GWG") contains of numerous clauses that 
deal with security of supply. 
Similar to the German Energy Act, the GWG states that security of energy supply 
shall be one of the main objectives of the legislation. However, there is no precise 
definition of what constitutes a security of supply incident. Section 6 No 21 states - in 
accordance with the Second Gas Directive - that "security means both security of 
supply and technical safety. " This kind of wording could mean long-term security 
and/or short-term network reliability. As already mentioned, it is important to have a 
precise definition for a security of supply incident. This would help to lay the legal 
274 For a detailed description of the no-longer valid steps see E-Control, supra note, p. 42-44. 
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basis for when the Government or the competent regulatory authorities were allowed 
to take security of supply measures. 
Under the GWG the roles and responsibilities of TSOs - with respect to security of 
supply measures - are not precisely defined. TSOs only have to meet the objectives of 
the legislation, which are inter alia security of supply. Furthermore TSOs are entitled 
to refuse TPA, if the a TPA request will hinder the TSO from fulfilling its legislative 
obligations with respect to security of supply (section 19 in conjunction with section 
3). 
Apart from this TSOs and Distribution System Operators (hereinafter "DSO") are 
responsible for operating their network systems in accordance with the latest technical 
standards in order to facilitate security, reliability and efficiency (sections 24,31 and 
31a GWG). This refers to the technical reliability of the networks. 
Balancing Zone Operators (hereinafter "BZO") have to cooperate with TSOs to 
overcome congestion that could lead to security of supply problems (section 12b 
GWG). Furthermore the BZOs are obliged to forecast what kind of energy supply will 
be needed in the future in order to avoid security of supply incidents due to, for 
instance, when higher gas demand cannot be met by higher pipeline capacities 
(paragraph 12 b GWG) 
. 
275 These obligations on BZOs and TSOs have to be 
welcomed because they introduce some clarity to congestion management issues, 
which is an important tool for security of supply. However, these obligations do not 
state what duties apply to BZOs and TSOs during a security of supply incident. It is 
also interesting to analyse what part the Austrian energy regulator (hereinafter "E- 
control") plays. According to section 38e GWG, in conjunction with section 16 of the 
Energy Regulatory Act (Energieregegulierungsbehördengesetz - E-RBG)276, E- 
Control is obliged to enforce market participants obligations as described above. 
ns The GWG does not define any other roles and obligations for the market participants. 276 Energieregegulierungsbehördengesetz 
- E-RBG vom ... BGBI. 
I Nr. 121/2000 in der Form BGBl. I 
Nr. 148/2002. 
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However, the regulator is not entitled to take necessary steps if congestion or a real 
security of supply problem occurs. 77 
From this survey's point of view, this has to be seen as a shortfall, in particular 
because the regulatory authorities are often closer to the markets and are usually 
equipped with the appropriate knowledge to deal quickly with a market problem such 
as a security of supply incident. Apart from this, the responsibilities of market players 
are vaguely defined and leave uncertainties. Therefore it must be concluded that the 
law does not provide appropriate mechanisms to deal quickly with security of supply 
problems. 
c) Security of supply measures under the Austrian Energy Steering Act 
Similar to the security of supply tools under the German EnSG, the Austrian Energy 
steering Act (Energielenkungsgesetz)278 gives power to the Federal Government in a 
security of supply incident. Most of these rights are equivalent to those of the German 
EnSG. However, there are shortfalls, which are relevant for subsequent sections. 
Similar to the German legislation it must be noted that the Federal Government will 
only be able to deal with an energy supply problem if the problem was foreseen, 
otherwise the tools provided by the law will not allow the Government to deal quickly 
with the problem. Similarly there are no requirements on TSOs to provide necessary 
data such as pipeline availability, congestion in the network or, flow directions and 
volumes shipped through the network system. This is also a deficit because the law 
does not allow the regulatory authority to take any action in a security of supply 
incident. As far as cooperation measures between Member State Governments are 
concerned, it must be stated that the law does not include any rules, obligations or 
policy tools. 
277 E-Control, supra note, p. 51. 278 Energielenkungsgesetz 1982, BGBl. 1 Nr. 545/1982. 
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Overall the law will neither allow increased security of supply nor will it have the 
tools to deal with a sudden and not unpredicted supply incident. 
3. What could happen in a security of supply incident between Germany and 
Austria? 
The above discussion raises the question of what could happen if a gas supply 
problem was occurs between Germany and Austria and whether the existing security 
of supply standards in both countries would help to limit or overcome possible 
security of supply incidents. 
One possible scenario is the case where transit gas within one of the Eastern European 
countries is interrupted (e. g. because of technical or political reasons). This by itself 
would not necessarily mean an immediate supply problem because immediate 
measures, like gas withdrawal from storage, could serve as a counter measure to 
overcome any system shortages for a short while. It could become a problem if the 
interruption lasts longer than a week or a month. 
In the aforementioned case it is likely that an eastern European TSO would report to 
its Austrian counter party that it would not be able to deliver the gas at the (east) 
Austrian border (i. e. Baumgarten). However, it is not clear what happens after that. 
None of the following connecting TSOs have standardised and published procedures 
in place on how to deal with this case. Neither does the aforementioned legislation 
oblige the TSO to report immediately to its customers that there is an interruption of 
gas supplies. This scenario is governed by non-standardised and not publicly available 
transportation contracts that TSOs have signed with their network users, and the 
connection agreements (if they exist) with the connecting TSOs. This could lead to a 
difficult supply situation in particular for third parties that do not have immediate 
access to all the relevant network information. Third parties need to find prompt 
alternatives for their allocated gas and transportation routes in order to meet their 
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supply obligations. Third parties risk high penalties in this scenario because they 
might not be able to meet their supply commitments. This could lead to disadvantaged 
market conditions. 
Additionally, it is not clear in what form nor when TSOs have to communicate to 
competent authorities that a shortage exists in their network. Any of the 
aforementioned legislative tools would be useless if the authorities do not know about 
the problems quickly enough, in particular because there are no penalties in place for 
untimely (i. e. without delays) communication by TSOs to Government Authorities. 
Looking at these results and the legislative measures analysed above, it must be stated 
that the legislative tools are not sufficient to provide real guidance on how the two 
countries may overcome a supply incident that affects both. None of the legislation 
includes the co-operation measures or establishes coordination groups that could deal 
ad hoc with a supply problem. Neither do they include the regular exchange of crucial 
market data that could help to overcome a supply issue. Furthermore, none of the 
legislation provides any details or rules on how TSOs should undertake their role in 
supply incidents; not to mention who should pay for any extra incurred costs. 
Although it is common legal and governmental practice that legislators direct third 
parties to fulfill governmental duties (e. g. traffic control), the legislator needs to 
provide sufficient legal mechanisms to create a stable legal environment for the third 
party to act properly. The current German and Austrian legislation is far from 
providing this stable legal environment by leaving the many uncertainties, described 
above. 
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4. What are the implications of Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning 
measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply on the German and 
Austrian security of supply legislation and what are the market implications? 
The outcome of the above analysis raises a question about what the implications of 
Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural 
gas supply are on the security of supply regimes in the German and Austrian market. 
This question is the subject of the subsequent section. 
According to Art. 3 (1., 2. ) of the Council Directive 2004/67/EC Austria and Germany 
are required to define the roles and responsibilities of the different market players 
with respect to security of supply. Both countries left to the market itself or the 
Government to define those roles after an incident occurred. The advantage of 
defining the roles beforehand is that Governments can investigate whether market 
players will be able to handle their "security of supply role". However - as stated 
above - the legislation does not give any guidance on how each Member State must 
define harmonised, transparent and coordinated rules and responsibilities for TSOs 
that are not counterproductive, yet enhance overall EU wide security of supply. If, for 
instance, Austria allows TSOs to charge extra security of supply fees on top of 
transportation charges, this could result in the TSOs storing extra gas or building extra 
pipeline capacities, to be used in a security of supply incident. However, these extra 
fees might not be recognised by the neighbouring German TSOs and therefore the risk 
exists that a shipper has to pay double security of supply fees in each Member State 
although he has only imported gas once into the European Union. This could lead to 
trade barriers and restrict basic community rights (such as the free movement of 
goods). 
Another possible scenario might be coordination during a supply incident. This refers, 
for instance, to the cutting off of firm and interruptible customers. The German TSOs 
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for instance might be entitled to cut off all supplies to neighbouring EU countries - no 
matter whether these supplies were agreed on a firm or interruptible basis. This would 
allow Germany to protect its domestic market but not take into consideration that this 
interruption could have negative results in neighbouring EU countries. 
However, neighbouring EU-TSOs might be entitled to only cut off interruptible 
capacity bookings and must continue supplying firm bookings. This could lead to 
unfair market conditions in particular for interconnected EU States such as Germany 
and Austria. 
From the Council Directive 2004/67/EC it is not clear how Member Sates should 
overcome these different implementation scenarios that may have severe effects on 
the security of supply situation. Art. 4 (5. ) allows Member States that are 
interconnected to cooperate when it comes to a security of supply incident. But there 
is no legal obligation to engage in such cooperation. In this respect the Gas 
Coordination Group (Art. 7) could have helped to find common criteria that apply for 
interconnected countries. However, this Group has no legal authority either. 
Some other measures such as the reporting obligation under Art. 5 need to be 
implemented by both countries but this does not have any implications on cross- 
border transportation problems for to security of supply discussed above. 
In line with what has been stated, Council Directive 2004/67/EC will not provide any 
new tools that will improve the overall security of supply situation unless Member 
States are willing to cooperate and agree on harmonised security of supply standards. 
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VIII. Conclusions and summary 
Given the above analysis, of the security of supply situation of Europe's gas market 
where the markets are not fully liberalised and not harmonised, the following must be 
said: 
- It has to be acknowledged that there is much debate amongst Member States 
and the Commission to introduce harmonised policies for security of supply 
standards. The main reason for this debate is that it is believed that harmonised 
standards would make the changing, and import dependent EU energy markets 
more secure. However, currently all EU Member States have either non- 
harmonised or no security of supply measures. 279 As the Commission280 and 
others281 point out, this is the case because of the different needs and market 
structures of each individual Member State when it comes to security of 
supply. 
- Due to the fact that there is no harmonised and fully liberalised European 
Energy market, the supply and demand situation and the overall market 
organisation and structure vary substantially within the European Union gas 
markets. Each Member State therefore has to take different action in order to 
meet its own and overall energy needs. 82 Where some countries such as The 
Netherlands have enough indigenous gas production in order to supply 
themselves and others, some countries - such as Germany - need to import 
massive volumes of gas in order to meet their national demand. 
279 European Commission, Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply" COM(2000) 769 final, p. 10-11,68-69,80-81. 280 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
concerning measures to safeguard security of supply, COM(2002) 488 final, p. 50. 281 Luciani, G., Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets - lChat is it and what is it not?, INDES Working Papers No. 2, <http: //www. ceps. be>, p. 3. 282 For an overview on the different market security of supply standards see: IEA, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets - LNG and Power at a turning point, Annexes: Governments & Other Stakeholders' view, p. 17-71. 
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- Whereas these points have to be acknowledged, it also has to be said that most 
Member States' gas markets are intermeshed and depend upon each other. 
This interdependency could result in a difficult supply situation for one or 
more Member States. If, for instance, one Member State has to trigger its 
security of supply measures without coordination with its neighbouring 
countries, this could then result in a negative chain reaction such as we saw in 
the massive power blackout on the east cost of the United States and Canada. 
Here a few problems in a rotten transmission system in one state resulted in 
massive blackouts in neighbouring states. 283 System failures like this, with no 
real clarity over who is responsible and liable for what, can result in 
difficulties in the aftermath of supply failure. Unresolved and difficult legal 
and economic issues for all market players, including the end-consumer, are 
incurred 
. 
284 The non-harmonisation of security of supply standards may also 
lead to discrimination between different markets. For instance, some countries 
apply an extra security of supply levy on gas transport. These charges may not 
be recognised in other countries and a new charge may then be applied. The 
shipper ends up paying two security of supply charges for the same volume of 
gas. 
- Apart from this the Second Gas Directive and the Security of Supply Directive 
are missing numerous elements and/or are non-practical for sudden and 
unpredicted security of supply incidents. They also do not provide clarity on 
who is responsible for what as far as security of supply is concerned. This is of 
special importance during the transition period from non-liberalised and non- 
283EIA, U. S. -Canada Power Outage Task Force, 19 November 2003, 
<http: //www. eia. doe. gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/at_a_glancelstates/statesny. html>. 284 See for negative impacts on the aftermath of a security of supply incident. Rooney, G.; Albano, Of Blackouts and Lawsuits, Class-action claims for widespread utility service interruptions are a growing 
trend, Public Utilities Fortnightly, July 2004, p. 36-41; also American Power Conversion, The Problem 
with Power, <http//: www. apc. com/power/problems. cfm>, p. 2; The Guardian, Heatwave brings power 
cuts in Spain, June 30,2004, <httpJ/www. guardian. co. uk/spain>; EL Mundo, Los cortes en Fracia y el 
record de demanda djaan la red electrica al Limite, 29 June 2004; Utility Week, Damhead sparks 
major row, Utility Week 15 October 2004, p. 5. 
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competitive markets to fully open and competitive market structures as we 
have seen in countries like the UK. 
- Worthwhile highlighting is also the fact that the introduction of liberalisation 
and competition is not a threat to security of supply. Fully liberalised markets 
such as the UK are, however, under some security of supply uncertainty as 
long as their neighbouring countries are not on the same level as they are. 
- The case study about the security of supply standards in Germany and Austria 
proves the fact that little or nothing has been done to coordinate security of 
supply standards between both Member States. It also shows that the existing 
legislation is not useful for real security of supply incidents as we have seen in 
the past and will most likely see in the future. 
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Commission's decisions sufficient to create a 
harmonised and liberalised EU gas market? 
There is much debate among European legislators, Member State Governments and 
stakeholders about whether the existing EU legislation is sufficient to create a fully 
harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. Some are of the view that the existing 
laws and treaties do not provide the basis for creating such a market. Others are of the 
opinion that the existing legislation is sufficient and warn of an over-regulated 
market, which will be counterproductive to overall EU energy policy aims. 
The following chapter will set the background for the analysis and comparison of the 
Dutch, Austrian and German gas sectors by discussing and outlining the 
fundamentals, origins, key elements and the problems of the current EU legislation 
and EU Commission decisions. This discussion aims to highlight the difficulties in the 
creation of a harmonised and liberalised internal market as well as the question of 
whether more must be done to create such a market. This discussion and analysis is 
relevant because the differences and similarities in the origins, legal implications, and 
the gas sector structures of the three EU Member Sates must be understood within the 
context of the thesis. 
The chapter will undertake the analysis in the following way: 
(1. ) First, there will be a short overview of the existing EU Treaties. In this 
context it will be discussed how this legislation contributes to the creation of 
a single, harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
(2. ) Following this analysis this survey will then emphasise the key elements of 
the Second Gas Directive 2003/55/EC (hereinafter `Directive') and the EU 
Gas Transmission Regulation. 285 The core elements and problems within the 
Directive and Gas Transmission Regulation will be highlighted and 
285 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks, COM(2003) 741 final, 2003/0302 (COD), 2005. 
107 
Chapter C- EU legislation and EU Commission's decisions 
discussed. In this respect the main focus of the analysis will be the question 
of whether the core elements of the Directive and Gas Transmission 
Regulation are sufficient to create a harmonised and liberalised EU gas 
market, and whether it can produce a sufficient balance between Member 
Countries' legal systems and industry structures. 
(3. ) The thesis will then discuss the Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for 
Storage System Operators (herein after `GGPSSO' or `storage Guidelines') 286 
and their influence on better and standardised third party access conditions to 
storage facilities. 
(4. ) Following this analysis, two decisions and the energy sector inquiry of 2005 
by the EU Commission will be examined to assess whether these rulings 
support the creation of a harmonised and liberalised pan-European gas 
market. 
(5. ) Furthermore, this thesis will discuss the European Energy Regulators Group 
for Electricity and Gas decision to establish regional EU gas markets. 
(6. ) Finally, this chapter will then conclude with an overview of the missing 
elements of the legal frame work that could create a single European gas 
market. 
I. EU Treaties: A sufficient legal basis for the creation of a 
harmonised and liberalised EU gas market? 
The following part analyses the existing EU treaties and their implication for the 
creation of a single, harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. This analysis is 
important in order to discover whether the Treaties provide a sufficient legal basis for 
the creation of a harmonised and liberalised European gas market. This discussion is 
also relevant because it highlights that there is diversity among Member States' 
legislation and the reason why it took so long to agree on the First and Second Gas 
Directives. 
286 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for Storage System Operators (GGPSSO), 23 March 2005. 
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From the Treaties of the European Community (Treaty of Rome287, Maastrich 
Treaty288, and the Treaty of Amsterdam289) the issue of reciprocity, strictly speaking, 
should not exist inside the European Community. Nevertheless the principle is a 
fundamental element of EU law, the obligations and rights of the Treaties - as 
emphasised290 - fall equally on all markets, market players and Member States within 
the EU. This refers in particular to the basic principles of the Treaties: free movement 
of goods, services, capital and persons without distortion of competition. 
However, as pointed out by others29', this was not the case for the European Energy 
Sector for two reasons: first of all, the energy industry was exempt for many years 
from EU policies and legislation and secondly energy legislation as well as energy 
policy was left to each Member State. This remained the case for many years. 292 
As a result of the policy and legislative exemption each Member State's legal 
framework has produced different market structures. 293 The Maastrich Treaty 
mentions for the first time in Art. 3 that "measures in the sphere of energy" should be 
included in the overall goals of the Community. Nevertheless - as pointed out294 - the 
Treaty's provision does not create any competencies on an EU level. Apart from this, 
the Treaty does not provide any details on what the roles and responsibilities of the 
EU Commission, Council or Parliament in this crucial area should be. 295 
287 European Union, Selected Instruments taken from the Treaties, Book 1, Vol. 1 (Germany: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993). 288 Treaty on the European Union, Maastrich (Germany: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1992). 
289 Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on the European Union, (Germany: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997). 290 Klom, A. M., The Liberalisation of Regulated Markets and its consequences for Trade: the Internal Market for Electricity as a case study, 14 (1) JENRL 7 (1996). 291 Wolf, D., Die Liberalisierung der europäischen Energiemärkte, 28/29 BB 1433 (1998). 292 Roggenkamp, M.; Boisseleau, F., The Liberalisation of the EUE/ectricity Market and the Role of Power Exchanges, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, It, (eds. ), The Regulation of Power Exchanges in Europe, p. 4. Birche, B., Die Elektrizitätswirtschaft in der Europäische Union, p. 23. 293 Eberlein, B., Regulation by Cooperation: The 'Third way' in making Rules for the Internal Energy Market, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 63. Z9° Ibid. 
295 Hancher, L.; The new EC Constitution and the European Energy Market, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report II, p. 5. 
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A further step to include energy `issues' into EU Treaties was undertaken by adopting 
Arts. 154-156 of the Amsterdam Treaty. These provisions gave a concrete mandate to 
establish (through guidelines) trans-European networks inter alia in the energy sector. 
However, as argued296 these provisions did not give any meaningful powers for the 
creation of an internal EU market. These facts were also recognised by the 
Commission and Member States. 97 As a result of this realisation an Internal Energy 
Market Programme was initiated and together with the Single European Act of 1987 a 
basis for the future energy liberalisation packages - such as the Gas Directives - was 
established. 298 
As the EU gas markets became more dependent on imports from non-EU countries a 
number of initiatives were taken to improve the relationship with non-EU producer 
countries (in particular Russia). 299 Worthwhile mentioning here especially is the 
Energy Charter Treaty (hereinafter `ECT') of 1991300, which was signed by more than 
54 countries. 301 The main objective of this treaty is to deepen and enhance the 
relationship in energy matters between the newly independent states of the former 
Soviet Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the West. 02 Art. 2 of 
the ECT stresses that the purpose of the Treaty shall be the establishment of a legal 
framework in order to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based on 
complementariness and mutual benefits between the contracting parties to the 
296 Eberlein, B.; supra note. 297 European Commission, Transit of Electricity and Gas, <httpJ/europa. eu. int/eu/dgl7/transit. html>, 1. 
9 
299 
Roggenkamp, M.; Boisseleau, F., supra note, p. 2. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Energy Dialogue with Russia - Update 
on progress, SEC(2004) 114, p. 10 300 Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents, October 1996, <http: //www. encharter. org>. 301 For further information of the origins of the Energy Charter Treaty see Dore, J.; Dc Bauw, R.; The EnerQV Charter Treaty -Origins Aims and Prospects, p. 1-3. 302 Waern, K. P., Transit Provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on Transit, JENRL 20/2002, p. 173. 
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Treaty. 303 Therefore this Treaty is from this survey's point of view really about 
enhancing the political relationship between the `East' and the `West'. 
However, the Treaty does not contain any specific rules on the trade of energy and the 
internal harmonisation and liberalisation developments of EU gas markets, the 
`internal' application of this treaty is limited to the political enhancement and 
deepening of relationships between EU countries and non-EU countries304 something 
that is not subject to this thesis as this survey only deals with EU internal gas 
matters 305 Therefore this survey will not make further reference to the ECT. 
Supplementary attempts to place energy issues in EU primary legislation are currently 
being undertaken in the not (fully) ratified EU Constitution306 and therefore are not 
legally binding. Pursuant to Art. 111-256,1. and 2. of the EU constitution it is inter 
alia stated, "1. [... ]Union policy on energy shall aim to: (a) ensure the functioning of 
the energy market; [... ]. 2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of 
the Constitution, the objectives in paragraph I shall be achieved by measures enacted 
in European laws or framework laws. [... ]. " Furthermore, Arts. III. 246 and 247 deal 
with the establishment and development of trans-European networks such as energy 
infrastructures. These shall be established by guidelines. It is argued307 that the text 
could be interpreted "as a step backwards and as a limitation upon the [EU] 
Commission's powers to propose new measures aimed at completing the energy 
market liberalisation process. " It is further said'308 "Some Member States, however, 
feared that the text of article would have posed a serious threat to continued national 
control over energy resources and supply policies. " It is also noteworthy - as 
303 For further analysis of the Energy Charter Treaty see Defilla, S., Energy Trade under the ECT and 
Accession to the WTO, JENRL 21/2004, p. 428; Scholten, C., Die Energiecharta - Bedeutung, aktuelle Herausforderungen und gemeinsame Handlungsoptionen mit ihren Partnern, RdE 4-5/2004, p. 85-92. 304 European Commission, Commission staff working paper, Completing the internal energy market, 12 March 2001, SEC(2001) 438, p. 67. 305 Nevertheless it is worthwhile mentioning that external policy has a significant influence on internal EU matters. However, to further analyse this matter would exceed the scope and subject of this thesis. 306Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/1,16.12.2004 307 Hancher, L.; The new EC Constitution and the European Energy Market, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R. (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report IT, p. 5-6. 308 Ibid. 
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argued309 - that the Constitution could not allow European institutions to "adopt 
measures directing a Member State to produce sufficient volumes from its own energy 
resources for the benefit of the rest of the Union, even in the interests of European- 
wide security of energy supply. " These comments leave serious doubt as to whether 
the non-legally binding Constitution will help to create more market harmonisation 
and greater market liberalisation across Europe's gas and power markets. 
This aside, there are currently serious doubts about the future of the draft and not 
implemented EU Constitution, as some Member States failed to ratify the text and 
therefore it is questionable whether the Treaty will ever be enacted. 310 
However, the fundamental question arises of whether the legal fundaments of the 
Treaties and currently non-binding Text of the Constitution are sufficient enough to 
establish a strong legal basis for a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
In this context, it is argued31 that any measures concerning energy taken by the 
Community are based on the general provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. As a result 
of this it is argued312, that the European energy market is inter alia subject to EU 
Competition law. In doing this, Member States shall have full regard to the relevant 
provisions of the Treaty and in particular Art. 86, which, among other things, 
stipulates that "undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest [... ] shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in 
particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. " 
However, the 2nd sentence of Art. 86(2) EC restricts the exemption from the 
application of such rules in that the "development of trade must not be affected to 
such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community. " 
304 Ibid., p. 7. 310 See for a brief overview of the current problems of the EU and the Constitution, Financial Times, 
Blair hits back on need for reform with debating tour de force, 24 June 2005. 
31 tImmenga, U., The Development of European Energy Policy: From the ECSC Treaty to the Internal 
Market, in: Mestmaecker, E. J. (ed. ), Natural Gas in the Internal Market, p. 49. 
312 Schulte-Beckhause, S., Energy Trading in the EU. - The Commoditization of Electricity and the 
Emergences of Energy Exchanges, in: Geradin, D., (ed. ), The Liberalization of Electricity and Natural 
Gas in the European Union, p. 5. 
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The EU Commission applies Art. 86 to the energy sector under the following 
conditions313: 
- "the obligations imposed must be related to the supply of the service of 
general economic interest in question; 
- they must contribute directly to satisfying this general economic interest; 
- they must be imposed in such a way that they do not affect the development of 
trade to an extent contrary to the interests of the Community. " 
Apart from the fact that the wording leaves room for interpretation the application of 
the competition provisions of the Treaty (including Art. 86) will always be subject to 
the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5 of the Treaty) and therefore each Member State 
has the power to adopt different solutions and approaches. 314 
Therefore, it must be concluded that the Treaties give little indication of how to deal 
with the issue of a common and comprehensive EU (energy) gas market, and they do 
not - as commented upon315 - provide a precise regulatory scheme with a legal basis 
for energy legislation as a whole. 
Hence it is obvious and also of importance for the implementation of the obligations 
set out in the Gas Directive and the Gas Transmission Regulation that the fragmentary 
nature of the Treaty provisions requires further market integration through secondary 
legislation. This has and will produce additional problematic barriers for the creation 
of a harmonised and liberalised gas market. 316 
313 See for instance European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, Public Service Obligations, 
16.1.2004, p. 2 
314 Schulte-Beckhause, S., supra note. 
31$ See Schwarze, J., European Energy Policy in Community Law, in: Mestmaeker, E., J., supra note, p. 
155; McEldowney, J., Electricity Industry Handbook: Law and Practice, p. 28-33. 
316 These issues have been partly been discussed in Chapter A and B but will be also subject to the 
subsequent analysis. 
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II. Does the Gas Directive 2003/55/EC provide sufficiently detailed 
elements to create a harmonised and competitive EU gas 
market? 
In the early 1990s some Member States - in particular the UK - where at the forefront 
of energy market liberalisation. For the remaining Member States the gas 
liberalisation process really began to emerge with the adoption of the First Gas 
Directive 98/30 (hereinafter `First Gas Directive'). The new legislation came into 
force in June 1998 and aimed at gradually opening up the EU gas market. The 
required market opening ranged from a minimum market opening of 20% in August 
2000 increasing to 43% in 2008. It soon became apparent that there was considerable 
disparity in market opening measures across EU Member States and that the First Gas 
Directive had a number of weak aspects, in particular: proper rules on unbundling, 
third party access and regulatory supervision. 317 This realisation resulted in further 
discussion about accelerating EU energy liberalisation. 18 This process led to the 
adoption of the Directive 2003/55/EC (hereinafter `Directive' or `Gas Directive'). The 
adoption was partly seen as a major step towards completion of the internal EU 
market. 319 
The subsequent paragraph will analyse the different rules and requirements of the Gas 
Directive and will focus on the discussion of whether its core elements provide 
sufficiently detailed elements in order to create a harmonised and liberalised EU gas 
market. This analysis is of importance for the subsequent chapters in order to 
3171lancher, L., Harmonisation of European Gas Markets: The EU Gas Directive, in: Arentsen, M. J.; 
Künneke, R. W., (eds. ), National Reforms in European Gas, p. 43. 
318 See Chapter A; also European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and natural gas, 13 March 2001, COM (2001) 125 final, p. 2-3. 319 Mombaur, P. M.; Balke, J., EU-Binnenmarkt für Strom und Gas: Ursprung und wirklicher Inhalt 
des jetzt verabschiedeten neuen Gemeinschaftsrechts, RdE 7/2003, p. 161. 
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understand why there are many differences in Member States gas market structures as 
well as the legal frameworks. It will also illustrate that further steps are necessary to 
create more harmonisation and liberalisation across EU countries. 
The following analysis of the section will be undertaken: 
(1. ) First the wording of the Directive's Preamble will be examined as to 
determine whether it promotes the ideas and objectives necessary to the 
creation of a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
(2. ) Following this analysis, the main elements of the Directive will be evaluated 
and discussed to see whether these elements are sufficient the creation of a 
single, harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
(3. ) This section will conclude with the results of the aforementioned analysis. 
1. The Preamble of the Directive: Does wording lay the basis for more 
harmonisation and liberalisation across the EU? 
Most preambles set the background and most importantly the aims and objectives of 
the legislation. Therefore it is of interest to this survey to find out whether the 
preamble of the Gas Directive supports and highlights the elements of a harmonised 
and liberalised EU gas market. 
Interestingly the preamble of the Directive uses numerous terms that either hint 
directly or indirectly to the creation of a competitive, liberalised and more harmonised 
EU gas market. For instance the Directive uses the following expressions: 
- "creation of an internal market for gas", Recital (1); 
- "achieving a fully operational internal market", Recital (3); 
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- "interoperability between systems", Recital (6); 
- "homogenous conditions", Recital (12); 
- "regulatory authorities in all Member States share the same minimum set of 
competences", Recital (13); 
- "encouraging cooperation and coordination of national regulatory authorities", 
Recital 14; 
- "remove differences between Member States", Recital (19); 
These elements of the Directive's Preamble illustrate that this legislation aims to 
change the current EU gas market status towards more harmonisation and 
liberalisation. Also, the wording recognises the core problems and ongoing issues for 
the creation of a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
But the Preamble also refers to one of the core difficulties of creating such market. 
Recital 30 states: "the Community may adopt measures in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. " These two fundamental principles of the 
Treaties can be seen as one of the significant obstacles to and as an excuse for 
Member States not creating a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
2. Core elements of the Directive 2003/55/EC 
The subsequent section will analyse some of the core elements of the Directive and 
discuss whether they fulfill the high aims of the Directive's preamble and whether 
they are sufficient to create a fully liberalised, harmonised and competitive EU gas 
market. The analysis will not be undertaken in the same way as the Directive is 
structured; rather it will concentrate on the core elements and their relevance to this 
survey 
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a) Full market opening 
A significant breakthrough for the introduction of a fully open gas market was 
established in Art. 23 of the Directive. 320 According to Art. 23 (1. ) (c) all customers 
are free to pick their supplier as of July 2007. This will formally complete the legal 
obligation for all Member States to open up their gas markets to competition. 
Although this is an important requirement it has been proven - as discussed above - 
that `legal' market opening is not enough to make liberalisation work 321 This 
conclusion will be subject to the further analysis in the subsequent sections of this 
survey. 
b) Unbundling 
The following section will review the unbundling provisions of the Directive and 
discuss in which way they support liberalisation and harmonisation across EU gas 
markets. 
Traditionally, and before liberalisation endeavours were introduced, most of Europe's 
gas markets were subject to monopolies or oligopolies. Still today the majority of 
Europe's gas transmission and distribution networks are owned or controlled by 
vertically integrated companies. 322 As it is correctly argued323 to make competition 
work it is essential that unbundling instruments be introduced in all markets. 324 This 
argument is based on the fact that there is often a conflict of interest if an energy 
supply company owns a network facility - such as a pipeline - that its competitors 
320 For historical background of this clause see Lecheler, H.; Gundel, J.; Ein weiterer Schritt zur 
Vollendung des Energie-Binnenmarktes: Die Beschleunigungs-Rechtsakte für den Binnenmarkt für 
Strom und Gas, EuZW 20/2003, p. 624. 
321 See Chapter B II. 
322 See for instance Schuppe, T.; Nolden, A., Markt- und Unternehmensstrukturen im Europäischen 
Strom und Gasmarkt, EWI Working Paper 99/1, Stand 09/1999, p. 46-49; Energiewirtschaftliches 
Institut Köln, Konzentration und Wettbewerb in der deutschen Energiewirtschaft, p. 139-14 1; 
Dannischewski, J., Unbundling im Energierecht, p. 36. 
323 Jones, C., EU Energy - The Internal Energy Market, Volume 1, p. 61; see also International 
Chamber of Commerce, Liberalization and privatization of the energy sector, Executive summary and 
recommendation, Paris, September 1998, p. 56. 
324 What unbundling means will be explained in the subsequent paragraph. 
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want to use as well. Apart from discriminatory behaviour - such as refusing third 
party access on false grounds - there are many hidden ways for vertically integrated 
companies to discriminate against third parties. 325 
The EU legislature agreed on the importance of unbundling. In this respect it is stated 
in the explanatory notes326 to the Second Gas Directive that "in order to ensure non- 
discriminatory access to the network and avoid conflicts of interest it is necessary to 
separate the network business (natural monopoly) from those activities of vertically 
integrated companies which compete in the market, namely production and supply. " 
The Gas Directive provides two provisions on unbundling. 327 The following sections 
will at first discuss what unbundling is and then analyse the different forms of 
unbundling, which are required under the Directive. 
aa) What is unbundling? 
Before discussing the different elements of the unbundling provisions of the Directive 
it is necessary to understand what is meant by the term `unbundling' and to determine 
when the unbundling provisions of the Directive are applicable. 
It is noteworthy that the Directive itself does not provide a definition of `unbundling'. 
Others328 have defined unbundling as "the process of separating the function of 
transporting gas through a pipeline system from the function of purchasing, trading, 
marketing, and selling gas. This process separates the commodity `gas' from the 
means of delivering this commodity to consumers. " 
325 Schütz, R.; Tüngler, S., Die geplante Novelle des EU-Energierechts - Inhalt und Umsetzungsbedarf 
RdE 4-5/2003, p. 101-102. 
326 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The unbundling regime, 16. January 2004, p. I. 
327 Here Article 9 and 13. 
328 Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives 
on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 531 
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However, one could argue that a separate definition of the term `unbundling' is not 
essential in the Directive, as the unbundling articles of the Directive provide the 
underlying facts for when unbundling provisions are applicable. According to the 
Directive they are applicable when a company is "vertically integrated", which is 
defined in Art. 2 (20). Pursuant to this provision the unbundling provisions are 
applicable in two circumstances: 
- Where a natural gas undertaking/group "is performing at least one of the 
functions of transmission, distribution, LNG or storage, and at least one of the 
functions of production or supply of naturals gas. " Or 
- Where a parent company is in control of daughter companies, of whom some 
are active in production and supply of natural gas while others have a network 
undertaking. 329 
In this respect it is argued330 that the first category does not need further clarification. 
The Directive's unbundling provisions kick in once a company undertakes either the 
operation of transmission and/or distribution and/or LNG and/or storage facilities and 
at least either gas production or gas supply. 331 This survey agrees with this viewpoint, 
as the wording of the Directive does not leave any room for a different interpretation. 
However, it is further argued332 that the second category of what vertically integrated 
means needs further explanation. This survey supports this view as it not immediately 
clear what is meant by the term "control of another company". In this respect the 
Directive refers to Art. 3 (3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 
December 1989 on the control or concentration between undertakings333 and hence 
329 In this respect the exact wording of Art. 2 (20) is as following: "Vertically integrated means a 
natural gas undertaking or a group of undertakings whose mutual relationships are defined in Article 
3(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [... ]. " 
330 Jones, C., EU Energy - The Internal Energy Market, Volume 1, p. 66. 331 In the case there remain doubts on what Transmission System Operator (TSO) or the term 
Distribution System Operator (DSO) means, the Directive defines both in Art. 2 (4) and Art. 2 (6). 
With respect to what transmission respectively distribution means the Directive facilitates two 
definitions in Art. 2 (3) and Art. 2 (5. ). See also C 11.2d) aa). 332 Jones, C., supra note, p. 66. 
333 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, OJ L 395,30.12.1989, The Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 
1310/97 (OJ L 180,9.7.1997). 
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provides guidance on how to interpret `control of concentration'. In this context it is 
stated334 that "control exists either where one company holds a majority of the shares 
of another (and thus it is a fully controlled subsidiary) or where it is a minority 
shareholder but nonetheless de facto controls the company in question. This de facto 
control can exist in two basic situations: 
- First, when a contract exists giving the company the right to direct the 
operations of the other; 
- second, where due to the disparate nature of the ownership of the shares, 
although a company only has, say 40% of the shares in another, in reality it 
always has an absolute majority of the votes at annual general meetings (due 
to the absence of many smaller shareholders). " 
This interpretation of the term `control' is in line with the Commission's official 
view. 335 
Although this brings some clarity about what is meant by control in practice, it will be 
discussed later that the definition has also caused ambiguity and therefore led to 
difficulties in the implementation process. 
bb) Three different kinds of unbundling. 
The following section will examine the different forms of unbundling that are 
required under the Gas Directive. 336 
The Directive introduces three kinds of unbundling, requiring accounting, legal and 
management unbundling for both transmission and distribution. The survey will 
examine the different implications of these unbundling requirements. 
334 Jones, C., supra note, p. 67. 
335European Commission, Commission notice of 2 March 1998, OJ [1998] C66/5. 
336 For an overview on how the different unbundling provisions were developed during the negotiation 
of the Directive see Schneider, J. -P.; Prater, J., Das europäische Energierecht im Wandel -Die 
Vorgaben der EG für die Reform des En WG, RdE 3/2004, p. 59. 
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(i) Accounting unbundling 
According to Art. 17 of the Directive `accounting unbundling' means that companies 
which own supply, transmission and/or distribution facilities must ensure that they 
provide separate accounts for each activity. 337 Unless required by national law the 
Gas Directive does not oblige companies to make their annual accounts publicly 
available. 338 Where they are not required to publish the annual accounts they have to 
keep a copy "at the disposal of the public at their head office. "339 However, under 
Art. 16 of the Directive, the competent authority (i. e. in most cases the national 
regulatory body) is entitled to access all the accounts of the company in question. 340 
In this context it is argued341 that the main purpose of this requirement is that any 
cross-subsidisation between the different entities are avoided and disclosed to the 
national regulatory bodies. But as correctly pointed out342 proper account unbundling 
needs full transparency on all parts of the vertically integrated company as well as 
resources from the regulatory authorities to undertake proper monitoring of the 
accounts in question. This is based on the fact that most energy companies are large 
corporations with thousands of employees as well as many transactions on a daily 
basis. In reality, it is therefore very difficult to ensure proper account unbundling in 
order to prevent cross-subsidisation or any other discriminatory behaviours. The 
337 Art. 17 (3. ) states inter alia: "Natural gas undertakings shall, in their internal accounting, keep 
separate accounts for each of their transmission, distribution, LNG and storage activities as they would 
be required to do if the activities in question where carried out by separate undertakings, with a view to 
avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition. They shall also keep 
accounts, which may be consolidated, for other gas activities not relating to transmission, distribution, 
LNII and storage. [... ]. " 
338 In this respect Art. 17 (2. ) states inter alia the following: "Natural gas undertakings, [... ], submit to 
audit and publish their annual accounts in accordance with the rules of national law concerning the 
annual accounts [... ]. Undertakings which are not legally obliged to publish their annual accounts shall 
keep a copy of these at the disposal of the public at their head office. " 339 Ibid., last sentence of Art. 17 (2. ). 
340 Art. 16 (1. ) states inter alia: "[... ] any competent authority [... ], including the regulatory authorities 
[... ], shall, insofar necessary to carry out their functions, have right of access to the accounts of natural 
as undertakings as set out in Art. 17. " 
01Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., The Liberalisation of the EU Electricity Market and the Role of 
Power Exchanges, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), The Regulation of Power Exchanges 
in Europe, p. 10-11. 
342 International Chamber of Commerce, Liberalization and privatization of the energy sector, 
Executive summary and recommendation, Paris, September 1998, p. 57 
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difficulties of proper unbundling can be even more complex if the national legislation 
does not require the company to publish their annual accounts. In such cases any 
crosscheck by competitors and third parties would be restricted if not impossible. 
Therefore the ability to ensure proper accounting unbundling is often restricted. 
(ii) Legal unbundling 
The Directive further requires under Arts. 9 (1) and 13 (1) the so-called legal 
unbundling of vertically integrated companies. 343 
According to the Directive `legal unbundling' means that transmission and 
distribution activities of the vertically integrated company must operate in legally 
separated companies. The (new) entities must have "effective decision making 
rights". 344 However, as the explanatory notes345 to the Second Gas Directive indicate, 
"the obligation to create a separate company only concerns the network business, i. e. 
the natural monopoly. All other activities, namely supply and production, can 
continue to be operated in one single company. " 
This implies further that the Directive does not require change of ownership which 
means that no vertically integrated company must sell the different parts of the 
company. This point has been subject to controversial debate amongst 
commentators. 346 Some have argued347 that only full ownership unbundling would 
343 Art. 9 (1) states as following: "Where the transmission system operator is part of a vertically 
integrated undertaking, it shall be independent at east in terms of its legal form, organisation and 
decision making from other activities not relating to transmission. These rules shall not create an 
obligation to separate the ownership of assets of the transmission system from the vertically integrated 
undertaking. " Art. 13 has the same wording only that the words `transmission system operators' are 
replaced by the words `distribution system operators'. 
3° Art. 9 (2) (c) states inter alia the following: "In order to ensure the independence of the transmission 
system operator [... ] shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated gas 
undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. " The same 
wording applies to distribution system operators, Art. 13 (2) (c). 345 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The unbundling regime, 16. January 2004, p. 5. 346 Some of the arguments are reflected in: Schütz, R.; Tüngler, S., Die geplante Novelle des EU- 
Energierechts - Inhalt und Umsetzungsbedarf, RdE 4-5/2003, p. 60; Jones, C., supra note, p. 73; 
Cameron, P. D., Completing the Internal Market in Energy: An Introduction to the New Legislation, in 
Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives on 
Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 18; EFET, The implementation of the single market in natural 
gas, EFET position paper, September 1999, <http: //www. efet. org>, p. 1-2; EFET, Guidance on 
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limit cross-subsidisation or other possible discriminatory behaviours by vertically 
integrated companies. It would also allow much better control mechanisms for the 
regulatory authorities. 
Contrary to this others have argued348 that because of constitutional law in some 
Member State countries - in particular in Germany - only legal unbundling and not 
ownership unbundling is possible. Others have argued349 that legal unbundling would 
create real value, in particular "if the [legally unbundled] network company is a 
distinct, identifiable company employees would have a clear and separate corporate 
identity which would reinforce their ability and willingness to think and act 
independently from the commercial interests of the parent company. " 
Nevertheless it is noteworthy that different forms of unbundling can produce EU-wide 
disparity and disadvantageous situations for some countries. This is particularly the 
case in some Member States, which have part or full ownership unbundling, whereas 
other countries only require legal unbundling. Across the EU today many Member 
States have different and incoherent measures for national unbundling. 35° As said 
above, the 2005 EU benchmark report 351 also stresses that "significant progress still 
remains to be made for full compliance with the provisions of the Directive" and 
"Member States [... ] appear unwilling to implement legal unbundling of distribution 
companies at this stage. " 
From this survey's point of view these differences can indeed lead not only disparity 
but also to unfavourable conditions for all involved parties. 
unbundling Transmission Operators for European Gas Market Development, June 2004, 
<http: //www. efet. org>. 
347 International Chamber of Commerce, supra note, p. 56. 
348 Schütz, R.; Tüngler, S., supra note, p. 60. A debate of whether constitutional rights would be 
infringed by ownership unbundling will be undertaken in the country study analysis in Chapter C. 
349 Jones, C., supra note, p. 73. 
350 See European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report 
from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 
863, Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 25. 
351 Ibid. 
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A further question that is raised352 in the context of legal unbundling is the issue of 
"whether a combined network operator, i. e. the operation of several networks of a 
different nature in one single company, would be compatible with legal unbundling. " 
This is of particular interest to multi-utilities that for instance operate power, gas and 
telecommunication networks. One could argue that this would be allowed under Art. 
15 ("Combined operator"), which does "not prevent the operation of a combined 
transmission, LNG, storage and distribution system operator [... ] from other activities 
not related to transmission, LNG, storage and distribution system operations. "353 It is 
argued by some commentators, 354 this is only possible if in the given example the 
power, gas and telecommunication operations are undertaken in different legal 
entities. However, these could be owned by the same holding company. 
Nevertheless the wording of the Directive does not directly imply this interpretation 
and therefore leaves room for multi-utilities that are also vertically integrated not to 
separate their different network activities (i. e. keep for instance gas, power and 
telecommunication network operations in one legal entity). This could allow issues 
such as cross-subsidisation or other discriminatory behaviour to flourish. It can also 
create unequal market conditions in EU markets, which are unfavourable for the 
creation of a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
(iii) Management unbundling 
Additionally, the Gas Directive requires management unbundling, Art. 9 (1. ) and Art. 
13(l . ). 
355 
352 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The unbundling regime, 16. January 2004, p. 6. 
353 First sentence of Art. 15 of the Gas Directive. 
35+ Jones, C., supra note, p. 73; European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 
2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The unbundling 
reime, 16. January 2004, p. 6. 
35 International Chamber of Commerce, Liberalization and privatization of the energy sector, 
Executive summary and recommendation, Paris, September 1998, p. 57 
355 Art. 9 (1) states as following: "Where the transmission system operator is part of a vertically 
integrated undertaking, it shall be independent at east in terms of its legal form, organisation and 
decision making from other activities not relating to transmission. These rules shall not create an 
obligation to separate the ownership of assets of the transmission system from the vertically integrated 
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Management unbundling means that the management of the network company is not 
allowed to work simultaneously for the distribution and/or supply company of its 
vertically integrated mother company. Also, the management and other staff of the 
network company must not receive their salaries or other benefits from the mother 
company. 356 
In the context of management unbundling it is argued357 that in absence of full 
ownership unbundling, management unbundling is a key element to ensure that 
transmission and distribution system operators act independently. Nevertheless a 
number of important issues and problems with the Gas Directive's management 
unbundling provision remain: 
- The Directive prohibits, under Art. 9 (2. ) (a) and Art. 13 (2. ) (a) for instance, 
that the managing director of the holding company (vertically integrated 
company) be involved in the day-to-day business decision making of its 
management unbundled network entity. 358 However, the Directive does not 
rule out that the managing director can accept a supervisory position in the 
network company, as long as this person does not get involved in the day-to- 
day activities. It is however, questionable whether it is possible to ensure that 
such involvement does not take place in particular if certain activities of the 
network company are of great importance to the mother company. In this 
context it is argued359 that this must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
Realistically the case-by-case approach will be almost impossible to handle. 
Gas companies are usually large corporations with thousands of employees 
undertaking. " Art. 13 has the same wording only that the words `transmission system operators' are 
replaced by the words `distribution system operators'. 
3S The same applies for the management/staff that work for the distribution or supply arm of the 
vertically integrated company. 
357 Jones, C., supra note, p. 75. 
338 Art. 9 (2. ) (a) states as following: "In order to ensure the independence of the transmission system 
operator [... ] the following minimum criteria shall apply: (a) those responsible for the management of 
the the transmission system operator many not participate in company structures of the integrated of the 
integrated natural gas undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of the 
production, distribution and supply of natural gas. " The same wording applies for distribution system 
orerators in Art. 13 (2. ) (a). 
3 9European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The unbundling regime, 16. January 2004, p. 8. 
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and activities on a daily basis, therefore the competent authority must have 
massive resources to ensure that the management unbundling provisions are 
enforced properly. 
-A further issue could arise about how the management unbundled vertically 
integrated company could use common services such as IT-systems, finance, 
transportation etc. It is argued360 that the Directive's management unbundling 
provisions do not strictly prohibit the usage of common services, "but [... ] a 
reasonable approach must be taken, separating services and premises in a 
manner appropriate to ensure effective independence. " This statement is from 
this survey's point of view too general. Also, the EU Commission's 
explanatory notes to Gas Directive361 do not bring much guidance on the issue. 
The Commission argues that whether the share of common services is allowed 
under the management unbundling provision of the Directive shall be judged 
again on a case-by-case basis. The Commission argues further that if the usage 
of common services is permitted then it should ensure the following: (1. ) "Any 
cross subsidies being either given to or received by the network business are 
excluded [... ]. " And (2. ) "common services shall normally be operated and 
managed outside the network business [... ]. " 
Apart from the fact that the Commission's notes are not legally binding and 
also disputed362, it is still questionable as to how a case-by-case enforcement 
would ensure that the unbundling provisions are obeyed effectively in 
practice. This produces further uncertainties in the unbundling provisions and 
can lead to different interpretations in Member State legislation. Therefore, 
markets are less harmonised and there are disadvantages for companies that 
are affected by stricter unbundling rules than others. 
360 Jones, C., supra note, p. 77. 
361 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The unbundling regime, 16. January 2004, p. 9. 
362 See Jones, C., supra note, Note 93, p. 77. For a detail legal analysis on what the Commission's 
explanatory notes legally represent see Ehricke, U., Vermerke der Kommission zur Umsetzung von 
Richtlinien, EuZW 12/2004, p. 359-364. Ehricke argues that the notes are legally null and just pure 
internal notes that were made publicly available. 
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(iv) Compliance with the unbundling provisions, Art. 9 (2) (d) and Art. 13 (2) (d) 
Art. 9 (2) (d) and Art. 13 (2) (d)363 of the Gas Directive requires the transmission and 
distribution system operator to establish an unbundling compliance programme. 
364 
The compliance programme is divided into three different steps: 
- The staff must be notified of the contents of the unbundling compliance 
programme. 
- The programme shall explain how the employee shall meet the objectives of 
the unbundling compliance programme. And 
- The company annual report should reflect whether these procedures and 
unbundling safeguards have worked in practice. 
Although the annual report has to be submitted to the regulatory body and later also 
published, from this survey's point of view the compliance programme is a self- 
control approach, which very much depends on the goodwill of the company. It inter 
alia raises the question of how objective the self-assessment of the companies will be. 
For instance will a company readily admit that its unbundling programme has not 
worked and that mistakes were made? This survey doubts that companies will be this 
forthcoming and believes that this could create situations where some Member States 
will have more strict interpretation and assessments of the unbundling programme 
whereas others might be less so. Again, this could generate advantages and 
disadvantages for gas players involved and produce a great deal of disparity in EU gas 
363 Art. 9 (2. ) (d) states: "[... ] the transmission system operator shall establish a compliance 
programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded, and 
ensure the observance of it is adequately monitored. The programme shall set out the specific 
obligations of employees to meet this objective. An annual report, setting out the measures take, shall 
be submitted by the person or body responsible for monitoring the compliance programme to the 
regulatory authority [... ] and shall be published. " The same wording applies to distribution system 
operators, see Art. 13 (2) (d). 
364 It is noteworthy that from this survey's point of view the wording of the Directive is not clear, as it 
is stated "the transmission system operator shall establish a compliance programme [... ]. " That could 
lead to the questions whether the TSO really have to establish a programme - 'shall' instead of `must'-. 
But all commentators (see for instance: Jones, C., supra note, p. 87) and the translation of this 
provisions (for instance in German) lead to the conclusion that TSO must undertake such programme. 
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markets. This view is supported365 and it is shown that in practice unbundling can 
have different outcomes. Examples in other industries such as rail or 
telecommunications have proven this. 366 
Taking the latter arguments and the above analysis on the compliance programme into 
account, it is, from this survey's point of view, unlikely that equal unbundling 
provisions will be introduced and enforced by all Member States. 
365 Theobald, C., Grundlage der deutschen Rechts der Energiewirtschaft, in: Schneider, J: P.; 
Theobald, C., (eds. ), Handbuch zum Recht der Energiewirtschaft, p. 37. 366 See also Theobald, C.; Zenke, 1., Grundlagen der Strom- und Gasdurchleitung. Die aktuellen 
Rechtsprobleme, p. 19-20. 
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(v) Enforcement of the unbundling provisions 
Successful unbundling requires proper enforcement by competent authorities. 367 In 
this respect it is argued368 that the Directive's unbundling provisions did not "provide 
effective sanctions for non-observance [... ] by vertically integrated companies. " The 
Directive only obliges vertically integrated undertakings to report on the unbundling 
compliance programme369 and if required by their national legislation to publish their 
annual accounts. 370 It further requires under Art. 25 (1. ) (2) (e) national regulatory 
authorities to ensure "[... ] effective unbundling of accounts [... ], to ensure there are 
no cross subsidies between transmission, distribution, storage, LNG and supply 
activities. " 
It is noteworthy that none of the problems with accounting, legal and functional 
unbundling raised above are specifically dealt with in the Directive's text. Therefore it 
is doubtful whether the Directive unbundling provisions can in practice be enforced 
properly. It very much depends on each Member State and how they design 
unbundling provisions under their national legislation. Therefore it is doubtful from 
this survey's point of view that all Member States will undertake unbundling 
provisions and enforcement in an equal and harmonised way. This view is supported 
by others371 who argue that the Directive's unbundling provisions do "not fully suffice 
to effectively open networks to competitors of the network energy supplier. " 
367 See for instance MacAvoy, P., The Natural Gas Market: Sixty Years of Regulation and 
Deregulation, p. 16-17. 
368 Albers, M., The New EU Directives on Energy Liberalisation from a Competition point of view, in: 
Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives on 
Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 44. 369 Art. 9 (2) (d) and Art. 13 (2) (d) and see above. 370 Art. 17 (2) and compare analysis above. 
371 Albers, M., supra note, p. 45. 
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(vi) Derogations from the unbundling provisions 
The Directive allows numerous derogations from its unbundling requirements, which 
will be subject to the subsequent analysis. 
Art. 13 (2) states that "Member States may decide not to apply [the unbundling 
provisions] to integrated natural gas undertakings serving less than 100,000 connected 
customers. "372 Although there are many reasons put forward373 on why such as 
derogation from the Directive distribution system operator unbundling provisions are 
useful, the following should be noted. 
Pursuant to Art. 13 (2) Member States `may' allow derogation from the unbundling 
provision. The wording of the article ('may') allows all Member States to have 
different approaches to unbundling provisions that will effect distribution companies 
with less than 100,000 customers. Although 100,000 customers does not seem to be 
many in comparison to large companies with millions of customers, nevertheless in 
some Member State such as Germany there are about 700 smaller distribution/supply 
companies of which some have less than a 100,000 customers 374 
Apart from that the wording ('may') also allows different and non-harmonised 
conditions for all European distribution system operators. The EU benchmark 
report375 on the implementation of the Gas Directive states in this respect that 
"Member States [... ] appear unwilling to implement legal unbundling of distribution 
companies at this stage. " This supports the view stated above that there is often little 
willingness of companies to obey the Directive's unbundling provisions and it shows 
that derogations can create even more unequal market conditions. It is further 
372 This provision only applies to distribution system operators (Art. 13). No derogations are allowed 
for transmission system operators are allowed. 
373 See for some arguments for the derogation, Schütz, R.; Tüngler, S., Die geplante Novelle des EU- 
Energierechts - Inhalt und Umsetzungsbedarf, RdE 4-5/2003, p. 102; Jones, C., supra note 89-92. 374Erbrecht, C., Netzzugang in der Gaswirtschaft, p. 27. 373 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 25. 
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argued376 that many Member States have chosen different unbundling derogation 
rules, which will create different market conditions. This argument is supported by 
this survey as the case study analysis later shows that all Member States have 
different unbundling approaches - particularly when it comes to the derogation rules - 
which then creates unequal market conditions across the EU. 
A further derogation is made under Art. 33 (2. ) according to which "Member States 
may postpone the implementation of [the legal unbundling provisions for distribution 
system operators] until 2007. " 
Again the wording `may' causes similar effects as those described above. 
c) National regulatory authorities 
It is widely agreed that for effective competition and true market harmonisation a 
strong and independent regulatory authority is absolutely essential. 377 It is further 
argued378 that the introduction of a regulatory body is essential as "competition policy 
can deal with certain cases of discrimination by dominant companies, [however] its 
procedures and remedies are inadequate to deal with a network industry where 
competition for the services in question is completely non-existent or at best very 
limited indeed. " This survey agrees with this comment as it became clear379 that there 
is limited gas competition in Europe's gas markets. 
On this basis EU legislators introduced after long negotiation - in particular with 
Germany38° - the concept of an energy regulatory body. 
7761Iense, A., Europaweite Tendenzen der nationalen Gasmarktregulierung, Energiewirtschaftliche 
Tagesfragen, 55. Jg. (2005), p. 320. 
377See for instance: Bannikov, M., Energy Regulators in the Emerging Markets, I. E. L. T. R. 8/2000, p. 
213; Ocana, C., Trends in the management of regulation: A comparison of Energy Regulators in 
OECD Member Countries, <http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>, p. 2. 37$ Jones, C., supra note, p. 97. 
379 See Chapter A and B. 
380 See Neveling, S.; Theobald, C.; Aktuelle Entwicklungen des europäischen Energiehandels: Die 
Vorschläge der EG-Kommission zur Anpassung der Strom- und Gasrichtlinien, EuZW 4/2002, p. 107; 
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In the following section of this survey the specific elements of the Gas Directive's 
regulatory provisions will be analysed and it will be discussed whether they will 
enable more harmonisation and liberalisation throughout European gas markets. 
aa) Appointment and position of the regulatory authority 
Art. 25 (1. ) of the Gas Directive states as follows: "Member States shall designate one 
or more competent bodies with the function of regulatory authorities. These 
authorities shall be wholly independent of the interests of the gas industry. [... ]. " This 
wording raises some concerns from a market harmonisation and liberalisation point of 
view on the following basis: 
- According to the first sentence of Art. 25 (1. ) Member States can appoint more 
than one regulatory authority. This could create numerous difficulties in 
particular if the different regulatory bodies disagree amongst each other. There 
are no guidelines nor rules on how such a conflict should be resolved. This 
issue becomes even more complex if other Member State's authorities get 
involved and/or disagree with each other. In this respect Art. 25 (10. ) states 
"In the event of cross border disputes, the deciding regulatory authority shall 
be the regulatory body which has jurisdiction in respect of the system 
operator, which refuses use of, or access to, the system. " However, it is 
unclear what happens if there is a conflict on both sides of the border and both 
system operators are involved. If both Member States regulatory authorities' 
arrive at different results, it is uncertain how the network operators or other 
involved third parties should behave. In this sense the provision does not 
create more market harmonisation, rather it leads to more regulatory 
uncertainty. 
- Furthermore, it is stated in the second sentence of Art. 25 (1. ) that the 
regulatory authority shall be "independent of the interests of the gas industry. " 
Schütz, R.; Tüngler, S., Die geplante Novelle des EU-Energierechts - Inhalt und Umsetzungsbedarf, 
RdE 4-5/2003, p. 105-106. 
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What the word `independent' means with respect to a regulatory authority is 
subject to debate. 381 Some argue382 that "independence usually means that the 
regulator [... ] is appointed for a fixed period and can only be removed either 
by a vote of Parliament, or according to specific criteria [... ]. " However, the 
Directive does not provide a definition. The non-binding EU Commission's 
explanatory notes383 on the Gas Directive express the view that the word 
`independent' does "not necessarily require the regulator to be separate from 
existing government structures, [... ]. The Directive allows for the possibility 
that a Regulator's decision can be reviewed by the relevant Ministry. " 
This latter view could cause difficulties and non-harmonisation among 
Member States. It is already argued384 that "Member States with state-owned 
utilities may have to develop mechanisms to separate the regulatory authority 
from the ministerial body that supervises the state-owned energy utility. " 
Apart from the difficulties of how national regulatory bodies can be separate 
from state-owned energy utilities, 385 further problems arise because the 
wording allows different and non-harmonised forms of `independent 
regulatory bodies'. Some Member States might introduce a regulatory body 
with full governmental independence and therefore full autonomy. Other 
Member States may decide to have some or full control over their regulatory 
bodies. Experiences for instance in the German telecommunication sector or in 
the UK gas industry exemplify the difficulties and issues that can occur with 
381 See for instance Marshall, E.; Chairmen's comments, in: Robinson, C., (ed. ), Competition and 
Regulation in Utility Markets, p. 88-89; see also Kühling, J., Sektorspezifische Regulierung in den 
Netzwirtschaften, p. 375-378. 
382 Jones, C., supra note, p. 98. 
383 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The role of the regulatory authorities, 
16.1.2004, p. 1. 
380 Cameron, P. D., Completing the Internal Market in Energy: An Introduction to the New Legislation, 
in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives 
on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 19. 
aas This is for in stance the case in France where the French Government is the majority shareholder in 
Gas de France. For more information see Finon, D., The French Gas Industry in Transition: Breach in 
the Public Service Model, in: Arentsen, M. J.; Künneke, R. W., (eds. ), supra note, p. 249-251. 
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full and less independent regulatory bodies. 386 Hence the degree of 
independence from government may mean uncertainty for all involved parties 
and can lead to unjustified treatment of some market players, which might 
have to be resolved in long and unnecessary court procedures. Also, the 
different possible approaches by Member States for `independent regulators' 
does not lead to more market harmonisation. Nor to similar market conditions 
across the EU. 
bb) Objectives and tasks of the regulatory authority 
As expressed in Recital 13 of the Preamble of the Gas Directive a minimum set of 
objectives and tasks for all Member State regulatory authorities is set out in the 
Directive in the interest of harmonisation. The following analysis will concentrate on 
the regulatory competences under the Directive and elaborate whether they create 
more harmonisation and improve competition across EU gas markets. 
(i) Control of the activities that relate to technical management of the network 
Art. 25 (1. ) (a) requires the national regulatory authorities to ensure "non- 
discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market, 
monitoring in particular: the rules on the management and allocation of 
interconnection capacity, in conjunction with the regulatory authority or authorities of 
those Member States with which interconnection exist. " 
From a harmonisation point of view, the cooperation element between different 
Member State authorities that have a pipeline interconnection must be welcomed, as 
this could potentially increase harmonisation and security of supply among Member 
States through joint activities. Nevertheless the wording of the Directive raises doubts 
386 See for instance: Slot, P. j., The Impacts ofLiberalization on long-term Energy Contracts, in: 
Geradin, D., (ed. ), The Liberalization of Electricity and Natural Gas in the European Union, p. 26-27. 
Fitzgerald, L.; Waddams Price, C., Gas Transmission Regulation, in: Voss, P., The Development of 
Energy Regulation -A Collection of Reviews, 100-103; Kühling, J., Sektorspezifische Regulierung in 
den Netzwirtschaften, p. 376-377. 
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as to whether this is likely to happen in practice. From the text one must deduct that 
the regulatory authority has purely an observational role ("monitoring in particular") 
but no jurisdiction over the activities of network operators. This is questioned by the 
European Commission's note387 on the Directive and its suggestion that "the 
regulator's powers will go beyond merely the monitoring of allocation rules since, by 
its decisions in dispute cases and its interventions in the market ex-post (after the 
event took place), the regulatory authority will establish what permissible practice in 
terms of capacity allocation is, and what is not. " In this context, other 
commentators 388 disagree with this comment as they refer to the purely monitoring 
role of the regulatory bodies. Even if one argued that the wording of the Directive 
includes more than a monitoring role, there are doubts about how the interconnected 
Member States' authorities should work together and what should happen in the event 
a disagreement occurs between the two (or more) authorities. Art. 25 (10. ) will not be 
applicable as it only comes into effect if a network operator refuses access to a third 
party, but it does not deal with questions about the jurisdiction of the regulatory body 
over the technical management of the networks. 
(ii) Level of transparency and competition 
Art. 25 (1) requires Member States to ensure and monitor: 
"(d) the publication of appropriate information by transmission and distribution 
system operators concerning interconnectors, grid usage and capacity allocation to 
interested parties [... ]; (h) the level of transparency and competition. " 
As all gas market players need access to information about the underlying supply and 
demand fundamentals, as well as the availability of pipeline and storage capacities in 
order to facilitate their market activities, the aforementioned provisions of Art. 25 
have to be welcomed. Nevertheless, the same issues raised before about the 
387 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The role of the regulatory authorities, 
16.1.2004, p. 8. 
388 Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 20-21. 
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monitoring role of the regulatory bodies apply here as well. In practice there is a great 
variance in the information available in the different Member States. Some countries, 
like the UK, publish online on a real time basis, online all necessary market data 
whereas other Member States only provide limited information, which is often not up- 
to-date. 389 
As the Directive's provisions do not require Member States to create the equal access 
to all necessary market data, it must be concluded at this point that it is unlikely that 
the current market situation with availability of market data will be improved and that 
the disparity will continue. 
(iii) Control over storage facilities 
Through the introduction of competition, storage facilities play a significant role as a 
product of commercial value. 390 Storage facilities can be used, for example, to benefit 
from gas price fluctuations over a certain time period. The 2005 Commission 
benchmark report 391 also highlights that "availability of storage is [... ] a pre-requisite 
for any company to enter the market. " 
However, it is uncertain what kind of role regulatory authorities will play in order to 
ensure that third parties can also access storage facilities on a non-discriminatory, 
transparent and fair basis. Art. 25 (1. ) (f) states that regulatory bodies "be responsible 
for ensuring non-discrimination, effective competition and efficient functioning of the 
market, monitoring in particular: [... ] (f) the access conditions to storage, [... ]. " 
Again the conflict arises over whether the regulatory body has a monitoring role or if 
it is allowed to intervene in the activities of storage operators. Some commentators 
389 In the UK the transmission system operator National Grid publishes accurate and real time market 
data, which is important for network users. The same applies to The Netherlands, where GTS publishes 
similar data, see subsequent Chapter D I.. In contrast to this GTE, which is obliged under the Madrid 
Forum agreements to publish data from its members, does not provide similar data as that in the UK. 
See <http: //www. gte2. be>. 
390 Storage will be subject to further analysis, see below. 
391 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 30. 
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argue392 that this is covered by the wording of Art. 25 (1. ) (f). It is further argued393 
that because of the objectives of the Directive (i. e. to create a competitive and fair EU 
gas market) and the importance of storage, regulatory bodies "may intervene" in the 
tariff set up or the methodologies. In the light of the discussion above, 394 most 
importantly, that Art. 19 specifies that third party access to storage facilities is only 
allowed on a regulated or negotiated basis, it is difficult to fully support these 
opinions. Their interpretation can only be fully supported in the case of regulated third 
party access where, the Member State can spell out what the obligations of the 
regulated storage operator shall be. In contrast to this in the case of negotiated third 
party access regulatory bodies can only intervene if the storage operator's access 
conditions are in breach of Art. 19 where, inter alia, it is stated that access to storage 
"shall operate in accordance with objective, transparent and non-discriminatory 
criteria. " 
Nevertheless, it is at the discretion of each Member State to decide what `objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory' criteria mean and how they want to enforce them. 
(iv) Provisional results 
From the previous discussion two things become clear: 
- How to interpret the role of regulatory bodies in the context of third party 
access to storage facilities is not clear. This survey therefore believes that it is 
most likely that differences among Member State legislation and regulation 
will continue in practice. 
- Negotiated third party access can lead to unfair market conditions as 
regulatory authorities have fewer rights to intervene. Therefore different (and 
392 Jones, C., supra note, p. 104-105. 
393 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The role of the regulatory authorities, 
16.1.2004, p. 7. 
394 See discussion on whether Art. 25 (1. ) only implies a pure monitoring role of regulatory bodies, ... 
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non-harmonised) market conditions among Member States will occur for as 
long as there are two different access regimes. 
cc) Tariff supervision, modification and dispute settlement 
It is argued395 that in order "to encourage a level playing field and market 
development, it is important that tariffs for access to the transportation system should 
be as transparent and non-discriminatory as possible. " Additionally, others argue396 
that tariffs, prior to their entry into force (ex ante), must be approved by the 
competent regulatory body. The Directive's provision on network tariff supervision 
reflects some of the aforementioned points. According to Art. 25 (2. ) "The regulatory 
authorities shall be responsible for fixing or approving prior to their entry into force, 
at the least the methodologies used to calculate or establish the terms and conditions 
for: (a) connection and access to national networks, including transmission and 
distribution tariffs. [... ]. " 
The Commission is arguing397 that "this implies that part of the regulator's role in 
approving a methodology should be a certain degree of ex-ante evaluation by the 
regulator of the main costs so as to avoid excessive cost recovery and potential cross 
subsidies. " Contrary to this interpretation of the Directive it is correctly pointed out398 
that the rights and abilities of the regulatory authorities might be limited, as Art. 25 
(3. ) permits Member States to design their national legislation in such way "that 
regulatory authorities shall submit, for formal decision, to the relevant body in the 
Member State, the tariffs or at least the methodologies referred to in that paragraph as 
well as the modifications [... ]. The relevant body shall, in such a case, have the power 
to either approve or reject a draft decision submitted by the regulatory authority. " 
393 International Energy Agency, Regulatory Reform: European Gas, Energy Market Reform, Paris, 
OECD 2002, p. 86. 
396 Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 21. 397 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The role of the regulatory authorities, 
16.1.2004, p. 5. 
398 Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 21. 
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As experiences in other regulated industries such as telecommunication399 show, 
governmental rights to interfere in the decision of the regulatory body will limit the 
effectiveness of the regulatory institutions 400 and raises again the question of how 
independent Member State regulatory bodies can be under the Directive's provision. 
Apart from that, depending on the national legislation, the Directive permits possible 
unequal treatment of network operators. Therefore this survey believes that the 
wording will not create greater harmonisation. 
Nevertheless the Directive might provide some `hope' for third parties, as it allows 
under Art. 25 (5. ), any party to complain about tariffs or the tariff calculation 
methodologies of a transmission, LNG or distribution system operator. The regulatory 
body should act as a dispute settlement authority and decide the case within two 
months 401 In this context, it is argued402 that this provision is very important as some 
Member States solely rely upon competition law to resolve issues like disputes over, 
for instance, possibly unjustified tariffs. It is further argued403 that "the burden of 
proof with respect to competition law is always set very high and the procedures for 
its enforcement reflect this. This is because competition law in effect `interferes' with 
the normal operation of a market upon which competition takes place. The starting 
point is therefore that in principle the market should be left to operate without state 
interference. Thus, a typical [legal] procedure will last 2-3 years. " 
Although the latter argument is supported by this survey, it is questionable how 
effective the control of tariffs and tariff methodology will be in practice. This 
argument is based on the fact that a complainant cannot argue that a tariff is 
unjustified. He/she needs evidence which, in practice, is not easy to obtain. 
399 See for instance: Slot, P. j., The Impacts ofLiberalization on long-term Energy Contracts, in: 
Geradin, D., (ed. ), The Liberalization of Electricity and Natural Gas in the European Union, p. 26-27. 
400 Eberlein, B., Regulation by Cooperation: The 'Third Way' in making Rules for the Internal Energy 
Market, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New 
Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 85. 
401 This timeframe can be extended twice, Art. 25 (5). 
402 Jones, C., supra note, p. 103. 
403 Ibid. 
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Furthermore potential complainants often hesitate to make an official complaint as 
this could seriously damage their commercial relationship with the network company 
in question. 
This apart, the rules on how such a dispute procedure might be handled will vary from 
Member State to Member State and the same question about the impact on real 
harmonisation - as raised above - is relevant. 
dd) Control over dominant behaviour 
The issue of market concentration in conjunction with the aim of avoiding market 
dominance urged the Directive's legislators to adopt Art. 25 (8. ). According to this 
provision "Member States shall create appropriate mechanisms for regulation, control 
and transparency so as to avoid any abuse of a dominant position, [... ]. " Nevertheless 
the EU Commission's 2004 benchmark report404on the implementation of the 
Directive still stresses "the issue of [market] concentration is now the most important 
obstacle to the development of more vigorous competition. " 
From this survey's point of view more detailed legislation was needed in order to 
overcome the current existing market concentration. The wording of Art. 25 (8. ) was 
kept general and leaves it up to each Member State to introduce legislation and market 
procedures to limit market concentration and market dominance. From this survey's 
point of view, the wording will continue to allow different and non-harmonised 
measures by national legislators and regulatory authorities. This view is supported by 
the fact that a recent planned (super) merger between ENI of Italy and Gas de 
Portugals and Energias de Portugal was blocked on the basis of EU competition law - 
here Arts. 81 and 82 - and not the Gas or the Electricity Directive. 
405 Others406 have 
404 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Annual Report on the Implementation 
of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, supra note, p. 6. 
405 For more information on this case see Conte, G. et al, EDP/ENI/GDP: the Commission prohibits a 
merger between gas and electricity national incumbents, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1, 
2005, p. 84. 
406 Albers, M., Competition Law issues arising form the Liberalisation Process, in: Geradin, D., (ed. ), 
supra note, p. 13. 
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agreed with this and argued that mergers need to be "compatible with EC competition 
law" and have not referred to the Directive's provision on market dominance. 
Apart from this, the Directive does not give the regulatory authorities any powers in 
the field of mergers, acquisitions or take-overs. 07 This power remains with the 
national competition authorities. Again this could cause confusion between the 
different authorities about who has authority and potentially both parties will have 
different views on a particular market conditions that might be subject to both 
authorities. It also highlights the fact that the Directive is weak in this respect, as the 
Commission and Member States enforce on the grounds of competition law rather 
than on the Directive's provision on market dominance. It is also noteworthy - as 
argued408 - that the cooperation between Member States and the EU Commission 
regarding mergers involving dominant behaviours by some energy market players has 
been unclear. Additionally "a comparison of some recent cases reveals considerable 
differences in the way national authorities assess concentration in their national 
energy markets. "409 Therefore it must be said that not only are the Directive's 
provisions on market dominance weak, but also the different practices of Member 
State Governments have and will continue to produce different market standards 
when it comes to control over certain parts of the energy market. 
ee) Cooperation between national regulatory authorities - the establishment of ERGEG 
Due to the fact that EU policy makers decided not to introduce a centralised EU 
Regulatory body, the Directive introduces in Art. 25 (12. ), in conjunction with Recital 
14, the obligation of national regulatory bodies to cooperate in order to create an 
internal EU market. 410 
4071lancher, L.; De Vlam, R., Mergers in the Electricity Sector, Relevant Markets and related Issues, 
in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report I, p. 35. 408 Van der Woude, M., Ii.; Recent Developments in EC Competition Law - Facing the Network, in: 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report II, p. 29. 409 Ibid. 
410 Art. 25 (12. ) states: "National regulatory authorities shall contribute to the development of the 
internal market and of a level playing field by cooperating with each other and with the Commission in 
a transparent manner. " 
141 
Chapter C- EU legislation and EU Commission's decisions 
To meet this Directive requirement the EU Commission established in November 
2003 the "European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas" (hereinafter `ERGEG' 
or `the Group') 41 1 ERGEG formalised the informal EU regulatory role played by the 
"Council of European Energy Regulators" (hereinafter `CEER') 412 
ERGEG is composed of the heads of each national regulatory body. According to Art. 
I in conjunction with Recital 6 of the Commission's Decision, the Group does not 
have any enforcement powers. It states however that "the Group, at its own initiative 
or at the request of the Commission, shall advise and assist the Commission in 
consolidating the internal energy market, in particular with respect to the preparation 
of draft implementing measures in the field of electricity and gas, and on any matters 
related to the internal market for gas and electricity. The group shall facilitate 
consultation, co-ordination and co-operation of national regulatory authorities, 
contribute to a consistent application in all Member States of the provisions set out in 
Directive 2003/54/EC, Directive 2003/55/EC [... ]. " 
Although the set-up of the group has to be welcomed it is questionable how effective 
the group will be. This refers in particular to resolving cross border, competition and 
market harmonisation issues. In this context it is already argued413 that "as the 
material scope of EU-level cooperation increases with progress towards an integrated 
energy market, the conflicts between ministries, or other government actors, and the 
national regulatory authority may well intensify, given the political sensitivity of 
issues such as security of supply. " It is further said414 that the new European Energy 
Regulatory body "will only function as a venue for the exchange of information, 
consultation and advice without having a more formal role to play in national 
4 'European Commission, Commission Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003 on establishing 
the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, OJL 296/34. 
412 CEER still exists and also allows non EU Member States, for more information see 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
413 Eberlein, B., Regulation by Cooperation: The 'Third Way' in making Rules for the Internal Energy 
Market, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), supra note, p. 85. 
414 Lavrijssen, S.; de Visser, M., The European Energy Regulators Group: A Panacea for Good 
Governance?, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report 11, p. 109. 
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decision-making procedures. " Others claim415 further that some Member States will 
face difficulties in enacting their obligations as the Group is missing the necessary 
legislative instruments. 
These observations stress how difficult it will be for the Group to enact common 
objectives that fulfill all the wishes of its members. Therefore this survey doubts that 
the Group will have much effect on improving market harmonisation. This argument 
is based on the fact that each Group participant will most likely think of its country 
first before considering pan-European market needs. Taking the long-term 
perspective, pan-European issues will have impacts on their national market as well. 
Due to the fact that the Group has no enforcement powers it will remain as a pure 
advisor to the EU Commission and other EU policy makers and legislators. 
This, however, will be subject to further analysis in the subsequent Chapter and the 
Conclusions of this survey. 
d) Third party access to the EU pipeline network systems 
As gas transmission and distribution networks are subject to monopoly activities and 
will most likely remain so, cost-reflective, fair and transparent third party access to 
the pipeline networks is an underlying principle and a decisive factor in the creation 
of a single and competitive EU gas market. 16 This principle is inter alia laid down in 
point 6 of the Guidelines of Good Third Party Access Practice. In this respect it is 
argued that if these requirements are not obeyed, numerous barriers remain which 
hinder the development of a single and competitive energy market. 17 This was also 
415 Britz, G., Erweiterung des Instrumentariums administrativer Normsetzung zur Realisierung 
f1 emeinschaftsrecthlicher Regulierungsaufträge, EuZW 15/2004, p. 462,464. 
6 Fritz, W., Network Access and Transmission and Distribution Pricing, in: Geradin, D., (ed. ), The 
Liberalization of Electricity and Natural Gas in the European Union, p. 37; Moen, K. B.; The Gas 
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acknowledged by the Directive and measures to ensure fair and transparent third party 
access were introduced. According to the Directive, Member States are required: 
- To appoint transmission, distribution and LNG operators; and 
- to ensure that access to their facilities is on a regulated and non-discriminatory 
basis. 
The subsequent section will analyse these requirements and discuss how they will 
contribute to a more harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
aa) Appointment and duties of transmission and distribution system operators 
In the Chapter B it was highlighted how important it is that changing markets have 
clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities for all market participants. This is not 
only important for security of supply but also for third party access, unbundling and 
transparency questions. 
The Directive acknowledged this and required Member States to introduce 
independent transmission, distribution and LNG operators (hereinafter `network 
operator(s)'). 418 The Directive lists numerous duties and competencies for network 
operators which are subject to the following analysis (i. e. with special reference to 
harmonisation and liberalisation across Europe's gas networks): 
(i) Refrain from discriminatory behaviour 
According to Art. 8 (1. ) (b) and Art. 12 (2) network operators "shall refrain from 
discriminating between system users or classes of system users, particularly in favour 
of its related undertakings. " Non-discrimination is an underlying principle for fair 
third party access the wording of the provision. However, the issue on how this 
provision should be enforced is left to subsidiarity, i. e. each Member State can decide 
how they will ensure the Article is implemented. As mentioned above this will 
418 Unless specifically mentioned the same rules applies to all network operators. 
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continue to create potentially considerable differences between the different Member 
States and their legislation and regulation. 
(ii) Exchange and disposition of information between network operators 
According to Art. 8 (1. ) (c) and Art. 12 (3. ) network operators have to provide each 
other with "sufficient information to ensure that the transport, [distribution] and 
storage of natural gas may take place in a manner compatible with the secure and 
efficient operation of the interconnected system. " The provision is indeed a decisive 
factor for secure network operation. It does not, however, define what is meant by 
`sufficient information'. For instance, one operator may believe that it needs further 
information from its neighbouring (connected) operator, whereas this operator does 
not want to provide the requested information. There are no further explanations and 
guidelines in the Directive regarding how these problems should be dealt with. 
(iii) Access to information 
All market participants need access to information about the underlying market 
conditions in order to facilitate their market activities. The Directive provides in this 
context the obligation for network operators to "provide system users with the 
information they need for efficient access to the system" (Art. 8 (1. ) (d) and Art. 12 
(4)). From the wording of the Directive it is not clear what exactly is meant by 
`information', thus it is left up to the interpretation of each Member State and their 
network operators. This, for instance, has created the current state of the market 
where only a few EU transmission system operators have published necessary 
network data in such a format that would increase overall network efficiency and 
security as well as increase the competitiveness of Europe's gas networks. 19 
419 See for instance Eurogas, Response to the questionnaire on transit, <http: /eurogas. org>. 
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Overall transparency is inadequately dealt with in all Member States with the 
exception of the UK. 420 For instance the calculation and the availability of network 
capacities are to a large degree not available. Requests from network users or the 
Madrid Forum to the transmission system operators to provide this information have 
failed so far. 421 Some essential network information such as balancing requirements or 
detailed descriptions of pipeline connection points is not publicly available. 22 
From this survey's point of view the lack of transparency leaves room for 
discrimination and disadvantages third parties. The (former) vertically integrated gas 
companies still gain significant benefit from inside information to which third parties 
do not have access. Also, third party access can be denied with the claim that all 
capacity is taken without describing the methodology used or giving impartial 
evidence. 
(iv) Transparent and non-discriminatory balancing rules 
Balancing the gas input with the off-take from the networks may become more 
complex and subject to discrimination and non-transparency once third party access is 
introduced. Therefore balancing presents one of the most important parts of third 
party access. 423 This is due to the fact that balancing is an important tool for gas 
transportation and the end-customer supply business. Due to the complexity of 
undertaking gas transportation and end-customer supply services, it is necessary for 
non-pipeline owners (i. e. suppliers/traders) to know well in advance the different 
balancing requirements in order to evaluate the risks and economic feasibility of each 
shipment. The Directive requires under Art. 8 (2. ) and Art. 12 (5. ) that "rules adopted 
by [network] operators for balancing the gas transmission system shall be objective, 
420 Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Third-Party access to natural gas networks in the EU, March 2001, p. 4. 
42'GTE has so far not responded to the agreement during the Madrid Regulatory Forum, see 
Conclusions of the 8th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 4. 
422 See for instance the GTE website <http: //www. gte. com>; Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., supra note, p. 4. 
423 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 26. 
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transparent and non-discriminatory [... ]. " However, the Directive's provisions do not 
provide any detail explanation on what is meant by these terms. It is noteworthy that 
there are currently substantial differences in Europe's gas balancing rules, which are 
set by national transmission and distribution system operators. 24 To date, only a few 
European transmission system operators - such as National Grid - provide sufficient 
transparency and therefore allow the customer to calculate the costs of using the 
networks. 425 The non-transparency of the balancing market makes trading and 
supplying risky for non-pipeline owners and suppliers. Operators that are part of a 
vertically integrated company continue to enjoy a substantial advantage over their 
competitors. Hence it must be concluded that the current Directive requirements on 
balancing obligations by network operators are not sufficient, nor contribute to more 
harmonisation and better market conditions for third parties. 
(v) Network maintenance 
In the interest of higher network efficiency and safety it is essential that network 
facilities are regularly maintained and/or upgraded. This principle is laid down in Art. 
8 (3. ) whereby that system operators shall "comply with minimum requirements for 
the maintenance and development of the transmission system, including 
interconnection capacity. " Apart from the fact that it is unclear what is meant by the 
phrase `minimum requirements', the wording will also allow different standards and 
conditions under which system operators have to undertake any work. This again does 
not lead to greater harmonisation and would leave some markets with an efficient and 
modem network system allowing better market access conditions (e. g. better 
communication systems), and other markets lacking these standards. 
424 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863, 
Brussels, 5. January 2005, p. 29. 
425 Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., supra note, p. 5. 
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bb) Regulated third party access 
A further requirement for Member States is to introduce regulated third party 
access. 426 The following section will discuss the different Directive requirement for 
third part access. 
(i) Publication of standard tariffs 
According to Art. 18 (1. ) all tariffs for access to the gas transmission and distribution 
systems, including balancing services and LNG facilities, must be published. In this 
context Jones argues427 that "the precise modalities of publication are left to 
subsidiarity, but evidently must be done in a manner which ensures that they are 
easily accessible and transparent. " However, there are different ways to interpret the 
words `easily accessible and transparent', and therefore this can lead to differences 
among system operators and on what to publish and most importantly on what not to 
publish. 
(ii) The use of network tariffs 
Pursuant to Art. 18 (1. ) tariffs shall be "applied objectively and without discrimination 
between system users. " In this context it is noteworthy that as far as network tariffs, 
charges and structures428 are concerned it must be stated that in practice there is no 
coherent and harmonised way to determine on which basis network tariffs are 
calculated and structured. 429 Thus, the European gas market structure is comparable to 
426 Prior to the Directive third party access to the network facilities was not necessarily subject to 
regulatory supervision, Member State also had negotiated third party access or so-called "single buyer 
system"; see Lecheler, H.; Gundel, J.; Ein weiterer Schritt zur Vollendung des Energie-Binnenmarktes: 
Die Beschleunigungs-Rechtsakte für den Binnenmarkt fur Strom und Gas, EuZW 20/2003, p. 625. 
427 Jones, C., supra note, p. 43. 
428 In the EU three main network structures are used in order to calculate network tariffs, these are: 
postal stamp; point-to-point and entry-exit. A detailed discussion on the different network structures 
will be subject to further analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
429 See for a full overview of different price structures: Arthur D Little, Appendix - West European gas 
transmission tar i ff comparisons, paper commissioned by Gastransport Services, May 2003, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm> ; Conclusions of the 3rd meeting of the 
European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 26-27 October 2000, p. 2, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>; see 
also European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report 
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a large patchwork quilt where each individual transmission and distribution system 
operator has different network standards, rules and procedures. Additionally, it is 
highlighted that some "Member States appear to have network tariffs significantly 
above the [EU-wide] average. "430 This is due to the weak and broad legal wording of 
the Directive's provision. 
Contrary to this statement, it is argued that the Member State and network differences 
have to be taken into account, hence non-harmonised tariff and network regimes as 
well as higher tariffs are justified 431 As far as network tariffs and structures are 
concerned it is difficult to support the latter argument. This is because Europe's Gas 
Transmission System Operators have failed so far to provide clear evidence on why 
different tariff regimes, structures and charges are justified. 432 Also, reports have 
shown that only the UK gas network structure and transmission tariffs reflect 
underlying costs 433 
In the context of network and tariff regimes, a high degree of transparency is also 
important for the efficient, safe, fair and competitive use of the gas networks 434 Yet, 
as discussed, the transparency requirements of the Directive are not sufficient and 
leave it up to each Member State to interpret the requirements. 
from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 
863, Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 27. 
430 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the report from 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, supra note, p. 26. 
431 See Eurogas opinion in: Conclusions of the 6'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, 
Madrid, 30-31 October 2002, p. 2, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
432 See Eurogas, Response to the questionnaire on transit, <http: //eurogas. org>, proves that numerous 
of TSOs are not willing to provide efficient information. Information on the GTE website on available 
capacity fails to provide the minimum standards of necessary information on tariffs, see 
<http: //www. gte2. com>. 
433 Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Third-Party access to natural gas networks in the EU, March 2001, p. 3. 
434 Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), Completing the Internal Energy Market: The 
missing steps, 6 October 2003, p. 2-4, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
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(iii) Regulatory supervision 
Pursuant to Art. 18 (1. ) all tariffs need ex ante approval by the regulatory authority. 
This survey has undertaken a detailed analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the 
regulatory authorities, see above. 435 
(iv) Refusal of third party access 
Pursuant to Art. 21 network operators are allowed - under certain conditions - to 
refuse access to their facilities. The main conditions for this will be analysed here: 
- According to Art. 21 (1. ) network operators "may refuse access to the system 
on the basis of lack of capacity. " Although it is obvious that no access can be 
granted if no capacity is available, it is noteworthy - as mentioned above - 
that in practice there are different practices for publishing capacity 
information; hence the information a third party - in the case of third party 
access denial - could receive, varies substantially from case-to-case. In some 
instances, the network operator simply informs the third party that no capacity 
is available without providing further information for how long, or whether 
interruptible or restricted firm capacity would be available. Again it is left 
open to each Member State and their regulatory bodies to outline what kind of 
information shall be made available to the rejected third party. 
-A further right to refuse third party access occurs when a network operator has 
"serious economic and financial difficulties with take-or-pay contracts", Art. 
21 (1. ) 436 In this context it is argued437 that Art. 27 (1. ) in conjunction with 
Art. 21 (1. ) allows derogation from third party access "if a [... ] company 
cannot reasonably sell all the gas for which it has contracted, it might be 
435 See C 11.2c). 
436 Take or pay contracts are defined as contracts "which entitles the buyer either to pay for the quantity 
of gas contracted to be taken in a specified period (e. g. day, month, quarter/year) or, if it does not take 
delivery of that quantity or only part of it, to pay for the quantity not taken. " See Cameron, P. D., supra 
note, p. 530. 
437 Jones, C., supra note, p. 171. 
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permitted to revoke the possibility for eligible customers to choose their 
supplier, thus obliging them to resume purchasing from it. " It is further argued 
that derogation under these conditions shall be the "last resort". 438 
Nevertheless, as the interpretation of this clause is again subject to 
subsidiarity, Member States and regulatory bodies will have non-harmonised 
views on this matter, which could ultimately be another delay in further 
liberalisation and fairer market conditions. 
e) Third party access to storage facilities and linepack 
Through the introduction of competition in gas supply, storage facilities have started 
to play a significant role in competition as well as becoming a product of (potentially 
high) commercial value. Storage is an essential tool for the network user and operator 
because it provides seasonal and/or load balancing, security and network 
optimisation 439 Gas storage can be undertaken in many different ways440 and it varies 
from country to country. The 7`h Madrid Gas Regulatory Forum stressed that access to 
storage facilities "need to ensure non-discriminatory and transparent access 
conditions". 441 
Art. 19 (1) of the Directive allows negotiated or regulated third party access to storage 
facilities. However, currently there is no coherent access regime for EU storage 
facilities and numerous barriers to accessing storage capacity remain. These barriers 
are similar to those described above, with reference to access to the network. The 
reasons for this market situation is, from this survey's point of view, based on the fact 
that the Directive allows two different kinds of access regimes, which will continue to 
lead to different and non-harmonised market conditions across the European gas 
438 Ibid. 
439Comot-Gandolphe, S., Natural gas supply and demand in Europe - the importance and changing 
nature offexibility, ZfE 27/2003, p. 102. 
440 See for the basic of underground storages EIA, The Basics of Underground Natural Gas Storage, 
August 2004, <http: //www. eia. doe. gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis-publications/stroagebasics/>. 
44'Conclusions of the 7'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 3. 
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sector. In addition, Art. 19 contains further problematic issues which are the subject of 
the subsequent section. 
aa) Access conditions 
Pursuant to Art. 19 (l. ) access to storage facilities shall be granted "when technically 
and/or economically necessary for providing efficient access to the system for the 
supply of customers, [... ]. " Apart from the fact that there is no definition of the terms 
such as `economically necessary', it is unclear which of the parties has the burden of 
proof that the access is or is not `economically necessary'. For instance, the storage 
operator and the third party wishing to access the facilities may have different views 
on this point; the third party might be reluctant to provide and prove that he needs the 
access as this could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive market data. 
The EU Commission's explanatory notes to the Directive442 indirectly express the 
view that the burden of proof shall be on the storage operator. Inter alia the 
Commission argues4a3 that storage facilities will always be essential for the supply of 
end-customers and therefore the storage operator should prove that this is not the case 
or that the third party wants to use the facilities purely for speculative reasons. 
Although the basis of this argumentation is understandable the Commission's note is 
not legally binding and is disputed 444 Furthermore the strict wording of the Directive 
does not justify the Commission's point of view as the wording is subject to 
subsidiarity i. e. left to the interpretation of each Member State and respective 
regulatory or court decisions. Therefore different and non-harmonised market 
conditions to for essential facilities like storage will continue to occur across the 
European gas market and present a barrier to third party market entry. 
442 European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, Third party access to storage facilities, 16. 
January 2004, p. 7. 
°43 Ibid. 
444 See Ehricke, U., supra note. 
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bb) Access to linepack 
It can take days for gas molecules to travel from the borders of Europe to the final 
customers. The transmission system operators can "pack" their pipelines with gas 
("linepack") to manage, maintain and optimise their system. Also, they can "store" 
the gas on the way to customers and avoid using storage facilities. According to Art. 
19 (1. ) access to linepack must be granted if it is "technically and/or economically 
necessary". Apart from the above discussed issue regarding the burden of proof, 
commentators question445 whether the system operator can chose between providing 
access to linepack or storage facilities. It is argued446 that the Directive does not 
provide an answer to this question. Although this survey agrees that Art. 19 does not 
solve this issue, the Directive's unbundling provision does provide an answer issue: 
today linepack service can only be provided by the fully unbundled transmission 
system operator whereas storage can only be granted by the independent storage 
operator, therefore the customer must negotiate and/or agree with either or both 
parties what kind of service is required. 
cc) Access to information and refusal of access 
According to Art. 19 (3. ) and (4. ) storage operator have to provide information about 
access to their facilities. In the case of negotiated third party access the Directive 
requires the operator "to publish their main commercial conditions" and in the case of 
regulated third party access to publish "tariffs and/or other terms and obligations". 
Already the wording shows that different market conditions for access to storage or 
linepack is unavoidable. Albers indirectly questioned447 whether these provisions will 
actually generate better market conditions and contribute to effective competition. 
This argument must be supported because of what has been concluded above about 
445 Jones, C., supra note, p. 53. 
446 Ibid. 
447 Albers, M., The New Directives on Energy Liberalization from a Competition Point of View, in: 
Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 46. 
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existing differences in the standards of publication for tariffs, and the terms and 
conditions of the networks 448 
J) Transit and long-term contracts 
A further important factor for a harmonised, single and competitive EU gas market is 
access to interconnectors as well as transit lines 449 This is particularly true for gas 
because there is a substantial flow of natural gas across many EU and non-EU 
countries. 450 An Interconnector is defined in Art. 2 (17. ) as "a transmission line which 
crosses or spans a border between Member States for the sole purpose of connecting 
the national transmission systems of these Member States. " However, the word 
`transit' is not defined under the Second Gas Directive. 
Prior to the Gas Directive, the Gas Transit Directive 91/296/EEC451 (hereinafter 
"Transit Directive") dealt with transit issues at the Community level. The scope of the 
Transit Directive was limited because Member States were only required to "take 
necessary measures to facilitate transit. " Under the Transit Directive the term `transit' 
was inter alia defined as "[... ] the crossing of at least one intra-community frontier. " 
However, it soon became clear that the objectives of the Transit Directive were not 
helpful to achieve a competitive and single market. 452 As a consequence, Art. 32 (1. ) 
of the Directive repeals the Transit Directive. 453 But Art. 32 (1. ) also states that it is 
"without prejudice to contracts concluded pursuant to Article 3 (1) of Directive 
448 See C 11 2 d) aa) iii). 
449 This view is supported by Appert, 0., Concluding Remarks, Cross-border Gas Trade Conference, 
Paris, France, 26-27 March 2002, <http: //www. iea. org>; Vasconcelos, J.; et al, Transmission and 
Trade of Electricity in Europe, O. G. L. T. R. 1999, p. 41. However, it can be questionable what a 
interconnector means. The Directive defines in Art. 2 (17) the term `interconnector' as "a transmission 
line which crosses or spans a border between Member States for the sole purpose of connecting the 
national transmission system of these Member States. " 
450 See Chapter BI1. 
431 Commission Directive 95/49/EEC of 11 November 1994 updating the list of entities covered by 
Council Directive 91/296/EEC on the transit of natural gas through grids. 452 Jones, C., supra note, p. 36. 
453 Including is above stated definition of the term `transit'. 
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91/296/EEC, which shall continue to be valid and to be implemented under the terms 
of the said Directive. " This means that all contracts that were signed under the Transit 
Directive remain valid. This refers in particular to long-term contracts, which have 
partly been responsible for the slow development of competition 454 In this context it 
is difficult to determine whether the rules and obligations of the Directive apply 
likewise to (long-term) contracts that were signed under the Transit Directive and are 
not repealed. 455 This could mean that all contracts could be dealt equally under the 
provision of the Directive. However, it seems to be the prevailing view456 that this is 
not the case. One argument that is used is that Art. 18 (3. ) of the Directive says that 
"this Directive shall not prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts in so far as they 
comply with Community competition rules. " Therefore it is concluded that 
Community competition law - here Art. 81 and 82 - will be applicable and not the 
Directive. This survey agrees with this analysis, as the Directive gives no grounds to 
assume otherwise. Nevertheless the following must be concluded; to allow (long- 
term) contracts, which were signed under the Transit Directive, to be examined under 
competition law will most likely continue to hold up competition among 
interconnectors. This is due to the fact that experience has shown that competition 
authorities tend to take much longer to decide on question presented to them. 
Apart from that, it is not clear how and in what way a cross-border dispute over a 
(long-term) contract, signed under the Transit Directive, will be resolved and which of 
the competition authorities will be in charge (or both). 
All of these elements create an unfavourable situation for competition and market 
harmonisation. 
454 For examples in the electricity sector see Albers, M., Competition Law Issues arising form the 
Liberalization Process, in: Geradin, D., (ed. ), The Liberalization of Electricity and Natural Gas in the 
European Union, p. 10. 
455EFET, Access to Transit Lines, September 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>, p. 3 
456 Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 14; Jones, C., supra note, p. 60. 
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In addition, it remains unclear what the term `transit' means. One could argue that a 
special definition of `transit' is not necessary, as the EU legislature indicated by not 
defining the term, that a distinction between domestic and cross-border (i. e. transit) 
gas transportation is not justified. However, one could argue that some Member 
States, such as Austria, make indeed a difference between the two. 457 
This survey is of the opinion that with the exemption of interconnectors, a 
differentiation between domestic and cross-border transportation is not suitable. This 
point of view is based on the fact, that on the one hand technical differences between 
both are not apparent and on the other hand the EU legislature clearly stressed, by not 
defining `transit', that it does not see a reason for a different treatment of cross-border 
transit and domestic gas transportation. Nevertheless the different practical treatments 
illustrate that the law is not clear and will not create harmonised standards across the 
European gas sector. 
g) Access to upstream pipelines 
Another fundamental element for a successfully functioning internal EU market is 
access to upstream pipelines. 58 The reason for this is that upstream pipelines 
"constitute an important category of (potential) gas supplies"459 and represent 
therefore the beginning of the gas value chain (up-, mid- and downstream). Art. 20 of 
the Directive covers access to upstream pipelines. Inter alia it is stated in Art. 20 (1. ): 
"Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that natural gas 
undertakings and eligible customers, wherever they are located, are able to obtain 
access to upstream pipeline networks, [... ]. " It is argued460 that this wording 
recognises the importance of upstream pipelines but also allows each Member Sate to 
457 For more details see the country study of Austria, D II. 
458 Upstream pipelines are defined in Art. 2 (2. ) as "any pipeline or network of pipeline operated and/or 
constructed as part of an oil or gas production project, or used to convey natural gas from one or more 
such projects to a processing plant or terminal or final coastal landing terminal. " For further 
explanations on what the definition of `upstream pipelines' consist of see Roggenkamp, M. M., The Gas 
Directive and the Implication for Offshore Pipelines in the North Sea, I. E. L. T. R. 6/2001, p. 121. 
4591bid, p. 120. 
460 Ibid, p. 122. 
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choose an access regime, as long as it is non-discriminatory and aims to achieve a 
competitive market. It is further argued461 that an access regime could be developed 
on a case-by-case basis. 
However, the different approaches to dealing with third party access to upstream 
pipelines could potentially lead to unfavourable market conditions or foreclose the 
market for third parties who want to enter the first part of the gas value chain 
(upstream). Notably only the UK and The Netherlands have significant upstream 
pipelines thus this survey will examine whether there are any unfavourable market 
conditions for third parties when they try to access upstream pipelines 462 
3. Provisional results 
In conclusion, with reference to some of the core elements of the Second Gas 
Directive this survey finds the following: 
(1. ) Unbundling 
As far as the Directive's unbundling provisions are concerned it must be said: 
- First of all, there seems to be a lack of willingness to implement the 
Directive's unbundling provisions. This view is supported by others463 who 
argue that more needs to be done by Member States to implement and enforce 
the unbundling provision of the Directive in order to achieve a competitive 
and transparent gas market. 
- It also must be said that proper enforcement of the unbundling provisions is 
absolutely necessary for the creation of a single and competitive EU gas 
market. 
461 Jones, C., supra note, p. 57. 
462 See Chapter D. 
463 European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET), Guidance on unbundling Transmission Operators 
for European Gas Market Development, June 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
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- Finally, this survey has to conclude that the existing Gas Directive's 
unbundling provisions do not provide efficient instruments to create effective 
and fair competition standards, nor do they contribute to more harmonisation 
across EU gas markets. 
(2. ) Regulatory authorities 
It was highlighted above that regulatory bodies are essential for the creation of a 
competitive market; nevertheless the Directive is missing the following essential 
elements: 
- The Directive's provisions do not oblige Member States to establish regulatory 
authorities with the same duties and responsibilities. It is often left open to 
each Member State to decide what position its regulatory body shall have. 
- It is not ensured that regulatory bodies must be fully independent from any 
governmental involvement. Again, each Member State can decide on how its 
regulator shall be governed. 
- The effects of the coordination obligations of Member States' regulatory 
bodies are uncertain and likely most not lead to greater harmonisation of 
Member States' gas markets. 
(3. ) Third party access to pipelines 
The Directive's third party access provisions leave some regulatory uncertainties as 
well as allowing certain market abuse conditions to continue in the future. This 
statement is based on the findings above which were: 
- The Directive does not ensure that network access is equal across the EU, e. g. 
harmonised standards for third party access. This refers not only to non- 
discriminatory and transparent access, but also to how network tariffs and 
methods will be set across the EU. 
- The cooperation between system operators by a mandatory and standardised 
agreement is not required. In this respect the Directive's provisions consist 
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only of very broad terms and will therefore not guarantee that system 
operators are legally obliged to cooperate and contribute to the future 
development of a more harmonised European gas market. 
- Refusal of third party access is very much subject to each Member States' 
legislation and practices. 
- Long-term contracts signed under the Transit Directive will continue to be 
valid and are not subject to the rules and obligations of the Directive. This 
must be identified as a further hindrance to market opening, in particular to 
interconnector capacities, which are essential for the further development of 
liberalisation. 
(4. ) Access to storage 
The analysis on the Directive's storage provisions highlight the fact that different 
regimes continue to allow considerable differences in access conditions to European 
storage facilities. This leaves barriers to market entry. Apart from that, the provisions 
on how to deny third party access to storage facilities leave room for discrimination. 
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III. Gas Transmission Regulation: Is it a significant legislative link 
for the completion of the internal EU gas market? 
As highlighted above, non-discriminatory third party access to cross border energy 
networks is one of the cornerstones for a successful internal, liberalised and 
harmonised EU energy market. This is particularly true for Europe's gas market as the 
EU is dependent on gas delivery, over various borders, from many non-EU countries. 
Therefore third parties need to access the networks not only domestically but also at 
interconnecting points in order to have equal market conditions. 
From the analysis made above it must be said that the Gas Directive does not provide 
sufficiently detailed rules according to which Member States can regulate cross- 
border gas trade. Nor does it consist of adequate rules for third party access conditions 
and procedures. 
In the case of the EU electricity market, a comparable situation exists with the 
Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC464 (hereinafter `Electricity Directive'). However, the 
EU legislature simultaneously adopted new EU Regulation465 on conditions for access 
to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (hereinafter `Electricity 
Regulation') with the Electricity Directive. Both pieces of legislation had to be 
implemented by July 2004. 
Generally speaking the Electricity Regulation places a greater emphasis on the 
availability and use of interconnection transmission capacity between Member States 
in order to improve competition within the EU internal electricity market. The 
Electricity Regulation establishes: 
464 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC. 
465 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (OJL 176/1). 
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- Inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanisms466, which result 
from cross-border electricity flows; 
- harmonised standards for cross-border transmission charges; and 
- general rules to improve congestion management 
467 
As far as the European gas market is concerned the Madrid Forum Guidelines for 
Good Third Party Access I and 11 468 (hereinafter `GGP' or `Madrid Guidelines') 
aimed inter alia at equivalent goals as in the Electricity Regulation. It is stated in the 
GGP that "an overriding principle is [... ] the safe operation of the system, whilst 
facilitating the development of national and EU competition in gas. [... ]. They [the 
GGP] are a set of basic principles [... ], aiming at the enhanced and efficient 
functioning of the Internal Gas Market. " 
However, during the 7`h Madrid Forum meeting469 it became apparent that there was 
an unacceptable level of non-compliance with the Guidelines. The EU Commission 
stated470 that because of the non-compliance with the non-legally binding GGP "a 
level playing field in terms of access conditions to the gas transmission network is far 
from being achieved. [... ] Without additional detailed measures regarding the manner 
in which transmission systems are operated, the objectives set by the Community in 
this context are unlikely to be met. " 
The Commission stated471 further that "the principle to supplement the internal energy 
market Directives [i. e. Electricity and Gas Directives], through regulation detailing 
466 What compensation payments are is subject to Art. 3 (1. ) of the Electricity Regulation where it is 
stated that "Transmission System Operators shall receive compensation for costs incurred as a result of 
hosting cross-border flows of electricity on their networks. " It is further stated in Art. (3. ) 
"Compensation payments shall be made on a regular basis with regard to a given period of time in the 
past. [... ]. " 
67 For more information about the Electricity Regulation see Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., The 
Liberalization of the EU Electricity Market and the Role of Power Exchanges, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; 
Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), The Regulation of Power Exchanges in Europe, p. 13-14. 
469 Conclusions of the 7'h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
Annex 1, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 6. 469 Ibid. 
470European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
conditions for access to the gas transmission networks, 10.12.2003, COM (2003) 304 final. p. 3. 
471 Ibid., p. 2. 
161 
Chapter C- EU legislation and EU Commission's decisions 
basic principles and implementation measures of certain key subjects considered 
necessary for the well functioning of the internal energy market, has already been 
acknowledged by the Council" by the adoption of the Electricity Regulation. 
In order to achieve similar standards in EU gas markets, the Commission proposed 
regulation to the European Parliament and the Council on conditions for access to the 
gas transmission networks (hereinafter `Gas Transmission Regulation', or 
'Regulation' ). 472 The main aim of the Regulation was to supplement and fill the 
missing gaps of the Gas Directive. But also the Regulation is directly applicable and 
therefore is not so dependent on what Member States make out of it. 
The proposal was agreed in principle by the European Parliament and the Council in 
spring 2005 and was adopted in the summer of 2005. The Regulation will enter into 
force in July 2006. 
This section will analyse whether the Gas Transmission Regulation provides a 
significant link to the further harmonise EU gas markets. This analysis will be 
undertaken in the following way: 
(1. ) First the Regulation's Preamble will be analysed as to whether it sets a 
sufficient background for further liberalisation and harmonisation across EU 
gas markets. 
(2. ) Following this discussion the core elements of the Regulation will be analysed 
and examined to determine how much the legislation's rules encourage 
competition and harmonisation. 
(3. ) It will also be discussed whether the new law will fully implement the Madrid 
Guidelines as envisaged or whether there are shortfalls. 
(4. ) This thesis will also examine whether the Regulation provides sufficient rules 
for effective cross border trade. 
472 Ibid. See also for an overview Lecheler, II., Europarechtliche Vorgaben für die Regulierung - Status 
quo und Entwicklungsperspektiven, in: Pielow, J: C. (ed. ), Grundsatzfragen der 
Enereiemarktre ulierung, p. 83. 
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(5. ) Finally, it will be discussed whether there are differences between the Gas and 
Electricity Regulations and if so, whether they are justified. 
1. Preamble and Definitions of the Gas Transmission Regulation 
Similar to the analysis of the Gas Directive it will briefly be discussed whether the 
Regulation's Preamble promotes the idea of harmonised and liberalised EU gas 
markets. Also, this survey will briefly touch on the Regulation's definitions. 
The Regulation's Preamble raises hopes in many ways that the legislation itself will 
bring more market interoperability, common standards and competitive elements. 
This argument is based on the fact that the Preamble inter alia states that "equal 
market access conditions", "principles and rules [... ] regarding congestion 
management, transparency, balancing and the trading of capacity rights" shall be 
established. But the legislation also stresses that it only lays down basic principles, 
which are subject to the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5 of the Treaty) as well as 
obeying the different market structures within each Member State. 
This - as seen above - highlights one of the main problems in the creation of a 
harmonised and competitive gas market. 
As far as the Regulation's definitions are concerned there is no definition of the term 
`transit'. In contrast to this the Electricity Regulation defines a related term by 
defining what `cross-border flow' means. 73 One could argue that a definition of 
`transit' is not necessary because the Gas Transmission Regulation defines what 
`transmission' means and therefore there is no need for further definition, particularly 
because there should not be a difference between gas transit transportation and 
transmission. Both are the same. To the contrary, one could say that the repealed 
Transit Directive defined the term 'transit'. 474 One could also say that during the 
passing of the repealed Transit Directive a difference in definition between domestic 
"" Here Art. 2 (2. ) (b). 
474 See analysis C 11.2 f. 
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and international gas transportation was made; now a distinction is not made, and 
therefore a separate definition is obsolete. Although this survey agrees with the last 
statement the discussion above shows that there could be different views on this 
matter and therefore more clarity by the legislature would be preferred. 
This aside, although the initial EU Commission's attempt was, in accordance with the 
Electricity Regulation, to focus on gas transit, the Gas Transmission Regulation does 
not mention the word `transit' in the entire text. This could be seen as a considerable 
shortfall as cross-border gas transportation is one of the fields where there are 
significant problems with respect to market harmonisation and liberalisation. To the 
contrary one could also say that Regulation intends to fill the missing `gaps' of the 
Second Gas Directive. 
Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that it is a considerable disappointment that the 
Regulation does not bring more clarification on whether transit and domestic gas 
transportation should be treated equally or whether Member States shall be entitled to 
continue to make a distinction between the two. From a harmonisation point of view a 
clarification would be necessary in order to improve and to standardise the access 
conditions to both domestic and transit gas networks 475 
2. Core elements of the Gas Transmission Regulation: Do they give direction for 
the creation of a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market? 
The following section of this survey will analyse the core elements of the Gas 
Transmission Regulation. In this respect, a special emphasis will be placed on the 
following questions: 
Whether the new rules under the Regulation will contribute and enhance the 
harmonisation and liberalisation movements across the EU gas markets. 
Do the new provisions fulfil the requirements of the Madrid Guidelines? 
475 For more information how transit is treated differently from domestic gas transportation see the case 
study of Austria, D II. 
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Are there justified differences between the Electricity and Gas Transmission 
Regulations? 
a) Tariffs for access to networks 
According to Art. 3 of the Regulation, regulated tariffs - in accordance with the Gas 
Directive - "shall [inter alia] be transparent, take into account the need for system 
integrity and its improvement and reflect actual costs incurred, [... ] [and] facilitate 
efficient gas trade and competition, while at the same time avoiding cross-subsidies 
between network users [... ]. " The wording reflects some key elements for a 
successful and more harmonised gas market. Nevertheless, it must also be said, that 
the provision is rather broad if one compares it with some of the requirements of the 
Electricity Regulation and the Madrid Guidelines. 
aa) Differences with the Electricity Regulation 
The Electricity Regulation requires inter alia that network tariffs "shall not be 
distance-related" (Art. 4 (1. )). A non-distance related access regime is either based on 
a postage-stamp476 or an entry-exit477 third party access system. Therefore the 
Electricity Regulation limits the access regimes to two, creating greater 
harmonisation. In most cases, both access regimes - in particular entry-exit - have 
enhanced competitive conditions for third parties as in practice the transportation 
becomes less expensive and time consuming as requires less work. 
In contrast to this, the Gas Transmission Regulation's provision allows Member 
States to have different approaches to setting the network access regimes and 
476 Postage-Stamp access system means "a system of transmission pricing in which the same unit price 
is charged for transmission, irrespective of how far the energy is transported. " See Cameron, P. D. supra 
note, p. 529. 
477 Entry-Exit access regime means that the third party network user only has to book an entry and an 
exit capacity - without an actual transportation pathway - in order to reach his customer. It is up to the 
transmission system operator to combine the entry and exit point. The total transportation charge is the 
sum of separate charges for the entry and exit capacity. Therefore the network user does not have to 
pay for the actual route on which the gas flows. He only has to pay for the entry and respective exit 
capacity. 
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therefore allows non-harmonised access conditions across EU gas networks. This will 
continue to create economic risks as well as possible anti-competitive conditions for 
third party access. 
Apart from this, Art. 4 (5. ) of the Electricity Regulation requires further that "there 
shall be no specific network charge on individual transactions for declared transit of 
electricity. " From this survey's point of view this indirectly implies that, as far as 
network charges are concerned, a distinction between domestic and transit tariffs is 
not permitted. Therefore this provision provides a significant step towards more 
market harmonisation and towards the creation of an internal and competitive market 
in electricity. The Gas Transmission Regulation is lacking such detailed provisions. 
This has to be identified as a shortfall and this survey sees no reason why a different 
approach was given to gas and electricity. 
bb) Missing elements of the Madrid Guidelines 
With respect to the requirements of the Madrid Guidelines there are also some 
significant differences: Inter alia the Guidelines obliged transmission system 
operators to set tariffs that "should reflect efficiently incurred costs". In this respect 
the Regulation states that tariffs should reflect "actual costs incurred. " The differences 
and the implications of both terms can in practice be substantial. As argued'478 it is 
important that tariffs are cost-reflective, otherwise they bear the risk of permitting 
excessive profits. Both wordings reflect this but the difference lies in the formulation 
of "efficiently" and "actual. " In this context it is said479 that it is key to tariff settings 
that they are `efficiently incurred', as this can limit the chances that network operators 
create the costs of inefficient operations. In contrast, under the term `actual incurred' 
costs the possibility could arise that a network operator passes on to its customers all 
478 Jones, C., supra note, p. 45. 
479 Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Convergence of non-discriminatory tar fand congestion management 
systems in the European gas sector, paper commissioned by GTE, September 2002, p. 37. 
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its actual incurred costs which possibly where not efficiently incurred; i. e. the 
customer paid for something that was actually not necessary. This therefore may 
create unfavourable market conditions for third parties, which may also have an 
negative impact on competition. 
b) Provision of third party access service 
The analysis of the third party access provisions of the Gas Directive has proven that 
third party access will not be successful if network operators across the EU do not 
provide the same or similar services to all third party network users. In this context it 
is argued480 that this is of special importance as the majority of network operators will 
"remain part of a vertically integrated group and thus may have a commercial interest 
to structure transmission services in a way that benefits their groups. In particular, 
they may have an interest in offering only long-term or bulk transmission contracts - 
suitable for the ex incumbent with a large portfolio, but inappropriate for the needs of 
new market entrants. " 
The guidelines for third party access under the Gas Directive are - as analysed above 
- in many ways too general. They also do not provide enough detail to allow effective 
incentives for competition and further harmonisation of third party access facilities. 
Art. 4 in conjunction with the annex guidelines of the Regulation aim to improve this 
situation. 
The following section will analyse some of these elements. 
aa) Standardised network access contracts or codes 
Pursuant to Art. 4 (1. ) the transmission system operator shall offer "the same services 
to different customers, [... ] [and] under equivalent contractual terms and conditions, 
either using harmonised transportation contracts or a common network code approved 
by the competent authority [... ]. " These aforementioned standardised contracts and 
480 Jones, C., supra note, p. 249. 
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network codes only refer to the contractual relationship between network operator and 
network user but not to the connections between network operators. Furthermore, they 
only require network operators to use the same contract for all its customers but do 
not require all EU network operators to use the same or an equivalent network access 
contract. This, however, would have achieved a great deal of harmonisation as 
network users would only have to deal with one type of contract. 
Nevertheless the legally binding annex guidelines481 (hereinafter `Regulation's 
Guidelines' or `Guidelines') to this regulation provide some further text on 
standardised network access contracts and codes. Pursuant to No 1 (3) of the 
Regulation's Guidelines, "Transmission system operators shall develop network 
codes and harmonised contracts following proper consultation with network users. " 
From this survey's point of view, this provision could be subject to different 
interpretation. One could argue that this provision implies that all network operators 
have to design the same network code and harmonised contract for third party access. 
On the contrary, one could say that the wording does not justify this argument 
because it does not say the word `same'. Therefore it is unclear what this provision 
actually intends and therefore leaves uncertainties, in particular for network operators. 
Apart from this, it is not said how the consultation process with network users should 
be undertaken. In this context one could say that each network user is allowed to 
consult with the individual network operator. Or one could put forward that the 
consultation should be undertaken in the same way as the consultation process 
employed during the Madrid Forum. Although this seems to be the most likely 
scenario doubts about the legal status of such negotiations have arisen. This refers in 
particular to the question of whether Regulation's Guidelines are legally binding and 
481 This survey is of the opinion that the annexes Guidelines to Gas Transmission Regulation are legally 
binding. This argument is based on the fact that Guidelines are in the Annex to the Regulation and 
therefore directly refer to the rules/provisions of the Regulation. Furthermore Art. 9 of the Regulation 
deals only with the Guidelines and inter alia it is stated in Art. 9 (1. ) "Where appropriate, Guidelines 
providing minimum degree of harmonization required to achieve the aim of this Regulation shall 
specify: [... ). " 
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what happens if network operators and users cannot agree on network code or 
contract. Again, there is much room for interpretation, which creates uncertainties, 
again in particular for network operators as they are obliged to undertake certain 
actions but it is not clear how. 
A similar situation exists in Regulation Guidelines No 1 (4) and (5). According to 
these provisions transmission system operators "shall implement standardised 
nomination and re-nomination procedures" and "shall harmonise formalised request 
procedures and response times [... ] after consultation with relevant network users. " 
Nevertheless it is noteworthy that these provisions could - once implemented - bring 
some improvements with respect to pan-European gas competition and harmonisation. 
This argument is based on the fact that currently across the European Union most 
network operators have different nomination procedures for example. This has in the 
past led to (sometimes serious) difficulties and expensive network access, as the 
network users have to submit to each individual network operator their nomination 
requests. 
However, doubts remain about how this provision will work in practice. In particular 
because Art. 9 (3. ) of the Regulation states that "the application [... ] of [the] 
Guidelines [... ] shall reflect differences between national gas systems, and shall 
therefore not require uniform detail and conditions of third party access at Community 
level. " This provision could lead to the assumption that even on each Member State 
level exemptions for the above discussed Guideline provisions could be granted and 
therefore the aim to harmonise could fail. This again has negative impacts on 
competition. 
bb) Operational balancing and interconnection agreements 
Although point 2.1.3. of the Madrid Guidelines requires network operators to enter 
"into both standardised interconnection agreements (lAs) and standardised operational 
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balancing agreements (OBAs)"482 with each other, the Regulation does not oblige 
network operator to sign such contracts. This must be identified as a shortfall as the 
objectives of these agreements are to improve the interoperability among network 
operators, as well as to introduce harmonised standard agreements for the operation 
and handling of the gas network facilities. In the interest of greater market 
harmonisation and network security, this survey believes such agreements are 
fundamental to the future, in particular because today there are still cases where 
network operators have not signed such agreements and/or they are kept secret. 
However, under No 1 (8) of the Regulation's Guidelines, transmission system 
operator shall at least "cooperate with other transmission system operators in 
coordinating the maintenance of their respective networks [... ]. " Although this 
provision has to be welcomed, IAs and OBAs should describe more in detail how 
such coordination is to be undertaken, to provide more clarity and market reliance for 
the network operators as well as the network users. Therefore the requirements of the 
Madrid Guidelines are preferable. 
cc) Length and contents of transmission contracts 
Art. 4 and the Regulation Guidelines also deal with the duration and contents of 
transmission contracts. Inter alia it is stated in No 1 (1) of the Regulation Guidelines 
that "Transmission system operators shall offer firm and interruptible services down 
to a minimum period of one day. "483 The wording nearly reflects the text of the 
482 This survey believes that Interconnection agreements (hereinafter'IAs') mean: "Agreements 
between interconnected transmission and distribution system operators that are designed to ensure the 
interoperability of the interconnection point and may cover, energy specification (including pressure, 
temperature and chemical gas specifications) and, change of flow rates and the operation of the 
interconnection point. " 
This survey further defines Operational balancing agreements (hereinafter 'OBAs') as "agreements 
between interconnected transmission and distribution system operators that are designed to ensure the 
interconnection such that network users are allocated their full nomination, unless there is a significant 
net shortfall or access. " 
483 The term `interruptible capacity' is defined in Art. 2 (12. ) of the Gas Transmission Regulation as 
"services offered by the transmission system operator as in relation to interruptible capacity. " `Firm 
capacity' is defined in Art. 2 (16. ) as "gas transmission capacity contractually guaranteed as 
uninterruptible by the transmission system operator. " 
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Madrid Guidelines, but with the difference that under the Madrid Guidelines network 
operators have to offer this service by July 2004 and under the Gas Transmission 
Regulation this deadline was extended to July 2006. The extension causes further 
delay as the offer of interruptible services brings, for both the network user as well as 
network operator, an advantage. For a truly independent and unbundled transmission 
network operator, an interruptible service means that the operator can maximise the 
use of his network to resell unused but contracted capacity on an interruptible basis. 484 
For the network user, the interruptible service can provide a cheaper back-up solution 
if the primary transportation route is not available. 485 
c) Capacity allocation and congestion management 
As mentioned in Chapter A, it is expected that future gas demand will significantly 
rise over the coming years. Therefore the issue of gas pipeline congestion 
management has and will be important for the future development of a competitive 
and harmonised EU gas market. This is particularly true for contractual congestion 
management. Already existing pipelines are fully booked on a long-term basis and 
therefore little pipeline capacity is available for third parties. This refers especially to 
cross-border flows where often there is little or no interconnector capacity available. 
This represents a considerable barrier to entry across all EU gas markets. 486 The issue 
of capacity hoarding is of special importance for the future development of a 
competitive market. Capacity hoarding means that unused but booked capacity is not 
made available to third parties and therefore blocks access to the market and thus the 
development of competition. However, it is argued487 "dealing with this [issue] 
484 Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Third-Party access to natural gas networks in the EU, paper 
commissioned by EFET, March 2001, p. 8-9. 
485 For a similar argument see Jones, C., supra note, p. 250. 
486EFET, Access to Transit Lines, September 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>, p. 1; Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, 
B., Convergence of non-discriminatory tariff and congestion management systems in the European gas 
sector, paper commissioned by GTE, September 2002, p. 65. 487 Jones, C., supra note, p. 254. 
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requires a delicate balance between respecting the property rights of the [capacity 
holder] and enabling competition to develop. " 
Art. 5 of the Regulation covers not only the issue of contractual but also physical 
congestion management and the allocation of capacity. 
This survey will analyse the core elements of this provision and compare them to 
rules under the Electricity Regulation. 
It is noteworthy that the Regulation provision on congestion management and 
capacity allocation go beyond the obligations of the Madrid Guidelines and therefore 
this survey will not make any reference to the Madrid Guidelines in this section. 
aa) Contractual congestion 
As noted above, contractual congestion can represent a considerable hindrance to 
competition. 
In addition to the general obligations on transmission system operators to publish non- 
discriminatory and transparent capacity allocation mechanisms, the Regulation 
consists of three provisions, which deal with contractual congestion: 
- In the case that transmission system operators conclude and/or renegotiate 
transportation contracts Art. 5 (3. ) (a) of the Regulation requires them to take 
into account that "in the event of contractual congestion, the transmission 
system operator shall offer unused capacity on the primary market at least on a 
day-ahead and interruptible basis. " In this context488 some are of the opinion 
that in the case where the capacity remains unused489 this would mean that the 
system operator is obliged to apply the use-it-or-lose-principle 490 However, as 
488 Ibid., p. 256. 489 The Gas Transmission Regulation defines in Art. 2 (4. ) `unused capacity' as "firm capacity which a 
network user acquired under a transportation contract but which that user has not nominated by the 
deadline specified in the contract. " 
490 The principle implies that the network operator requires the network user to nominate the amount of 
capacity he is planning to use for the shipping of his gas. The difference between contractual and actual 
nominated capacity volumes can be then made available to the market (e. g. if a shipper contracts 100 
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also pointed out491, this would only apply to contracts that are signed after the 
Regulation enters into force in July 2006. As many pipeline capacities have 
been booked on a long-term basis this could mean that a further delay in the 
development of competition will occur. This aside, it is not clear from the text 
of the Regulation how the use-it-or-lose-principle shall be applied in practice, 
i. e. who and on what basis should receive the `freed' capacity? 
Only the Electricity Regulation provides some clarity on this issue: It states in 
Art. 6 (1. ) "Network congestion problems shall preferentially be solved with 
non-transaction based methods, i. e. methods that do not involve a selection 
between the contracts of individual participants. " From the wording of this 
provision it is clear that the network operator cannot just `pick' a certain 
counter party to whom he wants to give the `freed' capacity. This is an 
important factor for the development of a competitive market, as all 
participants need to have equal and fair access to the `freed' capacity. 
Therefore, in the case where there are too many interested parties competing 
for the available capacity, either a pro-rata or preferably an auction should be 
applied. However, none of these solutions are covered in the Regulation, 
leaving room for interpretation and the possible mistreatment of third parties. 
- With respect to existing contracts the Gas Transmission Regulation takes a 
different approach. According to Art. 5 (3. ) (b) "network users who wish to re- 
sell or sublet their unused contracted capacity on the secondary market shall 
be entitled to do so. Member States may require notification or information of 
the transmission system operator by the network users. " This means that 
network users that have purchased but not used capacity do not have to sell it, 
and therefore capacity hoarding is still possible, blocking the market to other 
units of pipeline capacity and he actually uses (nominates) only 80 units, 20 units could be made 
available to the market). 
491 Jones, C., supra note, p. 256. 
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parties. Some argue492 that the clause had to be designed in this a manner 
because a reassignment of the unused capacity might be a breach of some 
Member State's legislation. This statement is partly understandable if one 
thinks of contractual or constitutional rights in some Member States that allow 
such a reassignment only under strict conditions 493 Nevertheless the argument 
becomes less powerful if one looks at Art. 4 (4. ) of the Electricity Regulation 
according to which "Market participants shall inform the transmission system 
operators concerned a reasonable time ahead of the relevant operational period 
whether they intend to use allocated capacity. Any allocated capacity that will 
not be used shall be reattributed to the market, in an open, transparent and 
non-discriminatory manner. " This provision implies indirectly the 
aforementioned use-it-or-lose-principle and does not have any problems with 
infringing property rights. In this respect, a different treatment of gas and 
electricity is not justified and therefore it remains questionable why the Gas 
Transmission Regulation does not contain a similar provision. 
-A similar issue occurs under Art. 5 (4. ) of the Gas Transmission Regulation 
which states "when capacity contracted under existing transportation contracts 
remains unused and contractual congestion occurs, transmission system 
operators shall apply [Art. 5 (3. )] unless this would infringe the requirements 
of the existing transportation contracts. Where this would infringe the existing 
transportation contracts, transmission system operators shall, following 
consultation with the competent authorities, submit a request to the network 
user for the use on the secondary market of unused capacity in accordance 
with [Art. 5 (3. )]. " It is difficult to understand why this provision does not 
require the transmission system operator to make the capacity available in 
accordance with the above described mechanism of Art. 5 (3. ) (a). A 
492 Ibid. 
493 For a further discussion on this issue see the country studies in Chapter D. 
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foreclosure of the market by unused (or sometimes hoarded) capacity remains 
possible. 
- Interestingly Art. 5 does not deal with the issue of secondary capacity trading, 
although this would be a possible solution to contractual congestion. As 8.1 of 
the Madrid Guidelines states, "[the] TSO shall allow and facilitate TPA 
capacity rights to be freely tradable between registered shippers in a secondary 
market [.. ]. " Secondary capacity trading will allow shippers that do not have 
any or too little capacity to buy capacity from those who do not need their 
already booked capacity. This can result in greater network efficiency, 
possible capacity liquidity and introduce more market opening. However, the 
Gas Transmission Regulation places this point in a separate Article. In Art. 8 
of the Regulation it inter alia is said, "Each transmission system operator shall 
take reasonable steps to allow capacity rights to be freely tradable and to 
facilitate such trade. [... ]. " What "reasonable steps" mean is not further 
explained and left open to each transmission system operator to decide. This 
obviously could lead to disparity in the introduction of an important free 
market element such as secondary capacity trading, creating good conditions 
in some markets whilst other markets lag behind. 
bb) Physical congestion 
In the event of physical congestion, Art. 5 (5. ) states that "[... ] non-discriminatory, 
transparent capacity allocation mechanisms shall be applied by the transmission 
system operator or, as appropriate, the regulatory authorities. " The first question that 
arises in the context of physical congestion is the query when does physical 
congestion occur? From this survey's point of view such congestion can only occur in 
two cases: 
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- Actual pipeline capacity has to be restricted for technical reasons (e. g. because 
of maintenance); or 
- Capacity is contractually overbooked. 
The second question that arises is how should Art. 5 (5. ) of the Gas Transmission 
Regulation be applied in these cases? 
The Regulation does not provide any clear answers. However, in reference to 
technical restricitions, this survey believes that the above described pro-rata allocation 
mechanism or an auction should be applied. However, there are no direct references 
to these kind of procedures in the Regulation. Only the Gas Transmission Regulation 
Guidelines state in 2.1. (1) that "[... ] congestion management procedures shall 
facilitate the development of competition and liquid trading of capacity and shall be 
compatible with market mechanisms including spot markets and trading hubs. They 
shall be flexible and capable of adapting to evolving market circumstances. " In 
practice auctions have been seen as a way to facilitate trading across EU gas markets 
if congestion occurs 494 Where physical congestion occurs because of technical 
reasons, the auction of capacity seems the best solution if there are more interested 
parties than capacity available. Nevertheless - as said before - this matter is not dealt 
with in the Gas Transmission Regulation. 
In the second case, where capacity is contractually overbooked, the transmission 
system operator should - from this survey's point of view - be held responsible 
because it allowed the actual used capacity to exceed the contractually booked 
capacity. Only the network operator has control over this matter. Therefore the 
transmission system operator should pay for any damages that occur. 
However, the Gas Transmission Regulation does not contain any such obligation nor 
does it say how these issues should be dealt with. This again leaves space for various 
interpretations and possible negative and anti-competitive effects on market players. 
494 Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Convergence of non-discriminatory tar(and congestion management 
systems in the European gas sector, paper commissioned by GTE, September 2002, p. 84. 
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d) Transparency Requirements 
As already mentioned, sufficient access to market information is an important element 
of third party access and the development of a competitive and harmonised gas 
market. 495 The Gas Directive - as analysed before - consists of some (very) broad 
transparency requirements. 
Art. 6 of the Gas Transmission Regulation aims to provide a common basic level of 
transparency. The transparency requirements are almost equivalent to the Madrid 
Guideline requirements therefore this survey will not undertake a comparison with the 
Madrid Guidelines. The survey will, however, focus on the question whether the 
transparency obligations under the Gas Transmission Regulation will help to bring 
more competition and harmonisation into European Gas Markets. Also, a cross 
reference to the Electricity Regulation will be made. 
Art. 6 of the Gas Transmission Regulation can be split in two sections: 
- Technical transparency; and 
- Commercial transparency requirements. 
These two sections raise three further questions: 
- For which points in the gas networks are transparency requirements 
applicable? 
- How detailed must the information be and will it promote competition and 
harmonisation? 
And 
- Are any derogations allowed and if yes, are they justified from the point of 
view of competition and harmonisation? 
The following section is structured around these three questions. 
495 See for what kind of information third parties require: EFET, Gas Market Information 
Requirements, May 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
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aa) Definition of `relevant points' 
In the European gas network there are many (i. e. thousands) entry and exit points as 
well as other interconnection points, which can also represent entry or exit points. In 
order to manage the network system the system operator needs to know how much 
gas will enter the network as well as how much gas will be withdrawn at the exit 
point. For the (potential) network user, it is also important to find out how much 
capacity is available at certain entry and/or exit points. This would enable the user to 
investigate whether to undertake to supply via a certain transportation route or 
whether to use the entry capacity in order to trade the gas with other counter parties. 
However, because of the high number of entry and exit points, it must be determined 
for which points the network operator is required release vital market information. 
Only the network operator can release this data as it is the only one who has first-hand 
access to the information as all network users inform the operator in advance what 
capacity they will or will not use. 
The Gas Transmission Regulation's Guidelines state in 3.2. that, 
"Relevant points shall include at least: 
(a) all entry points to a network operated by a transmission system operator; 
(b) the most important exit points and exit zones covering at least 50% of total 
capacity of the network of a given transmission system operator, including all exit 
points or exit zones covering more than 2% of total capacity of the network; 
(c) all points connecting different networks of transmission system operators; 
(d) [... ]; 
(e) all essential points within the network of a given transmission system operator 
including points connecting to gas hubs. All points are considered essential which, 
based on experience, are likely to experience physical congestion; [... ]. " 
The wording causes concern on the following grounds: 
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- The definition allows disparity among Member States gas markets. It is said 
that "at least" the following points should be covered by the definition. Some 
Member States might impose stricter regulation on their transmission system 
operator, which could have negative cost implications as the publication of 
entry or exit data can be time consuming, as well as disclosing important 
market information. 
- 3.2. (b) states the "most relevant exit points". It is not clear what `most 
relevant' means and therefore leaves room for interpretation. This survey 
believes the national regulatory authority should fix - after consultation with 
the network operator and user - these points. 
- It is also unclear why the 50% threshold in 3.2. (b) was laid down. It is 
difficult to comprehend why it was not 100%. Such an approach would at least 
guarantee the more information would be available and therefore increase the 
competitiveness of the market. 
- 3.2. (e) states that the term `relevant points' shall also include "all essential 
points". Further explanation of this phrase is found in quoting that gas hub 
interconnections are automatically also relevant points. Additionally all other 
"points are considered which, based on experience, are likely to experience 
physical congestion. " The wording is too vague to define exactly which points 
are included in the term. This again creates uncertainty for all market players 
and therefore does not contribute to better competitive and harmonisation 
standards across EU gas markets. 
bb) Detail of transparency requirements 
Whilst Art. 6 does not provide very detailed transparency requirements the 
Regulation's Guidelines present in 3.1. and 3.3. considerable detail. Apart from the 
terms and conditions that transmission system operators have to publish under the 
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requirements of 3.1., 3.3. contains of the most interesting transparency requirements. 
These relate in particular to the publication of capacity: 
- According to 3.3. (1) of the Regulation's Guidelines transmission operators 
have to publish the following information at all relevant points down to daily 
periods: "(a) the maximum technical capacity for flows in both directions, (b) 
total contracted and interruptible capacity, (c) the available capacity. " These 
requirements must be identified as a significant step toward more transparency 
in Europe's gas markets, which will - once used in practice - be to the benefit 
of competition and market security, as all involved parties can access vital 
information. Nevertheless there are gas markets - such as the UK - where a 
network user can access this information on real time basis and not - as the 
Regulation requires - on a daily basis. The advantages of real time publication 
are obvious, as market participants can react immediately to sudden changes in 
the operation of the network in question. 
- Pursuant to 3.3. (2) transmission system operators "shall publish available 
capacities for a period of at least 18 months ahead [... ]. " This has to be 
welcomed but operators should also be required to publish the already 
contracted amounts. This would allow all involved parties to see whether the 
numbers "match". 
- According to Art. 3.3. (4) transmission system operators are required to 
"publish historical maximum and minimum monthly capacity utilisation rates 
and annual average flows at all relevant points for the past three years. " A 
longer period, i. e. 5-10 years, would produce more clarity on how the pipeline 
capacity was used in the past. It would also allow better forecasting as the 
period of three years has proven in practice to be too short. This argument is 
based on the fact that forecasts are usually undertaken on historical data of 
between 5-10 years. Three year old data can sometimes not be reliable (e. g. 
extraordinary cold or warm winters, which can produce abnormal data). 
Therefore an extension of the historical reporting period could overcome 
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future pipeline congestion and therefore support competition in the market. 
Furthermore it would allow a re-assessment of whether claims made five years 
ago that pipeline capacities were "fully booked" were actually valid. 
cc) Derogation of transparency requirements 
It has also been said above that availability of necessary market data can conflict with 
confidentiality. As expressed496 "this gives rise to a difficult balance. The information 
in question may be needed to encourage new market entry, but nonetheless the 
confidentiality issues may be legitimate. " 
Art. 6 (5. ) addresses this question and gives national regulatory authorities a leading 
role. In the Gas Transmission Regulation text it is stated, "Where transmission system 
operators consider that it is not entitled, for confidentiality reasons, to make public all 
the data required [under Art. 6], it shall seek the authorisation of the competent 
authorities to limit publication with respect to the point or points in question. The 
competent authorities shall grant or refuse authorisation on a case by case basis, 
taking into account in particular the need to respect legitimate commercial 
confidentiality and the objective of creating a competitive internal gas market. If the 
authorisation is granted, available capacity shall be published without indicating the 
numerical data that would contravene confidentiality. No such authorisation as 
referred to in this paragraph shall be granted where three or more network users have 
contracted capacity at the same point. " 
From the last sentence it is clear that the Regulation's provision is only applicable in 
the case where there are less than three shippers in the network in question (the so- 
called "two-shipper-rule"). This raises a concern, as it is not clear why a network 
operator cannot publish on an aggregated basis, the required information; i. e. not 
listed the number of shippers in any publication, just state how much capacity is 
contracted and taken. Often fewer than three shippers use pipeline capacities and 
496 Jones, C., supra note, p. 264. 
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therefore - under this provision - such data is not available to the market and 
therefore hinders access to vital information. 
This aside, Art. 6 (5. ) also requires the regulatory authorities to undertake a case-by- 
case study. The above analysis of the Gas Directive, with a special reference to the 
case-by-case approach of regulatory authorities, question this approach as it means 
some Member State authorities may grant exemptions from the Regulation's 
requirements, whilst others would not in a comparable case. This leads to non- 
harmonised market conditions, which do not promote a competitive European gas 
market. 
This aside, the Electricity Regulation does not provide for such an exemption and it is 
not clear why there should be different treatment for the two commodities. 
e) Balancing rules and imbalance charges 
It was briefly discussed before497 that balancing rules and imbalance charges are 
becoming more difficult and important in liberalised markets. The previous analysis 
touched on the need for non-discriminatory and transparent imbalance rules. 
However, a further problematic issue in the context of third party access and gas 
transportation is imbalance charges and penalties. In this respect the following should 
be considered: 
Gas supply and/or transportation to end customers is dependent on a number of 
factors such as weather, time of day etc. The consumption by the customers will vary 
according to these components. For the supplier and network operator, some of these 
supply elements can be predicted, some cannot. The majority of gas supply contracts 
do not require the customer to take a specific gas amount each day and/or week; most 
contracts have some flexibility (i. e. allow customers to vary their consumption levels). 
This flexibility can cause problems for the operation of the network, in particular if 
497 See C II. 2. d) aa) (iv). 
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many third parties are using the network. This is most likely the case in more 
competitive markets, where often many shippers and/or traders use the networks. 
However, to manage and maintain the system at safe standards, imbalance charges 
have to be introduced for shippers that abuse the `flexibilities' in the transportation 
contract. Theses charges are called `imbalance charges' or `imbalance penalties'. 
From a competition point of view, it is important that imbalance charges are not 
excessive because they would make transportation for third parties economically 
unfeasible. Therefore, the right equilibrium must be achieved between appropriate 
imbalance penalties and incentives for shippers to limit their imbalances as much as 
possible. 
The Gas Directive does not deal with the issue of imbalance charges to any great deal. 
As analysed before it only requires Member State regulatory authorities to authorise 
balancing charges and transmission system operators to publish balancing tariffs. 498 
Art. 7 of the Gas Transmission Regulation intends to bring more detail to balancing 
rules and charges. However, the balancing rules under the Regulation cause some 
doubt as to whether they will improve and harmonise the balancing regimes across the 
European gas markets. This is of special importance as gas transportation crosses 
many borders, where many pipeline operators have different balancing regimes, 
which can cause difficulties for third party access. 
This section will analyse the balancing rules under Art. 7 of the Gas Transmission 
Regulation. Whilst observing the general obligations that balancing rules shall be fair, 
non-discriminatory and transparent, Art. 7 also covers the following areas, which 
could have an impact on the harmonisation and liberalisation of Europe's gas markets: 
- Tolerance levels: In the design of balancing mechanisms, it is important that 
the shipper is allowed to use a certain degree of tolerance i. e. the difference 
between the actual used capacity and the nominated capacity. But the 
tolerance level should also ensure that the shipper is not misusing this tool. 
Art. 7 (2. ) of the Gas Transmission Regulation states, "[... ] tolerance levels 
498 Arts. 18 (1. ) and 25 (2. ) of the Gas Directive. 
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shall be designed in a way that either reflects seasonality or results in a 
tolerance level higher than that resulting from seasonality, [... ]. " As a result, it 
is argued499that balancing tolerances will vary among Member States' 
markets. The wording of the provision leaves room for interpretation and 
therefore may create unjustified balancing charges, which could continue to 
make third party access difficult and limit competition. It is also argued500 that 
"a "one-size-fits-all" approach to balancing regimes will be difficult or 
impossible. " The latter argument is difficult to fully support as it is not clear 
why an agreement on equal balancing charges over a wider region cannot be 
established. Experiences in the Nordic power market have proven that this is 
indeed possible. 50' 
- Cost-reflective imbalance charges: To avoid any unjustified imbalance 
charges it is necessary that the network user is only levied those costs that 
actually occur as result of the imbalance. In this respect Art. 7 (3. ) says, 
"Imbalance charges shall be cost-reflective to the extent possible, [... ]. " It is 
obvious that in particular the last part of the provision leaves much room for 
interpretation across EU gas markets. Also, the Madrid Guidelines require 
under number 7.3. that the costs must be "efficiently incurred". As discussed 
before, there should be an obligation for transmission system operators not to 
pass on to the end-customer all the actual costs because in some cases these 
might not be efficiently incurred by the operator. Therefore the wording of 
Art. 7 (3. ) leaves room for uncompetitive and non-harmonised imbalance 
charges across the EU gas markets, which could limit the further development 
of gas liberalisation. 
- Excessive balancing charges: Furthermore, it is necessary that there are rules 
for what happens if balancing charges exceed the actual cost for managing the 
imbalance of the shipper. In this respect Art. 7 (5. ) states, "Penalty charges 
499 Jones, C., supra note, p. 268. 
S0° Ibid. 
501 This issue will be subject to further analysis of Chapter E. 
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which exceed the actual balancing costs incurred, insofar as such costs 
correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network 
operator and are transparent, shall be taken into account when calculating 
tariffs [... ] and shall be approved by the competent authorities. " Requiring 
regulatory approval for exceeding balancing charges must be welcomed. 
However, the wording of Art. 7 (5. ) leaves the question of how it should be 
enacted on the ground. This refers in particular to the wording "insofar as such 
costs correspond to those of a [... ] structurally comparable network operator". 
It is doubtful whether there are any "structurally comparable network 
operator" across EU gas markets. Most of Europe's networks have their 
specific elements, which often are difficult to compare. Therefore, this survey 
believes that this provision could be unworkable in practice and leaves room 
for unjustified imbalance charges, which are a burden to third parties and thus 
competition. 
Access to balancing information: It is has been noted above that it is important 
for network users to have sufficient access to information. This also refers to 
balancing, as third parties need to know well in advance what the likely costs 
of imbalances will be. Art. 7 (6. ) deals with this matter and states, "[... ], 
transmission system operators shall provide sufficient, well-timed and reliable 
on-line based information on the balancing status of network users. The level 
of information provided shall reflect the level of information available to the 
transmission system operator. [... ]. " This provision has to be identified as a 
positive step toward improving general network transparency and therefore 
contributes to overall market reliability and the predictability of costs and 
charges. However, information should be published on a real time basis, as 
this would improve the transparency of the entire network operation. 
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J) Roles and responsibilities of transmission system operators and network users 
As concluded in Chapter B it is of special importance in a changing, liberalised and 
non-harmonised market that the roles and responsibilities of all market players are 
defined. The Madrid Guidelines lay down specific rules and responsibilities for 
network operators as well as users. Unfortunately the Gas Transmission Regulation is 
missing any of those rules, which has to be identified as a shortfall. A definition of 
roles and responsibilities for all parties could have brought more clarity and help 
create a stable market environment. It is argued502 that the Madrid Guidelines impose 
a "moral obligation" on both operators as well as users to follow its rules. 
Unfortunately, the compliance experience (or lack of) with the Guidelines shows that 
many involved parties -in particular the network operators - were not interested in 
following the Guideline's provisions. 
Therefore from a harmonisation and liberalisation point of view, it is an important 
omission that legally binding definitions of the roles and responsibilities of network 
operators, as well as users were not included in the Gas Transmission Regulation. 
3. Provisional results 
Concluding the above analysis the following must be said: The Gas Transmission 
Regulation contains some positive elements, which could - if complied with by 
market players - bring better harmonisation and competition standards across EU gas 
markets. This refers particularly to the various transparency requirements for the 
availability of pipeline capacities and imbalance charges. Furthermore good progress 
has been made on requiring transmission system operators to introduce equal 
transportation contracts. 
However, it is yet to be seen how the Regulation will help to resolve cross-border 
issues. Also, there remain serious doubts as to whether the Regulation will 
502 Jones, C., supra note, p. 245 
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significantly improve harmonisation and liberalisation across EU gas markets in the 
following areas: 
(l. ) Tariffs for access to the networks 
The Gas Transmission Regulation's coverage of tariffs for access to the networks is 
too broad and is not as precise as the Madrid Guidelines nor the Electricity 
Regulation. The lack of precise legal wording can create room for unfavourable and 
unequal tariff structures and therefore does not contribute to the creation of a more 
harmonised EU gas market. 
(2. ) Third party access service 
It is questionable whether the Regulation's provisions inter alia on common 
transportation contracts and nomination procedures will come in effect as envisaged. 
This is based on the fact that the Regulation allows considerable derogations from 
these rules. 
Furthermore, operational balancing agreements and interconnection agreements are 
not mandatory for the network operators. Both agreements would be beneficial to the 
overall operational standards and therefore improve harmonisation. 
(3. ) Congestion management 
The Regulation's provisions on congestion management are inadequate for the 
creation of more gas competition. The text is missing any detailed requirements on 
how future capacity problems may be partially overcome by introducing proper 
congestion management tools such as auctions and mandatory secondary-capacity 
trading rules. These tools would facilitate the development of competition. 
These missing elements have to been seen as shortfalls that will continue to hinder 
competition. 
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(4. ) Transparency requirements 
As mentioned before some of the Regulation's transparency requirements are to be 
welcomed. However, doubts remain particularly over the question of the definition of 
`relevant points' and which transparency requirements are mandatory for those points. 
Also, allowable derogations from the transparency requirements leaves open whether 
the provision will actually be effective once implemented in July 2006. 
188 
Chapter C- EU legislation and EU Commission's decisions 
IV. Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for Storage Operators: Is this 
the right instrument to bring competition and harmonisation to 
EU storage facilities? 
The importance of gas storage facilities in changing and liberalised gas markets has 
already been analysed. 503 Their importance for competitive gas markets is based on 
the fact that storage is an essential part of end-customer supply service, as the 
consumption pattern is based on a number of different and fluctuating parameters. 
It soon became clear that the Gas Directive's third party access provision for storage 
facilities -Art. 19 - is not detailed nor precise enough to create proper third party 
access to storage and simultaneously facilitate competition and harmonisation across 
Europe's gas storages facilities. The 8"' Madrid Gas Regulatory Forum started to 
draw up Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for Storage System Operators (herein after 
`GGPSSO' or `storage Guidelines'). 504 The most important aims of the GGPSSO are 
to set minimum standards and rules for the organisation of storage facilities. The 
underlying principle of the organisation is, that storage system operators (hereinafter 
'SSO' or `storage operators') allow access to their facilities on a fair and non- 
discriminatory basis. 505 Furthermore, the storage Guidelines are support the 
development of competition. 
The discussion on the GGPSSO was subject to disagreement and first resulted in the 
rejection of the guidelines by the SSOs. 506 
503SeeCII2. e) 
504 Conclusions of the 8th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 July 2004, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 1. European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), 
Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for Storage Operators (GGPSSO), <http: //www. ergeg. org>. 505 Ibid, p. 1. 
506 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good TPA Practice 
for Storage Operators (GGPSSO) - Summary of responses, 1 December 2004, 
<http: //www. ergeg. org>; Council of European Energy Regulators, Press Release, Guidelines for Good 
Practice for Gas Storage System Operators delayed, 9. December 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
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However, in March 2005 the storage Guidelines where finally agreed and were to be 
implemented by 1 April 2005.507 
The storage Guidelines is a voluntary agreement and is therefore not legally binding. 
In this context, it has been expressed508 that due to the non-legally binding nature of 
the Guidelines that "no requirement can be made [... ] that contravenes national 
legislation. " Furthermore, some Member States have also indicated509 that they 
"would have reservations, if the Guidelines were to be translated into binding piece of 
legislation. " 
The following section will examine some of the core elements of the GGPSSO and 
discuss whether its provisions will facilitate more competition and promote 
harmonisation with respect to access to Europe's storage facilities. 
1. Third party access 
In accordance with Art. 19 (1. ) of the Gas Directive the storage Guidelines allow two 
kinds of third party access regimes: negotiated and regulated third party access to 
storage facilities. 510 As discussed above, two third party access regimes can have a 
negative impact on competition and further harmonisation of Europe's gas markets. 511 
This refers particularly to negotiated third party access as it leaves more room for 
(hidden) discriminatory behaviours, which are difficult for regulatory authorities to 
investigate due to the fact that they often have limited authority over the operators. 
507 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good TPA Practice 
for Storage System Operators (GGPSSO), 23 March 2005. 
508 GTE, GTE/EGSO Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for Storage System Operators, 20 December 
2004, p. 1. 
509 Madrid Forum Joint Working Group, Minutes (Discussion on Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for 
Storage Operators - GGPSSO), Brussels, 18 March 2005, p. 5. 510 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good TPA Practice 
for Storage System Operators (GGPSSO), 23 March 2005, p. 1. 
511 SeeCII2. e). 
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Similar to Art. 19 (1. ) of the Gas Transmission Regulation, under 3.1. of the storage 
Guidelines, storage operators shall offer third party access "when technically and 
economically necessary for efficient access to the network. " The wording raises the 
same concerns as discussed before with regard to the Gas Directive storage provision 
s and will not be repeated here. 512 
However, pursuant to number 3.3. of the storage Guidelines storage operators shall 
offer "a menu of services" for access to storage facilities. These services inter alia 
consist of "long-term (>_ 1 year) and short-term service (< 1 year) down to a minimum 
period of one day" and "firm and interruptible storage services". 
As can been seen the GGPSSOs acknowledge the fact that a more competitive market 
needs flexibility as well as different services. Furthermore, the "menu of services" 
introduces some common ground for what SSOs have to offer to the market. This is a 
contribution to more harmonisation of storage access conditions and as such has to be 
welcomed. 
However, as far as the conditions for tariff structures are concerned, the storage 
Guidelines differentiate between regulated and negotiated third party access (7.1. and 
2. of the GGPSSO). Under regulated access, system operators are inter alia obliged to 
adopt tariffs structures that "7.1. a. reflect efficiently incurred costs [... ]; c. avoid 
cross-subsidies [... ]; f, be clear and transparent [... ]. " Pursuant to 7.2. under a 
negotiated access regime, "SSOs shall adopt any charging principles and/or tariff 
structures compliant with non-discrimination principles [... ]. " Already the wording 
shows that the different access regimes will lead to unequal market conditions, as the 
requirements for regulated third party access regimes are stronger with a number of 
rules according to which the tariffication shall be structured as well as made public. In 
contrast to this, the negotiated regimes allow charging principles that comply with the 
principle of non-discrimination. The meaning of this wording can be subject to a 
S1eSeeCII2. e)(ii). 
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variety of interpretations and creates room for the different treatment of storage users 
across EU gas markets. 
2. Congestion management 
The analysis of the Gas Transmission Regulation's provision on congestion 
management has shown how important its correct implementation is for a liberalised 
and competitive gas market. 513 This also refers to storage facilities, as they are often 
booked on a long-term basis and therefore block any new entrants from using this 
essential facility for end-customer supply services. 
The following section will analyse some of the GGPSSO's provisions on congestion 
management: 
- According to point 4.2. a., market based solutions shall be applied if 
congestion occurs. As said before, market based solutions can inter alia refer 
to the auction of capacities. Auctions can usually ensure that all parties have 
fair conditions for the purchase of capacities and therefore have to be 
welcomed from the point of view of competition. However, under 4.2. b. 
derogations from market-based mechanisms are allowed, "if they ensure 
equivalence in terms of non-discriminatory and competitive access. " It is 
doubtful how derogation of market based congestion management can be 
properly enforced particularly as the Guidelines are not legally binding and are 
lacking any detailed powers for national regulatory bodies to enforce against 
possible discriminatory behaviour. Apart from that, the exemption could lead 
to different competitive and non-harmonised standards across the European 
gas markets. 
- According to 4.4. "the SSO shall actively endeavour to discourage hoarding 
and facilitate re-utilisation and trade of storage capacity by all reasonable 
means [... ]. " This very broad provision on capacity hoarding does not oblige 
313 SeeCIII2c). 
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storage operators to introduce the principle of use-it-or-lose-it which has been 
identified as having a key function for resolving congestion. 514 The vague 
language will allow capacity hoarding and therefore delay better competitive 
standards from developing. 
- Secondary capacity trading has already been identified" as an important tool 
to limit congestion. According to the storage Guidelines, storage operators 
"shall allow and facilitate" secondary storage capacity trading. However, the 
wording already shows that there are no real incentives for system operators to 
promote a secondary market for storage capacities. 
3. Transparency requirements 
The importance of proper access to information in liberalised markets has been 
mentioned. 
In terms of storage transparency requirements, 6.1. of the storage Guidelines require 
generally that "information shall be disclosed in a meaningful, quantitatively clear and 
easily accessible way and on a non-discriminatory basis. " 
The storage Guidelines distinguish further between the publication of commercial and 
technical information: 
a) Publication of commercial terms 
Pursuant to 6.4. of the GGPSSO storage operators should publish ex ante regulated 
third party access tariffs and tariff methodologies. For negotiated third party access, 
the SSOs have to publish "the main commercial conditions including the prices for 
standard services. " The different treatment of the two access regimes illustrates how 
different market conditions are created: In the case of a regulated access regime the 
514 See C III. 2 c). 
515SeeCIlI2c)aa). 
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conditions for the storage operator are tougher because all of the tariffs must be 
approved by the regulator prior to application to storage customers. Conversely, under 
negotiated access, the operator simply has to publish the `main commercial 
conditions'. The differentiation will continue to produce unequal market access 
conditions that lead to different burdens on system operators as well as network users. 
b) Publication of technical information 
According to 6.5. of the storage Guidelines, storage operators shall inter alia publish 
"a. technical, available and contracted or held storage capacity [... ]; b. for each 
storage site or group of storage facilities, aggregated inflows and outflows and 
historical utilization rates at least on a weekly basis for the immediately preceding 
week; [... ]. " The publication of the available and contracted capacity has to be 
identified as an improvement in the availability of information for storage users and 
regulatory authorities, as they need to know for commercial and supervisory purposes 
what volumes are really in the storage facilities. Also, the publication of the 
aggregated flow directions is an important indicator for the proper operation of the 
storage facility. It is, however, stated in 6.7. that the information "shall be updated in 
an appropriately timely fashion. " The wording leaves room for interpretation and 
different approaches to publication. It has already been argued516 that daily reporting 
would be necessary to improve the overall transparency of access availability to 
storage facilities. This view in particular has to be supported as in some countries, 
such as the UK, storage operators are obliged to publish on a real time basis all the 
required information. This would not only improve the access conditions for third 
party storage users in the rest of the EU but could potentially lead to market synergies 
resulting from the availability of Europe's storage facilities, possibly helping in a 
security of supply incident. This argument is based on the fact that in such an incident 
$16 Madrid Forum Joint Working Group, Minutes (Discussion on Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for 
Storage Operators - GGPSSO), Brussels, 18 March 2005, p. 4. 
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authorities could immediately analyse the stock of gas in store and therefore assess 
the situation and respond accordingly. 
c) Derogations from transparency requirements 
According to 6.2., "user(s) may request the SSO not to publish information about the 
aggregate use of storage if such publication would harm the commercial interest of 
user(s). In cases of non-publication, the relevant national regulatory authority will, 
when requested by relevant parties, review the decision not to publish. [... ]. If it is 
considered that the reasons for non-publication are not [rightful] [... ] the relevant 
authority can require that the SSO publishes the information. [... ], information should 
always be published by the SSO when three or more storage users have been allocated 
capacity [... ]. " This clause of the storage Guidelines causes some concern due to the 
following: 
- According to this clause storage operators can ask for an exemption of the 
transparency requirements if fewer than two users are accessing the facility. 
The above discussion517 about whether the `two-shipper-rule' is justified led to 
the conclusion that the application of such rule is often used as an excuse. If 
storage data is published on an aggregated basis, it is, from this survey's point 
of view, often not the case that names of companies using a specific storage 
facility will become known, as their details are not listed. It simply lists 
whether the storage capacity has been contracted or not, giving no details 
about how many users use the facility. 
- 6.2 further states that the national regulatory authority can force the system 
operator to publish the necessary information. It is, however, questionable as 
to what legal grounds the regulatory authorities can order publication as the 
Guidelines are not legally binding. 
517SeeCIII. 2d)cc). 
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- Finally, an exemption may be granted if the "publication would harm the 
commercial interest of user(s). " It is hard to imagine when this actually might 
be the case as the Guidelines do not oblige the system operator to publish 
company names or the number of shippers that operate in the storage facility. 
It only refers to the availability and contracted volumes of storage. 
4. Provisional results 
Generally speaking, it has to be welcomed that the storage Guidelines have been 
agreed which may bring some basic structure to the operation of Europe's gas storage 
facilities. However, the non-legally binding nature of the Guidelines raises concern as 
to whether they will actually bring more competition and harmonisation into Europe's 
gas storage as storage operators are only morally obliged to comply with the 
Guidelines. 
The non-binding aspect of the guidelines - similar to the compliance experience of 
the Madrid Guidelines for good third party access (GGP)518 - also leave many market 
uncertainties for all parties involved, in particular the network users. It is likely that 
the market abuse will continue. This even more so as some Member States have 
expressed doubts519 about some of the provisions of the Gas Transmission Regulation 
and therefore leaving open whether the GGPSSO will be complied with by all 
European storage operators as well as enforced by all Member States and national 
regulatory bodies. 
Regardless of this, the different treatment of the two storage access regimes will 
continue to produce unequal and non-harmonised market conditions, which leave 
considerable market risks for both operators and users. It remains to be seen how 
518 See Chapters A; C III. 
519 Madrid Forum Joint Working Group, Minutes (Discussion on Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for 
Storage Operators - GGPSSO), Brussels, 18 March 2005, p. 4. 
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regulatory authorities will enforce the Guidelines and most importantly under what 
kind of legal authority. Therefore this survey believes it is uncertain whether the 
Guidelines will bring more harmonisation and liberalisation of access to Europe's 
storage facilities. 
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V. EU Commission decisions: The creation of enhanced third party 
market access conditions? 
Over recent decades the EU Commission has paid considerable attention to obstacles 
that affect third party market access to energy networks, as access was identified as a 
vital tool for a successful, competitive and liberalised energy market. 52° In this 
context, some have already argued521 that the Commission, as a competition authority, 
has made a contribution to better third party access conditions in the European energy 
sector. 
The following section will examine two EU Commission decisions on energy 
competition issues. It will discuss whether decisions have improved third parties 
access to the market and whether they contributed to the liberalisation of Europe's gas 
markets. This section will also deal with the 2005 EU Commission's energy sector 
inquiry, which consisted of some interesting outcomes as well future implications. 
1. The Marathon case 
One of the most interesting EU Commission energy competition cases was the so- 
called Marathon case. 522 
520 Van der Woude, M., H.; Recent Developments in EC Competition Law - Facing the Network, in: 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law- Report II, p. 21; Fernandez Salas, 
M. et al, Access to gas pipelines: lesson learnt from the Marathon case, Competition Policy 
Newsletter, Number 2,2004, p. 41. 
521 Albers, M., The New EU Directives on Energy Liberalisation from a Competition point of view, in 
Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives on 
Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 48. 
522 European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Thyssengas, Press Release 
IP/03/1641,23 November 2001; European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with 
Gasunie, Press Release IP/03/547,16 April 2003; European Commission, Commission settles 
Marathon case with BEB, Press Release IP/03/1129,29 July 2003; European Commission, Commission 
settles Marathon case with Gas de France and Ruhrgas, Press Release, 30 April 2004. 
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The underlying facts of this case are as follows: In the early nineties the Norwegian 
gas production company Marathon -a subsidiary of an American oil firm - was 
denied access to five continental gas transportation networks. These pipeline networks 
belonged to three German Companies - Thyssengas, BEB and E. ON Ruhrgas -, the 
Dutch Company Gasunie, and Gaz de France (hereinafter `GDF'). Although 
Marathon initially filed a complaint with the European Commission, it reached out-of- 
court settlements with some of the companies and therefore withdrew the 
complaint. 523 Nevertheless the Commission took the view "that it would be in the 
Community interest to pursue the matter on an ex officio basis. "524 The Commission 
believed that the above listed companies had infringed Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty, as they had misused their dominant position. 525 The Commission judged 
further that a case settlement in conjunction with the implementation of the First Gas 
Directive would be more beneficial to the overall improvement of access to European 
gas networks than a prohibition decision. 526 
After years of negotiation, the cases with Thyssengas and Gasunie were settled in 
2001527, followed by BEB in 2003 and finally with E. ON Ruhrgas and GDF in 
2004.528 
The basis of the settlements were a number of improvements by the companies in 
question, which inter alia referred to third party access regimes, balancing systems, 
congestion management and the handling of access requests. 529 All of the 
aforementioned settlement issues were also recognised and considered by the Madrid 
Forum. 530 
523 For further information see Fernandez Salas, M. et al, supra note, p. 41-42. 524 Ibid. 
525 Van der Woude, M., li.; supra note, p. 24-25. 326 Ibid. 
527 European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Thyssengas, Press Release 
IP/03/1641 
, 23 November 2001. 528 European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Gas de France and Ruhrgas, Press 
Release IP/04/573,30 April 2004. 
529 Albers, M., supra note, p. 48. 530 Fernandez Salas, M. et al, p. 42. 
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The following section will examine one of the Marathon case settlements and discuss 
whether the settlement clauses did contribute to enhanced access conditions in the 
network system of the company in question. 
a) The E. ONRuhrgas settlement 
The subsequent case study will focus on the EU Commission decision and settlement 
procedures with E. ON Ruhrgas of Germany, structured on the settlement conditions 
as well as the question of how the settlement supports better third party access: 
aa) The abolishment of the fictitious contractual path model 
According to the settlement agreement, E. ON Ruhrgas was obliged to abolish the so- 
called `Vertragspfadmodell', which meant, "capacity reservation had to respect a 
fictitious contractual path between the point where the gas is entered into the system 
and the point where the gas is withdrawn form the system. "531 Under a new access 
regime, customers will be able to book capacities separately at the entry and at the 
exit points without booking any capacity between the two points. 532 Generally 
speaking the E. ON Ruhrgas commitment to establish a new access regime has to be 
welcomed. It introduces improved flexibility for third parties because they can trade 
their gas with other counter parties more easily. Nevertheless there are problems 
related to other aspects of the settlement. 
bb) Introduction of tariff and balancing zones 
Pursuant to the settlement E. ON Ruhrgas will introduce six tariff zones, which are 
split into four H-Gas zones and two L-gas zones. These zones had to be reduced to 
five zones in May 2005 and a further reduction shall take place in May 2006. It has 
531 European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Gas de France and Ruhrgas, Press 
Release IP/04/573,30 April 2004, p. 3. 
532 Ruhrgas, Einigung mit der EU-Kommission im Marathon-Verfahren, Pressemitteilung, 30 April 
2004, <http//: www. ruhrgas. com>. 
200 
Chapter C- EU legislation and EU Commission's decisions 
been controversial 533 whether Germany needed more than three tariff regimes. 534 
However, E. ON Ruhrgas' new tariff regimes required the shipper - apart from 
booking entry and exit capacity - to purchase transportation capacity in order to 
connect the entry and the exit of the capacity. This element leads again to a 
transaction based access regime and hence is not a true entry-exit regime. Therefore 
this survey has to state, that access conditions have only been partly improved. 
As far as balancing is concerned, it is true that the introduction of tariff zones could 
help the customer to avoid imbalance. It must, however, also be acknowledge that 
there is no introduction of a market based balancing system within the E. ON Ruhrgas 
system. E. ON Ruhrgas has introduced a balancing level of 15%, which is a significant 
improvement over their previous regime as well as in comparison to other European 
network operators. 
cc) Extension of entry/exit regimes 
Furthermore, under the Marathon settlement E. ON Ruhrgas will extend its entry-exit 
regime to include seven further gas transportation companies. 535 This inclusion will 
lead to greater market integration and therefore harmonisation. One could also argue 
that the transaction costs for network users could be reduced as capacity booking and 
nomination procedures are limited to one operator rather than two or more. However, 
it is yet to be shown whether overall network fees will decrease. 
dd) Introduction of use-it-or-loose-it principles 
E. ON Ruhrgas committed itself further to introducing the so-called `use-it-or-lose-it' 
principle. However, under the E. ON Ruhrgas terms and conditions capacity that has 
been contracted "can" be released to the market, if the capacity holder does not want 
533 Schuler, B; v. iiammerstein, C., Vorschlag eines Nezzugangsmodel/s für die deutsche 
Gaswirtschaft, ZIE 2/2004. 
534 This will be subject to detail discussion in the Chapter D, see .... sss These are: Ferngas Nord-Bayern and offer enclosure to Gas-Union, Saar-Ferngas, MVV Energie, 
IIEAG and Erdgasversorgung Thüringen-Sachsen and EVG. 
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to use it. This could mean that a capacity holder would not have to release its 
contracted capacity, if it is used it at least once in the contracted period. Therefore one 
must conclude that capacity hoarding is still possible. 
b) Provisional results 
The settlement conditions contain some important elements to bring better access 
conditions to the German gas markets. It also brings some integration of other 
German networks. 
It must, however, be seen as only an initial step to more market harmonisation and 
better access conditions. These will be subject to more detailed discussion in Chapter 
D. 
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2. The ENI-Gazprom case: Destination clause settlements 
It has already been mentioned536 that in the last 50 years many European gas suppliers 
signed long-term contracts with non-EU gas producers that included so-called 
"destination clauses". 537 These destination clauses can be found in many longer-term 
gas supply contracts (i. e. usually more than ten years). 
At the beginning of 2000, the EU Commission started to investigate a number of 
supply contracts that contained a destination clause. An inquiry into these contracts 
were inter alia undertaken in those contracts signed between Russian Gazprom and 
ENI of Italy. 
The European Commission took the view that contracts, which contained these 
clauses were in breach of Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 538 This was based on the 
fact that it was believed that these clauses are considered to be anti-competitive and 
will slow down the further opening of Europe's gas markets. 539 It was also argued540 
that the Commission's investigation wanted to achieve better competitive conditions 
in European power and gas markets "first by increasing supply competition, second 
by ensuring effective access to energy networks [... J, and third by guaranteeing free 
consumer choice by challenging consumer lock-in. " 
However, in October 2003, the European Commission reached the first settlement 
with Gazprom and ENI where the destination clause was abolished in their long-term 
supply contracts. 541 This settlement was followed by a mutual agreement between 
536SeeBI5. 
537 Some call them also "territorial restrictions". For further information on the destination clauses 
respectively territorial restrictions see BI5. 
538 Egenhofer, C., Gialoglou, K., Rethinking the EURegulatory Strategy for the Internal Energy 
Market, Report of a CEPS Task Force, Report No. 52, December 2004, p. 35; Schnichels, D.; 
Marktabschottung durch langfristige Gaslieferverträge, EuZW 6/2003, p. 171-175. 
539 Ibid. 
540Nyssens, 11. et al, The territorial restrictions case in the gas sector: a state of play, Competition 
Policy Newsletter, Number 1,2004, p. 48. 
541 European Commission, Press Release, European Commission reaches breakthrough with 
GAZPROM and ENI on territorial restriction clauses, 6 October 2003, 
<http: //www. delrus. cec. eu. int/en/news_101. htm>; European Commission, Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Energy Dialogue with Russia - Update on progress, SEC(2004) 114, p. 10. 
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OMV of Austria, Gazprom and the European Commission in February 2005.542 
Although this settlement was partially heralded as a major breakthrough for the 
further development of Europe's gas markets, many questions remain. On the one 
hand many more destination clauses are still in force and it is unclear whether further 
settlements will be reached. 543 On the other hand any positive market effects of the 
ENI/Gazprom destination clause settlement have not yet been reported. 
The following section will undertake an analysis of some of the settlement agreement 
elements in the Gazprom-ENI case and discuss how much these elements promoted 
better access conditions in the European gas market. 
The EU Commission settlement agreement with Gazprom-ENI can be split into two 
sections: the first deals with the contractual issues between ENI and Gazprom; the 
second section deals with commitments by ENI. 
a) Contractual obligations 
Gazprom and ENI agreed to undertake the following amendments to their existing 
contracts544: 
- Both parties agreed that restrictions on ENI to resell gas to third parties should 
be deleted from all existing sales contracts. Gazprom has to provide gas now 
at two delivery points instead of one. ENI can choose at which of these two 
points it wants to receive the gas. The amendment to the clause could indeed 
bring more access to gas sources, if ENI is willing to sell the gas on to third 
parties. This is doubtful, however, because ENI would be making it easier for 
new competitors to enter its supply area. 
542 Gas Matters, European Commission closes investigation on gas supply contracts between OMV and 
Gazprom, 21 February 2005. 
543 Ibid. 
544See European Commission, Commission reaches breakthrough with Gazprom and ENI on territorial 
restriction clauses, Press Release IP/03/1345,06 October 2003. 
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- Gazprom can also provide gas to interested parties that are operating in the 
same supply area as ENI. This could potentially bring more gas competition 
into Europe's gas markets because more parties would be able to purchase gas 
from Gazprom and sell this on to end-customers. Therefore, different buyers 
would be competing with each other. However, further development is very 
much dependent on the good will of Gazprom to also sell gas to other counter 
parties. It is not publicly known whether this has happened in the Italian gas 
market. 
- The above commitments by both companies were combined with the 
requirement not to sign a so-called `consent clause', which would have meant 
that Gazprom was obliged to seek permission from ENI if it wanted to sell gas 
to other customers in Italy. Furthermore ENI and Gazprom were required not 
to use any profit splitting mechanism in their contracts. 545 These obligations 
can bring more freedom into the contractual relationship of both parties but it 
is questionable whether they will use them. 
b) ENI commitments 
ENI committed itself further to the following points546: 
- ENI agreed to sell `significant' gas volumes to customers outside of Italy 
starting in 2003 over a period of five years. It is argued that in particular 
German and Austrian customers would benefit from these gas sales. 547 
However, it has not been reported publicly that ENI has sold significant gas 
volumes outside of Italy. 
5+5 See for further details on these contracts Nyssens, II.; Osborne, I., Profit splitting mechanisms in a 
liberalised gas market: the devil lies in the detail, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1,2005, p. 
25. 
546 European Commission, Commission reaches breakthrough with Ga prom and ENI on territorial 
restriction clauses, Press Release IP/03/1345,06 October 2003. 
547 Fernandez Salas, M. et al, p. 50. 
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- It was further settled that ENI would increase capacity in its majority- 
controlled Trans Austrian Gasleitung (hereinafter 'TAG 1)548, which runs from 
the Austrian Buamgarten hub to the Italian border. The expansion has to be 
completed by 2008 and 2011. It remains to be seen how significant the 
expansion will be. 
- Apart from this ENI offered to improve the third party access rules in the TAG 
line. It will be the subject of the subsequent chapter whether conditions have 
actually improved or not. 549 
sae See Appendix 3. 
549 See D 11.3. 
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3. The EU Commission's Energy Sector inquiry 
As energy wholesale prices started to increase significantly at the end of 2004 and 
throughout 2005, industrial consumers and new entrants voiced strong concerns over 
developments in, and the obstruction of, the wholesale gas and electricity markets. 55° 
As a result of these wholesale energy price increases the EU Commission launched - 
on the basis of Art. 17 of Council Regulation 1/2003/EC551 - an inquiry into 
competition in gas and electricity markets in June 2005.552 The inquiry had numerous 
aims which were, inter alia, identified as focusing on the energy price rises and the 
possible distortion of competition. 
On 15 November 2005 the EU Commission published the first findings of the 
inquiry 553, followed by the final report in February 2006.554 The following main 
conclusions were reached: 
- The DG COM criticised the fact that the gas and electricity markets in many 
Member States continue to be controlled by a few major suppliers. It 
considered it difficult for new companies to break into the gas markets as 
incumbent suppliers control the import of gas and pipeline capacities are 
reserved through long-term contracts. According to the Report, vertical market 
foreclosure leads to a lack of flexibility in the wholesale market. The vertical 
integration of production and network operations or supply is reinforced by 
long-term supply agreements, inadequate unbundling and transport activities 
and a lack of access to gas storage. 
550 European Commission, Competition: Commission opens sector inquiry into gas and electricity, 
Press Release IP/05/716,13 June 2005, p. 1. 
551 Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002on the implementation of the rules and 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1,04.01.2003. 
552 European Commission, Competition: Commission opens sector inquiry into gas and electricity, 
Press Release IP/05/716,13 June 2005, p. 1. 
553 European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry - Issues Paper, Non-Confidential Version, 15 
November 2005. 
554 European Commission, Sector Inquiry under Art 17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas and electricity 
markets, 16 February 2006. 
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Furthermore, according to the Commission, national segmentation of the 
electricity and gas markets is still too strong and, as such, a single European 
internal energy market does not exist. This is attributed to restrictive clauses in 
gas import agreements as well as insufficient access to cross-border gas and 
electricity interconnectors. The Commission expressly objects to long-term 
capacity reservations agreed upon in contracts concluded before the 
liberalisation process began to take place. Moreover, while gas pipelines could 
be optimised for better use of existing capacities, an increase in 
interconnectors is considered necessary in the electricity sector. The 
Commission proposes introducing incentives, such as penalty fees for system 
overload. 
According to the Commission, the energy markets are insufficiently 
transparent, in particular it blames the lack of reliable information on available 
transport capacities to make up a key deficit of gas transport access. The 
Report criticises a lack of transparency in the wholesale markets. With regard 
to pricing, the Commission criticises oil price indexation, claiming it is not 
fully reflective of gas market conditions and is insufficiently responsive to 
supply and demand conditions. 
Following the conclusion of the Sector Inquiry and the Report on the implementation 
of the Directives, respectively, the Commission intends to propose further measures 
by the end of 2006. 
The key findings of the sector inquiry were as follows: 
- In carrying out the inquiry the Commission showed that it could require all 
market participants to supply information, documents and statements. 555 This 
indeed becomes a powerful tool as the Commission is now able to monitor the 
"5European Commission, Communication by Ms. Neelie Kroes in agreement with Mr Piebalgs, Sector 
inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC in the European electricity and gas markets, 
COMP/13-1/39172 (electricity sector inquiry) and COMPS-1/39173 (gas sector inquiry), p. 2. 
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activities of all companies across the European energy markets. This could 
become a particular problem for those companies that operate in many 
Member States, as they have to disclose all information to one authority rather 
than many national authorities. 
- It is further argued556 that suspicious facts are enough for the Commission to 
investigate the market behaviour of companies. This, however, as it also put 
forward557 can generate numerous risks for the companies in question as there 
might be months or even years where they do not know whether certain 
market practices are in line with EU competition law. 
556 Grave, C.; Trafkowski, A., Sektorenuntersuchung durch die Kartellbehörden - Rechtsgrundlagen, 
Ermittlungsbefugnis und Konsequenzen, RdE 9/2005, p. 214. 
s5' Ibid. 
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VI. The creation of regional gas markets - the ERGEG roadmap 
Although at a far more advanced stage of development, similar observations to those 
made in the gas market have been made in the EU electricity market regarding 
harmonisation and liberalisation issues. This awareness of the current state of the 
electricity sector has resulted in several discussions in particular at an EU level. 558 For 
instance, it was argued'559 "There are different acceptable ways to conduct 
competitive energy reform. Nonetheless, however broad the range of tolerable 
diversities at the beginning or during the maturing phase of the reforms, an absolute 
minimum of competitive nature and openness must be ensured for these new 
markets. " The European Commission560 states in this context further, "The reality of 
today's electricity network is that Member States are not particularly well 
interconnected. In addition certain countries have already adopted common 
harmonised rules [... ]. " However, many have not created such rules. It is further 
stressed, 561 that there are four main elements that are holding back the development of 
the internal electricity market, which are: 
-A high degree of diversity in the design of individual Member State's 
electricity markets ; 
-A weak EU internal market approach, in particular with regard to 
interconnections; 
- High levels of market concentration within the power industry; 
- Grid operators as well as national authorities thinking only nationally. 
ssa See for instance, de Jong, J., The 'Regional Approach' in Establishing the Internal Electricity 
Market, Clingendael International Energy Programme, December 2004, p. 9-10 
559 Glachant, J: M.; Leveque, F., Electricity Internal Market in the European Union, What to do next?, 
SESSA, <http: //sessa. eu. com>, p. 4. 
560 European Commission, DG Energy and Transport working paper, strategy paper, Medium Term 
vision for the internal electricity market, Brussels, 01.03.2004, p. 6. 
561 Glachant, J. -M.; Leveque, F., supra note, summary of main elements of the report. 
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Similar observations were made by the eleventh (electricity) Florence Forum. 562 In the 
course of the Forum, it was decided to establish so-called `mini-fora', whereby the 
European electricity grids where divided into seven zones: 
- Iberian peninsula (PR-ES-FR) 
- UK and Ireland (IE-UK-FR) 
- Benelux (FR-BE-NL-LU-DE) 
- Italy (FR-IT-CH-DE-AT-SI) 
- Nordic countries (NO-DK-SE-FI-DE-PL) 
- Central Eastern Europe (DE-PL-CZ-SK-AT-HU-SI) 
- Baltic states (EE-LV-LT). 
From this survey's point of view, this division of Europe electricity grids was based 
on the Commission's view563 of "its vision and process for the creation of a Single 
Electricity Market, anticipating the single market being reached via the interim step of 
establishment and further development of regional markets that span across TSO and 
national borders". The European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) 
agreed with this view by stressing564, "that the concept of regional markets is a 
practical and achievable way of delivering progress on the move towards a single 
electricity market. " Since the establishment of these `mini-fora' or regional markets it 
was stressed by the twelfth (Electricity) Florence Forum that good progress had been 
made within those regional markets. 565 Nevertheless the Forum highlighted566 further, 
"the need for increased and accelerated harmonisation or compatibility of rules, as 
well as national legislation, and involvement of and cooperation between 
562 Conclusions, Eleventh Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum, Rome, 16-17 
September 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 1. However, the Forum stressed that significant 
improvements should be made in the field of `congestion management' at cross-border points where 
often discriminatory market based congestion management solutions are apparent (p. 4 of the 
Conclusions). 
563 See European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Cover note to ERGEG public 
consultation, The Creation of Regional Electricity Markets: an ERGEG Discussion paper, 8 June 2005, 
1. 36' 
Ibid. 
565Conclusions, Twelfth Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum, Florence, 1-2 
September 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 2. 
566 Ibid., p. 3. 
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governments and between governments and regulators in the development of regional 
markets. " 
Although developments within the electricity sector are well advanced in comparison 
to the European gas sector, the formal establishment of a regional market approach 
was at first not on the EU `gas agenda'. It was, however, emphasised567 that in order 
to overcome the current obstacles to gas competition and market harmonisation 
solutions need to be found that are based on a regional basis that, "however, take into 
account the goal of a single European market for gas, and progress towards regional 
markets must not themselves throw up barriers to trade between regions. Work on the 
`horizontal' principles common to all regional markets will be taken forward in 
parallel. " Nevertheless, in November 2005 the ERGEG published - for public 
consultation -a "Roadmap for a competitive single gas market in Europe"568. As an 
interim step the roadmap foresees the establishment of regional European gas 
markets. The roadmap also lays out a specific timetable throughout the year 2006 
during which ERGEG will develop a detailed programme to achieve a fully 
competitive single European gas market. The full programme is envisaged for January 
2007. Furthermore, the roadmap consists of a detailed questionnaire, which all 
interested parties are invited to take part in until January 2006. In order to achieve the 
aforementioned steps the roadmap foresees the establishment of regional gas markets 
as follows: 
- Spain/Portugal and Southern France; 
- Zeebrugge, EuroHub, TTF, NBP - with integration of the North Sea region, 
Norway, The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Northern France; 
Baumgarten - with the integration of Austria, Hungary and the Slovakia; 
- Italy (PSV). 
567 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Developing a roadmap towards a 
single competitive European Gas Market, An introductory paper from ERGEG for the Madrid Forum, 
09.09.2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org>, p. 4. 
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The major task facing these regional gas markets is to address the following points: 
- How can the physical bottlenecks at cross-border points be eliminated? 
- How will the current market situation change by rising import dependence? 
- How can European gas markets be differentiated/separated? 
Although this initial step towards the creation of regional markets has to be welcomed 
from a harmonisation and market liberalisation perspective, this survey partly 
disagrees with the formation of regional markets as envisaged by the ERGEG. 
However, this will be subject to the conclusions of this thesis whether the set-up of 
the aforementioned regional markets was fully appropriate. 569 Also, this survey will 
also provide some detail answers to the aforementioned questionnaire by ERGEG in 
its final chapter. 
VII. Summary and conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, this survey will look into the potential for a harmonised and 
liberalised EU gas market under existing EU legislation. In this respect, the following 
must be stated: 
(1. ) First, it must be deduced from the analysis of the Gas Directive that the document 
has decisively failed concerning many key elements that are important for the 
further development of a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. This refers in 
particular to the following issues: 
- Unbundling; 
- the independence of national regulatory authorities; 
- transit; 
568ERGEG, Roadmap for a competitive single gas market in Europe, An ERGEG Discussion Paper for 
Public Consultation, 21 November 2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org/>. 
569 See Chapter E. 
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- third party access to pipelines and storage facilities; and 
- transparency requirements. 
The success of the implementation of the Directive is very much dependent on 
what Member States make of it. If they are not willing to interpret the Directive in 
a consistent way, a system will continue to exist, which can endanger the sector 
and also lead to an unfair and insecure area for the entire industry. Furthermore, 
the Directive's provisions consist of a number of loopholes, which will allow 
further delays in harmonisation and liberalisation across European gas markets. 
(2. ) It is yet to be proven whether the Gas Transmission Regulation will have a 
significant impact on filling the missing gaps of the Gas Directive. The Regulation 
itself is missing the subsequent elementary factors for further harmonisation and 
liberalisation: 
- Tariffs for the third party network access; 
- third party access services; 
- congestion management; and 
- transparency requirements. 
It also has to be acknowledged that the Regulation is lacking detail to deal with 
the subject and the improvements of cross-border gas transportation. In this 
respect it is not understandable why there is different treatment of electricity and 
gas, between the Electricity Regulation, which mainly deals with this issue, and 
the Gas Transmission Regulation. 
(3. ) In this context, the question arises, with special reference to the legal and political 
basis of the legal instruments and the future of a harmonised and liberalised EU 
gas sector, of whether the articles of the Treaties that refer to energy issues could 
have produced a stronger Gas Directive and Gas Transmission Regulation. This 
question must be negated. The legal foundation of the Directive and Regulation 
consists of general terms, not precise enough to build up strong provisions for a 
free and competitive common market. This legal failure is followed by decisive 
mistakes in EU energy policy illustrated by the way the Directive and the 
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Regulation were negotiated, especially the compromises on unbundling, third 
party access, congestion management and transparency requirements. In this 
respect it became apparent that Member States were unwilling to override 
minorities by strong majority-based policies. Furthermore many of the founding 
fathers of the Directive and the Regulation deliberately made numerous 
compromises while negotiating the aforementioned legislation as they believed a 
full energy market harmonisation and liberalisation process can only be achived 
by gradual steps spread over several years. Although this is true, the 
implementation of the `first EU energy package' - as described in Chapter A- 
took many years to implement with many Member States not willing to implement 
the legal/regulatory requirements. This also reflects another failure - namely that 
Member States have strong reservations when it comes to sharing sovereignty in 
the field of energy. 
(4. ) The voluntary Guidelines (GGPSSO) for the access to Europe's storage facilities 
highlight the fact that negotiated and regulatory third party access regimes create 
considerable disparity in access conditions to Member States' storage facilities. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Guidelines are not legally binding raises the 
question of whether they will actually work in practice. In this respect the 
experience with the GGPs - described in Chapter A- proved that this is unlikely. 
Also, the discussion among Member States, the Commission and third parties of 
whether the Guidelines should become legally binding illustrates another factor 
which endangers the idea of a common market, namely the lack of co-operation 
between the European institutions and the European gas industry. 
(5. ) In contrast to this position are the EU Commission's decisions on the Marathon 
and the ENI-Gazprom cases coupled with the energy sector inquiry. These 
initiatives are a clear indication of the Commission's attempt to sort out anti- 
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competitive behaviour by dominant EU and non-EU gas companies. It further 
illustrates the fact that if the Commission can act independently from the Member 
States it is much stronger. In the case of the Gas Directive and Regulation the 
hands of the Commission are often bound because mostly Member States are in 
charge and can apply the rules of the legislation with some freedom. 
Nevertheless the actions taken by the Commission further illustrate the dilemma 
this institution is confronted with: On the one hand it wants to create more 
favourable third party access conditions, while on the other hand it has restricted 
powers. Furthermore Member States seem to not agree with the Commission's 
decisions and therefore make it more difficult for the Commission to promote a 
more forceful energy policy aimed at the creation of a single, fully liberalised and 
harmonised EU gas market. 
Taking all these facts into account and trying to foresee the future position with 
regards to the Gas Directive and the Gas Transmission Regulation within the EU, the 
Commission will continue to play a major role in pushing and enforcing Member 
States to co-ordinate their national laws. This factor is of great importance especially 
because of the fact that many Eastern-European countries have entered the 
Community. These countries might have adjusted their national laws to the European 
model but changing the law does not automatically adjust reality. These countries are 
facing even more problems introducing and enforcing the new legislation. This 
illustrates the survey's view that if these countries are allowed to enter the 
Community, the system can be endangered because there is no strong and reliable 
legal, economic and political framework. To introduce such a framework inextricably 
linked to the success of a fully liberalised and harmonised EU gas market, should be 
the main objective for the Commission and the European Parliament in this sector. 
This can only be done by amending the existing legislation again and by giving 
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precise definitions and better guidelines on the issues described above. The need for 
amended legislation will be one of the main themes of Chapter E. 
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harmonisation: Lessons to be learnt from 
the Dutch, Austrian and German Gas 
Markets 
The above analysis raises the question of how the implementation of the gas 
legislation is taking place within EU Member States and what lessons can be learnt 
from the implementation process, the different approaches Member States take and 
most importantly what this means for EU gas market liberalisation and harmonisation. 
This chapter will discuss the above questions by undertaking case studies of the 
Dutch, Austrian and German gas markets. These case studies are of considerable 
importance to this survey as they lay a further basis to understand the ground 
applications of the legislation and policies and the concerns raised by the thesis. This 
chapter will discuss whether certain core market elements and legislative 
measurements within these three gas markets could be exemplary for the rest of the 
European gas markets'. If not, are there ways to improve these core elements. The 
discussion also aims to highlight the difficulties that Member States and the EU have 
in creating a single, competitive and harmonised European gas market that not only 
includes harmonisation and competition but also addresses security of supply 
problems. 
The subsequent case studies will be undertaken in the following way: 
(1. ) First, the Dutch gas market and its specific structure will be analysed. The 
main focus will be the unbundling provision under the Dutch energy 
legislation and whether the Dutch gas market can be a significant gas 
facilitator for some of the European gas markets. 
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(2. ) Second, this survey will analyse the Austrian gas market. As Austria is one of 
the most important EU gas transit countries, the focus will be on gas transit 
issues. In this context it will be examined whether Austrian transit 
requirements under existing national energy legislation and transportation 
contracts will increase gas harmonisation between different EU gas markets, 
as well as whether they allow fair and non-discriminatory third party access. 
(3. ) Third, this thesis will explore the German gas market with a special focus on 
whether the July 2005 German energy legislation could create gas market 
harmonisation, which will not only benefit the domestic gas market but also 
lead to Germany becoming the most important gas interconnection country in 
the EU. 
(4. ) Finally, this chapter will conclude with the findings of the case studies. 
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I. The Dutch Gas Market: Can the Dutch unbundling provisions 
be a model for the rest of the European gas market? Can the 
Dutch gas market be a gas facilitator for Europe's gas market? 
It is argued570 that the Dutch gas market is of great importance for the European gas 
sector. This refers in particular to the fact that The Netherlands is the only EU 
Member State that has enough indigenous gas resources to allow significant gas 
export. Already The Netherlands supplies Italy, Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
with large volumes of gas. The Dutch gas market has gone through market 
restructuring - particularly the unbundling provisions - which could have a ground 
breaking influence on the further liberalisation and harmonisation of the Dutch gas 
market and the entire EU gas market. 
The case study of the Dutch gas market will examine whether this market can act as a 
non-discriminatory, transparent, liquid and efficient gas sourcing point in the 
European gas market. In the course of this analysis it will also be discussed how much 
the Dutch gas market reforms, particularly in terms of unbundling, has or will 
contribute to the further creation of a harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
The examination of the Dutch gas market will be undertaken in the subsequent way: 
(1. ) First of all this section will provide a short historical background for the gas 
market structure in The Netherlands. 
(2. ) Following this discussion the gas liberalisation process within The 
Netherlands will be briefly analysed. 
570 Peebles, M., Dutch Gas: Its role in the Western European gas market, in: Mabro, R.; Wybrew- 
Bond, I., (eds. ), Gas to Europe - The Strategies of Four Major Suppliers, p. 93. 
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(3. ) This thesis will then focus on the implementation of the Second Gas Directive 
and on recent Dutch gas market developments and their implications for the 
further Dutch and EU-harmonisation and liberalisation process. In this 
context a special focus will be placed on the following questions: 
- Will the Dutch Government's unbundling provisions contribute to 
more market harmonisation and liberalisation in The Netherlands and 
in the rest of the EU? 
- Will the Government's market reforms enable the Dutch gas market to 
become a fair and transparent facilitator in accessing gas for non-Dutch 
gas market players? 
(4. ) Finally this section will present the conclusions of the first case study. 
1. The Dutch natural gas market prior to market liberalisation 
The following section provides a brief outline of the Dutch market organisation prior 
to market liberalisation. This historical background is important in order to understand 
the subsequent analysis of this case study. 
The Dutch gas market began to develop with the discovery in the early 1960'of the 
(onshore) Groningen gas field in northern Netherlands near the German border. 571 The 
Groningen field is the largest gas resource in Western Europe. In this context it is 
argued572 that the discovery of this field gave The Netherlands long-term domestic 
access to one of the most important energy commodities in the world and also allowed 
571 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA countries - The Netherlands 2000 Review, 
Paris 2000, p. 53; see also Appendix 4 and 5. 
372 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., Dilemmas of Duality: Gas Market Reform in The Netherlands, in: 
Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., (eds. ), National Reforms in European Gas, p. 103. 
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The Netherlands to be an important exporting country. This survey agrees with this 
view but also believes that the importance of this field is even greater as the field is 
geographically, from its pipeline interconnection, located in an easily accessible place 
for many EU gas markets. This is even more important because new pipeline projects 
- such as the Balgzand-Bacton-Line (hereinafter 'BBL-line') - are underway to create 
more interconnection between The Netherlands and other EU countries. 573 
However, the exploration and transportation of Groningen gas and the corresponding 
gas policy were undertaken in unique way, which is the subject of the following 
analysis: 
a) Public private partnership for the exploration of the Groningen field 
A 50-50% joint venture between Shell and Exxon (Mobil) was given the right to 
technically explore the Groningen field. This joint venture was called "Nederlandse 
Aardolie Maatschappij" (hereinafter 'NAM 9). 574 In order, to secure the interests of 
The Netherlands a public-private partnership was created, the so-called `Maatschap', 
which dealt with the commercial side of the exploration of the field. In this 
partnership NAM holds 60% and The Netherlands 40%. 575 Through this partnership 
the Dutch government was able to have a significant say in the development and in 
the exploration of the field, because - as argued576 - "all decisions related to off-take 
and production at the Gronningen gas field are taken by this partnership. " This 
referred particularly to whom the gas should be sold. NAM was obliged to sell all the 
gas from the Gronningen field to N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie (hereinafter `Gasunie'). 
sn The BBL-line project will be subject to further discussion later on in this section; see D I. 3 b) cc). 574 Neef, Y., The Development of a gas exchange in The Netherlands: Opportunities and threats, in: 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report II, p. 245. sn Ibid. 
576 Roggenkamp, M. M., Country Report: The Netherlands, in: Geradin, D., (ed. ), The Liberalization of 
Electricity and Natural Gas in the European Union, p. 210. 
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Gasunie was established in 1963 and its shareholders were 40% Energie Beheer 
Nederland B. V., a state owned company577; 10% the Dutch government; 25 % Shell 
and 25% Exxon Mobil. 578 The establishment of this public-private partnership and the 
organisation of the entire Dutch gas market is called the `Gasgebouw' (gas building), 
which was - as argued579 - the cornerstone of the Dutch gas market before the 
liberalisation. It is further said580 that the Gasgebouw "is a metaphor for a complex 
structure of public law regulations and private law agreements. "581 
b) Tasks of Gasunie 
Gasunie's main responsibilities were to sell and transport any gas that comes from the 
Groningen field. As correctly argued this market organisation placed Gasunie in the 
central position of coordinating the entire Dutch gas market and the export to other 
countries. 582 
Once founded, Gasunie developed and extended the existing domestic and cross- 
border gas pipeline infrastructure. In 1998 the total pipeline network consisted of 
about 112,000 km of transmission and distribution networks. 583 
The discovery of the Groningen field and the extension of the transmission and 
distribution network resulted in gas connection for all end-customers. Local energy 
companies (also called `municipals') and gas distribution companies undertook the 
supply of end-customers and medium sized industrial users. Gasunie, however, 
supplied all large industrial users as well as the local energy companies. 584 
sn Which represents the state's interest in oil and natural gas reserves and production 
578 Gasunie, Facts and Figures, <http: //www. gasunie. nl>. For more information on the historical set-up 
of Gasunie see Peebles, M., supra note, p. 97. 
579 Aarts, V., The Netherlands, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - 
Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 258. 
580 ibid. 
581 This survey, however, will not discuss the set-up of Gasgebouw any further as this was partly 
replaced and also this survey intends focusing more on different matters as highlighted in the 
introduction to this Chapter. 
582 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 109. 
583 Peebles, M., supra note, p. 102. 
514 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 105. 
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c) Small field policy 
The experience of the oil crisis in the Seventies made the Dutch government change 
its exploration policy in the Groningen field. 585 As pointed out "The exploitation of 
the Dutch gas reserves was assumed to benefit the Dutch society as much as possible" 
and most importantly as long as possible. 586 The Dutch government aimed to 
encourage the exploration and use of small fields discovered on- or offshore near the 
Groningen field. This so-called `small field policy' aimed to protect the Groningen 
field as the main guarantor of a long lasting and important energy source. Under the 
new policy, Gasunie was obliged to buy all the gas produced from the small fields at a 
reasonable price. 587 
This new policy caused some difficulties as the Groningen field consists of low 
calorific gas (hereinafter `L-gas') but most of the gas from the small field and gas 
imports had a different calorific value (mostly high calorific gas - hereinafter `H- 
gas'). 
However, as the majority of Dutch end-consumers and medium sized industrial users 
consume L-Gas, the H-gas from the small fields and imports had to be converted into 
L-gas that matched the Groningen gas quality. 588 With the beginning of the small field 
policy the Groningen field was mainly used as a `swing gas field'. 589 As large 
industrial users and power generation facilities needed H-gas for their production, 
Gasunie constructed high-pressure pipelines for the transportation of H-gas from the 
smaller fields and imports to these aforementioned consumer groups. 
583 Ibid., p. 106. 
S$6 Ibid., p. 106. 
587 Neef, Y., supra note, p. 246. 
588 This is either done by mixing H- and L-gas or by adding nitrogen to high caloric gases. 
589 A swing field means that the field will only be used during times when the network and/or 
customers need more gas than was originally planned for. This refers particularly to the winter when 
unexpected cold days require the quick withdrawal of more gas. 
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d) More gas imports from the EU and non-EU countries 
In the eighties, the Dutch government wanted to further preserve its national gas 
reserves and encouraged considerable gas imports from other gas producing countries 
such as Norway, the UK, and Russia. 590 Nevertheless Gasunie and The Netherlands 
remained as one of the most important exporting companies/nations within the EU. 59' 
2. Liberalisation within the Dutch gas market 
The following section will briefly outline gas liberalisation within The Netherlands. 
In the beginning of the nineties, there was a significant policy change within The 
Netherlands, which some592 describe as a change "from being an implacable opponent 
to a vigorous proponent of liberalisation in the space of a few years. " 
It became clear that the existing Dutch gas market structure for the exploration and 
gasification of the Gronningen field combined with the de facto natural monopoly 
position of Gasunie would not fit into a liberalised market and the need to reform the 
existing gas market structure ('Gasgebouw') became clear. 
Following the passing of the First Gas Directive, the Dutch government passed the 
(first) Gas Act593 in 2000 that aimed to reform the existing gas market arrangements. 
As stressed by some commentator594 three main questions dominated the debate about 
the 2000 Gas Act: 
- Whether there should be negotiated third party access to the gas networks? 
S90Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 110. 591 In 2000, for instance, Gasunie exported 17.7 bcm to Germany and 6.7 bcm to Italy, see Gasunie, 
Facts and Figures, <http: //www. gasunie. nl>, p. 2. 592 Peebles, M., supra note, p. 124. 593 Wet van 22 junie 2000, houdened regels omtrent het transport en de levering van gas (Gaswet), 
Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargant 2000,305. (Dutch Gas Act 2000). 
594 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 111. 
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- How should the future exploration of Dutch gas fields be undertaken in a 
liberalised market? 
- Finally, what are the impacts of liberalisation on the treasury's gas revenues? 
The following describes main elements of the 2000 Gas Act and how they reflect 
some of these concerns. 
a) Market opening 
As market opening in the Dutch electricity market moved rapidly, the Dutch 
government decided to move up full gas market opening to 2007 instead of 2008.595 
As correctly argued, 596 the date of full market opening exceeded significantly the 
requirements of the First Gas Directive and - as discussed above597 - fulfils the market 
opening requirements of the Second Gas Directive. Therefore The Netherlands was 
already at the forefront of legal market opening in 2000. 
b) Unbundling 
Gasunie and the gas distributors were initially obliged to unbundle transport and sales 
activities at least administratively. However, Gasunie was forced to move towards 
legal unbundling in 2002, which - as again argued598 - exceeded the requirements of 
the First Gas Directive but also partly fulfilled the requirements of the Second Gas 
Directive. However, as it will be discussed in this survey, further market unbundling 
reforms were pursued by the Dutch policy makers between 2004-2005.599 
595 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries - The Netherlands, 2004 Review, 
OECD 2004, p. 80. 
596 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 112. 597SeeCII. 2. a). 
598 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 112. 
599 See D. I. 3. a). 
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c) Regulator authority 
With the 2000 Gas Act a new regulatory authority for gas and electricity was 
introduced. The new authority was called "Dienst uitvoering entoezicht energie" 
(hereinafter `Dte'). Dte and the Dutch competition authority - Nederlandse 
Mededingings-autoriteit (hereinafter 'NMa') - took from the 2000 Gas Act key roles 
in the field of market regulation, concentration, tariff supervision and approval. 600 The 
role of both authorities will be subject to further discussion at a latter stage of this 
case study. 
d) Negotiated third party access 
As raised above, one of the main issues with the 2000 Gas Act was whether there 
should be regulated or negotiated third party access to the Dutch high-pressure gas 
infrastructure. It was finally agreed that a `mixture' of both regimes should be 
introduced, which had the following requirements 601: 
- The Dte and NMa had competencies to settle disputes over access to the 
networks. 
- Network tariffs and access conditions had to be published upon discussion and 
agreement with the main network users. 
As can be seen, access to storage facilities remained under a negotiated third party 
access regime. 
e) Continuation of the small field policy 
The 2000 Gas Act obliged Gasunie to continue to buy all the gas that came from the 
small fields. 602 As agued603 "to achieve continuous Groningen field swing function for 
600 See for instance Netherlands Competition Authority, NMA and Die Annual Report 1999, 
<http: //www. nma. de>. This annual reports describes in detail the different activities of both authorities 
in the beginning of the liberalization in the Dutch gas and power market. 601 See also Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 112-113. 
602 Roggenkenkamp, M., supra note, p. 215 
603 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 113. 
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as long as possible, the overall depletion of all national reserves stayed under the 
control of the state. " Gasunie was only allowed a yearly supply of a max. of 80 
bcm boa From this survey's point of view this put Gasunie in a difficult market 
position, as it was obliged to buy the often more expensive gas from the small fields, 
whereby it was also restricted in its sales. That initially allowed other companies to 
break into Gasunie's market share. 
ß Privatisation of distribution companies 
The 2000 Gas Act further allowed distribution companies to sell up to 49% of their 
shares to private companies. Until 2003 this was subject to governmental approval 
because there were fears that a private majority shareholder in a distribution company 
could not guarantee security of supply. 605 
g) Provisional results of the first market liberalisation efforts within the Dutch gas market 
It is argued606 that the 2000 Gas Act brought a number of difficulties as the old gas 
policies continued to conflict with the liberalisation efforts and requirements in the 
EU gas markets. This argument is, from this survey's point of view, mainly based on 
the fact that Gasunie was supposed to operate in a `free' market but had governmental 
restriction. 
However, as it is further argued'607 "it soon became clear that liberalisation as well as 
the newly enacted gas law induced significant changes in the centralised Dutch gas 
market. " This survey agrees with this view but also points out that the Dutch 
difficulties arose from moving from a centralised market organisation into a fully 
liberalised market. The Dutch experience is typical of many Member States' market 
604 Ibid. 
b0$ Ibid. 
60' ' Ibid., p. 114. 
607 Ibid., p. 115. 
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conditions and they share similar concerns about changing their energy market 
structures. 
3. Core elements of the amended Dutch Gas Act and recent market reforms: 
how do the legislation and market reforms encourage competition? Will they 
encourage The Netherlands to be a gas facilitator for the EU? 
The difficulties of transferring the Dutch gas market from an `old' to a more 
competitive and liberalised market structure led to further debates among Dutch 
legislators as well as all market participants. The debate was also significantly 
influenced by the passing of the Second Gas Directive and other market reports, 
which stressed that further reforms needed to be undertaken to have more competitive 
market conditions in The Netherlands. 608 In 2004 the Dutch Gas Act was considerably 
amended (hereinafter `amended Gas Act'). 609 It is argued610 that the amended Gas Act 
"brought sweeping changes" to the Dutch gas market. 
The following section will analyse the amended Gas Act and whether recent market 
reforms have indeed brought significant changes to Dutch and EU gas markets. This 
analysis will be undertaken in the light of the following questions: 
- Will the new law and market reforms allow more competition and better 
access to gas? 
- Will not only The Netherlands but also the EU gas markets benefit from the 
restructuring and allow other (EU) market participants to have better access to 
Dutch gas reserves? 
- Are the law and reforms in line with EU legislation? 
608 Aarts, V., supra note, p. 259; see also Harris, D.; Lapuerta, C., Wholesale gas competition in The 
Netherlands and implications for phase III customers, paper commissioned by DTE (June 2003). 
6" Wet van 22 junie 2000, houdened regels omtrent het transport en de levering van gas (Gaswet), 
Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargant 2000,305. Tekst geldend op 20-07-2004. 
(Dutch amended Gas Act 2004). 
610 Aarts, V., supra note, p. 259. 
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a) Unbundling of Gasunie and local distribution system operators 
The following section will examine the unbundling provisions of the amended Gas 
Act in conjunction with the Government's unbundling decisions. This analysis will 
study how the unbundling provisions and reforms will be enacted with regard to 
Gasunie and other distribution system operators and whether these will create better 
i. e. more competitive market conditions. 
aa) Unbundling of Gasunie 
The unbundling provisions of the Second Gas Directive required Member States to 
oblige their national gas companies to undertake financial, legal and management 
unbundling. 61 The amended Gas Act fulfilled these requirements, as it inter alia 
obliged companies to establish a limited liability company as a transmission system 
operator for the national transmission network. 612 In 2002, Gasunie had already 
internally and physically split into two companies: A trading company - Gasunie 
sales and trading - and a transportation company - Gas transport services (hereinafter 
`Gts'). The shareholder structure, however, remained the same as described above. 
These unbundling measures were implemented long before the Second Gas Directive 
provision had required this. However, it was heavily discussed among Gasunie's 
shareholders and Dutch policy makers whether the shareholder structure should be 
changed in such a way that inter alia Gts would be wholly owned by the Dutch 
Government, and the Dutch Government would reimburse the private shareholders for 
the share transfer. It was questioned what should happen with Gasunie sales and 
trading. In this context it was argued613 that one of the most problematic issues about 
such shareholder change would be "who would be in control of the Dutch gas 
reserves, in particular the huge Groningen gas field. [... ] Gasunie's control has been 
611 See C. 11.2. b). 
612 See Section 3 of the amended Gas Act. 
613 Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., supra note, p. 121. 
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and still is predominately a function of swing and flexibility in gas supply additional 
to the gas supply from the small Dutch gas fields. " 
On the first of July 2005 it was announced614 that as of this date, Gasunie would be 
"divided into two separate companies: a gas transport company wholly owned by the 
State of The Netherlands which will operate under the name N. V. Nederlandse 
Gasunie [hereinafter `Gts'], and a gas trading company, Gasunie Trade & Supply 
B. V. [hereinafter `Gasunie Trade and Supply'], which is jointly owned by Shell, 
ExxonMobil, [... ] and the State of The Netherlands. " As reasons for the split it was 
inter alia argued615 that this break-up of trading/sales and transport functions "was 
taken in response to the liberalisation of the gas market, a process that is 
comparatively far advanced in The Netherlands. " Furthermore, it was argued616 that 
the (now) state owned transportation company should offer non-discriminatory and 
transparent access to the transmission networks, whereas Gasunie Trade and Supply 
shall focus on the supply side. 
This groundbreaking development has, from this survey's point of view, a number of 
debatable and interesting aspects, in particular, for the further development of a 
competitive and more liberalised Dutch Gas market, which could have considerable 
influence on the EU gas market regarding access to gas resources. 
The following two sections will analyse the break-up decision and its implications for 
the liberalised European gas markets. 
614 Gas Transport Services, Legal split of N. V.. Nederlandse Gasunie, 1 July 2005, 
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(i) The establishment of a state owned transmission system operator 
From this survey's point of view, the following issues arise from the decision to 
create a fully state owned transmission system operator: 
- The creation of a fully state owned transmission company seems unique in the 
European Gas Market. Only in Denmark is the transmission system operator - 
Gastra, part of the mother company DONG617 - fully owned by the Danish 
Government. 618 There is, however, a significant difference between the Danish 
and the Dutch market structure: Gastra/DONG has been fully controlled by the 
Danish Government since it was established before market liberalisation 
measures were introduced in the EU and Denmark. 619 In contrast, the Dutch 
Government decided to `nationalise' its transmission system operators long 
after liberalisation efforts began in The Netherlands and the EU. One could 
argue that this means, for the formerly private shareholders ExxonMobil and 
Shell, that they were expropriated and were detached from a significant part of 
the gas value chain. Moreover, one could claim that they have been `robbed' 
of influencing a considerable part of the Dutch gas market. 
- From a competition and liberalisation point of view - in particular what has 
been said above about the unbundling the Gas Directive's provisions620 - this 
decision is controversial. On the one hand it could be argued that a fully 
independent but state owned transmission system operator would ensure the 
network is operated with no cross-subsidisation, in a transparent, cost- 
reflective and non-discriminatory manner, avoiding any disadvantages to the 
network users. But one could also argue that a state owned transmission 
system operator will mainly focus on the domestic market and not consider 
617 Gastra is the legally unbundled company of its mother company DONG, for more information see 
<http; // www. gastra. dk>. 
618 Mortensen, O. G., Ownership as a regulatory instrument in a liberalized energy market: The Danish 
experience, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report II, p. 141. 61 Ibid. 
620 See C. 11.2. b). 
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any EU-wide transportation issues such as higher integration with other 
markets. 
- One could further question why the Dutch government did not take a similar 
step as the UK government when it forced the former UK monopoly - British 
Gas - to de-merge into four different companies in the period between 1994 
and 1996.621 As result of UK break-up, a private limited national transmission 
company, National Grid was established, with which the government and the 
former owners of British Gas have no involvement. 622 Although there is no 
governmental participation in National Grid, the UK gas market is one of the 
most competitive gas markets in the world. The aims of for the Dutch 
government involvement, such as promoting liberalisation, could, from this 
survey's point of view, also have been fullfiled without nationalising its 
transmission system operator. Even if one was to argue that a private 
transmission operator company might misuse its position one could counter 
argue that national regulatory authorities in conjunction with the competition 
authorities could take measures to counteract this behaviour. 
- Further difficulties could arise as both the transmission operator as well as the 
regulatory and competition authorities, have direct governmental involvement. 
`National interest' could cause certain (unfair) decisions by the state owned 
transmission system operator to be tolerated. This argument is partly based on 
the fact of what has been previously said about the problems where regulatory 
authorities are not fully independent. 623 
Experiences with National Grid and the UK national regulatory authority - 
OFGEM - have proven, from this survey's point of view, that proper market 
enforcement can best take place if government and transmission are not 
621 Thomas, S., Gas as a Commodity. The UK Gas Market: From Nationalism to the Embrace of the 
Free Market, in: Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., (eds. ), National Reforms in European Gas, p. 191. 
622 For more information see <http: //www. ngtgroup. com>. 
623SeeCI1.2. c). 
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interlinked. 624 This has positive effects on liberalisation whilst ensuring 
overall security of supply. 
- Overall, it seems rather that the Dutch government wanted to strengthen its 
position in the gas value chain, in particular in the field of gas transportation, 
in order to pursue their own national interests. This stands in contrast to the 
overall EU policy aim to create an internal gas market that is driven by 
liberalisation and competition rather than by nationalisation of certain parts of 
the gas market. 
(ii) Governmental involvement in gas trade and sales 
Maintaining ownership of the trading and sales arm of Gasunie could, from this 
survey's point of view, have the following implications: 
One could primarily argue that the Dutch government wanted to continue to 
have a considerable say in the exploration of the small gas fields and the 
Groningen field. Furthermore, it appears that Dutch policy makers have an 
ongoing interest in continuing the small field policy as well as keeping - for as 
long as possible - the Groningen gas as a guarantor of security of supply. 
However, one could further point out that rather than `nationalising' the Dutch 
transmission system, changes to the organisation and management of Gasunie 
Trade and Supply should have been made. This argument is based on the fact 
that the Dutch regulatory and competition authorities - Dte and NMa - 
announced that the wholesale gas market was not working. 625 One of the 
arguments that is put forward by Dte is that "the most important cause of 
insufficient effective competition is the strong position of Gasunie Trade and 
Supply (Gasunie) on the entire wholesale market and, in particular, its 
dominant position in the market for supply of flexibility services. The 
investigation [into the gas market] showed that most suppliers cannot operate 
independently of Gasunie. " Others626 support this view of the Dutch market. 
624 After the de-merger of British Gas OFGEM forced National Grid to amend numerous market rules 
that would create more competition in the UK gas market, see Thomas, S., supra note, p. 198-200. 
625 Dte, Wholesale Market for Gas Functions Inadequately, 17 March 2005, <http: //www. dte. nl>. 
626Frontier Economics, Research into Flexibility Services - Final Report, A report prepared for Dte, 
March 2005, p. 61-62. 
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Inter alia it is claimed627 that Gasunie Trade and Supply has obtained a 
monopoly position in the Dutch L-Gas market in particular due to the fact that 
it has sole access to the Groningen gas. It is further stated628 that "Gasunie has 
a very high capacity share in all market segments and is pivotal for a 
significant proportion of the year. In addition, the very low cost of incremental 
flexibility from Groningen combined with excess capacity is likely to form a 
greater entry deterrent than in the H-Gas market. Finally, due to its greater 
capacity share in the L-Gas market, Gasunie is likely to make relatively more 
profits through foreclosure of L-Gas flexibility for its rivals than it would with 
foreclosure for H-Gas rivals. " 
These views highlight the fact that, on the one hand, a governmental 
intervention should have rather taken place with the handling of Gasunie 
Trade and Sales rather than the nationalisation of Gts. On the other hands, it 
shows that managing the access to Groningen field will continue to be 
problematic. It appears to be contradictory that Gasunie Trade and Sales to 
provide fair and transparent access to its gas resources would benefit not only 
the domestic Dutch but also the European gas market. This is mainly based on 
the fact that Gasunie Trade and Sales is almost in a monopolistic position 
when it comes to access to gas in The Netherlands. 
bb) Unbundling of the Dutch distribution systems 
Soon after the Dutch government had decided to unbundle Gasunie, - as described 
above - it was decided to unbundle the Dutch distribution system in such a way that 
the network operation should stay with the Dutch State and all shares were to be 
transferred to it. The supply side, however, was obliged to establish a private 
company. 629 The break-up of distribution companies has to be enacted by 2007 to 
fulfil the unbundling provisions of the Second Gas Directive. 630 The Dutch 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid., p. 71-72. 
629 Aarts, V., supra note, p. 276. 
630de Volkskrant, Brinkhorst: 'Splitsing energiebedyven in 2007', 31 March 2004. 
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government justified its unbundling policy inter alia by arguing that these measures 
were necessary because it wanted to ensure - in the 'public interest' - that distribution 
system operators would not misuse their market position, either by cross-subsidisation 
of certain parts of the integrated distribution system, or by using unfair market 
practices in order to avoid competition with third parties. 31 Furthermore, it was 
argued that the supervision by the regulatory authority would be very difficult without 
a legal shareholder separation. 632 Some of the arguments raised by the government 
reflect similar issues to those described above in the analysis of the unbundling 
provisions of the Second Gas Directive. 633 Unbundling has further legal and economic 
implications on distribution systems that will be the subject of the following 
discussion: 
- As mentioned before, the Dutch `unbundling' is unique in the EU and raises 
the question again whether a `nationalisation' of the transmission (and of the 
distribution system) is necessary. Again experiences in the UK-market have 
shown that private ownership of transmission (including the distribution 
system) is possible without having any distortion to competition. 634 
- Furthermore, it has been pointed635 out by the affected distribution system 
operator companies, that after the split-up they - without the transmission 
networks - would be easy targets for take-overs as the companies would 
become so small. This survey agrees with this critique, as this unbundling 
policy could bring disadvantages for the Dutch gas (and electricity) market. 
Large non-Dutch energy corporations could take over these (small) supply 
companies and - if allowed under Dutch and EU competition law - control 
further parts of the EU gas value chain. This could have negative 
611 Brinkman, I., The unbundling of gas and electricity distribution grids in The Netherlands - the pros 
and cons of controversial policy intention, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European 
Energy Law --Report II, p. 153-155. 632 Ibid. 
1,33 See C. 11.2. b). 
634 For more information see <http: //www. xoserve. com>. 
635 Platts, Dutch energy firms vow to fight on as legal unbundling approved, 18 March 2005, 
<http: //www. platts. com>. 
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repercussions for overall competition. Therefore this survey is of the opinion 
(again) that such unbundling measures as carried out by the Dutch 
government, can only work if they are done in an EU-wide consistent manner. 
Otherwise the results for the market - here the Dutch gas market - could be 
one-sided. This view is supported by others636 who argue that because of the 
Dutch unbundling provision a "backlog would [be] create[d] for the Dutch gas 
and electricity supply companies and grid companies, in relation to their 
foreign (European) competitors that are [... ] not confronted with legislation 
regarding unbundling. Thus, the level playing field in the European energy 
market would be negatively affected. " 
- It is also argued637 that the Dutch unbundling provisions might be in breach of 
the Community principle of free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment. Inter alia it is claimed638 that the "legislation would restrict the 
opportunities available to gas and electricity supply companies" and grid 
companies to issue share capital. Possible (foreign) investors would not be 
allowed to invest, for example, at the same time in Dutch grid companies on 
the one hand, and supply, trading and production companies on the other. 
Therefore, the respective gas and electricity supply companies would 
experience difficulties in attracting new capital, whilst possible foreign 
investors would be unable to invest and exercise their right to freedom of 
movement of capital. This is a very interesting point of view. One could argue 
that state intervention through the nationalisation of a company has something 
already been experienced in socialist countries where the Government 
believed that matters like energy should be in the hands of the State. 
Obviously this is in stark contrast to the idea of a free market. Also it raises the 
question whether this is what is really meant by liberalising the energy 
market? This survey agrees with the opinion that nationalising stands in 
636 Brinkman, I., supra note, p. 167. 
637 Ibid., p. 166. 
638 Ibid. 
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opposition to the idea of a free market. Experiences in the UK have proven 
that nationalisation is not necessary. 
b) Third party access 
The following section will analyse the third party access rules under the amended Gas 
Act coupled with the existing third party access regimes that exist in The Netherlands. 
This analysis is of importance because third party access - as described before639 - is a 
fundamental prerequisite for liberalisation and the development of a competitive gas 
market. In the Dutch case, this survey is of the opinion that this is even more 
important as The Netherlands have significant indigenous gas resources, which need 
to be able to be transported in a fair, transparent, cost-reflective and non- 
discriminatory way from the gas production facilities to the domestic and to 
international gas markets. 
The following analysis will consider: 
- The third party access rules under the amended Gas Act together with the 
existing entry-exit gas access regime. 
- The existing Dutch virtual trading hub, which is called `Title Transfer Facility' 
(hereinafter TF'). 
- This survey will also discuss further third party issues that arise for instance as 
part of the Bacton-Balgzand Pipeline project. 
aa) The introduction of an entry-exit regime 
In accordance with Art. 18 of the Second Gas Directive64° Section 12 of the amended 
Gas Act requires a mandatory regulated third party access regime. This obligation is 
also coupled with the general principle of the Second Gas Directive641 that network 
639 See C. Il. 2. d). 
640 See C 11.2. d). 
641 See C 11.2. d) aa) (i). 
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operators offer third party access on fair, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory 
basis. 2 
The introduction of a regulated third party access model was soon followed with the 
implementation of a physical entry-exit access model in the Gts-system in 2003 
643 
The introduction and the current entry-exit regime is the subject of a number of 
debates which are examined in the subsequent analysis: 
(i) Capacity bookings in the Dutch gas network system 
The Dutch gas network contains about 50 entry points and some 1100 defined off- 
take points. Capacities can be reserved in the form of annual, monthly or daily 
contracts. Capacities must be booked no later than ten working days before the actual 
transport date. In the case of usage capacities on a daily basis, the minimum booking 
time is two days before the intended date of use. Capacities are awarded on a first 
come, first served basis. Unused transport capacities will lapse and become available 
to other users ("use-it-or-lose-it"). If capacities at bottlenecks are not used or only 
partially used, Gts has the right in principle to withdraw the unused capacities from 
shippers, with no right to compensation. As is the case in UK, additional rights of use 
that become available in this way are made available on a daily basis as interruptible 
capacities. Shippers affected by such withdrawal have the right to a hearing or to 
submit an objection; it is not out of the question that there may have been valid 
grounds that temporarily prevented the shipper from using its capacity but will not 
apply (to the same extent) in the future. In this case, the withdrawal will be invalid 
and the capacity use of the shipper who entered the system in the meantime will be 
interrupted. 
642 For more detail analysis on this general network access principles within the amended Dutch Gas 
Act, see Aarts, V., supra note, p. 264-266. 
643 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries - The Netherlands, 2004 Review, 
OECD 2004, p. 82. 
239 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
(ii) Balancing 
Balance fluctuations between entry and off-take for all individual dealer transactions 
are balanced over the entire network system. Balancing is performed on a daily basis 
with an upper and lower tolerance limit of 2%. If the balancing weightings of an 
individual shipper remain within these limits, Gts will charge the reference price for 
the necessary balancing transactions. For daily volumes in excess of 2%, network 
users must accept a 40% discount. If entries fall below the lower limit on a daily 
basis, the balancing energy will be charged at the reference price plus a penalty 
surcharge. 
Network users can check gas flows against their booked entry and exit capacities at 
any time using an on-line information system, and determine their balancing position 
accordingly. To avoid penalties from foreseeable balance fluctuations, network users 
have access to their own electronic trading platform for balancing within the TTF, 
which shippers can use to exchange unused tolerance potentials between themselves. 
Gts also offers shippers a tolerance service: for a charge, individual network users can 
move their tolerance limits beyond the defined daily and hourly values. 
(iii) Transparency requirements 
The entry-exit access regime introduces a number of transparency requirements. 644 
These transparency requirements have to be identified as one of the most detailed and 
comprehensive in the EU gas market 645 This is not only based on the fact that it 
consists of an easily accessible online system but also that it fulfils all the 
transparency requirements that were mentioned above in the examination of the 
Second Gas Directive. 646 
644OfIce of Energy Regulation, Guidelines for Gas Transmission 2005,10 June 2005, 
<http: //www. dte. nl>, Section 11, p. 13. 
645 See Appendix 6. 
646 See C. 11.2. d) aa) (iii) and (iv). 
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These (Dutch) transparency requirements will allow third party network users to plan 
and organise their transportation in a much easier and predictable way because they 
have access to all the necessary information to undertake transportation. This has also 
improved the conditions for cross-border transportation. 
(iv) Availability of pipeline capacity and open season 
Although the transparency requirements have to be identified as a considerable 
improvement on overall market conditions, the Dutch regulator - Dte - has also 
highlighted 647 the fact that almost all of the firm capacities at the main physical entry 
pointsTM8 had been fully booked on a long-term basis (i. e. 10-15 years). Dte asked Gts 
to further extend its existing H-gas-networks. This resulted in a so-called `open- 
season' for the H-gas Gts network system, which started at the beginning of 2005 and 
is supposed to be completed in mid 2005 649 Under the open-season, interested third 
parties engage with Gts in a non-legally binding discussion about the reservation of 
capacity bookings. After Gts accepts the third party as a counter party, both parties 
will make a binding agreement to book capacity. After this process is completed, Gts 
will undertake necessary extensions to its pipeline capacity. This work is believed to 
finish between 2007 and 2009. 
This initiative by Gts to extend its existing network capacities has to be welcomed, as 
the extension can increase overall liquidity as well as improve security of supply 
because gas can now flow at higher volumes from the Dutch gas networks to other 
foreign gas markets. Also the whole process seems to provide a good incentive for 
network operators to extend their existing capacities, as Gasunie is almost guaranteed 
that their investment will be paid back over a period of time by the existing pipeline 
capacity bookings. 
647Dte, Onderzoek Ontwikkeling Gasmarkt, 2004, <http: //www. dte. nl>, Paragraph 3.4.1 and No. 44,64. 
648 The main entry points in particular for cross-border gas trade/shipping are: Emden (D), Oude 
Statenzijl, Zelzate and Balgzand (all NL). 
649 Gas Transport Services, Open season -Northeast and southwest hi-cal entries and exits, 1 January 
2005, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
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However, one could also argue that the open-season process has a negative impact on 
those parties that were not involved or was excluded from the process as they will not 
be able to have any first-hand access to (important) pipeline capacities. This argument 
becomes even stronger if the future capacity holders of the extended gas network 
were already capacity holders before the work was undertaken. This will move them 
into an even more dominant market position. There are no specific rules that would 
prevent this. 
(v) Transportation costs 
It was partly claimed650 that the Dutch transportation costs were among the cheapest 
of the EU gas markets. This argument is based on the fact that The Netherlands - next 
to the UK - is one of the first EU countries to introduce an entry exit regime. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch regulatory authority - Dte - still believes that the 
transportation tariffs are excessive and are hampering the development of further 
liberalisation in the Dutch end customer business. 651 On the basis of this claim, Dte 
obliged Gts to reduce its 2004 tariffs, costs for quality conversion and imbalance 
652 charges, by 5% for the year 2005. This initiative by Dte has to be welcomed as it 
obliges Gts to operate its system on the above653 principle of efficiently incurred 
costs, which implies that the network operator cannot burden its network users with 
unjustified costs, incurred through the operation of a inefficiently operated network. 
650 See Gas Transport Services, European Gas Transmission Tariff Comparisons, paper prepared by PA 
Consulting Group for Gastransport Services, March 2002, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm>; Gas Transport Services, Gas Carriage 
and Third Party Transmission Tariffs in Europe, paper prepared by PA Consulting Group for 
Gastransport Services, May 2001, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm>. 
"'International Energy Agency, Energy Policies ofIEA Countries - The Netherlands, 2004 Review, 
OECD 2004, p. 82. 
652 Office of Energy Regulation, Guidelines for Gas Transmission 2005,10 June 2005, 
<http: //www. dte. nl>, here section 22, p. 19. This kind of tariff regulation is called 'Price-cap' 
regulation Under this price regulation the system operator has some flexibility in how tariffs should be 
structured. There are (significant) differences between this kind of tariff regulation and the now 
discussed `incentive tariff regulation'. See for a comparison, Ilene, A., Gasmarktregulierung in 
Europa: Ansätze, Erfahrungen und mögliche Implikationen für das deutsche Regulierungsmodell, WIK 
- Diskussionsbeiträge, March 2005. Also Hemphill, R. C. et al, Incentive Regulation in Network 
Industries: Experience and Prospects in the U. S. Telecommunications, Electricity, and Natural Gas 
Industries, Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 4- December 2003. 
653 See C 111.2. a). 
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(vi) Gas quality conversion 
Another problematic issue within the Dutch entry-exit regime is the mandatory gas 
quality conversion by Gts. The gas quality conversion - as mentioned above - is 
necessary as the Dutch end-customer business is based on L-gas and large industrial 
users consume H-Gas. Gts operates both of these networks, which run parallel. The 
quality conversion is necessary as different gas qualities enter the Dutch gas market. 
A technical gas quality conversion is only possible from H- into L-gas. However, 
commercially, gas quality conversion is undertaken by exchanging (swap of) L- and 
H-gas. 
As Gts is the only transmission network operator that has the facilities to convert H- 
Gas into L-Gas, it has gained a monopolistic position in this respect. Furthermore, it is 
highlighted654 in this context that the majority (i. e. 70%) of the available quality 
conversion capacity has been committed on a long-term basis to Gasunie Trade and 
Supply, which presents a significant barrier to entry. One could argue that that the 
extension of the H-gas network through the open season could bring some capacity, in 
the case where a (commercial) quality conversion is undertaken through a swap of L- 
and H-gas. However, it was also realised that the extension of H-gas-transmission- 
network had to be combined with an increase of gas quality conversion by a release 
programme, which will be undertaken in a similar fashion as the open season. 655 The 
period that it will cover is 2007 until 2009. Although this release programme has to be 
welcomed because it allows new players to enter the market, it is too early to judge 
whether it will have a significant impact on competition as well as gas liquidity. 
(vii) Capacity allocation 
654 l larris, D.; Lapuerta, C., supra note, p. 16-17. 
655 Gas Transport Services, Capacity Release Quality Conversion Capacity 2007,2008 and 2009,15 
July 2005, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
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It has been discussed above656 that transparent and fair capacity allocation is an 
important prerequisite for the creation of a competitive and liquid gas market. This 
refers, in particular, to where contractual or physical congestion occurs and principles 
such as use-it-or-loose should be applied. 657 According to Section 12 (4. ) of the 
(Dutch) Guidelines for Gas Transmission for 2005658 "The system [of capacity 
allocation] [... ] shall also include provisions that the unused transmission capacity, 
after a reasonable term has passed, may be offered by Gastransport Services as an 
interruptible service, in so far as a network user fails to actually use the transmission 
capacity contracted by it. " It is further set out in Section 12 (2. ) that the capacity 
allocation system "shall at least meet the requirements of transparency, non- 
discrimination, objectivity and fairness. This means in particular, that the system shall 
ensure that Gastransport Services does not favour itself in allocating the available 
transmission capacity. " It is also stated in Section 12 (3. ) that "Gastransport Services 
may desire to base the [capacity allocation] system [... ] on an auctioning 
mechanism. " 
This wording, unfortunately, leaves a lot of room for interpretation. First of all 
Section 12 does not oblige Gts to apply a strict use-it-or-lose-it principle in the case 
where capacity is not used or if congestion occurs. Furthermore, capacity hoarding is 
not forbidden. This can - in practice - have a negative impact on competition, and 
will not encourage secondary capacity trading to flourish. 
656 See C 111.2. c). 
657 Ibid. 
658 Office of Energy Regulation, supra note. 
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bb) Title Transfer Facility 
The above entry-exit access regime was, soon after its implementation, combined 
with the Title Transfer Facility ('TTF') in 2003. The TTF is a virtual gas hub659 and is 
defined by the network operator Gts as "the virtual location, serving as an entry 
and/or exit point, on which [ ... ] parties can transfer quantities of gas 
[ ... ]. »660 This 
wording implies that parties can transfer gas from one party to the other without 
needing physical capacity nor delivery at an entry or exit point. It is a simple transfer 
of title rights from one party to another. It is said, "The TTF facilitates parties to trade 
bilaterally, over the counter (hereinafter 'OTC 7)661 or via the exchange. " 
However, the implication of this virtual hub for liberalised markets and the possible 
improvements in liquidity in the Dutch and other gas markets is the subject of the 
subsequent analysis: 
- The TTF makes the transactions between parties much quicker. The majority 
of trading parties are using a standardised TTF-trading-agreement662as an 
Annex to the Gts Transmission Service Conditions (hereinafter 'TSC' ). 663 The 
standardised trading agreement brings, from this survey's point of view, more 
harmonisation into the trading activities of all market participants because 
communication and billing procedures etc are dealt with in a similar way. 
- The TTF has already had a positive influence on the creation of more liquidity 
and therefore more competition. This argument is based on the fact that third 
parties and traders can access the system in a `simpler' way without needing 
659 Gas hubs are created at important supply points and points where a number of pipelines converge. 
Prerequisites for working gas hubs are easy access to the networks including pipelines as well as 
storage facilities. See for more information Kraus, M., Lexikon der Energiewirtschaft, p. 109. 
6°Gas Transport Services, Transmission Service Conditions 2005-2 - Standard Conditions concerning 
the Transmission of Natural Gas and the Performance of related services according to Agreement 
between Gas Transport Services B. Y. and Customer, 1 November 2004, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>, Section 1.88, p. 10. 
661 OTC means that counter parties trade not on the stock exchange. All their trades are bilateral and 
(usually) not known to the market. 
662 See for the standardised TTF agreement EFET, TTFAppendix, June 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
663 Gas Transport Services, supra note. 
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physical capacity. It also provided an incentive for existing capacity holders to 
use the TTF as a platform for secondary trading. 
- Apart from the positive elements of the TTF, it has been put forward 664 that 
trade only occurs at the TTF and not at any other (physical) entry or exit points 
because "Gasunie only supplies a limited quantity [at the TTF] [... ], [and] the 
importance of the TTF on the wholesale market as a whole is limited. " This 
view is supported by others665 that also argue "currently not all suppliers are 
willing to deliver gas at TTF. Consumers should be given the opportunity to 
get the gas delivered wherever they want. " 
- Another critical point about the TTF can be found in Section 6.1.6. of the 
TSC which states "Customers [of Gts], in the process of matching according to 
the [Annex of the TSC] [... ] acting as counter party of the Customer, the latter 
being referred to as the defaulting party, may be invoiced by Gts for the 
amount due by the defaulting party [... ], if it is not reasonably possible to 
receive the amount due from that defaulting party. " This provision implies that 
a third party, which had bought gas from a defaulting customer of Gts, would 
be liable for the debts in the contractual relationship of the defaulting customer 
of Gts. One could argue that this has to be the case as once a title is transferred 
all the other legal implications such as liability are transferred as well. 
Conversely, one could argue that the affected party would have to pay the gas 
price twice666 and had no contractual influence in the (contractual) relationship 
between the defaulting party and Gts. One could further say, that this clause 
bears enormous economic and/or legal risks for third parties, which might 
hinder them from using the TTF facility. 
664 Dte, Wholesale Market for Gas Functions Inadequately, 17 March 2005, <http: //www. dte. nl>. 6°s Neef, Y., supra note, p. 249. 
666 First to the defaulting party and secondly to Gts. 
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cc) The Bacton-Balgzand Pipeline and third party access issues 
The UK became a net gas importer in 2004, causing the existing Interconnector 
between Belgium and the UK (`IUK') to become even more important. Since its 
construction in 1997, the IUK already has had a significant influence on the 
development of gas competition and security of supply. However, the IUK was also 
identified as not being sufficient for the future gas demand in the UK. 667 Therefore, 
other pipeline connections to the Continent as well as to Norway were discussed. 
This section will examine the planned interconnection pipeline project between The 
Netherlands and the UK, the so-called Bacton-Balgzand Pipeline (hereinafter 'BBL- 
line' or 'BBL-project') and its implication on third party access and the further 
development of competition. 668 
Soon after construction of the IUK, it was realised that the UK was in need of more 
gas in the future and that some of this extra gas was required to be transported through 
another pipeline connection. Gts started with the BBL-project through an open 
season, where interested parties could reserve on a non-legally binding basis capacity 
in the new (planned) BBL-pipeline. 669 After a number of negotiation rounds, three 
companies received on a legally binding basis capacity bookings on a long-term basis 
(i. e. 10-15 years). The three companies were Gasunie Trade and Supply, E. ON 
Ruhrgas of Germany and Wingas of Germany. In the process, an independent BBL- 
pipeline company was established, of which Gts holds 60%, E. ON Ruhrgas 20% and 
Fluxys of Belgium 20%. The BBL-line is supposed to be completed by 2006. 
667 See Gastransport Services, BBL - Balgzand (The Netherlands) Bacton (UK) - Pipeline Project, 
September 18 2003, <http: //gastransportservices. nl>, p. 5; Roggenkamp, M. M, Establishment and Role 
of the Bacton-Balgzand Pipeline within the Internal Gas Market, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, 
R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report II, p. 173-174. 668 For more information on the interconnection between the UK and Norway see Brautaset, A. L., The 
Ormen Lange Field, the Langeled Pipeline and the new UK-Norway framework agreement concerning 
cross-boundary petroleum cooperation, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European 
Energy Law - Report II, p. 197-218. 
«'9 Gastransport Services, BBL - Balgzand (The Netherlands) Bacton (UK) - Pipeline Project, 
September 18 2003, <http: //gastransportservices. nl>. 
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Because of the advice of the Dte, the BBL-pipeline operator asked simultaneously at 
the beginning of the open season and the final assignment of capacity rights for an 
exemption of third party access under Art. 22 of the Second Gas Directive. Involved 
in the process were the regulatory authorities OFGEM and Dte as well as the 
European Commission. 
Recalling670 that Art. 22 of the Second Gas Directive allows an exemption of third 
party access if, for instance, a new built piece of gas infrastructure - such as an 
interconnector between two Member States - enhances overall gas competition and 
security of supply. On this basis, the aforementioned regulatory authorities agreed that 
these requirements are fulfilled by the BBL-project and a final permission for an 
exemption was issued in 2005. It has been argued671 "An exemption was considered 
necessary as the regulatory experience so far suggested that the regulatory framework 
may be subject to (constant) change and the returns of regulated access are likely to 
be insufficient incentives for developing the project. Incorporating regulatory risks 
[... ] makes such a project economically unattractive. Even with an exemption the 
remaining risks are considerable. " 
However, from this survey's point of view, the following issues raise doubts as to 
whether the new pipeline will promote more competition and greater flexibility in the 
European gas markets: 
(i) Open season 
It has been said above that the open season is, from a pipeline operator perspective, a 
good approach to limit certain risks in the construction of a multi-million Euro 
pipeline project. Nevertheless, it is still problematic that the open season had missed 
some third parties or they were eliminated from the process, leaving them without any 
boo See B 111.2. d). 
671 Roggenkamp, M. M., supra note, p. 188. 
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direct access to the pipeline capacities and therefore totally reliant on the third party 
access rules. In the case of the BBL-project, the operator asked for an exemption for 
third party access because it is more difficult than under `normal' conditions. This 
argument is also based on the fact that the capacity rights have been designated on a 
long-term basis i. e. more than 10 years, and therefore one could argue that the market 
is constrained for a long time. 
(ii) Access regime 
In the context of the third party access regime to the BBL-line it has been argued, 672 
"The regulators' desire that BBL applies a non-discriminatory access regime 
obviously seems to contradict with the legal rational of [a third party access] 
exemption. " However, it was believed673 that the open season ensured non- 
discrimination of third parties. As mentioned above, this is questionable because after 
the open season was closed only three parties held the long-term capacity rights. 
The BBL-company has chosen to offer unused capacity on an interruptible basis to 
third parties because it is believed that a firm offer could infringe existing contractual 
obligations. It has been noted above that this argument is often used within the 
European gas industry but as the analysis of the Electricity Regulation proved, 674 this 
is not the case in other sectors of the European power industry. It is still unclear why a 
legal differentiation is made between the electricity and gas sectors. 
However, to allow the existing capacity holder to continue to hold first right access to 
the capacity while not using it could hamper competition as this constitutes capacity 
hoarding. 
672 Ibid., p. 191. 
673 ibid. 
674 See C. 111.2 c) aa). 
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(iii) Competition issues 
One could argue that the BBL-pipeline will not contribute to any more competition or 
greater liquidity in the Dutch or the UK gas market. This argument is based on the 
fact that the capacity holders are already dominant players in the UK, EU and the 
Dutch gas markets and therefore new competitors will find it difficult to get first-hand 
access to gas and capacity. They will continue to depend on free capacities in the 
IUK. However, others675 are of the opinion that the pipeline will bring more 
competition to both because there is more room for new entrants in both markets and 
the existing market rules discourage market dominance. It is further claimed that the 
BBL will be in direct competition with the IUK. 
However, the first two arguments are difficult to support. It is true that there is `room' 
for new entrants but these new players need to have access to gas and pipeline 
capacities. The BBL has been booked on a long-term basis and therefore new players 
are very much dependent on buying gas from the existing pipeline holders. 
Whether the IUK and the BBL engage in a direct pipeline-to-pipeline competition is 
yet to be proven. From this survey's point of view, this is unlikely to happen as the 
transportation route from the Groningen field via the BBL-line into the UK is much 
shorter and therefore the gas is presumably cheaper. In contrast there is no direct 
access to production facilities in the IUK. The gas in the IUK comes from different 
sources such as Norway (natural gas), Algeria and Nigeria (both LNG). Therefore the 
gas needs to be transported from further away and will most likely be more expensive. 
675 Roggenkamp, M. M., supra note, p. 193. 
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c) Access to storage 
During the analysis of the Second Gas Directive and the GGPSSO it was 
highlighted676 that access to storage facilities and linepack is an important prerequisite 
for competition and liberalisation, as they provide an essential tool for the customer 
supply business. 
The Second Gas Directive required either regulated or a negotiated third party access 
regime to storage facilities and linepack. 
In comparison to the relatively well-advanced third party Dutch transmission access 
regime, the Dutch legislature chose to have negotiated third party access to storage 
facilities and linepack (hereinafter `Dutch storage guidelines'). 677 In this context one 
could argue that because of the importance of storage facilities in the overall gas value 
chain, the Dutch negotiated storage access regime could be a disadvantage to third 
party gas storage and linepack users. This argument is partly based on the analysis of 
the negotiated third party access rules under the Second Gas Directive as well as the 
GGPSSO. Both texts highlighted that a negotiated storage access regime bears a 
number of negative risks for third parties. However, one could counter argue678 that 
the Dutch gas storage and linepack facilities are of no great importance because the 
Groningen field provides enough flexibility, that only very little back-up services are 
required from storage facilities. This view is supported by the fact that the Dutch 
market is equipped with only three main storage facilities, 679 although The 
Netherlands are one of the main gas consumers in the EU 680 However - as claimed 
076 See C 11.2 e); C IV. 
671 l Jere section 18 of the amended Gas Dutch Act in conjunction with the legally binding Storage 
Guidelines of 2003; see Dte, Richtlynen Gasops 2003,30 August 2002, <http: //www. dte. nl>. 
The Dutch Mining Act of 2003 deals with the issue of licensing of storage facilities. However, this 
survey does not cover the issue of licensing requirements of storage facilities. For more information 
about the Dutch storage licensing regime see Van Beuge, M. J. J., Underground Gas Storage in The 
Netherlands, in: Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report I, p. 332. 678 Ibid., p. 331. 
679 Van der Wal, W., The Technological Infrastructure of the Gas Chain, in: Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, 
R. W., (eds. ), National Reforms in European Gas, p. 20; DRI-WEFA, Executive Summary - The 2002 
European gas storage study, <http: //www. dri-wefa. com>; Borowka, J.; Möller, A., Zander, W.; 
Koischwitz, S., Technical study gas storage, Büro für Engergiewirtschaft und technische Planung 
GmbH, May 2001. 
680 DRI-WEFA, Netherlands - country analysis, 2001/2002, <http: //www. dri-wefa. com>. 
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further681 - since half of the Groningen field is depleted, storage facilities in The 
Netherlands "have become necessary to provide flexibility due [... ] to the diminishing 
pressure on the Groningen field. " Nevertheless, this survey is of the opinion that in 
contrast to other EU Member States, The Netherlands are far less dependent on 
storage facilities than countries like Germany that have over fifty storage facilities. 682 
Therefore this survey will only briefly outline, in the subsequent paragraph, some of 
the main issues within the Dutch negotiated third party storage access regime: 
- One of the core issues seems to be that some of the storage operators do not 
feel that their facility falls under the definition of a `gas storage facility' under 
the amended Gas Act - here Section 1 (1) (f). According to this provision a 
`gas storage facility' is "an installation for the storage of gas, with the 
exception of the part that is for production activities. " The above-mentioned 
storage operators claim683 that their storage facility is used as a production 
facility and therefore does not fall into the scope of the definition. Contrary to 
this argument, the Dutch Regulator is of the opinion that even (former) 
production facilities are covered by the definition. One could agree with this 
point of view when looking at the definition of a `gas production network' that 
also covers storage facilities. 684 The disagreement between both contradicting 
opinions has not been settled. Nevertheless, the above stated storage operators 
offer in practice third party access to their facilities. 685 However, the 
disagreement proves that there are potential uncertainties over the 
interpretation and therefore binding obligations of third party access. 
Much of the above stated Dutch storage guidelines refer to technical 
obligations and leave much of the commercial implications open to 
negotiation between operators and users. This has created in practice 
681 Van Beuge, M. J. J., supra note, p. 353. 
682 Van der Wal, W., supra note, p. 20. 
683 See Van Beuge, M. J. J., supra note, p. 345. 
684 Section 1 (1) (c) defines `gas production network' as "one or more pipelines or gas extraction 
project or are used for the transmission of gas directly from a gas extraction project to a processing 
facility, a storage facility or a landing terminal. " 
685 See Van Beuge, M. J. J., supra note, p. 348. 
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numerous uncertainties, in particular for third party storage users. 686 Therefore 
this survey believes again - as stated above during the analysis of the Second 
Gas Directive - that a common approach preferably by a regulated third party 
access regime, needs to be implemented, not only in domestic gas markets but 
also in the EU. It is still to be proven whether the GGPSSO will produce such 
a regime. 
d) Regulatory supervision 
In the above analysis of the Second Gas Directive, 687 this survey highlighted the fact 
that a strong and independent regulatory authority is important to the proper 
development of competition, liberalisation and market harmonisation. 
It was mentioned above that the Dutch legislator has already established the 
regulatory authority Dte, with the implementation of the First Gas Directive. 
Nevertheless, under existing Dutch legislation, which includes the amended Gas Act 
as well as the Competition Act688, not only the Dte but also NMa and the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereinafter `MEA') have powers over the Dutch 
energy market. It is already argued689 that a number of powers between the authorities 
overlap. From this survey's point of view - as mentioned above690 - this can cause 
difficulties when it comes to proper enforcement. However, it seems that in practice 
"many of the powers that have been conferred upon the MEA or the NMa have either 
been mandated to the Dte or are being prepared by the Dte. "691 
The following section will briefly analyse the different powers of the Dutch 
authorities and some of the possible issues arising from sharing these powers: 
686 See for some examples Van Beuge, M. J. J., supra note, p. 348-350; van Nieuwland, A. J. F. M, 
Practical experience and recent developments with UGS TPA in The Netherlands, presented to Energy 
Wise, April 2003. 
697 See C 1I. 2. c). 
688 Dutch Competition Act, Act of 22 May 1997, Providing New Rules for Economic Competition, 
Netherlands Government Gazette 2004,345, Version applicable as of 1 August 2004. 
689 Aarts, V., supra note, p. 282. 
6`10 SeeCII. 2. c). 
691 Aarts, V., supra note, p. 283 
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aa) Supervision rights 
According to section 59 of the amended Gas Act the Dutch competition authority - 
NMa - "shall be responsible for supervising compliance with the provisions of or 
pursuant to this Act, [... ]. " However, from this general rule there are numerous 
exemptions within the Gas Act. Pursuant to sections 60 and 60a "the Dte has the 
power to issue binding instructions and, if necessary, orders for periodic penalty 
payments to enforce compliance with specific provisions. "692 The different powers of 
the two main authorities can cause difficulties from this survey's point of view, in 
particular where both authorities disagree over a certain matter. Even if - as argued693 
- both authorities share resources and create synergies in overlapping areas, the 
problem of sharing power still remains. 
bb) Intervention rights 
Sections 5 and 5a of the amended Gas Act allow the MEA to appoint a network 
operator in case the existing network operator `under performs'. Again it is interesting 
to observe that the ministry is in charge of such tasks. Although it appears that Dte is 
the main market monitor and therefore should, from this survey's point of view, be 
responsible for such an important matter as the supervision and intervention of 
network operator behaviour. This argument is also based on the fact that as of 2007, 
all network operators will be wholly owned by the State and it is questionable whether 
MEA would admit that one of the network operators had under performed and needed 
to be replaced. 
692 Ibid., p. 284. 
693 van Gent, C., Energy regulation - "the Dutch case ", presentation by Dte, September 2002. 
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cc) Competition law versus regulatory law 
A further interesting matter of concern is the question of what impact competition law 
and regulatory law (i. e. the amended Gas Act) have on the aforementioned authorities. 
This refers particularly to the query of how information gained from one authority is 
to be passed on to other. In this respect, section 34 (3) of the amended Gas Act states 
that "Data or information, which Our Minister obtains in relation to any operations in 
the performance of any of his duties in accordance with this Act, may be used only for 
the performance of that duty. " This would mean - as claimed694 - that in principle any 
information gained as part of an investigation under the amended Gas Act could not 
be used for any other purpose, for instance one arising from a competition inquiry. 
However, pursuant to section 91 of the Competition Act NMa can pass on any 
information that the authority has gained under the Competition Act to the Dte. The 
difference in procedure of the Competition and the amended Gas Act brings up the 
query of what impact both laws have upon each other. It is argued695 "The Dte has the 
task of helping to create a level playing field in the Dutch energy sector. To that end 
the Dte imposes ex ante rules of conduct on market players. For example, the Dte 
determines tariff structures, tariffs, and access conditions. Although the NMa is 
involved ex ante in the regulation of concentrations, the cartel prohibition and rules on 
abuse of a dominant position apply ex post. The NMa is responsible for enforcing 
these prohibitions and for imposing sanctions in case these rules are violated. " 
Nevertheless, the above-described impact of the Competition and amended Gas Act 
illustrate again the problems of overlapping jurisdiction, which are not properly dealt 
with in either legislation and therefore can cause practical problems. 
dd) Cooperation with other EU regulatory authorities 
Neither the Competition law nor the amended Gas Act include provisions that deal 
with the cooperation of Dutch regulatory and competition authorities with their 
694 Aarts, V., supra note, p. 281. 
695 Ibid., 282. 
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neighbouring countries. This is surprising as The Netherlands is an important transit 
and exporting country. 
4. The development of a Dutch-German gas hub: The case of EuroHub GmbH 
When gas markets become open to new suppliers and the existing suppliers seek to 
become flexible in their gas procurement, gas hubs, as a main interchange of gas, will 
become more important for gas sourcing and gas trading. A gas hub is a point where 
major interconnections of (mainly high pressure) pipelines meet and storage facilities 
are available. Often many buyers and sellers undertake natural gas trading at this point 
as well as at the location of the delivery of this gas. In this context it is often argued696 
that gas hubs are an important driver for competition and increase gas liquidity. It is 
further said that hubs help to balance supply and demand in a more sophisticated way 
and also support the proper development of investment plans. 
Although there are many gas hubs within the EU, 697 it is often argued that in 
particular The Netherlands is one of the best places within the EU for having a gas 
hub. It is said698, "The strong position of The Netherlands as a gas producer and 
exporter has resulted in The Netherlands having a comprehensive gas infrastructure, 
with important existing and planned major East-West and North-South [pipeline] 
connections. The recent investments in storage capacity have stabilised and enhanced 
this position. The Netherlands therefore has all the actual means [... ] to be an 
important hub in the EU gas market. " One of the most talked about hubs within The 
Netherlands and part of Germany is the EuroHub GmbH on the Dutch-German 
border. 699 
°`'6 Lyle, C., Gas Trading in the UK, 13 June 2005, <http: //www. iea. org>. 
b97 See Appendix 7. 
698Energieraad, Gas for tomorrow, Advice of the Energy Council on policy options for The Netherlands 
in a changing global and European gas market, January 2005. 
m See Appendix 8, location of the EuroHub. 
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The following section will examine whether the EuroHub GmbH can be a hub that 
contributes considerably to gas availability and competition in the EU. This question 
is of great interest, as the EuroHub GmbH is located where main gas deliveries for the 
European Gas Market arrive (from Norway, Russia and The Netherlands), and there is 
an interface between production, transportation and consumption. Furthermore, it is 
one of the largest physical markets in the EU gas markets. 700 
a) The establishment of the EuroHub 
Before EuroHub GmbH was established in April 2004, two other hubs existed in the 
same area Hubco and EuroHub. 701 However, trading at these hubs was unsuccessful 
because inter alia of the lack of import capacity and market integration between 
Germany and The Netherlands. After it was realised that both hubs would not be able 
to work in parallel, the shareholders of both decided to merge into one hub, the so- 
called EuroHub GmbH (hereinafter `EuroHub'). 702 The shareholders of EuroHub are: 
Gts, E. ON Ruhrgas, BEB of Germany, Wingas of Germany and Statoil 
Deutschland 703 
b) The EuroHub service and possible problems 
It is planned that EuroHub will offer a trading service at the pipeline interconnections 
at Emden (D), Oude Statenzijl (NL) and Bunde (D) by integrating the Dutch and 
German gas markets. It is further anticipated to extend the Hub to the UK via the 
BBL-line. It is argued704 that EuroHub will have the potential to concentrate the 
liquidity of different European gas markets in one place. However, at this stage 
Eurollub has only offered an interim service and no significant trading activities have 
70°Kager, P., EuroHub, lEA Eurogas Joint Workshop, Paris, 13 June 2005, <http: //www. iea. org>. 701 See <http: //nwehub. com>. 
702 llubCo, New Impulses for a strong European Gas Trading Hub, 27 April 2004, 
<http: //www. nwehub. com>. 
703 Statiol Deutschland is a subsidiary company of the Norwegian state owned gas and oil company 
Statiol. 
704 Kager, P., supra note. 
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been reported. In contrast to the TTF, for instance, where more than 26 
shippers/traders are registered, at EuroHub only eight customers have signed up to the 
hub. Therefore, it is yet to be proven whether the hub has the potential to be one of the 
major gas exchanges and will contribute to more competition as well as liquidity in 
the European Union. 
However, from this survey's point of view, the following aspects play a vital role in 
the further development of the hub and ultimately gas competition and liberalisation: 
- One of the main issues is access to pipeline capacity. It has already been stated 
that the majority of capacity within the Dutch network, but also other 
European pipeline networks, has been booked on a long-term basis and there is 
very little capacity available to new entrants. The restricted access to gas 
capacity has an immediate impact on the development of the hub because 
where no or very little available firm capacity is available third parties cannot 
enter the market and therefore trading counter parties are missing. Whether the 
extension of the Gts H-gas-pipeline system will bring significant changes to 
this current situation is questionable, since it is yet to be seen who are the 
(new) capacity holders and whether they will make any unused capacity 
available to allow the EuroHub to flourish. 
- This rather critical view of the benefits of the gas hub development is further 
complicated by the question of whether the existing shareholders of EuroHub 
will have an interest in improving the current state of the hub. This is doubtful 
as these shareholders are often the same as existing capacity holders and they 
need these capacities to serve their own customers; not releasing unused 
capacity prevents any direct customer competition with third parties. 
- Finally, it is questionable how the '17F and the EuroHub can work alongside 
each other. This is even more true because the Amsterdam Power Exchange 
(hereinafter `APX') and the TTF operator Gts have agreed to establish a gas- 
258 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
trading platform at the APX. 705 It is therefore doubtful whether the gas market 
is big enough to make EuroHub and TTF work alongside each other. 
705Kager, P., 7TF - The Dutch Balancing Point, IEA Eurogas Joint Workshop, Paris, 13 June 2005, 
<http: //www. iea. org>. 
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5. Provisional results of the Dutch gas market analysis 
In conclusion the results of the case study and the answers to the initial questions of 
whether The Netherlands can be a gas facilitator and how much this market and its 
recent reforms have contributed to the creation of a more harmonised and liberalised 
EU gas market, the following can be stated: 
(1. ) The Dutch gas market prior to market liberalisation 
Summarising the comments about Dutch gas policy and market structure prior to 
market liberalisation, the following must be said: 
Dutch gas exploration policy was centralised, coordinated, and planned. This kind of 
policy is almost unique within the EU and stands, for instance, in contrast to the UK, 
where all the gas resources where explored, sometimes to a maximum, which led to 
the near depletion of all gas resources. However, the Dutch government had a strong 
interest in limiting the exploration of its resources as long as possible. 
The Dutch policy makers also wanted to be in the control of the marketing and 
transportation of the natural gas resources by entering into public-private partnership 
with the gas company Gasunie. That had an influence on the rest of the European 
Union, as one Member State Government had a significant influence on how gas 
should be sold and transported to other EU Member States. This point also illustrated 
the fact of how close the energy industry is bound to politics. 
Finally, security of gas supplies - as in many other EU Member States - was seen as a 
mere domestic matter, where the Gronningen field was perceived as a guarantor for a 
long-lasting energy supply source, serving mainly national interests such as the 
economy and Dutch citizens. 
Therefore, it must be said that prior to market liberalisation in The Netherlands, the 
Dutch gas market had only a limited gas-sourcing function within the EU. 
Liberalisation and market harmonisation efforts were not pursued. 
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(2. ) The first phase of market liberalisation 
Although the first energy liberalisation phase within The Netherlands was well ahead 
of many other EU Member States, the involvement of the government in the 
exploration and marketing of Groningen and other small Dutch gas fields continued, 
meaning that the Dutch gas market potential as a source gas in the EU remains. In 
contrast to the UK, where all the major gas and oil fields were explored, the Dutch 
government kept a close eye on the extent of exploration of gas resources, so it would 
not endanger their national security of supply. 
(3. ) The second phase of market liberalisation 
The implementation of the Second Gas Directive into Dutch energy legislation and 
the market reforms by Dutch policy makers have, from this survey's point of view, 
the following impacts on the Dutch as well as the European gas market: 
- Gasunie Trade and Sales remain more or less in the same position as they were 
before the split-up. The de-merger has not produced better access conditions to 
Dutch gas resources. 
- Apart from this the nationalisation of the transmission networks has to be 
criticised. Experiences in other markets have shown that privately owned 
transmission system operators could also guarantee fair, cost-reflective and 
transparent third party access. 
- The third party access rules in conjunction with a Netherlands-wide entry-exit 
system and the TTF, have brought a considerable positive impact on 
liberalisation and market harmonisation, as well as accessibility to the Dutch 
gas market. This is based on the fact that new entrants will find it easier to 
access the transportation networks under the current rules and better national 
gas transportation can also extend to cross-border transportation. Nevertheless, 
it seems questionable whether the problems related to long-term capacity 
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bookings can be resolved. The extension of the H-gas networks is positive but 
it needs to be ensured that unused capacity is being made available to third 
parties, to avoid any anti-competitive capacity hoarding. 
- The BBL-line project could lead to greater market harmonisation and 
integration that potentially could have a great influence on competition as well 
as accessibility to gas resources. Nevertheless that will very much depend on 
the capacity holders, the BBL-line operator and whether they have a real 
interest in promoting third party access. This refers particularly to the question 
of whether they make any unused capacity available to third parties. 
- It is still not proven whether EuroHub will actually develop into a significant 
gas sourcing and trading point that will allow new market players to undertake 
gas procurement. It seems - from this survey's point of view - that there is a 
lack of interest among the shareholders of EuroHub to develop the hub. Most 
importantly the shareholders would need to free up gas as well as 
transportation capacities. 
In addition, it is also questionable whether the Dutch TTF and EuroHub can 
successfully work alongside each other. This is obviously only a theoretical 
question for as long as the EuroHub development lies fallow. 
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II. The Austrian gas market: Does the Austrian gas market allow 
fair and transparent third party access to cross-border gas 
transportation and will the Baumgarten Hub develop into a 
major gas sourcing point within the EU? 
The Austrian gas market has in recent decades developed into one of the most central 
gas transit networks within the EU. It is said706 that Austria is one of the most 
important gas interconnection countries between the East and the West. 
The following section will focus on gas transit issues in Austria. In this context this 
thesis will debate the question whether the current third party access regime to cross- 
border networks allows fair and transparent third party access, allowing competition 
to flourish. This analysis is of importance to this survey as new market entry can - 
from this survey's point of view - only develop if non-pipeline owners, i. e. third 
parties, have fair and transparent access to major (cross-border) transportation 
networks that allow them to compete with the (former) national monopolies. 
These questions will be discussed in the following manner: 
(1. ) First of all, this section will provide a brief overview of the Austrian gas 
industry structure. This short analysis aims to illustrate how the market is 
organised and who are the main players. This is necessary in order to 
understand the context of the later commentary. 
(2. ) Following this overview, the thesis will briefly discuss the liberalisation 
efforts and legislation within the Austrian gas market. This discussion is also 
important as it partly provides the background for the subsequent analysis but 
also highlights the different implementation processes of the EU Gas 
Directives in comparison to the Dutch and German gas markets. 
706 E-Control, Annual Report 2004, Energie-Control GmbH 2004, <http: //www. e-control. at>, p. 64. 
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(3. ) In the subsequent section, this survey will see whether the Austrian gas hub - 
Baumgarten - could develop into a gas sourcing point as a major gas 
interconnection between the East and the West. This analysis is of importance 
for the discussing in particular of transit issues. 
(4. ) This thesis will then analyse the third party access conditions to the Trans- 
Austrian-Gas pipeline (hereinafter `TAG') and debate whether it allows fair 
and transparent access for third parties. In this context, it will also be 
discussed whether the third party access rules of the TAG-pipeline are in line 
with the second EU Gas Directive as well as the Gas Transmission 
Regulation. 
(5. ) Finally, this section will briefly summarise the findings. 
1. The structure of the Austrian gas market 
The following section will provide a brief overview of the Austrian gas market 
structure. This analysis is of importance as it is necessary to know who the main gas 
market players in the Austrian gas market are. 
a) Natural gas demand in Austria 
In recent decades, natural gas has become one of the most important energy sources 
for the Austrian energy market. 707 In the year 2003, gas consumption amounted to 8.6 
bcm, which was an 11.3% increase over 2002.708 Since then there has been a steady 
increase of overall gas demand. 709 Austria has limited domestic gas reserves, which 
consist of less than 10% of the overall gas demand. About 80% of the overall gas 
707 Vorbach, S.; Schneider, R., Die Liberalisierung des österreichichen Energiemarktes, May 2000, 
<http: //www. kfunigraz. ac. at>, p. 28-29. 
708 E-Control, supra note, p. 58. 
709 Vorbach, S.; Schneider, R., supra note, p. 28-29. 
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demand is covered by Russian gas imports. The remaining 15-20% is covered by 
take-or-pay gas import contracts from Norway and Germany. 
The Austrian Gas Companies OMV AG (hereinafter 6OMV')710 and the RAG AG 
(hereinafter `RAG') are in control of domestic gas exploration. OMV is also in 
control of the major long-term gas import contracts. 7I 1 
b) Transportation, distribution, supply and storage 
The following section will describe transportation, distribution, supply and storage 
within the Austrian Gas market. 
aa) Transportation 
The Austrian domestic gas transportation network system is divided into three so- 
called `control areas'. 712 These areas are controlled by a so-called `control-area 
manager', which inter alia are in charge of undertaking network scheduling 
procedures, gas balancing and other operations. 713 By far the biggest control area - 
`East' - is operated by a 100 % subsidiary company of OMV. The gas companies 
VEG and TIGAS manage the other considerably smaller areas. 
Transportation within the high-pressure and gas transit pipelines are carried out by a 
subsidiary company of OMV. The high-pressure network does not only transport gas 
for the regional gas companies, but also carries out gas cross-border transportation 
through three cross-border transit lines. 714 The organisation and structure of these 
cross-border pipelines are analysed below. 
710 In this case a 100% subsidiary company of OMV AG - the OMV Austria Exploration and 
Production GmbH undertakes the exploration; for more information see <http: //www. omv. com>. 
711 Vorbach, S.; Schneider, R., supra note, p. 28-29. 
712 For further information see E-Control, Gas Act II - Range of Regulation, E-Control GmbH 2002, 
<http: //www. e-control. at>. 
713 Ibid. 
714 The three cross-border transit lines are: the Trans-Austrian-Gaspipeline (TAG), which transports gas 
from the gas intake point at Baumgarten (on the border of Austria and the Slovak Republic) to Italy. 
Natural gas for France, Germany and other EU gas markets is transported via the West-Austrian- 
Gaspipeline (hereinafter `WAG'). Gas to Hungary is transported via the Hungarian-Austrian- 
Gaspipeline (hereinafter 'HAG'). Finally gas to Slovenia and Croatia is transported via the South-East- 
Pipeline (SOL). For an illustration of these pipelines see Appendix.... . 
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bb) Distribution and supply 
Historically there were nine regional Austrian gas companies, 715 which were mainly 
responsible for gas distribution and supply to local energy companies and larger gas 
users. The `supra-regional' activities of these regional gas companies were managed 
by the company Austrian Ferngas (hereinafter 'AFG' )716, which used to negotiate 
supply contracts with RAG and OMV on behalf of the regional gas companies. 
In 2002 the aforementioned gas companies combined their gas purchasing and 
distribution activities with OMV and merged into a new gas company called 
EconGas. 717 The aims of the new company are inter alia to protect and enhance their 
domestic gas market position as well as extend their market activities into other 
European gas markets. 718 It is already argued719 that the merger will limit competition 
endeavours within the Austrian gas (energy) market due to the fact that EconGas 
holds approximately 86% of the import gas capacity, 80% of the final customer 
business as well as 70% of large industrial users. 
Nevertheless, the merger resulted in numerous remedies by the Austrian regulatory 
and competition authorities, which will be subject to further discussion below. 
cc) Storage 
As far as storage facilities are concerned the following must be stated: Austria has 
significant storage facilities, which can hold roughly one third of the overall gas 
demand. The main storage facilities are operated by OMV and a few small storage 
facilities are operated by RAG. 
715 See for an overview of the regional gas companies Vorbach, S.; Schneider, R., supra note, p. 28. 
716 Austrian Ferngas GmbH, Geschäftsbericht 2001, Wien 2001. 
717 EconGas, Neuer europäischer Gasanbieter aus Österreich, Press release 19.12.2002, 
<http: //www. econgas. com>. 
713 Ibid. 
266 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
2. Gas market liberalisation in Austria 
The following section will briefly outline the main market liberalisation efforts within 
the Austrian gas market. It will focus on the implementation of some of the core 
elements of the Second Gas Directive. This analysis is not only of importance in order 
to understand the subsequent discussion about cross-border transportation as well as 
the development of the Baumgarten gas hub, but also because it illustrates the 
different implementation processes in comparison to The Netherlands and Germany. 
As a result of the First Gas Directive the Austrian Parliament enacted a new Austrian 
Gas Act - `Gaswirtschaftsgesetz' (hereinafter `GWG I' or `first Gas Act') in 2000.720 
The first Gas Act required inter alia the following elements: 
- gradual market opening from 2000 until full market liberalisation in October 
2002; 
- regulated third party access; 
- legal unbundling; 
- the introduction of a regulatory authority; and 
- the implementation of balancing zones within the three control zones. 
721 
however, while the Second Gas Directive was being debated, the Austrian legislature 
realised that further amendment to the existing gas legislation was necessary. In the 
final stage of the negotiation of the Second Gas Directive an amended Austrian Gas 
Act (hereinafter `GWG IF or `Second Gas Act')722 was passed in 2002. 
719 Böheim, M., Wettbewerb und Wettbewerbspolitik auf dem österreichischen Strommarkt, WIFO 
Monatsbericht 9/2005, p. 643. 
7"Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (GWG), 121 Bundesgesetz: Energieliberalisierungsgesetz, Jahrgang 2000, 
ausgegeben am 1. Dezember 2000, Teil 1. 
n1 For further information about requirements of the first Gas Act see BMWA, Erläuterungen zur 
Novelle GWG 2002,26.04.2002, p. 1-3. For information about the liberalisation in the electricity sector 
see Lausegger, G., Die Öffnung des österreichischen Elektrizitätsmarktes - Das 
Energieliberalisierungsgesetz 2000, RdE 6/2001; and Tauscher, K., Abram, M., The Liberalisation of 
the Austrian Electricity Industry and the Role of the Austrian Power Exchange, Roggenkamp, M. M.; 
Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), The Regulation of Power Exchanges in Europe, p. 223. 
722 Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (GWG II), 148. Bundesgesetz: Gaswirtschaftsgesetz-Novelle 2002, 
ausgegeben am 23. August 2002, Teil 1. 
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The core elements of the second Gas Act are subject to the following analysis: 
a) Unbundling 
It was partly argued723 that the best solution for the Austrian gas market would be full 
ownership unbundling for all transmission system operators. This argument is in line 
with what has been enacted in the Dutch gas market. Nevertheless, the Austrian 
legislatire decided that transmission and distribution system operators have to 
introduce legal and management unbundling measures, which meant under section 7 
of the second Gas Act that the system operators must be independent in terms of their 
organisation and decision making from the supply and sale of natural gas. 
In this context, some have stated724 that the Austrian legislature has only fulfilled the 
absolute minimum requirements of the Second Gas Directive's unbundling provision 
because the Directive's requirements are more or less copied into the Second Gas 
Act. 725 As argued above'726 this could still allow issues such as cross-subsidisation to 
occur and also stands in contrast to what is allowed under the Dutch unbundling 
provisions. 727 It is further said728 that this kind of legislation can create different 
market conditions across the EU gas markets. Therefore this could lead to different 
(i. e. non-harmonised) market conditions across the EU. 
Apart from this, section 7 (2) GWG II permits power and gas companies to merge into 
one single entity. It is questionable whether this provision of the GWG II is in line 
with the Second Gas Directive. Some have argued729 that under the unbundling 
723 Vorbach, S.; Schneider, R., supra note, p. 28-29. 
7241 Tense, A., Gasmarktregulierung in Europa: Ansätze, Erfahrungen und mögliche Implikationen für 
das deutsche Regulierungsmodell, WIK - Diskussionsbeiträge, March 2005, p. 46. 725 See also Kossuth, K., Austria, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - 
Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 106. 
726 See C 11.2 b) bb) (ii). 
727 See C II. 3. a). 
7281lense, A., Europaweite Tendenzen der nationalen Gasmarkiregulierung, Energiewirtschaftliche 
Tagesfragen, 55. Jg. (2005), p. 320. 
729 See C II. 2 b) bb) (ii). 
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provision of the Second Gas Directive, the merging of the activities of a power and 
gas company is only possible if their operations are undertaken in different legal 
entities. However, the wording of the second Gas Act does not justify this argument. 
Hence this survey believes that the wording of Section 7 (2) GWG II is in line with 
the Second Gas Directive. 
b) Regulatory authority 
The Austrian energy regulatory system is based on the interplay of numerous national 
and Federal State (`Länder') authorities. The main responsibilities lie with the 
national authorities. Nevertheless the State authorities have inter alia powers over the 
construction approval of, for instance, gas pipeline extensions. 
As far as the national authorities are concerned the Austrian legislation gives four 
different authorities areas of competence over the energy industry. 
Most decisive regulatory duties are assigned to the Austrian national regulatory 
authority Energie-Control GmbH (hereinafter `E-control' or `regulator'), which came 
into power in conjunction with the implementation of the First Gas Directive. The 
Austrian legislature laid down the establishment of and most of the responsibilities of. 
the regulator in a new law called `Energie-Regulierungsbehördengesetz' (Energy 
Regulatory Authority Act; hereinafter `E-RGB'). 730 Although - as some claim731 - E- 
control, has many duties it has only few decision-making and enforcement powers. 
This survey partly agrees with this point of view. This is based on the fact that E- 
control is mainly responsible for monitoring, supervising and development market 
rules for the Austrian gas and power market. 732 
730Energie-Regulierungsbehördengesetz 
- E-RBG, BGBI. I Nr. 121/2000 in der Form BGBI. I Nr. 
148/2002. 
731 l lense, A., Gasmarktregulierung in Europa: Ansätze, Erfahrungen und mögliche Implikationen für 
das deutsche Regulierungsmodell, supra note, p. 45. 
732 See for a full overview of the duties and responsibilities of the Austrian Regulator: E-Control, 
Jahresbericht 2001, E-Control GmbH 2001, <http: //www. e-control. at>, p. 18. 
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In the ' case where E-control has no decision or enforcing powers the so-called 
`Energie-Control Kommission' (Energy Control Commission, hereinafter `ECK'), 
acts as the main regulatory authority. If however, E-control is in charge the ECK acts 
as an appellate authority for decisions taken by the regulator. 733 
The third authority with considerable influence on the energy industry is the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour (hereinafter `BMWA' or 'Ministry' ). 734 According 
to section 3 of the E-RGB, the Ministry is in charge of the monitoring and supervision 
of the activities of the regulator. It also has the policy-making powers for all energy 
related issues. This raises the question - as discussed before735 - of how independent 
the Austrian regulatory authority can be in practice. The thesis it has already 
concluded736 that the lack of independence can cause some problems, particularly if 
the regulatory authority makes a decision that the ministry does not agree with. 
Finally, the Austrian cartel authority, the so-called `Kartellgeicht', also has powers 
over energy related issues. It is argued737, that "The relationship between competition 
law and the regulation of the energy markets is not wholly clear in Austria, because 
the provisions of the law are not very precise in this respect. " This is mainly based on 
the fact, that there are many areas where both authorities have overlapping powers. 
Some738 are of the opinion that "This is due to the nature of infrastructure-based 
markets, in which the owners of infrastructure are natural monopolists and therefore 
automatically have a dominant market position. A refusal to interconnect can 
therefore be seen as a regulatory issue, but also as misuse of a dominant market 
position, and therefore a competition law matter. " 
733 For an overview of the further duties of the ECK see Tauscher, K., Abram, M., supra note, p. 233. 
734 In German: `Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit'. 
735SeeC1I. 2. c)aa). 
736 Ibid. 
737 Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 113. 
739 Ibid. 
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Even if one were to agree with this statement, it is unclear what would happen if both 
authorities make contradicting decisions on a specific issue that falls within their 
powers. According to the competition law and the E-RGB, both authorities are not 
bound by the decisions of the other authority. It is argued739 that in practice there will 
not be a contradictory decision, "as the two authorities, who would be well aware of 
the fact that parallel claims are being filed, would coordinate their decisions. Even if 
they did not, it is highly likely that in appeal proceedings the two decisions would be 
aligned. " However, experiences in Germany740 prove that there could indeed be 
contradicting judgements and/or views that can considerably delay important market 
decisions, which has a negative impact on all involved parties. Therefore it would be 
wise to change the above situation in such a way that only one authority would have 
the prevailing decision-making power. This will avoid market uncertainties due to 
decisions by regulators and other involved parties. 
739 Ibid., p. 115. 
740 See for instance the Ruhrgas take-over by E. ON which left many market uncertainties for some 
time, Klag, N. D., Die Liberalisierung des Gasmarktes in Deutschland, p. 206-212. 
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c) Third party access system and tariffication 
The following section will discuss the third party access rules and tariff structures: 
(1. ) For the domestic gas network system, 
(2. ) For transit lines, and 
(3. ) For storage facilities. 
aa) Third party access to domestic gas transportation networks 
The following paragraph will discuss different elements of the Austrian third party 
access model for domestic gas transportation networks. 
(i) Regulated third party access 
During the implementation process of the First Gas Directive, the Austrian legislature 
moved, away from a negotiated third party access regime to a regulated regime for 
domestic gas transportation networks. Under this `new' regime access to domestic gas 
market infrastructure networks have to be approved ex ante by E-control. 
(ii) Network access regime 
The Austrian third party access regime is based on an entry-exit system, which means 
third party users only have to book entry and exit capacity without booking the actual 
transportation route. The management of the transportation has to be organised by the 
zone operator. Where entry and exit capacities are available741 - according to section 
17 of the GWG II - the system operators must allow all third parties742 access to their 
networks. Entry and exit capacities have to be booked on a first-come-first-serve 
741 Section 19 of the GWG II lays down numerous of exemptions when third party access can be 
denied; these are inter alia technical requirements, or take-or-pay obligations. For more information 
see below and Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 99. 
742 Third parties are defined in section 41 GWG. 
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basis, which means that a first capacity booking or reservation is given priority over a 
subsequent reservation. 743 
If there is a change of supplier the actual network access is organised through the so- 
called `one-stop-shop' principle, under section 41b. According to this principle the 
requesting third party. must only request third party network access in that gas control 
area where the customer is located. 744 This principle must be identified as a significant 
improvement to the third party access regime as it can in theory speed-up the gas 
supply switching process. The proceedings have, from this survey's point of view, 
improved even more as the Austrian legislature introduced simultaneously with the 
one-shop-stop principle the so-called `rucksack' principle. Under this principle the 
new supplier will take-over the former supplier's capacity. 745 
(iii) Existing contracts 
Pursuant to section 19 (2) 1. of the GWG II, existing capacity bookings that were 
booked before the Act came into force do not fall under the first-come-first-serve 
rule. 746 This must be identified as a considerable shortfall of the legislation because - 
as discussed before - existing capacity bookings usually cover the majority of the real 
available capacity and therefore do not allow new market entry because the majority 
is already taken on a long-term basis. 
however, under section 19 (2) of the GWG II, unused capacity is subject to the use-it- 
or-lose-it principle. The provision states only that unused capacity must be made 
available for third parties. From the wording, it is unclear what this means, i. e. it is 
743 Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the New Directives 
on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, p. 527. In this context Cameron argues that this "leaves little 
room for short-term trading". From this survey's point of view this statement can only be partly 
supported as for the proper planning of end-customer supply a certain percentage of capacity must be 
given away on firm basis. However, uncommitted gas capacities should be indeed made available for 
short-term bookings, which could, inter alia, be distributed by auction procedures. 
7" This means, for instance, if the customer is located in Vienna, the new supplier only has to inform 
the network operator of the Vienna gas network area. 
745 Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 99. Kossuth describes this principle also "as if the customer had the 
capacity in a rucksack on his back. " 
7" See also Hense, A., supra note, p. 47. 
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not defined when the capacity has to be released and who is in charge of handling the 
release process. The hope - as some747 have indirectly expressed - that the use-it-or- 
lose-it principle will improve the overall available pipeline capacity is from this 
survey's point of view misplaced, based on the fact that there is no specific 
explanation of how the principle will be enacted in practice. In this respect Art. 5 (3. ) 
(a) of the Gas Transmission Regulation gave some guidance as it said that unused 
capacity must be offered "on the primary market at least on a day-ahead and 
interruptible basis. "748 Apart from the fact that this provision also included some 
negative elements749, it at least set minimum standards for what should happen with 
unused capacities. Therefore this survey is of the opinion that the GWG II should be 
changed in order to fulfil at least the requirements of the Gas Transmission 
Regulation. 
(iv) Transparency requirements 
Another negative aspect of the Austrian Gas Act must be seen in the transparency 
requirements. According to sections 19a and 8 of the GWG II the Austrian regulatory 
authorities have the right to ask the operators and all gas companies for information 
that they require. This inter alia refers to the actual available pipeline capacities. 
Some750 have identified these transparency requirements as positive. This survey can 
share this view only in some respects. Generally speaking it is positive that regulatory 
authorities can access all crucial market information. However, some - such as the 
availability of pipeline capacity - should also be made available to the entire market. 
This argument is based on the fact that proper access to necessary market information, 
such as the amount of available capacity, is necessary for third parties and therefore 
"' Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 99. 
749 See C 1112 c aa) and bb). 
749 Ibid. 
7" Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 110. 
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competition. 751 Otherwise non-network operators cannot assess whether they could 
undertake certain business transactions (e. g. the supply of an end-customer) because 
they do not have reliable information about the availability of specific transportation 
routes. Again in this respect the Gas Transmission Regulation is far more advanced 
and requires system operators to provide relevant infonnation. 752 Therefore the GWG 
11 should, from this survey's point of view, be improved or amended. This view is 
also supported by what has been enacted in the Dutch gas market where Gts has to 
follow numerous transparency requirements. 753 
(v) Tariff structure 
As far as the network access tariffs754 are concerned the following is noteworthy: All 
network access tariffs are subject to ex ante approval by the national regulatory 
authority E-control. The tariff structure is organised in the gas-network-tariff decree 
('Gas-Systemnutzungstarif-Verordnung', hereinafter `GSNT-VO '). 755 Under this 
decree the Austrian tariff regulation is following the so-called `cost orientated' 
approach, which implies that the basis for the tariffs are the costs of the network usage 
plus profit margins (also called `rate-of-return-regulation' ). 756 The regulatory 
authorities define - on the basis of this tariff regulation - the network tariffs. Although 
the network access system is based on an entry-exit system, the tariffs do not apply to 
each entry and/or exit point. Tariffs are determined by a so-called `postage stamp 
tariff system', which is defined as "A system of transmission pricing, in which the 
same unit price is charged for transmission, irrespective of how far the energy [gas] is 
751 This view is supported by the Council of European Energy Regulators, see Council of European 
Energy Regulators (CEER), CEER Work Plan 2005-2007 and Work Programme 2005,1 March 2005, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 24. See also above C 111 2 d). 
752 Ibid. 
753 See Appendix 7. 
75" This analysis in this paragraph refers only to the domestic gas market in Austria. 
755Gas-Systemnutzungstarife-Verordnung, (GSNT-VO 2004), Verordnung der Energie-Control 
}Commission, mit der die Tarife für die Systemnutzung in der Gaswitschaft bestimmt werden, in der 
Fassung des Bundesgesetzes BGBI. I Nr. 148/2002. 
Asa 1lense, A., supra note, p. 49 
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transported. 9757 This tariffication system can - from this survey's point of view - 
circumvent elements of the entry-exit system as it stands. This argument is based on 
the fact that the tariff system is still transaction based, which is believed to be a major 
barrier to entry and therefore competition. 
bb) Third party access to transit lines 
It has been mentioned above that Austria is an important gas transit country for many 
other European gas markets. However, as argued758 "the provisions concerning cross- 
border [gas] trade are very sparse in [... ] the GWG [II]. " This survey partly agrees 
with this statement when it comes to transportation of natural gas that comes from 
outside Austria (i. e. mainly from Russia). If, however, gas is transported from 
domestic gas production fields to other third countries, the Austrian legislature has 
introduced some `extra' legislation next to the provisions of the GWG 11.759 Due to 
the fact that domestic gas production, in comparison to gas imports, are minor, this 
survey will only concentrate on the rules of the GWG II that deal with cross-border 
transportation from non-Austrian gas fields, subject to the following analysis: 
Sections 31c - 31b of the second Gas Act deal with non-domestic natural gas cross- 
border transportation. 
Pursuant to section 31d (2) "Contractual agreements on the handling of cross-border 
transports shall be concluded between the party entitled to system access and the 
owner of the transport rights under the general terms and conditions for cross-border 
transport. " This wording includes some interesting aspects: 
751 Cameron, P. D., supra note, p. 529. 
758 Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 100. 
'71Q For more information about cross-border gas transportation from domestic gas fields see 
Grenzübergreifende Transport Verordnung - GTVO, Verordnung der Energie-Control Kommission 
reit welcher ein Systemnutzungsentgelt für die Durchführung von grenzüberschreitend Transport von 
Erdgas aus inländischer Produktion festgesetzt wird, BGBl. I Nr. 121/2000 in der Fassung des 
Bundesgesetz BGBl. 1 Nr. 148/2002. 
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- First of all the system operator and the transportation right holder do not have 
to be identical. In this context it is correctly argued760 that "This provision 
reflects the actual situation in Austria where the TSO has leased its 
transmission lines to other companies, who in turn passed on the transport 
rights back to the TSO. "761 
- Second of all the above wording implies that third party access to transit lines 
- in contrast to the domestic gas market rules - is undertaken under a 
negotiated third party access system. From this survey's point of view, it is 
unclear why the legislature made such a distinction. This is even more 
surprising as the repealed EU Transit Directive - including its definition762 - is 
for the most part no longer valid. 63 Therefore one could even argue that a 
distinction between domestic and international gas transportation is not 
justified. Nevertheless there are no explanations offered as to why this 
distinction was made. 
However, according to section 31f (1) of GWG II the holders of the transportation 
rights shall "[... ] publish the terms and conditions applicable in a given destination 
state on the Internet and shall, upon request, notify these terms and conditions to any 
interested party. " In this context, one could ask why the Austrian legislature made 
such an obligation. The transit line(s) in question is / are located on Austrian ground 
and therefore - from this survey's point of view - no other rules except Austria's 
should apply. 
However, pursuant to section 31f (2) "The general terms and conditions for handling 
cross-border transport shall not be discriminatory and shall not contain any abusive 
practices or unjustified restrictions nor jeopardise the security of supply or the quality 
760 Kossuth, K., supra note, p. 101. 
761 This issue will be subject to further discussion during the analysis of the TAG-pipeline contracts, 
see below. 
762 The Transit Directive defined the term `transit' inter alia as "[... ] the crossing of at least one intra- 
Community frontier. " 
763 See above C 11.2 f). 
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of service. " The wording of sections 31f (1) and (2) could contradict itself in the case 
where the terms and conditions "applicable in a given destination state" (section 31 If 
(1)) are indeed discriminatory, although - pursuant to section 31 f (2) - they "shall not 
be discriminatory". It is unclear from the wording of the Gas Act what should happen 
in such circumstances and what terms and conditions should apply. Apart from that, 
the wording of section 31 f (2) is ambiguous because words such as `abusive practice' 
are not defined and are subject to different interpretations. This aside, section 31 If does 
not provide any obligation on the capacity holders or the system operator to publish 
any information, for instance, on available pipeline capacity. This must be identified 
as a shortfall of the legislation because it has been highlighted before how important 
transparency requirements are for third party access. 
As far as network tariffs are concerned, the regulatory authorities have no direct 
influence. The Gas Act states only in section 31g (1) that network charges shall 
"comply with the principle of non-discriminatory and cost-orientation. " Obviously 
there could be different interpretations of these words, as parties might, for instance, 
think differently about what 'cost-orientation' means. Also, these rules stand in 
opposition to what the Austrian legislator has laid down for the domestic gas market. 
The differentiation between domestic and international gas transportation brings, from 
this survey point of view, less harmonisation to the European gas market and could 
create two `classes' of gas markets: one with strict rules and the other one with many 
loopholes and possibilities for discrimination. This situation could be in breach of the 
Second Gas Directive, which does not allow such a distinction. 
cc) Access to storage facilities 
According to the Second Gas Directive's provisions the Austrian Gas Act - here 
section 39 (1) - should require storage operators to grant third party access under non- 
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discriminatory and transparent conditions. As there are minor differences between 
Austrian legislation and the Second Gas Directive rules this survey refers to the 
analysis made above of the problems associated with the Directive. 764 
3. The development of the Baumgarten Hub: A real chance of the creation of a 
liquid trading point on the border between East and West? 
Through the introduction of liberalisation gas hubs - as indicated above765 - have 
become more important as gas trading and procurement points. 
The Austrian gas market has a significant gas interconnection point between East and 
West. 766 This point is located at Baumgarten, which is on the Austrian and Slovakian 
border. 767 From Baumgarten two major gas (transit) pipelines - WAG and TAG - 
start and transport gas via Austria to other EU gas markets. As a result of the EconGas 
merger, 768 a so-called Central European Gas Hub GmbH (hereinafter `CEGH')761 was 
established to manage the Baumgarten Hub. The EconGas merger resulted also in a 
gas-release programme where EconGas has to auction 250 mcm at the Baumgarten 
hub 770 The auction is online and starts each year in June/July until the 250 mcm are 
sold. The first auctions took place in July 2004 and 2005. A number of bidders 
participated in the auction. However, from this survey's point of view, the following 
issues arose from the auction: 
764SeeCI12e). 
765 See D 14. 
7' See Appendix 3. 
767 See also Appendix 7. 
765 SeeD1I. 1. b). 
769 The CEGII is wholly owned by OMV Gas GmbH, see <http: //www. gashub. at>. 
° E-Control, Zusammenschlus OMV/EnergieAlianz/OOF- "ECONGAS - Zusagen der beteiligten 
Unternehmen, Nicht vertrauliche Fassung, 9 October 2002. 
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-. The purchased gas did not remain in the Austrian gas market, the majority of 
gas was transported to the high-price gas market in Italy. 
- It was also clear that a number of bidders had difficulties getting transport 
capacity in the TAG pipeline. This was due to contractual congestion and that 
the starting date of the auction and the starting date of booking capacity in the 
TAG pipeline did not correspond. From a harmonisation point of view, this 
must be identified as a shortfall, as the anomaly can mean a considerable 
barrier for third party market entry. This argument is based on the fact that a 
shipper would have to buy pipeline capacity, not knowing whether he would 
need it in the future, as he might not receive gas at the auction. 
- Others77' partly agree with the above views and claim further that it is highly 
doubtful that the Baumgarten Hub will develop into a liquid gas 
interconnection point where new market players are able to source gas and 
then compete with the incumbents. This argument is backed by claims772 that 
the EconGas merger has produced a monopolistic gas market structure that 
does not allow any gas market competition to flourish. These views are 
partially supported by the Baumgarten hub operator. 773 CEGH claims that only 
today there is not enough liquidity, but that by 2010 this would improve 
significantly. 774 
- However, this survey questions this optimistic appraisal by CEGH based on 
two points: On the one hand there are no alternative suppliers that could 
potentially sell gas to interested parties. On the other hand, the key to more 
liquidity is access to pipeline capacity. As will be discussed in the subsequent 
paragraph, there is very little or no pipeline capacity available to allow the 
Baumgarten hub to flourish. 
771 1 tense, A., supra note, p. 48-49. 
772 Böheim, M., Wettbewerb und Wettbewerbspolitik auf dem österreichischen Strommarkt, WIFO 
Monatsbericht 9/2005, p. 643. 
" Central European Gas Hub Gmbli, OMVHub Baumgarten, IEA Workshop, Paris, 13 June 2005, 
<h ttp: //www. iea. org>. 
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Taking all theses aspects into account this survey believes that the development of the 
Baumgarten hub into a liquid trading point between East and West will not happen. 
Access to the hub will be restricted to a few participants. 
4. Access to Austria's transit lines - Experiences with the Trans Austrian 
Gasleitung pipeline system 
As part of the above analysis it was stressed how important access to high-pressure 
gas transit lines is for the development of proper gas competition and the 
improvement of overall gas market harmonisation. 
It has also been noted that Austria is one of the most important gas transit countries in 
the EU and that the Austrian legislature made a distinction between domestic and 
cross-border gas transportation access rules. 
However, practical experience has shown that numerous problems occur when third 
parties want access to Austria's high-pressure transit pipeline networks. In this respect 
it is inter alia argued'775 "some improvements in negotiated access for cross-border 
gas transmission [... ] have been made [... ]. " Nevertheless it is also stressed776 that 
with respect to the Guidelines for Good Third Party Access Practice (GGP II) and the 
Gas Transmission Regulation777 that "The Austrian transit systems have some way to 
go before they comply with the requirements of the GGP and the [... ] Regulation on 
conditions for access to the gas transmission networks. " This refers to a number of 
aspects such as availability of crucial market information, congestion management 
and the'operation of the secondary market. 778 These shortfalls have to be identified as 
one of the reasons why competition and market harmonisation have not flourished in 
Austria and other European gas markets. This view is partially supported779 and it is 
"4 Ibid. 
ns E-Control, Annual Report 2004, E-Control GmbH 2004, <http: //www. e-control. at>, p. 66. 
77" Ibid., p. 66. 
T" See C Ill. 
" E-Control, supra note, p. 66. 
779 See Bense, A., supra note, p. 51. 
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further argued that there is a significant lack of gas and pipeline capacity780, which led 
to little or no competition within the Austrian gas market. 
The following section will discuss the third party access conditions under the Trans 
Austrian Gasleitung GmbH contract (hereinafter `TAG-contract' or 'contract' ). 78 1 The 
main problems for third parties, which could occur under provisions of the TAG 
contract, will be discussed. This analysis is of considerable importance to this survey 
as it aims to illustrate the difficulties that third parties face when trying to access one 
of the most important EU gas transit lines. It also emphasises that more needs to be 
done in terms of the harmonisation of cross-border transportation rules. 
The analysis will be undertaken in the following manner: 
(1. ) First, this survey will give a brief overview of the technical data and 
ownership structure of the TAG-pipeline to lay the foundation for the 
subsequent analysis. 
(2. ) Secondly, the main aspects of the relevant TAG-contract provisions will be 
discussed. The implications they might have for third party network users will 
be highlighted. It will also be analysed whether the provisions allow fair and 
transparent third party access. 
(3. ) Finally, this survey will discuss whether the current TAG access conditions 
will be in line with some of the core elements of the Gas Transmission 
Regulation. 
a) The Trans-Austrian gas pipeline - ownership and technical issues 
The TAG pipeline network structure consists of two parallel pipelines, which run 
from Baumgarten (at the border of Slovakia and Austria) to Arnoldstein/Travisio 
"°Dow Jones Trade News Energy, Spätestens 2007/2008 steigt Gasbedarf Bedrohliche Engpässe im 
österreichischen Ferngasnetz, 22 September 2005. 
nt Trans Austrian Gasleitung GmbH, Standard Transportation Contract between Trans Austria 
Gasleitung GmbH and [name of shipper], updated 16 August 2004, <http: //www. taggmbh. at>. 
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(Austrian/Italian border). 782 Both pipelines are about 380 km long and have a yearly 
capacity of approx. 28 bcm. 
The Trans Austrian Gasleitung GmbH (hereinafter `TAG company') is the 
undertaking company responsible for the transportation of natural gas as well as the 
acquisition, construction, expansion and operation of the TAG pipeline(s). The 
shareholders of the TAG company are ENI International B. V. with 89% and OMV 
Gas GmbH with 11%. 783 
The TAG pipeline has been subject to considerable congestion and ENI has agreed - 
as part of the `destination-clause settlement' with the EU Commission784 - to extend 
the TAG pipeline capacity over the coming years. In this respect the TAG company 
has announced that it "is currently in a process of assessing the economic and 
technicfeasibility of increasing the transportation capacity on the TAG pipeline 
system by adding new compressor stations to the TAG pipeline system which will 
lead to additional transportation capacity of up to approximately 6.5" bcm for the 
entire system. 785 Although it is unclear what is meant by the words "assessing the 
economical and technical feasibility" there have been reports786 that the extension 
would start in the autumn of 2005, but in the beginning of 2006 nothing has happened 
yet.. 
b) Clauses of the TAG transportation contract 
For any gas transportation via the TAG pipeline the `standard transportation 
contract' 787 of the TAG company applies. 
The following section will analyse some of the provisions of the TAG contract and 
discuss whether the clauses allow fair, transparent and non-discriminatory third party 
7E2 See also Appendix 3. 
'1113 See Trans Austra Gasleitung GmbH, <http: //www. taggmbh. at>. 
714 See C. V. 2. b. 
715 See Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH, <http: //www. taggmbh. at>. 
"6 Energy Economist, TAG expansion starts in fall, 1 July 2005. 
797 Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH, supra note. 
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access, and also promote the idea of harmonised gas standards with other EU gas 
nctworks. 
aa) Contractual penalties 
It has been said above788 that contractual penalties on the network user are useful and 
necessary in order to avoid a third party network user making excessive use of the 
network without being penalised for this. However, these penalties must be fair, non- 
discriminatory and should, from this survey's point of view, be cost-reflective (i. e. 
reflect the costs that are incurred because of the wrongful behaviour of the network 
user). Also, penalties should not be enforced as long as the transmission system 
operator has the chance to inform the network user about any unjustified usage of the 
network. 
The TAG contract consists of numerous clauses, which could in part result in heavy 
penalties for the shipper. 789 The following section will analyse some of these 
contractual penalties and discuss their implications and their possible justification. 
(i) Transportation service 
Art. 4 of the TAG contract deals with transportation service under provisions 4.2 and 
4.3, where contractual penalties are assessed on the shipper if he exceeds his 
committed flow rates at the intake point by either 102% or 105%. 790 This clause has, 
from this survey's point of view, the following negative implications for the third 
party network users: 
'lag See C II 2. d) aa) (iv) and C. 111.2. e). 
789 The term `shipper' means a third party network user that uses a pipeline network in order to `ship' 
his gas from one point to another point. 
70 The term `committed flow rate' means that a shipper informs the transmission system operator that 
he will deliver a pre-defined quantity of gas at a pre-defined intake point, from where the transmission 
system operator shall undertake the transportation of the gas to its final destination. If, for instance, the 
shipper has declared that he will deliver 100 gas units but actually delivers more than these 100 units, 
the above stated penalty shall apply. 
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- In the case where the shipper exceeds his flow rate at the gas intake point by 
more than 105%, the contractual penalty is nine times higher than if it exceeds 
it only by 102%. 791 
In all cases the penalties do not reflect the actual incurred costs for the 
operator to deal with the violation of the contractual flow rates. This argument 
is based on the fact that in the case of a 105% excess over the flow rate a 
penalty of approx. 45 Euro-cent per cubic meter per hour applies. 
792 This is an 
excessive price in comparison to what other European transmission system 
operators require. 
- Even if one was to agree with the penalties, it is noteworthy that the shipper 
has no way of avoiding the penalties. This argument is based on the fact that 
the TAG operator is not obliged to inform the shipper immediately of its 
exceeding the flow rates. In most cases the shippers - who are not in control 
and possession of the gas - have no information about whether they are 
exceeding flow rates. This information is in the hands of the transmission 
system operators and/or the supplier. 793 
Following the above analysis, it must be said that penalties for exceeding flow rates 
are only justified if the transmission system operator has the obligation to 
immediately inform the shipper that an excess has occurred and therefore the shipper 
has the opportunity to change the flow rates. This is not in the TAG contract and 
therefore the survey identifies the TAG provisions as unfair because they could result 
in considerable and partly unjustified penalty costs. 
791 This calculation is based on the formulas in the TAG contract, see here Trans Austrian Gasleitung 
GmbH, Standard Transportation Contract, supra note, Art. 4.2 and Art. 4.3, p. 12-13. 
This price is calculated on the basis on UK gas price in 2003. 
Obviously this argument does not apply in the case that the shipper orders his supplier to extend the 
flow rates. 
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(ii) Balancing 
Pursuant to Art. 5.1/2. of the TAG contract the "shipper shall offtake, at the offtake 
point, a quantity of natural gas equal, in terms of energy, to the total quantity of 
natural gas simultaneously delivered by the shipper at the intake point, [... ]. " In the 
case of an imbalance between the off- and intake794 point the "carrier shall notify 
without delay to shipper of the occurrence of an unbalance event. " 
Although this notification obligation on the carrier has to be welcomed the following 
obligations and contractual penalties apply for the shipper, in the case it is out of 
balance: 
- According to Art. 5.2, the "shipper shall compensate "in kind" the imbalance 
within 48 hours after receipt of the notification in which the imbalance results 
to be more or equal to 2% of the committed flow rate multiplied by 24 hours 
[... ] at the intake point. " 
- In the case where the shipper does not compensate the carrier in kind and "on 
a daily basis the absolute value of the total imbalance exceeds [... ] 2% of the 
committed flow rate multiplied by 24 hours [... ] [the] shipper shall pay to 
Carrier a penalty [... ]. " 
- Further more, "if the cumulated quantity of unbalance [... ] exceeds at the end 
of the day 2% of the committed flow rate multiplied by 24 hours [... ] and the 
shipper fails to compensate in kind [... ]" a ten times higher contractual penalty 
shall apply. 
From the above the following points have a considerable effect on third party access: 
- In practice it will be difficult to compensate the TAG operator `in kind' on the 
same day that the out of balance occurred. This argument is mainly based on 
the fact that there is not enough gas liquidity available at the Baumgarten Hub 
where the shipper would be able to purchase the extra gas needed on the spot 
market. Experiences have shown that most quantities of gas have been 
7" This means, for instance, that a shipper feeds-in 100 gas units but withdraws more than 100 gas 
units at the offtake point; this is also called `out of balance'. 
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committed on a long-term basis and that it is rare that free gas volumes are 
available on a short-term basis. This statement refers only to the TAG transit 
line where no market based balancing has been introduced. This stands in 
contrast to what has happened in the domestic Austrian gas market, where a 
(partly) market-based balancing regime has been developed. 795 
Further more the current TAG balancing regime has a significant impact on 
third party network users as gas transportation can become very expensive in 
the TAG system if the shipper is out of balance. Therefore it is questionable 
whether the contractual penalties, particularly in the case where the cumulated 
quantity imbalance exceeds 2% on a daily basis, is justified and cost- 
reflective. This argument is based on experience in other markets. In The 
Netherlands, for instance, a 13% hourly balance tolerance within the GTS 
applies, when the temperature is above zero degrees Celsius. 796 In the 
German E. ON Ruhrgas gas network system, which is one of the largest gas 
networks in the EU, shippers are allowed to exceed their booked capacity by 
up to 15% on an hourly and daily flow rate. 797 From this comparison, it is 
clear that the TAG balancing rules are considerably unfair and stand out 
against far better balancing regimes in other European gas networks. 
Therefore, it is argued798 that "a system of daily balancing with (relatively 
lax) hourly tolerances strikes a good compromise between maintaining system 
stability and avoiding unnecessarily stringent balancing rules" as currently 
exist in the TAG balancing regime. 
795 Christoph, P., Beurteilung der Funktionsfähigkeit des österreichischen Ausgleichsenergiemarketes 
in der Regelzone Ost, Gutachten, Vienna, 15 May 2005, p. 4-7. 
71 Brattle Group, International balancing regimes, March 2003, in the Annex 6.2 to Christoph, P., 
supra note, p. 9. 
79 Ibid., p. 18. 
799 Ibid., p. 10. 
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(iii) Gas Pressure 
According to Art. 6.1 the "shipper shall deliver the natural gas at the intake point at a 
pressure not lower than 50 bar and not higher than 70 bar. " However, "if [the] shipper 
delivers natural gas at a [lower] pressure [... ] the carrier shall be entitled to reduce the 
natural gas offlaken at the intake point [... ]. If the natural gas is delivered by the 
shipper at a pressure higher than the pressure limit set forth above, the carrier shall be 
entitled to refuse taking delivery of the natural gas [... ]. " From this survey's point of 
view, these consequences for the shipper - if he delivers gas with the wrong pressure 
- appear only to be fair, if the shipper has a chance to react 
immediately to 
information from the operator that his gas pressure is not in line with what has been 
set forth in the TAG contract. However, there are no obligations on the operator to 
inform the shipper about any incorrect gas pressure levels. Without this information, it 
will be difficult or almost impossible for the shipper to react to any wrong pressure 
levels of the gas intakes / offtakes. Therefore the TAG contract should explicitly 
require that the operator is obliged to inform the shipper immediately of any wrong 
gas pressure levels. 
(iv) Nominated Quantities 
In order to undertake gas transportation the shipper has to nominate, 
799 either on a 
daily or weekly basis, the gas quantities that it wants to be shipped from one point to 
another point. These `nominations' have to be communicated to the network operator 
in order to allow the operator to undertake the transportation of the shipper's gas 
quantities. This survey identifies the following problematic areas: 
(1. ) Pursuant to Art. 8.1 of the TAG contract, the "shipper shall nominate the 
quantities of natural gas to be transported on the TAG system [... ] by transmitting 
to [the] operator [... ]. " In accordance with Annex 8 of the TAG contract shippers 
7" Nomination is also called scheduling. According to Art. 2 (1) No. 7 of the Gas Transmission 
Regulation `nomination' means the prior reporting by the network user to the transmission system 
operator of the actual flow that he wishes to inject into or withdraw from the system. 
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have to nominate their gas quantities between Bam and Bam the next morning. 
This goes against the nomination periods in other networks where the shipper is 
required to nominate from 6am to 6am the following morning. 800 This deviation 
from the `normal situation' is not only negative from a harmonisation point of 
view but also from a security of supply viewpoint because the connecting 
transmission system operator cannot properly match their gas quantities with the 
TAG operator, as there is a time difference of two hours. This could result then in 
difficulties if there is a mismatch801 between the nominations in the TAG system 
and, for instance, the subsequent system. 
(2. ) This aside, if the TAG operator is not able to transport the nominated gas volumes 
of the shipper, the "carrier shall submit to the shipper an `alternative 
transportation program"' (Art. 8.7). Furthermore, the shipper has 60 minutes to 
accept or to propose an alternative program. It is further provide in the TAG 
contract that "No transportation will be performed if the shipper rejects the 
`alternative transportation program'. " This requirement has - from this survey's 
point of view - the following unfair aspects: 
-. The 60 minute acceptance period is far too short for the shipper as it will find- 
in most cases - that it is extremely difficult to re-nominate the gas volumes in 
such short a period of time. This is based on the fact that the shipper needs to 
communicate with the transmission system operators located both before and 
after the TAG system. To undertake such communication in 60 minutes is in 
most cases impossible, as these operators need to check their system to 
determine whether a re-nomination is possible. 
S0° See for instance E. ON Ruhrgas Transportation system, which is one of the largest in Europe, were 
shipper have to nominate between 6am and 6am the next morning. More information under 
. http: //www. eon-ruhrgas. com>. 
EOI `Matching of gas nominations' means that transmissions system operators counter check the 
nominations they have received from a specific shipper who wants to ship a certain quantity of gas 
within their gas network. 
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- Additionally, if the shipper does not accept the `alternative transportation 
program' he risks that no gas will be transported, which will in most cases 
result in (heavy) penalties being assessed by the subsequent transmission 
system operators and customers. 
(3. ) Apart from this, the following shall apply if there is a mismatch of gas 
nominations between the intake and / or the offlake point802 within the TAG 
network system: 
- According to Art. 8.3 the "carrier shall notify without delay the shipper the 
occurrence of mismatching at the intake point (respectively offtake point); " 
- Furthermore the "carrier shall have the right to agree with the upstream 
(respectively downstream) operator the most appropriate way of re- 
nomination. " 
According to this provision, the shipper will be notified but has no right to correct 
the . mismatch. Therefore this survey believes that this clause has negative 
implications, particularly as the shipper "shall indemnify [the] carrier from and 
against any properly [... ] [incurred] costs" as a result of the mismatch. An 
indemnification would only be justified if the shipper has the right to correct its 
mismatch. 
(v) Provisional results 
The above comments about the nomination provisions under the TAG contract 
illustrate numerous areas where they are unfair and discriminatory towards third 
parties. The nomination provisions also do not provide more harmonisation within the 
EU gas network service, as the TAG requirements stand in contrast to the 
transportation contracts of other European network operators. Additionally, the TAG 
provisions bear significant risks for third party network users, which hinders proper 
802This means, for instance, that the shipper has nominated 100 gas units at the intake point but either 
more or less units arrive at the intake and/or off-take point. 
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competition from developing at one of the most important transit connections within 
the EU gas markets. 
cc) Compliance with the Gas Transmission Regulation 
It has been discussed above803 that the new EU Gas Transmission Regulation - once 
in force - will introduce numerous provisions for gas transportation and third party 
network use. It has also been stressed that the Gas Transmission Regulation codifies 
some requirements of the GGP I. / II. The following section will discuss whether 
some of the TAG transportation requirements are in line with the Gas Transmission 
Regulation and fulfil the GGPs. This analysis is of importance in order to illustrate the 
following questions: 
- Do the Regulation and the Guidelines work in practice and are they already 
implemented as required? 
- Are further steps necessary in order to introduce improved third party access 
conditions to one of the most important transit countries in the EU? 
(i) Congestion management 
It noted above contractual pipeline capacity congestion represents one of the reasons 
for the slow development of competition. 
In Austria, most high-pressure transit gas pipelines are subject to significant 
congestion and it is feared804 that from 2007/2008 not enough capacity will be 
available to meet the high domestic and EU demand for gas pipeline capacity. As far 
as the TAG pipeline is concerned, the majority of the available capacity is taken. If 
gos there is available capacity then it is restricted to a single point within the network. 
803 See C Ill., 
"04 Dow ]ones Trade News Energy, Spätestens 2007/2008 steigt Gasbedarf Bedrohliche Engpässe im 
österreichischen Ferngasnetz, 22 September 2005. 
$05 Ibid. See also Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH, <http: //www. taggmbh. at>. 
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However, it is stressed806 that the TAG pipeline is subject to significant contractual 
congestion. 807 As a result it is even more important that principles like use-it-or-lose- 
it are introduced. These will inter alia allow third parties, who have no capacity rights 
to have a `second chance' to purchase pipeline capacity rights. This would also bring 
a secondary capacity market into being. 
However, under the existing TAG transportation rules there are no provisions that 
introduce the principle of use-it-or-lose-it. The GGP II but not the Gas Transmission 
Regulation, however, requires this principle. The TAG provisions give only the option 
for existing capacity holders and interested parties to participate in a secondary 
market. As indicated'808 this does not represent an implementation of the above-stated 
principle. Therefore there is not only a lack of compliance with the GGPs but also a 
significant opportunity to improve the existing congestion is lost. 
As far as the Gas Transmission Regulation is concerned Art. 5 of the Regulation only 
requires that the "system operator shall offer unused capacity on the primary market", 
if contractual congestion occurs. This is also not covered by the TAG rules either. 
Therefore the TAG operators must change the rules to incorporate congestion 
management provisions. 
However, - as said above809 - it is doubtful whether the Gas Transmission 
Regulation's provisions will have any immediate effect on enhanced third parties 
access rights and competition as the rules will only apply once the Regulation is 
implemented, and it will not be before July 2006. Therefore all transportation 
contracts, which were signed before July 2006, will not fall under the Regulation's 
provisions. Hence this survey does not expect significant improvement on the issue of 
congestion management. In this respect it would be more fruitful if the Austrian 
$" Dow Jones Trade News Energy, supra note. 
907 As said above this lead to agreement between ENI and the Commission that ENI agreed to extend 
the existing pipeline capacity by the end of 2005, but it is still unknown how much the extension will 
improve the current situation. See Dow Jones Trade News Energy, supra note. 
$03 E-control, supra note, p. 66. 
50'See C 111.2. c) cc). 
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legislature would decide that the TAG transit line would need some form of 
transparent use-it-or-lose-it provision that could improve the contractual congestion 
within the TAG pipeline system. 
(ii) Transparency requirements 
With respect to transparency requirements, the TAG pipeline is in some respects in 
line with the requirements of the Gas Transmission Regulation. The TAG operator 
publishes monthly the technical, committed and available capacity on a firm and 
interruptible basis until February 2007.810 But there are no requirements for a daily 
capacity publication, which is a significant shortfall. The Dutch example81 has shown 
that some European network operators publish numerous crucial transportation data 
on an almost real-time and online basis. This could, for instance, improve the above- 
described expected long-term congestion within the TAG pipeline. In this respect, it 
would be of considerable help if the available, reserved and the actually used capacity 
would be published on a real time and online basis. This will allow, not only third 
parties but also regulatory authorities to see whether any capacity is available on a 
short-term basis, thus allowing some secondary use of capacity. This could potentially 
improve the current existing pipeline congestion. 
(iii) Balancing levels 
As the Gas Transmission Regulation analysis above stressed, 812 gas balancing is 
important for the supply of end-customers. Gas balancing rules also must find the 
right balance between being fair and not being too lose which could allow a third 
party network user to misuse the balancing tools. 
The Gas Transmission Regulation requires, under Art. 7, that balancing rules should 
contain the following elements: 
"° See Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH, <http: //www. taggmbh. at>. 
a 11 See Appendix 6. 
$12 SeeCIII2e). 
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(1. ) Fair tolerance levels; 
(2. ) Cost-reflective imbalance charges; 
(3. ) No excessive balancing fees; and 
(4. ) Access to balancing information. 
Although it has been stressed813 that the Gas Transmission Regulation's balancing 
requirements are often ambiguous and will in most cases not improve balancing 
conditions, it is clear that the TAG pipeline does not even fulfil points (1. ) - (3. ) 
above. As part of the TAG contract analysis, it has been said that the TAG balancing 
conditions do not include fair tolerance levels, the imbalance charges are not cost- 
reflective and in most cases they are excessive. Furthermore, it was stressed that the 
shipper did not have real-time access to balancing information, which could lead to 
further excessive balancing penalties. 
Therefore, it must be said that although the Gas Transmission Regulation's balancing 
provisions are weak, the TAG pipeline balancing rules are not in line with what the 
Regulation requires. There is a great need to improve this situation. 
s1 s ]bid, 
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5. Summary - case study findings 
To summarise the main findings of this case study as well as answer the questions of 
whether the Austrian rules for third party access to transit lines are fair and promote 
competition, and whether the Baumgarten hub will develop into a major gas sourcing 
point, the following must be said: 
(1. ) It becomes clear that the Austrian legislature wanted to make a clear 
distinction between domestic and international (i. e. cross-border) gas 
transportation and to third party access to both. In this respect the domestic 
gas market is by far more `third party access friendly' by providing detailed 
rules and requirements that should guarantee fair and transparent third party 
access and therefore more gas competition. In contrast to this are the rules on 
cross-border transportation. These provisions are often drafted in ambiguous 
terms that allow loopholes. Also, they favour network operators. 
It is unclear why a distinction between domestic and international gas 
transportation was made. More importantly, it is doubtful whether this is in 
line with the Second Gas Directive. 
(2. ) The TAG case study proves that significant barriers to third party access exist 
for one of the most important EU transit lines. The TAG contract is in many 
respects unfair and discriminatory to third party access. Some of the rules 
stand in contrast to what other European network operators require. More will 
need to be done to bring the TAG contract in line with other European 
network operators rules. Some of the TAG conditions do not fulfil the 
requirements of the GGP II as well as the Gas Transmission Regulation. 
(3. ) As far as the Baumgarten hub is concerned, it is not certain that the hub will 
indeed develop into a major gas sourcing point. This argument is mainly 
based on the fact that most gas companies are committed on a long-term basis 
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and therefore cannot or are not willing to voluntarily release any gas to third 
parties, as they fear new competitors. As a result new supplies from gas 
producing countries in the East are/will not be available. Finally, the gas hub 
will find it difficult to develop as there is very little or no capacity available 
within the transit lines that would take any gas bought by third parties at the 
hub to other EU gas markets. 
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III. The German Gas Market: Will the 2005 German Energy Act 
and the actions of German Federal Cartel Authority bring 
more competition and harmonisation elements to the German 
gas markets? 
It is often argued814 that the German Energy market - in particular the gas market - 
has of one of the most complex market and organisational structures in the world. It 
has also been said815 that the market liberalisation process has not been as successful 
as in other gas markets. This is, from this survey's point of view, not only based on 
the fact that Germany has over 1,000 energy companies but also because of the way 
the energy market has evolved historically. 
However, it is also believed816 that since the German government implemented the 
second EU Energy legislation package in July 2005 the German energy market - 
predominantly the gas market - is now facing a major turning point that could bring 
significant improvements to both competitive and market harmonisation dynamics, 
factors that have been lacking for many years. 
- The following case study on the German gas market will concentrate on two 
main issues, namely: 
- The Genpan Energy Act of 2005 in conjunction with its two gas decrees; 
And the investigation by the Federal Cartel Authority into long-term supply contracts. 
In this context this thesis will concentrate on whether the new legislation and the 
Cartel Authority investigation will indeed result in greater harmonisation and 
914 This argument is made in part by Mez, L., The Transformation of the German Gas Supply Industry, 
in: Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., (eds. ), National Reforms in European Gas, p. 239-240. 
815 OECD, OECD-Prüfungen im Bereich Regulierungsreform, Deutschland, Konsolidierung der 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Erneuerung, Paris 2004, p. 166; Riechmann, C., Notwendige Bausteine 
r die Gasliberalisierung in Deutschland, Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 51. Jg (2001). 
816 Clement, W., Rede des Bundesministers fir Wirtschaft und Arbeit Wolfgang Clement zum Zweiten 
Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts im Bundestag, 15 April 2005, 
, <http: //www. brnwa. bund. de>. 
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stronger competitive dynamics in the German market whilst benefiting new entrants 
as well as the wider European gas market. 
The aforementioned issues will be discussed in the following way: 
(1. ) First, the thesis will provide a brief overview of the German gas market. 
Second, the survey will then describe briefly the liberalisation efforts within 
the German gas market. 
(2. ) The 2005 German Energy Act will be described and analysed. 
(3. ) The investigation of the Cartel Authority into long-term supply contracts will 
be discussed. 
(4. ) Finally, the survey will summarise the findings of the case study. 
1. The German Gas market - structure and main characteristics 
The following paragraph will provide a brief outline of the German gas market. This 
refers mainly to what role natural gas plays within Germany, who the main players 
are and what the main market characteristics are. 
u) Natural Gas in Germany 
In common with most other EU energy markets natural gas has played, and will 
continue to play, an important role in the energy sector. Today natural gas is the 
second largest energy commodity consumed in Germany with an annual demand of 
80 bcm/a or about 22 % of the total energy consumption. 817 In the future the role of 
gas is certain to grow in both magnitude and importance. This is mainly based on the 
_11 Klag, N. D., Die Liberalisierung des Gasmarktes in Deutschland, p. 72. 
298 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
fact - as correctly argued818 - that "Both environmental concern about climate change 
caused by CO2 emissions and the aim of the Federal Government to phase out nuclear 
power in Germany indirectly support gas-based energy conversion solutions. " There 
are also a number of energy schemes in place that either directly or indirectly support 
gas as a main energy source either for heating or power generation. 
819 
As German indigenous gas production accounts for only 20% of annual demand, large 
volumes have to be imported - mainly from Russia, Norway and The Netherlands. 
This import dependency has resulted in the creation of significant pipeline 
interconnections with these countries. 820 Also, because of its geographical location 
Germany is one of the most important transit routes for gas imports to other countries 
in Europe. 82 1 
b) Gas market structure 
There are about 730 gas companies that operate within the German gas industry. 
These companies operate at different levels: 
(1. ) First level: 
Gas production and importation activities are currently undertaken by a small 
group of less than 10 players. However most of this activity is undertaken by five 
players who are also involved in transmission activities. Collectively these five 
players produce and import the vast majority of German gas supplies. These 
companies are: 
- E. ON Ruhrgas, which has the largest gas portfolio and a large share of the 
high pressure transmission system. It currently controls approximately 60% of 
the market; 
"' Mez, L., supra note, p. 222. 819 Ibid. 
820 Klag, N. D., supra note, p. 119-122. 821 See Appendix 9: Pipeline interconnection in Germany. 
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- Wingas (65% owned by Wintershall and 35% by Gazprom) which controls a 
broadly parallel network of pipelines which can import gas from both east and 
west; 
- VNG which operates in the former East German region; 
-. BEB (50% owned by Shell and 50% by Exxon), which is the main producer of 
indigenous gas; and 
- RWE (Thyssengas). RWE is also one of the two largest electricity companies 
in Germany. Over the past years it has made significant investments in 
Thyssengas and now has a controlling stake in the company. 
Prior to market liberalisation in 1998 these companies were partly protected by the 
existence of monopoly demarcation treaties. 82' The former geographic monopoly 
areas remain partly aligned with the current geographical areas of operation of these 
companies. 
Within Germany these companies sell large volumes of gas directly to supra-regional 
end consumers, mainly local municipal utilities known as `Stadtwerke'. 
(2. ) Second level: 
There are about 16 supra-regional gas companies that sell gas to the 
aforementioned Stadtwerke or directly to large industrial users. 
(3, ) Third level: 
On the third and final level there are about 700 of the Stadtwerke within the 
German gas market. These local energy companies, which in most cases also 
sell electricity, sell the gas to the final household-customer on a retail basis. 
821 See for more information Büdenbender, U., Schwerpunkte der Energierechtsreform 1998, p. 183- 
184. 
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A particular feature of the German gas industry is that in recent years there have been 
significant `super'-mergers that created large multi-utilities. 823 As a result of these 
super mergers E. ON Ruhrgas and RWE dominate the gas market today. Wingas is in 
third place and has strong backing from one of its owners, Russia's Gazprom, which 
is trying to gain a stronger foothold in both the German and European gas markets. 
There are also strong ownership links between some of the large importing and 
purchasing companies and the regional and local gas companies. The possibilities for 
cross-ownership between the gas companies are legally capped at 25 percent. The 
Federal Cartel Office examines these cross-ownerships on a case by case basis. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the large gas companies derive some benefits 
other than financial dividends from their interests in these companies. 
Since the introduction of liberalisation in 1998 some local energy companies seem to 
lack the critical mass to survive in the new competitive environment. Many local 
authorities sold shares in their distribution activities and it is generally recognised that 
the number of distribution companies will decrease in the near future as larger 
regional players grow in size. 
c) Problems with the existing gas market structure 
The above-described market structure has led to numerous problems, particularly 
since the gas market liberalisation process began. The main problems occur in the 
following areas: 
- The cross-ownership and the creation of (very) large multi-utilities that not 
only operate on a national level but also in most other European energy 
markets have been subject to strong criticism824 and have been blamed for the 
slow development of competition in the German gas market. 
513 For more information on these mergers, see Metz, supra note, p. 226; also Klag, N. D., supra note, 
199-220. r24 
See, for instance, Gabler, A., Schaffung und Erhaltung von Wettbewerb auf Energiemärkten durch 
die kartellrechtliche Netzzugngskontrolle gemäß & 19 Abs. 4 Nr. 4 GWB, p. 19-21; Frontier Economics, 
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- The large number of gas companies in Germany make it difficult, or in some 
cases impossible, to introduce German-wide standards to promote competition 
and market harmonisation because it is difficult to agree on such standards that 
fit all the different interests. 
2. Regulatory framework after introduction of market liberalisation 
Generally speaking the legal framework of the energy industry in Germany is based 
on a number of general laws and codes governing civil and commercial transactions, 
competitive behaviour, technical safety of equipment and installations, taxes, among 
other matters. 
However, until July 2005 the main regulatory framework of the German gas market 
consisted of three main acts: 
- the Energy Industry Act of 28 April 1998825 (hereinafter 'EnWG I' or `first 
German Energy Act'); 
- the Competition Act826 (hereinafter `GWB' or `Competition Act'); and 
- the self-industry regulation agreement - the so-called `Association's 
Agreement' (Verbändevereinbarung) of May 2002 (hereinafter `Agreement' 
or 'VV II') for gas827 
The following section will only briefly outline the above-mentioned legislation as 
well as the problems that arose with those acts. 
Objections to the BP-E. ON deal, Strategy document for statement of objections to the Eon Ruhrgas 
takeover, August 2001. 
its Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 24. April 1998, BGBl. 1998 1739, BGBl. 
200112785; mit Begründung BT-Drucksache 13/7274,11.4. zu Paragraph 1, zul. geändert 2003. 
821 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), vom 26. August 1998, Neugefasst durch BEK. 
v. 15.7.2005 I 211 geändert durch Art. 1Gv. 1.9.2005 12676. 
827 Verbändevereinbarung bei Erdgas (VV Erdgas II) zwischen den Verbänden Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), 
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a) The introduction of liberalisation - the first German Energy Act of 1998 
The passing of the First Gas Directive resulted in the passing of the first German 
Energy Act of 1998 ('EnWG I'), which replaced the Energy Act of 1935. With the 
implementation of the EnWG I Germany legally opened 100% of the market to 
competition. The core elements of the law were: 
aa) Unbundling 
As correctly argued828 the EnWG I provisions closely followed the requirements of 
the First Gas Directive, which required legal unbundling. 
However, many of the German gas companies had also unbundled their internal 
accounts although there was no legal obligation to do so. According to the provisions 
of the Directive there were limited requirements for access to company information 
and accounts or requirements to make them public. In case of suspicion of abuse of 
dominant market position, the Federal Cartel Office and the energy supervisory 
bodies of the Federal States had (and still have) the right to investigate the unbundling 
of internal accounts. 829 
bb) Network access 
The first EU Energy Directives allowed Member States to choose either between 
negotiated or regulated third party access. Germany chose to take the option of 
negotiated third party access, the only country in the EU to do so. 830 However, the 
more precise access rules and conditions have been codified in the Association 
Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW), Verband kommunaler Unternehmen 
(VKU), 3. Mai 2002. 
=u Pritzsche, K.; Klauer, S., Germany, in: Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy 
)Zcýulation - Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Eure, p. 149. 
52' For further information see before. 
1311lowever, there had already been a legal basis for network access of third parties on the basis of the 
German Competition Act, here section 19 (4) GWB. 
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Agreements, which will be analysed below. Nevertheless, the decision by the German 
legislature was subject to considerable criticism as it was believed the existing rules 
on third party access were not sufficient to allow fair and efficient third party entry. 
83 1 
cc) No regulatory authority 
The EnWG I did not require the establishment of a sector specific regulatory 
authority. Therefore no regulator at a national level equivalent to that found in many 
other EU countries existed in Germany until July 2005. 
However, the Federal Cartel Office and State energy authorities were involved in 
energy specific regulation. The Federal Cartel Office was the general competition 
authority in Germany and was in some respect a `supervisory body' over energy 
issues. Also, matters relating to network access were put before it, but only as far as 
the competition laws were affected. The States (the so-called "Länder") were (and 
still are) supervisory bodies and were responsible for the supervision of the companies 
and approvals of tariffs. 
Other `supervisory' bodies for gas in Germany existed as part of the Association 
Agreements. The VV II included a dispute settlement procedure run by the signing 
parties. 
b) The self-regulated approach: The Association Agreement for Gas 
As previously mentioned, as Germany favoured a negotiated third party access 
solution over government regulation the details of the access conditions had to be 
established by a third party. Germany chose a unique way to achieve this by involving 
four main associations 832, which represented the full spectrum of the gas industry. 833 
$31 Zenke, I., Germanys Electricity and Gas Markets Stand Alone: Negotiated Third Party Access, 
JENRL 21/2003, p. 146. 
$32 The associations were: The Federation of German Industry (BDI), the Association of Large 
industrial Power Users (VIK), the Federal Association of the German Gas and Water Industries (BGW) 
and the Municipal Enterprise Association (VKU). The Federal Minister of Economics was also 
presence during the signature of the agreement. 233 
For detail description of the different association see Klag, N. D., supra note, p. 308. 
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After long negotiation between the parties involved the first agreement (VV 1) was 
signed in July 2000834 followed by several amendments in 2001 and an improved 
agreement in May 2002 (VV II). However, with the implementation of the Second 
Gas Directive further discussions about amending the VV II failed in 2004. 
The VVs set out the framework for network access conditions, distinguishing three 
levels: 
- Long distance network access tariff based on distance and diameter; 
- regional network tariff; and 
- local network access tariff based on postage stamps. 
It should be noted that the VVs were a voluntary framework with no explicit legal 
standing, though were based on German energy law. However, because the VV had 
been presented to and checked by the Ministry of Economics and the Federal Cartel 
Office, it had a de facto binding effect. 835 
As the Association Agreements are `history' and have no relevance now this thesis 
will not include them in further analysis. This survey will, however, briefly analyse in 
the subsequent paragraph the main problems of the law and the agreements. 
a) Problems with the 'old' regulatoryframework 
It has been mentioned before that several authorities and other interested parties 
claimed that there had been little or no competition and market harmonisation within 
the German gas market since the introduction of gas market liberalisation in 1998. 
Some of the reasons for the slow development are seen in the following areas: 
=N Verbändevereinbarung bei Erdgas (VV Erdgas II) zwischen den Verbänden Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), 
Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW), Verband kommunaler Unternehmen 
(VKU), 4. Juli 2000. 
835 Corino, C., Energy Law in Germany, p. 97. 
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aa) No regulatory authority 
It was often claimed that one of the reasons why new entrants had experienced 
considerable difficulty in entering the market was the absence of a regulatory body. It 
became clear that the self-regulatory approach via the Verbändevereinbarung did not 
solve the conflict between the `old' and the `new' world where new market players 
wanted to enter the market and use the network of the former vertically integrated 
companies. 
bb) The Association Agreements did not bring fair and non-discriminatory third party access 
One of the strongest reasons for the slow development of competition and market 
harmonisation was seen in the Association Agreements. In this respect the following 
claims were made: 
- Many parties heavily criticised the agreement as being far too opaque and 
complex to foster competitive conditions in the market. 836 
- The agreement did not provide any indicative prices apart from those for the 
local distribution networks. Individual companies were responsible for setting 
their own tariffs. The transaction-based charging system and the fact that 
charges for additional services such as flexibility, quality conversion and 
balancing were generally negotiated by the two parties involved meant that 
prices were determined on a case-by-case basis, making it practically 
impossible for customers to work out precise tariffs. There was also a lack of 
clarity on the rules for access to and costs of storage, balancing and gas quality 
management. 837 
- The three-tier tariff structure also meant that third parties faced multiple 
charges for moving from one network level to another, or indeed from one off- 
take region to another, with each network operator charging as if the gas was 
2-16 Theobald, C., Competition in the German Electricity and Gas Industries, JENRL 22/2004, p. 37. 
f371lussain, M.; Riechmann, C., Netzzugang in der Gaswirtschaft - Anforderungen aus der Sicht von 
Gashändler, GWF 143(2002) Nr. 6, p. 362. 
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entering the overall system at their entry point. In addition to the impact this 
had on the overall cost of access, it also involved negotiation with a number of 
parties for each access deal resulting in a more drawn out and complex 
process. The lack of a clear definition of which pipes were long-distance and 
which are regional, leading to arbitrary decisions as to what the actual tariff 
would be, had also been criticised. 
3. The German Energy Act of 2005: A guarantor for more gas market 
competition and harmonisation? 
The passing of the Second Gas and Electricity Directives in 2003 resulted in 
controversial discussions between the legislature and all stakeholders about how the 
EU requirements should be implemented. 838 This referred particularly to the German 
gas market where opposition to further changes was particularly strong. 
However, it is often said839 that the German gas industry is currently facing a major 
turning point in its history. This claim is mainly based on the fact that following the 
Energy Act of 1998 the German legislature passed a new Energy Act (hereinafter 
`EnWG II' or `second Energy Act' or `law') in July 2005840, which brings a 
fundamental change in the legal framework conditions. This relates also to the scope 
and substance of two gas decrees, which were passed simultaneously with law. 
These decrees are: 
- Gas network access decree (hereinafter 'GasNZV' or `access decree')841; 
: 3sBündenbender, U., Das deutsche Energierecht nach der Energierechtsreform 2005, 
Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 2005, Heft 9, p. 642; Eder, J.; de Wyl, C., et al, Der Entwurfeines 
neuen EnrVG, ZNER 1/2004, p. 3. 
$39 See Clement, W., supra note. 
a'O Zweites Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 7. Juli 2005, BGBl. Jahrgang 
2005 Teil I Nr. 42, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 12. Juli 2005. 
341 Verordnung über den Zugang zu den Gasversorgungsnetzen (Gasnetzzugangsverordnung - 
GasNZV), Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2005 Teil 1 Nr. 46, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 28. Juli 2005. 
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- The decree for charges for access to the gas networks (hereinafter 'GasNEV' 
or 'decree' ). 842 
All participants, i. e. the transmission system operators and their customers as well as 
the regulatory authorities at a national and State level, face a complicated body of 
legislation that - from this survey's point of view - often contradicts each other. 
843 
It is clear from the legislation that demands on the various companies will increase 
markedly as a consequence of the unbundling regulations, network access and 
network fee decrees, the extensive reporting and documentation requirements, the 
labour involved and the associated costs within the companies themselves. This is 
partly based on the fact that the law contains over 125 sections enumerating 20 
powers to prepare statutory instruments, and constitutes a complete `remoulding' of 
the existing legal framework for the energy industry. 
The amended Energy Act has been in force since 13 July 2005. The GasNZV and the 
GasNEV came into effect on 29 July 2005. The Second Gas and Electricity Directives 
will finally be implemented one year later than required. 
Simultaneously the EU Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of natural 
gas supply have been implemented within German legislation. 
In accordance with the provisions of these Directives, a regulatory authority to 
monitor the electricity and gas markets will be created in Germany for the first time. 
Even during the negotiation of the new law it was still questioned by numerous 
commentators whether the introduction of a regulatory authority was useful or even 
necessary. 
844 Nevertheless as correctly argued845 the introduction of a regulatory 
authority is a prime prerequisite of the Second EU energy Directives. Even more so 
$42 Verordnung über die Entgelte für den Zugang zu Gasversorgungsnetzen (Gasnetzentgeltverordnung 
- GasNEV), Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2005 Teil I Nr. 46, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 28. Juli 2005. 843 This view is supported by other's that claim that the legislator codified rules that considerably 
contracted each other. See Säcker, F. J., Der Referentenentwurf zum Energiewirtschaftsgesetz - 
ordnungspolitische und rechtsdogmatische Grundsatzbemerkungen, N&R 2/2004, p. 46. I lowever, this 
will be explored and discussed in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs. 
'" Tettinger, P. J.; Pielow, J: C., Zum neuen Regulator für den Netzzugang in der Energiewirtschaft 
aus Sicht des öffentlichen Rechts, RdE 12/2003, p. 289-290. 
I'll Pritzsche, K.; Klauer, S., supra note, p. 147-148. 
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this survey has shown how important the role of a regulatory body is within a 
liberalised and non-harmonised EU gas market. 846 
The new regulatory body will be given extensive powers of examination and 
intervention, particularly with regard to network access and fee decrees. The 
regulatory powers will be assured by the Federal Grid Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Postal Services and Railways (hereinafter `BNA' or also called 
`regulator' )847. 
A six-month transitional period has been allowed until the central rules governing 
transmission access, charging, and the associated provisions come into application in 
for gas. Within this period, the transmission operators must develop a transmission 
access model that complies with the law and the regulation, as well as prepare the 
transmission fee calculation methodology. 
The following section of the case study will examine the main elements of the new 
German Energy Act as well as its two associated decrees. In this respect the main 
focus will be on how much the new legislation will promote competition as well as 
gas market harmonisation within the domestic gas market. This analysis is of 
considerable importance to this thesis as it is said that there has been particularly slow 
development in gas market competition and harmonisation within Germany. It is also 
important as Germany is geographically and due to its gas pipeline interconnection a 
key gas `landing' and `exchanging' point within the EU gas market. Therefore the 
primary question is whether the new legislation can be a guarantor for more gas 
market competition and harmonisation with respect to Germany as well as to other 
EU gas markets. In this context this survey will analyse the main elements of the 
legislation in the following way: 
1'6 See C. 11.2 c). 
147 The BNA was formerly also called Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Postal 
Services (RegTP). 
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(1. ) First, the survey will examine the unbundling provisions and discuss how 
much they support competition and harmonisation. 
(2. ) Following this analysis the survey will examine the duties of the German 
regulatory authorities and discuss whether their powers will allow more 
market competition. 
(3. ) A main focus will then be placed on the third party access rules and their 
possible implications on competition and harmonisation. 
(4. ) This survey will then present a summary of the findings. 
a) Unbundling 
As mentioned before proper unbundling is a key factor for gas market competition as 
well as market harmonisation. In this respect the unbundling requirements under the 
new German Energy Act require the following: 
aa) Legal unbundling 
According to section 7 of the EnWG II transmission and distribution operators must 
be independent of other areas of activity within the energy supply system (e. g. sales of 
gas to customers) in terms of their legal form. Transmission operators must carry out 
their capacity marketing transactions via a legally independent company. The law, 
however, does not prescribe a specific legal form for this activity. 848 
$48 The requirement for legal and operational unbundling leads to a comprehensive restructuring of the 
businesses involved, for which there are also tax aspects to be considered (here section 6 (2)-(4) of the 
law). In principle, the law provides for unbundling to be tax-neutral. The unbundling process should 
avoid the creation, for tax reasons, of impractical structures that result in competitive disadvantages 
compared to companies in other EU countries. The rules on tax neutrality provide, for example, that 
cconomic assets that are transferred in close connection with legal or operational unbundling constitute 
a part-operation from the perspective of the provisions of the Reorganisation Tax Act, which can be 
transferred on a tax-neutral basis. The provisions on income tax neutrality are already applicable, with 
effect from 26 June 2003. These provisions also apply to companies that engage in a legal unbundling 
process on a voluntary basis. 
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bb) Operational unbundling 
The provisions on operational unbundling, which are laid down in section 8 of the 
EnWG II govern how the companies should ensure the independence of the 
transmission operators in terms of organisational structure, decision-making powers 
and network transactions. The following are the key areas and also the most 
problematic issues with respect to competition: 
- Persons who are tasked with pipeline duties for the network operator or who 
are authorised to take final decisions that are significant in terms of 
guaranteeing non-discriminatory transmission operation may not belong to 
business areas such as the recovery or sale of gas to customers in a vertically 
integrated energy supply company. As said before it will be difficult to ensure 
that staff who are involved with pipeline operations will not also be involved 
`un-officially' with gas sales and trading activities. Therefore it is still possible 
that crucial market information is passed on within the different parts of the 
company without being detected by or notice to other market participants 
and/or the regulatory authority. 
- According to section 8 (3) of the EnWG II "appropriate measures" must be in 
place to ensure the freedom of action of the transmission operators 
management. However, it is not defined what is meant by the term 
"appropriate measures", which could create different interpretations as well as 
possible loopholes. Nevertheless the law requires further that the transmission 
system operator must not be the owner of the network, but must have actual 
decision-making powers in connection with the assets that are necessary for 
the operation, maintenance and development of the network system. However, 
vertically integrated energy supply company may still assert its justified 
interests against its legally independent transport subsidiaries. For instance, 
the parent company may establish general upper limits of indebtedness for its 
subsidiaries and approve annual finance plans. Parent companies may not 
instruct their subsidiaries with regard to on-going network transactions. Nor 
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may they give any instructions regarding decisions on development measures 
if such measures fall within the scope of the approved finance plan. 
Nevertheless this survey believes that the borderline between what the parent 
company is allowed to do and not do will often not be strictly adhered to and 
the influence of the parent company will always be significant. 
- Vertically integrated energy companies must establish binding measures for 
the employees who are involved in transmission operation activities to ensure 
that the transmission transactions are non-discriminatory (the so called `equal 
treatment programme'). These measures may also include sanctions. An office 
or a person will monitor the observance of the programme and report to the 
regulatory authority on an annual basis regarding the measures taken. It is 
doubtful how effective the equal treatment programme will be in practice, 
particularly because it is doubtful that the nominated person that governs the 
programme will in deed report to regulatory authorities that problems within 
the equal treatment programme have occurred. 
- Pursuant to section 8 (6) of the EnWG II companies with less than 100,000 
connected customers are not required to be unbundled, either in legal or 
operational terms. This exception does not apply to those companies that are 
controlled by a company, under the in terms of the EC Merger Regulation, if 
the controlling company is not itself covered by the exception. If, for example, 
a small municipal utility is controlled by a company within a group, the group 
as a whole must be considered, which means that all of the group's customers 
are counted, not just those of the municipal utility. Nevertheless it has been 
said before that the provision itself might be justified but the different 
application across EU gas markets - as for instance in The Netherlands - will 
most likely lead to non-harmonised and different competition standards across 
the EU. 
312 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
cc) Account unbundling 
As was the case under the 1998 Energy Act, energy companies must - according to 
section 10 of the EnWG II - maintain separate accounts for transmission-based areas 
of activity (long-distance gas pipelines and gas distribution) and gas storage, to avoid 
the risk of discrimination and cross-subsidisation. The new legislation adds the 
obligation to maintain an internal account for each economic use of a right of 
ownership of gas supply grids, storage facilities and LNG plants. This exceeds the 
requirements of the Second Gas Directive, which requires only that revenues from 
grid ownership be shown separately on the accounts. 
The EnWG II also requires that the audited annual financial statements be submitted 
to the regulatory authority. The regulatory authority is required to treat business 
reports on the areas of activity that are not identified in the law (e. g. activities 
involving trading in gas) as commercial secrets. The accounting unbundling 
provisions will bring significant improvements for better market conditions as now 
the (new) regulatory authorities can view in a far more accessible way how the 
accounts of the energy companies are managed and while at the same time have the 
possibility to ensure that issues such as cross-subsidisation are discovered and 
possibly corrected. 
dd) Confidentiality 
According to section 9 of the EnWG II energy companies must ensure the 
confidentiality of information of an economically sensitive nature that they learn of in 
the exercise of their business activities as transmission operators. 
If the energy companies disclose information about their own activities as 
transmission operators that could produce economic advantages, this must be done on 
a non-discriminatory basis. If the conditions for this provision are satisfied, 
transmission operators must make the information in question available to all 
transmission customers, not just one. However, it remains to be seen how this rule 
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shall work in practice i. e. how the regulatory authority will be able to enforce this 
provision. This argument is based on the possibility that sensitive market information 
will only be passed on the within vertically integrated company. It will be difficult for 
the regulatory authority to prove this. 
b) Powers of the German regulatory authorities 
As noted above before the new Energy Act came into force in July 2005 three 
regulatory bodies, 
- The German Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour (hereinafter `BMWA' 
or `Ministry'); 
- (in some respect) the Federal States, and 
- the Federal Cartel office (hereinafter `BkartA'); 
had powers over the energy industry. Following the implementation of the Second 
Electricity and Gas Directives the German legislature introduced a fourth regulatory 
body the so-called `BNA' - the Federal Grid Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Postal Services and Railways. But next to the BNA the State- 
based regulatory authorities also assure regulatory tasks. 849 The following section will 
briefly describe the duties and responsibilities of the BNA and the State regulatory 
authorities. It will concentrate on possible areas of conflict between those authorities. 
aa) Duties of the Federal regulatory authority - BNA 
The duties and tasks of the BNA are manifold. Some primary areas of responsibility 
are found in the following sections of the EnWG 11850: 
249 Fora full overview see Klauer, S., The new German Energy Regulator - Context and Structure, in: 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report 11, p. 91. 
aso The duties and tasks of the BNA will also be discussed within the analysis of discussion on third 
party network access. But also see Klauer, S., supra note, p. 91-96. 
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- Pursuant to the law, the regulatory authority is responsible for tasks such as 
the checking and approval of charging applications in the case of cost-based 
charging structures (s. 23a EnWG). 
- Individual powers (e. g. in connection with market-based charging structures 
by the operators of supra-regional gas pipeline networks) are determined in 
detail based on the ordinances issued under the law. 
- The law contains general provisions regarding the powers of the regulatory 
authority, e. g. how the authority makes its decisions (establishment and 
approval procedure, s. 29 para I EnWG) and how it can amend already 
established terms and conditions and methods. 
- It can also stop abusive behaviour by the transmission system operator (e. g. by 
demanding changes to grid fees) and order any measures that may be required 
to effectively terminate a violation (s. 30 EnWG). 
- It can also impose appropriate payments to absorb the advantage enjoyed by 
companies that violated the regulatory provisions and obtained economic 
advantage as a result (s. 33 EnWG). 
- To ensure performance of its tasks and create market transparency, the 
regulatory authority monitors various aspects, e. g. mechanisms to resolve 
capacity bottlenecks in the national natural gas grid, the actual extent of 
unbundling, the extent to which grid operators are complying with their 
obligations, amongst others (s. 35 EnWG). 
- Part 8 of the law (s. 65 - 108 EnWG) contains details regarding supervisory 
measures and the official tasks of the regulatory authority, which mostly deal 
with procedural requirements that are typical for German public law and will 
not be discussed any further. 
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bb) Role of the German States as regulatory authorities 
According to section 54 (2) of the EnWG II, the State regulatory authorities have 
jurisdiction over the companies that have less than 100,000 customers connected to 
their distribution networks when the law takes effect and whose distribution grids lie 
entirely within the State in question. Their duties and rights are comparable with the 
tasks of the BNA. However, the Federal States may transfer their regulatory powers to 
the BNA. Until now the majority of the Federal States have decided to keep their 
regulatory jurisdiction. Measures including a newly created State Committee should 
ensure that the authorities act consistently (Art. 2, section 8 of the EnWG II). The 
State Committee makes decisions on the basis of a simple majority, which should be 
seen positively as it does not need a larger majority to make decisions. The law, 
however, does not enumerate what happens if one State does not abide by a 
Committee decision. It is unclear what powers the Committee has in this case. 
Therefore it is still to be seen how the Committee and its members will work in 
practice bearing in mind that there are a substantial differences between the different 
States when it comes to energy issues. 
cc) Cooperation and possible conflicts between regulatory and cartel authorities 
As noted above the BNA, the Federal States, the Federal Cartel Office, and the 
German Ministry of Economic affairs have ruling powers over the gas industry. This 
may potentially create areas where there are overlapping authorities and possibly 
contradictory decisions. The new German Energy Act introduced a number of 
provisions, which aim to increase synergies between the different authorities as well 
as to reduce possible conflicts to a minimum. The following section will discuss the 
main contents of these provisions as well as their implications: 
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(i) Cooperation between the Federal States regulatory authorities and the national regulator 
It has been mentioned above that it is still to be seen how the State Committee will 
work in practice as it is not (yet) foreseeable how the different States will actually 
behave if a State Committee vote is against their interests. Obviously this could also 
have an influence on the working and decision-making relationship between the State 
Committee, the Federal States and the BNA. 
In accordance with section 55 of the EnWG II, the law requires that the BNA and the 
State regulatory authorities inform each other of decisions that they have made. This 
does not include provisions requiring that the authorities exchange (crucial) market 
data that was the basis for their decision. This argument is based on the fact that 
section 55 only requires the different authorities to `inform' each other but no more. 
This is a considerable shortfall of the law as it could be useful for the involved 
authorities to be provided with the underlying market data and information. This 
might help their own investigations into related issues. Therefore the informational 
requirements that section 55 includes does not really have many positive effects on 
the involved authorities. Apart from that, the law does not include any other duties for 
State and national regulatory authorities to cooperate with each other. Therefore the 
grounds for cooperation between authorities are considerably restricted and it is yet to 
be seen whether any positive synergies for market harmonisation and competition can 
be gained from this structure. 
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(ii) Cooperation between the Cartel authority and the national regulatory authority 
According to section 58 of the EnWG II, both the German cartel authority and the 
BNA have the right to give their views before either authority makes a formal 
decision. However, a disagreement over a particular matter does not lead to further 
consultation between authorities. This could be counterproductive. If, for instance, 
one authority decides on a particular matter that could impacts on a decision by the 
other authority, both authorities should have a similar view, and not two potentially 
contradictory views. This would bring more clarity and reduces risk for the affected 
companies. It is unclear how the problems related to this can be solved. 
It is however worthwhile mentioning that according to section 58 (4) of the EnWG II 
the mentioned authorities "can" exchange information insofar as it is necessary for the 
fulfilment of their duties. As said before the exchange of essential market information 
is necessary for regulatory authorities in order to guarantee a successful market 
supervision and enforcement of the regulations. Nevertheless the word "can", could 
create different interpretations for how the authorities actually exchange data. In this 
respect it would have been more useful if the law required ("must" instead of "can) 
the authorities involved to exchange this information. 
(iii) Cooperation between the national regulatory authority and other European regulatory 
authorities and the EU Commission 
Pursuant to section 57 of the EnWG II, the BNA is entitled to exchange non-publicly 
available market information with other European regulatory authorities as well as the 
EU Commission. However, confidential information about companies can only be 
passed on if the company agrees. 
Generally speaking this provision has to be welcomed as it triggers at least some form 
of cooperation between the German regulator, other European regulators and the 
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Commission. This argument is based on the fact that the second German Energy Act 
is missing any other obligations or incentives on the German regulator to initiate 
cooperation between it and other EU regulators. This has to be identified as a missed 
opportunity for the German legislature to codify obligations of the German regulator 
to instigate possible fields of cooperation. With cooperation, many gas harmonisation 
and competition issues could have been raised and addressed. 
c) Third party access to the German gas networks: A new era of market harmonisation and 
competition? 
Probably one of the issues most debated during the negotiation process of the EnWG 
II were the rules on third party access to German gas networks . 
851 Even after the law's 
implementation process all involved stakeholders heavily discussed how the new 
network model shall be designed and work in the future. These ongoing debates 
illustrate very well the different interests of the involved parties. On the one hand all 
transmission system operators fear - as a result of the implementation of the law - 
loosing influence over their network system. On the other hand new market players 
and the regulatory authorities were keen to push for a third party access regime that 
promised to bring more competition and harmonisation to German gas markets. 
The provisions on third party access are laid down in the law and in the related gas 
access decree (GasNZV). 852 Generally speaking, according to the EnWG II gas 
transmission system operators must grant access to all parties without discrimination. 
The terms and conditions, including sample contracts and charges, must be published 
online. However, the organisation of third party access is governed in greater detail by 
$51 Bündenbender, U., supra note, p. 64; Eder, J.; de Wyl, C., et al, supra note, p. 3. $52 The access fees are governed in the fee access decree (GasNEV) and will be subject to detail 
analysis later on. 
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the GasNZV, a decree issued pursuant to section 24 of the EnWG II. The key 
elements of the GasNZV contain rules governing the organisation, development and 
contractual structure of network access, as well as obligations for disclosure and 
reporting, rules governing the use of several networks, balancing, flexibility services 
and gas composition, rules for the refusal of network access, change of supplier, and 
metering and rules governing the powers of the regulatory authorities. 
The following section will discuss the main elements of the third party access rules 
under the GasNZV. The analysis will be undertaken in the following manner: 
(1. ) First, this section will discuss the different requirements of the law and the 
access decree. In this context it will be debated whether the new rules will - 
as planned by the legislator - bring more competition and harmonisation to 
the German gas market. 
(2. ) This section will then evaluate the other obligations the transmission system 
operators have to guarantee third party access. 
aa) Third party access requirements 
The third party access conditions under the EnWG II and the GasNZV are 
multilayered and complex. The main criteria for the analysis here will be how much 
the new rules can provide more competition and harmonisation elements. 
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(i)The introduction of an entry-exit access regime 
Section 20 (1b) of the EnWG II contains the core provisions for the third party access 
regime under the legislation. Section 20 (lb) of the EnWG II is intended to implement 
Art. 8 (ld), Art. 12 (4), Art. 18 (1) and Art. 25 (4) of the Second Gas Directive. 
Section 20 (lb) contains the basic right to access the gas transmission networks and 
sets out how, in principle, gas network access should be structured. 
Accordingly the law requires that transmission system operators must first offer in- 
and off-take capacities that will enable network access without having to establish a 
transaction-based transport pathway, which can be independently used and traded. In 
pr i nciple, this could mean that all German network operators convert access to their 
networks to an entry-exit system. This would be in line with section 3 of the GasNZV 
where it requires transmission system operators to introduce such a system. 
853 This 
would also mean that every single German transmission system operator introduces 
an entry-exit system that only applies to his network. 
However, one could question whether the wording of section 20 (1 b) of the EnWG II 
also allows the interpretation that one Genpan-wide entry-exit system that covers all 
networks must be introduced. This is partly argued854 by the German regulator who 
maintains that similar to the rules for the electricity sector, where only an exit 
capacity has to be booked in order to supply the end-customer855, a German-wide 
entry-exit system should be introduced in the near future. 
This, survey, however, is of the opinion that at this stage neither the wording of 
section 20 (lb) EnWG II nor the wording of the GasNZV justifies this claim. Other 
s33 With the exemption of local distributor (local municipals) where section 8 GasNZV contains a 
provision that deviates from this principle. However, section 3 GasNZV and possible exemptions will 
be subject to the further analysis later on. 
954 Schmidt, W., Die Ausgestalltung des Zugangs zu den Gasversorgungsnetzen durch § 20 Abs. ]b 
En JVG und die GasNZV, 06 October 2005, <http: //www. bundesnetzagentur. de>. 
30 1 Iere section 20 (1 a) EnWG II. 
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commentators assert that the ownership structure of each network operator needs to be 
guaranteed and therefore each operator should manage its own entry-exit network. 856 
This view is based on the wording of section 20 (lb) where it also states that "for 
handling of the network access" the network user has to sign one contract with the 
transmission system operator that takes the gas into the network (gas in-take contract) 
and another contract with the operator where the gas should exit (gas off-take 
contract). 
This means that in practice the network user has to negotiate both entry and exit 
capacities in two different contracts (and not just one exit capacity as in the electricity 
market). This also implies that the transmission system operators at these entry and 
exit points have to, in order to undertake the transportation, explore whether they can 
actually transport the gas between the entry and exit points as there might be no free 
capacity between these points or no available connections. This will probably be the 
case because of the GasNZV, which is the subject of the following analysis. 
(ii) Concretisation of the entry-exit model 
As mentioned before the more detailed organisation and structure of the entry-system 
within each of the transmission systems is regulated by the key provisions of the 
GasNZV. Pursuant to section 3 of the GasNZV, transport customers must conclude 
contracts with the transmission operator or operators whose networks are to be used 
for the in- and off-take of gas. 
The transportation customers have the right to conclude a gas in- and off-take contract 
that governs key rights and obligations, including charges. In each case in- and off- 
take contracts consist of a capacity contract, a portfolio contract and a balance group 
contract. The capacity contract establishes the capacity rights of the transport 
customer at specific in- and/or off-take points. The portfolio contract establishes the 
concrete transport service, i. e. which capacity rights should be associated together at 
'5" Koenig, C.; Rasbach, W., Netzeigentumsübergreifendes Regelzonenmodell auf dem 
;. erfassungsrechtlichen Prüfstand, N&R 2/2004, p. 58. 
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the in- and off-take points. The balance group contract governs the creation of balance 
groups, through which any differences in volume between gas in- and off-take will be 
offset. Layering the contracts ensures that capacity rights are always used in such a 
way that, regardless of the owner, the capacity rights for each feed-in into the grid can 
be allocated to an off-take point. 
From the above analysis it becomes even clearer that the law was designed to allow 
each transmission system operator to introduce its own entry-exit system and not 
requiring all German network operators are obliged to create one single entry-exit 
system. Therefore the opinion857 of the German regulator is not legally justifiable. 
(iii) Free allocation of capacities 
Section 4 of the GasNZV governs the concrete structure of capacity rights. Section 4 
(2) requires transmission system operators to offer capacities that can be freely 
allocated. These are capacities that make it possible to use booked in- and off-take 
capacities without specifying a transport pathway. This constitutes a fundamental 
change compared to the previous practice of capacity marketing and the underlying 
principles of the system is planning. Previously, in response to a transport request, a 
check was performed to determine whether transport capacity was available for in- 
and off-take at specific points within the network. Now, by contrast, entry and exit 
capacities have to be determined in advance to ensure that any linking of these 
capacities within a network will be possible without further checking. 
This is supposed to ensure that booked in-take capacity at a given point can be 
combined with any booked off-take capacity at other points in the grid, or, conversely, 
that any booked off-take capacity can be combined with any booked in-take capacity 
at other points in the network. In practical terms, this means that every off-take point 
957 Schmidt, W., supra note. 
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can be reached from any gas in-take point within a network using the capacity that 
can be freely allocated (transaction independence). 
In any case the unlimited ability to combine feed-in and off-take points in a network 
is generally a commercial fiction. Technical reality shows that a range of technical 
restrictions have to be taken into account when calculating capacities that can be 
freely allocated, and that these are obstacles to the complete freedom to combine entry 
and exit capacity rights. Since these restrictions must be included in any calculation of 
capacities that can be freely allocated, only part of the total available capacity can be 
identified as being open to free allocation in most cases. Therefore one could say that 
such system could `block' actual free capacity for a certain time period. 
To increase the proportion of capacities that can be freely allocated, section 6 of the 
GasNZV provides for the checking of various measures by the transmission system 
operators to determine whether they are realistic in practical terms. Accordingly, the 
use of third-party capacity flow undertakings must be checked in the first instance in 
order to increase the capacities that can be freely allocated. These are undertakings by 
a transport customer to in-take or withdraw a specific minimum volume at a particular 
point in the system. This should give rise to exchange potentials that could then be 
used to overcome technical restrictions and thus increase the extent to which 
capacities can be freely allocated. 
A further measure offered by section 6 of the GasNZV is a restriction on the ability to 
freely allocate capacities and the exclusion of individual in- or off-take points and, 
ultimately, the formation of sub-systems. The background to this is the fact that there 
is a direct relationship between the size of the network in question or, more 
specifically, between the number of the resulting technical restrictions and the 
proportion of the capacities that can be freely allocated. The formation of sub-systems 
reduces the level of technical complexity, which means that a greater proportion of 
capacities that can be freely allocated can be identified for sub-systems. According to 
the GasNZV, the formation of sub-systems is permitted in particular in the case of 
lasting network bottlenecks, as happens, for instance, with different gas compositions 
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or the absence of network connections. To avoid unnecessary splintering of the 
market, the reasons for forming sub-systems must be documented and made available 
to the regulatory authorities upon request. The regulatory authority may also order 
sub-systems to be merged if technically possible and feasible in practical terms. 
The decree does not contain a concrete method for the calculation of capacities that 
can be freely allocated. The appropriate calculation methodologies will thus be 
developed on the basis of practical application. In addition to the procedures that are 
based on different load flow scenarios, such calculation methods will be based on 
statistical analyses or "nodal" considerations. 
The above-described allocation processes and rules show that risks remain, due to the 
fact that many different entry-exit zones are established without proper coordination 
and integration. It, however, also describes the difficulties that arise when an entry- 
exit regime is introduced which is subject to the loss of network capacities. 
(iv) Special rules for local distribution networks 
In contrast to section 20 (lb) of the EnWG II, section 8 GasNZV provides for network 
access based on a transport contract that defines in- and off-take points and reserved 
capacity in the case of local distribution (i. e. usually the supply to the end-customer). 
Accordingly, the provisions of the GasNZV that relate to the marketing of in- and off- 
take capacities do not apply (i. e. the establishment of an entry-exit system). One could 
argue that the decree constitutes a simplification in this regard, since there is generally 
no shortage of capacity for local distribution. However, this survey is of the opinion 
that this kind of system will make the booking of capacity more complicated as this 
system is not harmonised and integrated with the above described establishment of an 
entry-exit system. This could produce barriers to third party access and therefore 
could limit competition. 
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(v) Capacity allocation and "use-it-or-lose-it" 
Capacity allocation is generally based on the principle of "first come, first served", 
i. e. depending on the order in which bookings are received (s. 9 GasNZV). If the 
booked capacity exceeds 90% of overall capacity, section 10 of the GasNZV states 
that the capacity transfer must be made as a priority to transport customers that feed in 
biomethane or gas from biomass. The remaining capacities should then be awarded by 
way of an annual auction. The auction procedure is not set out in greater detail, which 
from this survey's point of view is a significant shortfall as this leaves loopholes on 
how the capacity auction should be undertaken. Therefore it is possible that 
transmission system operators will undertake transportation in a non-harmonised way, 
which could have a negative influence on the competitiveness of Germany's gas 
market. 
Apart from that, sections 9 and 13 of the GasNZV introduce an obligation to release 
unused capacities (the so-called `use-it-or-loose-it principle'). However, this principle 
only applies after six months during which the capacity holder has not used its 
capacity. After this period the holder has the right - within another month - to release 
its capacity to a third party, which can be selected by the capacity holder. 
Nevertheless the capacity holder can in any case oppose the application of the use-it- 
or-loose-it principle if it proves that the capacity might be needed, for instance, to 
fulfil contractual obligations. Section 13 of the GasNZV also allows for network 
operators to offer the temporarily unused capacity of a transport customer to the 
market as interruptible capacity, and also to call upon transport customers to offer 
capacity to third parties if there are indications of capacity hoarding caused by misuse. 
Transport customers can avoid the possibility that the network operator will withdraw 
capacity if they can demonstrate that they need the capacity to exercise contractual 
rights or fulfil contractual obligations. The above has the following (negative) 
implications for competition: 
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- The use-it-or-loose-it principle will only apply seven months after the capacity 
holder has not used its capacity. Therefore the entire process, during which 
much needed gas is often not made available for the market, will delay any 
release of capacity. 
- Also, one could further argue that after the initial six months the capacity 
holder has the right to sell the capacity to another party of its choosing is a 
problem, as it should be made available, for instance, through an auction 
procedure to all interested parties. 
- It seems that the whole release process will take `forever' and therefore blocks 
the access to much need gas capacities. 
- It is believed that the above use-it-or-loose-it principle will not bring more 
competition as the entire release process of unused capacity takes too long. 
(vi) The "rucksack principle" 
Section 9 of the GasNZV relates to the change of suppliers. In this case, a new 
supplier has, as a matter of course, a right to have the in- and off-take capacities 
needed to supply the customer transferred (referred to as the so-called "rucksack 
principle"). This does not apply in the case of border transfer points if the previous 
supplier can demonstrate that it still needs the in-take capacities to fulfil contractual 
obligations or to exercise contractual rights. It is, however, unclear how this proof 
should be presented in practice, as it is not known how, or what evidence needs to be 
produced. Furthermore it is likely that the exemption will be used as an excuse for not 
applying the rucksack principle, which then will delay the development of 
competition. 
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(vii) Rules on existing contracts 
In its final provisions, section 115 of the EnWG II determines how existing network 
access contracts and contracts for supply to end users and household customers should 
be handled as part of the new regulatory framework, and when and under what 
conditions these contracts must be adapted. 858 
Under the provisions of the law existing contracts with a remaining term of six 
months after the law comes into force are not affected. Contracts with a longer term 
must be adapted in accordance with any ordinance (i. e. GasNZV, GasNEV) issued 
under the EnWG no more than six months after such ordinance takes effect, if any 
party to the contract so requires. Amendments to these contracts are still subject to the 
will of the contract parties, with the exception of charges that are subject to cost-based 
charging structures and have to be approved by the regulatory authority. Nevertheless 
this handling of the existing long-term contracts have the following (negative) 
impacts: 
- The above-stated requirements on capacity allocation will not apply to the 
"old" contracts therefore capacity hoarding is still possible and a continuation 
of market barriers is probable. 
- As been said above it is not clear why only some existing contacts must be 
adapted to the new rules of the law. Under the rules of section of the 115 of 
the EnWG, a long transition period will be created that, for instance, can block 
much needed gas capacities from reaching the market and therefore delay 
competition. 
959 Supply contracts with industrial customers are not covered. 
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(viii) Transparency requirements 
Sections 20 to 22 of the GasNZV govern the network operators' transparency 
requirements. These are largely based on the details in the above described and 
analysed rules of the Gas Transmission Regulation and therefore this survey refers to 
the analysis made above. 859 
(ix) Balancing 
In contrast to some standard transportation contracts such as the E. ON Ruhrgas 
contracts the GasNZV introduces some negative balancing rules. The essential 
innovation here involves a reduction of the basic balancing threshold. This now is 
10% within an hourly tolerance limit, associated with a cumulative tolerance limit of 
at least one hour's volume (s. 30 GasNZV). It is surprising that the legislature 
introduced rules that have negative impact on competition even though - before the 
law came into effect -some transmission operators actually had better balancing rules 
in place. 
(x) Negotiated third party access to storage facilities 
The EnWG II requires operators of storage facilities to grant other businesses access 
to storage on a negotiated basis, insofar as access is required on technical and 
practical grounds to ensure efficient grid access to supply customers (s. 28 EnWG II). 
Access may be refused if the operator can demonstrate that access is either not 
possible or not reasonable on operational or other grounds. 
A number of transparency obligations are also provided for: 
$19 See C 111.2. d). 
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- Location of the storage facility; 
- Information about available capacities; 
Key business conditions for storage access to be published online, particularly: 
- Handling storage access requests in accordance with procedure; 
- Composition of the gas to be stored; 
- Nominal working gas capacity; 
- Feed-in and off-take period (if required for an offer from operators); 
- Minimum required volume in technical terms for feed-in and off-take. 
Although the transparency requirements, which are mostly in line with what the 
GGPSSO require, it is (again) questionable why the legislature introduces a different 
access regime for storage facilities. This will not contribute to more market 
harmonisation and improve the competitiveness of the German gas market. 
bb) Obligations on transmission system operators 
The EnWG II and the GasNZV require that a number of co-operation duties be 
fulfilled, which include: 
According to section 20 (lb) of the EnWG in conjunction with section 24 of 
the GasNZV the network operators must work together to ensure that, in the 
case of transport via several networks, the transport customer has to conclude 
only one contract for entry capacity with the grid operator in whose network 
the in-take takes place, and one for off-take capacity with the network operator 
from whose network the gas is withdrawn. This means that, in the case of 
multi-network transport, the network operators in question are generally 
obliged to book the capacities needed for transport in upstream or downstream 
networks in their own names and under their own accounts, and thus to 
organise the transport cycle, unless this is not possible for technical reasons or 
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is not realistic on practical grounds. The concrete practical arrangements to 
fulfil the obligation to co-operate is the responsibility of the network operators 
themselves. 
However, the interface between the first and last network operators involved, 
which are needed in the case of transport across more than one network, are 
not defined in greater detail. Under the GasNZV, a link between entry and exit 
capacity ("portfolio contract") must be created before the transport is initiated. 
This link enables the last network operator to organise the transport cycle to 
discover which entry points should be associated with which exit points for a 
given transport transaction and thus to determine the relevant interfaces for the 
transport cycle. 
- To be able to perform the transport with an entry and exit contract, the 
network operator must book additional entry and exit capacities with other 
operators in its own name and under its own account to complete the transport 
cycle. This procedure presupposes that every operator offers its own access 
model. Booking entry and exit capacities is then performed either directly by 
the transport customer or by the operator responsible for implementing the 
transport cycle. 
- More details on the cooperation requirements are laid down in sections 23 to 
25 of the GasNZV. In addition to the development of rules and standardised 
procedures for the exchange of data, network operators are obliged to 
conclude "network coupling contracts" with each other, the key rules are 
already set out in section 25 of the GasNZV. 
331 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
d) Access tariff structurse under the German access fee decree: A guarantor for more 
transparent and competitive access fee structures? 
The 2005 German Energy Act introduces numerous basic provisions on how access 
fees should be structured. 860 However, the access fee decree (GasNEV) establishes the 
framework for network operators and regulators for the structuring of charges, and 
also governs the disclosure obligations of the regulated companies. The provision for 
cost-based charge structuring are take from the relevant requirements contained in the 
calculation guideline of the Second Association Agreement (VV II), which have been 
refined in many areas. 
The following section will briefly discuss some of the main elements of the tariff 
structure and their market implications. The main question will be whether the rules 
will produce better transparency, harmonisation and competitive access fee structures. 
aa) Basic charging principles 
According to section 21 the conditions and charges for network access must be 
appropriate, non-discriminatory and transparent, and may not give preferential 
treatment in comparable cases to the companies that are affiliated or associated with 
the grid operator. 
The charge structure is based on the costs of network management, but must equate to 
those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator. In addition, an 
appropriate, competitive and risk-adjusted rate of interest on the invested capital must 
also be taken into account when establishing the charge. 861 However, it is unclear 
860 The issue how network tariff should be structured under the 2005 German Energy Act where subject 
to considerable debate. See, for instance, Kühling, J., Eckpunkte der Entgeltregulierung in einem 
künftigen Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, N&R 1/2004. 
361 It is possible to deviate from the principle of cost-based charge structures by ordinance. The 
regulatory authority will check the appropriateness of the charges on a regular basis by a process of 
comparison. This, however, will be subject to further analysis later on. 
332 
Chapter D- Member State gas liberalisation and harmonisation 
what is meant by "efficient and structurally comparable network operator". As has 
been said above that it will be difficult to identify `comparable' networks as each 
network and network operator are different. 862 Only rarely do pipelines of different 
companies run in parallel or network operators have similar or equivalent assets. 
Therefore one could argue that it will be difficult to fulfil this requirement, which 
leaves uncertainties on how it should be implemented in practice. 
bb) Approval of charges 
Section 23a of the EnWG II requires that all network fees that are structured on a cost 
basis (i. e. not just increases, as originally planned) must in future be approved by the 
BNA or a State regulatory authority. Approvals will be subject to a time limitation 
and will be able to be revoked. If the authority has not made its decision within the six 
months following receipt of full documentation supporting the application, the 
application shall be deemed to have been granted (approval by default). Applications 
for approval of network fees must be applied for six months after the GasNEV takes 
effect. Current charges may be maintained until the regulatory authority issues its 
decision regarding the application for approval. However, the following issues arise 
from the tariff charging structure: 
- One could say that with approximately 600-700 network operators in the 
system it will be difficult or almost impossible for the regulatory authority to 
approve all their network tariffs. 
- Therefore one could further argue that this will lead to unjustified treatment of 
those companies that get `proper' approval and those where the regulator has 
had no time to check the tariff regime. This could lead to non-harmonised 
tariff-structures which could have negative impacts on competition. 
862 This view is suported by v. Hammerstein, C., Schriftliche Stellungnahme zur öffentlichen Anhörung 
von Schaverständigen am 15. Dezember 2004 zum Thema Novelle des Energiewirtschaftsrechts unter 
dem Gesichtspunkt der Gasnetzengetlkalkulation, Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschussdrucksache 15(9) 
1599,13 November 2004, p. 1. 
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- Finally, the operators in questions face also a 6-month waiting period until 
they will know whether their tariffs have been approved or not. This results in 
considerable market risk as it is possible that the worse case scenario will 
arise, where the tariff is not approved and the operators have to re-calculate 
their tariffs and apply again. 
cc) Incentive Regulation 
The EnWG provides for the introduction of an incentive regulation system if a cost- 
based charging structure is adopted (s. 21a EnWG). By 1 July 2006, the regulatory 
authority must submit a report to the Federal Government containing an appropriate 
plan to implement an incentive regulation system. The incentive regulation will then 
be set out in detail in a decree. 
It is unclear how the new incentive regulation scheme will work. Industry players and 
the regulatory authority currently are debating different approaches. 
dd) Possibility of forming market-based charges 
Pursuant to the requirements of section 24 clause 2 (5. ) of the EnWG, section 3 (2) of 
the GasNEV provides in principle for cost-based charge structuring. Operators of 
supra-regional long-distance gas pipelines have the opportunity to deviate from this 
principle if the network is extensively exposed to effective existing or potential 
competition. 
According to the definitions in the GasNEV, "supra-regional long-distance gas 
pipelines" are long-distance pipeline grids into which gas is fed at the German border 
or at a delivery point from a domestic production pipeline, and which: 
- Serve to transport the gas to an off-take point at the German border, or 
- Are used exclusively or predominantly for the import of natural gas or the 
transport of natural gas produced in Germany, and from which gas is fed into 
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downstream gas distribution networks within Germany, either entirely or for 
the most part. 
Immediately after I January 2006, supra-regional long-distance pipeline network 
operators must give notice that they wish to apply market-based charges. The BNA 
will check the following minimum conditions; the obligation is upon the grid operator 
to provide evidence that the conditions have been met. 
The minimum preconditions for establishing the presence of effective existing or 
potential competition are: 
- The great majority of the off-take points of the grid lie in areas that are also 
reached via third-party supra-regional long-distance gas pipeline networks, or 
can be thus reached under commercially practical conditions; or 
- The bulk of the transported natural gas is output in areas that are also reached 
via third-party supra-regional long-distance gas pipelines, or can be thus 
reached under commercially practical conditions. 
Evidence must be supplied again every two years. Until the BNA releases its decision, 
the network operators may continue to apply existing charges from before the 
GasNEV took effect. 
The standard for determining whether the market-oriented charges are reasonable is a 
process of comparison that the BNA will perform each year. Network operators in 
other EU Member States can also be taken into consideration in the comparison. 
The charging mechanisms discussed above have following problems: 
- The wording of the preconditions for establishing the presence of effective 
existing or potential competition is ambiguous. It is not clear what is meant by 
`effective existing competition'. It is left open to the market players and the 
regulator to interpret these preconditions. Therefore - in particular for the 
operators - market uncertainties will exist. This view is supported by other 
commentators 863 who claim that there is no effective competition. 
963 v. Hammerstein, C., supra note, p. 2. 
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- It is also questionable why a differentiation was made between `ordinary 
networks' and `super-regional high pressure pipelines'. There is not rationale 
to support the different treatment, in particular as it will produce non- 
harmonised and possibly anti-competitive charging structures. 
ee) Cost distribution and fee structure 
The GasNEV also includes principles for distributing the calculated network costs 
between primary and secondary cost centres. The Annex to the decree provides for a 
cost centre structure in this regard. Codes used in the cost centre calculation must be 
comprehensible to "third parties familiar with the subject" and must be documented in 
full. Again the wording is ambiguous and gives no real guidance on how companies 
should deal with this provision, which therefore creates market uncertainties. 
However, the principles for fee determination will refer (in general) to the network 
access model in section 20 (lb) of the EnWG. The entry-exit model shall be taken as 
the basis. In- and off-take charges must be shown as capacity fees in EUR per cubic 
metre per hour per time unit. There are also rules governing capacity rights during the 
year, as well as fixed and interruptible capacities. The procedure for the formation of 
in- and off-take fees must be documented by the network operators and submitted to 
the BNA upon request. 
Determination of fees is governed by the principle that grid costs must be distributed, 
as far as possible, based on where the costs were incurred, between in-take fees on the 
one hand and off-take fees on the other. "Acknowledged business administration 
procedures" are used in this regard the regulator may specify requirements for this. 
For groups of in- or off-take points, standard fees must be created as far as possible. 
A transaction-independent point model is used for local distribution, unlike regional 
distribution and long-distance pipelines. The extent of network fees is thus 
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independent of the spatial distance between the in- and the off-take point. The 
network fee for each off-take point consists of an annual service charge in EUR per 
kilowatt and an energy charge in E-cents per kilowatt/hour. The principle of 
distributing costs based on their origin also applies here. The "acknowledged 
procedure" for local distribution is still the grid participation model. 
ff) Comparable procedures and documentation obligations 
A central component of cost-oriented fee determination is the comparison process 
described in Part 3 of the GasNEV that may be performed by the BNA at regular 
intervals (at least once a year). Network operators must first be assigned to structural 
classes so as to guarantee a better level of comparison. Criteria for assigned are sales 
density (high, medium and low) and geographical position (western or eastern 
Germany). Comparisons may be made only in terms of the costs of the business. In 
any case, the GasNEV continues to contain a reference to fees and revenues as the 
basis for comparison. Apart from a few principles, the GasNEV contains no concrete 
description of the comparison process. The BNA will publish the results of the 
comparison on its Internet website. 
The GasNEV contains many disclosure and documentation obligations. In addition to 
the applicable network fees, operators must also publish information about the 
structural features that are required for the comparison process (e. g. length of the grid, 
differentiation by pipeline diameter class, number of off-take points) on their 
websites. A report must also be drawn up that describes the fee structure; it must also 
include a wide range of information on individual aspects of the cost calculation in a 
comprehensive Annex. 
The procedures described above could contribute to enhanced transparency within the 
charging structures of all network operators which may have positive effects on 
competition as it becomes clearer to all market players what the basis is for their 
network access. 
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4. Action by the German Federal Cartel Office in relation to long-term 
agreements: A resource for improving gas prices and competition on the 
German gas market? 
In January 2005, the German Federal Cartel Office (hereinafter referred to as the 
'FCO' or `Cartel Office') initiated proceedings under competition law against 16 
German gas importers. 864 According to the FCO, such proceedings were brought for 
the following reasons: 
- In the Cartel Office's view, competition or liberalisation within the German 
gas market has developed too slowly. The FCO believes that one of the main 
reasons for the slow development of a more open market lies in the existing 
long-term contractual obligations of the gas importers to supply gas 
redistributors. 
- Investigations by the FCO showed that approximately 75% between all supply 
agreements between gas importers and gas redistributors cover the total 
demand for gas redistributors (these are referred to as 'agreements covering 
total demand' ('Gesamtbedarfsdeckungsverträge')), or cover supply volumes 
ranging between 80% and 100% of the total demand of gas redistributors 
(these are referred to as 'quasi-agreements covering total demand' ('Quasi- 
Gesamtbedarfsdeckungsverträge')). Only a small proportion dealt with supply 
volumes ranging between 50% and 80% of the total demand. Almost all of 
these agreements last an excess of four years, either from the date the 
agreement was entered into, or from the date of liberalisation. 
86° Bundeskartellamt, Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 8. 
Beschlussabteilung, B8- 113/03, Bonn, 25 Januar 2005, <http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. Followed 
by Bundeskartellamt, Langfristige Gasverträge, Bonn, 6 April 2005, 
<http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
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Negotiations between gas importers and the FCO in relation to the future format of 
supply agreements succeed with some of the importers, however talks between the 
gas importer E. ON Ruhrgas broke down after several months in September 2005.865 
In December the cartel authority issued interdiction proceedings 
('Untersagungsverfügungen) against the aforementioned company in 
November/December 2005.866 
The proceedings brought under competition law will be examined the following 
sections to determine whether or not the proposals by the Cartel Office will actually 
increase the level of competition in the German gas market. 
The analysis will cover following points: 
(1. ) First, the legal appraisals and proposals made by the FCO will be overviewed. 
(2. ) Then, the views of the parties involved will be assessed. 
(3. ) Finally, an examination as to whether or not the proposals made by the FCO 
would actually result in an increase in the level of competition, as well as a 
drop of gas prices, in the German gas market, will be undertaken. 
9e5 Bundeskartellamt, Keine Einigung mit E. ONRuhrgas zur Öffnung der langfristigen 
Gaslieferverträge, Press release, 27 September 2005, <http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
866 Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt macht Ankündigung wahr und mahnt E. ON Ruhrgas wegen 
langfristiger Gasverträge ab, Pressemeldung 13 December 2005; Börsen-Zeitung, Eon attackiert das 
Bundeskartellamt -, Sichere Gasversorgung wird gefährdet', 14 October 2005. 
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a) Position of the Cartel Office 
The following sections will present the legal claims made, as well as the proposed 
solutions, by the FCO in relation to the long-term agreements. 867 
aa) Legal claims made by the Cartel Office 
The FCO made the following legal claims in relation to long-term agreements: 
- Long-term agreements between gas redistributors and gas importers to meet 
total demand, or least a large part thereof, are in breach of EU, as well as 
German, competition law. 868 In this regard, the FCO is of the view that there 
has been a breach of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty. 869 
- The FCO is of the view that the existing long-term agreements870 between 
established gas suppliers and gas redistributors, both because of the duration 
of such agreements, as well as the level of gas volumes to be supplied, restrict 
competition of the (first-time) supply to a gas redistributor customer to the 
disadvantage of other gas suppliers as referred to in Art. 81 (1) of the EC 
Treaty. The reason for this is that already established gas suppliers bind their 
customers through agreements by duration and volume, thereby excluding 
customer third-party suppliers. 
- Based on the presentation of information by the FCO, gas redistributors with a 
large share that are located within the gas network area of a specific supplier, 
are 100% dependent on such suppliers for their long-term gas requirements. A 
further substantial number of such redistributors are required under such 
867 See Bundeskartellamt, Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 8. 
Beschlussabteilung, B8- 113/03, Bonn, 25 Januar 2005, <http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
868 Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt zur Verhinderung einer BGH-Entscheidung zu langfristigen 
Energie-Lieferverträgen, Press release, 7 November 2003. 
869 In accordance with Art. 81 (1) EC, the following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market: all such agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object 
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market. 
870 Also referred to as 'vertical agreements'. 
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agreements to provide quantities ranging between 80% and 100%, which - in 
the FCO's view - effectively operates as a non-competition clause under 
competition law. The effect of this type of clause is that other gas suppliers 
who may be interested in supplying gas redistributors within these gas 
networks are deprived of a significant amount of 'available' customers to 
whom they could supply gas. Such interested third-party suppliers could be 
'newcomers' to the relevant market, as well as established German gas 
suppliers, who want to compensate for any loss of customers in their own gas 
network areas through expansion into other gas network areas. In addition, the 
FCO also claims that even if the agreements are not limited to the 
relationships within the gas network area of a specific supplier, but should 
take into account the whole of Germany, individual long-term agreements 
would also restrict competition by limiting access to the relevant market. In 
the FCO's view, such long-term agreements are part of a network of parallel 
long-term agreements that, taken in their entirety, are in breach of competition 
law. 
As a result, the FCO claims that the following gas supply agreements should be held 
to be in breach of competition law: 
- Those that cover more than 80% of the total demand, lasting in excess of two 
years; 
- Those that cover more than 50% of the total demand up to and including 80% 
of such demand, lasting in excess of four years. 
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bb) Proposals by the Cartel Office in relation to long-term agreements 
The FCO have presented the following proposals: 
(i) Volume threshold regulation 
In the event that a main supplier would like to enter into an agreement lasting between 
two and four years, the FCO proposes that the suppliers next in line should in effect 
have access to supply opportunities that at a minimum equal 20% of the required total 
volume. In the event of long-term agreements lasting in excess of four years, the 
suppliers next in line to the main supplier should in effect have access to at least 50% 
of the total demand, which - in FCO's view - may not be covered by such main 
suppliers. Total contractual volume of a main supplier must never exceed 80% or 50% 
of the actual total demand. 
(ii) Distribution of risks 
In addition, the FCO is also of the view that an appropriate distribution of risks is 
required in order to clearly and successfully establish a multiple suppliers model. The 
distribution of risks should be spread between main suppliers and those next in line, 
as well as gas redistributors and gas suppliers. 
If opening up the relevant market benefits a supplier next in line to a main supplier, 
then the percentage of risk to be covered by such next-in-line supplier should not 
exceed the percentage of its share of the total contractual volume. 
In the FCO's view, the following items should be considered in the distribution of 
risks: 
- Allowance of a more generous volume subject to Take-or-Pay for the benefit 
of gas redistributors; 
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- Inclusion of a buyer's right to transfer a specific percentage of the volume paid 
for in a 'warm year', but which has not yet been collected, to the subsequent 
year; 
- Inclusion of a re-order right in 'cold years' corresponding to a specific 
percentage of the contractual volume. 
As a result, the Cartel Office will only deem the supply agreement of a main supplier 
to be in compliance with competition law if the risk carried by the main supplier at a 
minimum corresponds proportionally to the size of its contractual share. 
(iii) Exclusion of 'English clauses' 
In addition, the FCO is also of the view that any clauses binding a customer to notify 
suppliers of all offers made by competitors that are below the contractual price, as 
well as providing such suppliers with the option of adjusting their prices accordingly, 
or alternatively releasing the relevant volume, restrict the relevant market from 
opening up. As a result, the FCO considers such clauses to be in breach of 
competition law. 
(iv) No application of automatic renewal clauses 
The FCO is also of the view that supply agreements that include clauses which 
provide for the agreement to be automatically renewed when they come to an end 
without any further action being required by the customer, are in breach of 
competition law. 
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b) Responses to the proceedings under competition law 
Several parties871 involved in the relevant markets have responded to these 
proceedings. Their responses, based on competition law, are described in the 
following sections. 
aa) Position of gas importers 
In response to the threshold volume proposed by the FCO, several gas importers have 
proposed a model that would enable main suppliers to enter into one agreement for a 
fixed volume of 50% of the actual total demand for an indefinite period, a second 
agreement for an additional 30% for four years, as well as a third agreement for the 
remaining 20% for two years. 872 
In the FCO's view, such a building-block model is not suitable for removing the 
restrictions in the market, since the FCO believes that such restrictions relate to the 
following: 
- On the basis of the agreements with main suppliers that already exist, a 
'domino effect', which benefits the main suppliers must be taken into account 
when the second and third type of agreements are entered into. This 'domino 
effect' prevents the opening up of the market to potential competitors. Such a 
'domino effect' already takes place in relation to cost benefits, which a main 
supplier can use to calculate prices offered in the additional agreement, which 
is also based upon acquired supply volume. 
- Such a building-block model would not be in accordance with the requirement 
that in the event of entering into an agreement covering a demand in excess of 
80%, the whole supply volume (independent of its breakdown into quotas) 
must be offered again on a competitive basis after two years. Contrary to this 
8 This issue was also debated within the literature, see for instance v. I Jammerstein, C.; Langfristige 
Lieververträge/Bundeskartellamt, emw 1/05, p. 67-68. 
""Z See Bundeskartellamt, Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 8. 
Beschlussabteilung, B8- 113/03, Bonn, 25 Januar 2005, <http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>; B6rsen- 
Zeitung, Eon attackiert das Bundeskartellamt -, Sichere Gasversorgung wird gefährdet', 14 October 
2005. 
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approach, this building-block model merely envisages a maximum volume of 
20% of the total demand in relation to such renewed offering. Accordingly, if 
entering into an agreement covering a demand in excess of 50%, up to and 
including 80%, only a maximum volume of 50% of the demand would be 
available for a renewed offer after four years. 
bb) Position of German Industrial Energy and Power Association 
One of the largest German energy associations, the 'German Industrial Energy and 
Power Association' (hereinafter to be referred to as 'VIK' ('Verband der Industriellen 
Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft'), which represents the interests of industrial gas and 
energy users, welcomed the FCO proceedings. 873 VIK has adopted the following 
position: 
- The percentage-based division of supply agreements according to supply 
period as proposed by the Cartel Office would open up the relevant market to 
new suppliers; 
- In addition, VIK also welcomed the distribution of risks proposed by the FCO; 
- Finally, they also welcomed the exclusion of both the 'English clauses' and the 
automatic renewal clauses, since these clauses would force buyers into a 
dependent relationship with sellers. 
873 Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), Stellungnahme zu den 
Kartellrechtlichen Beurteilungsgrundsätzen zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 28.02.2005, 
<httpi/www. vik. de>; 
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cc) Position of German Federal Gas Industry Association 
Representatives of the 'German Federal Gas Industry Association' (hereinafter to be 
referred to as 'BGW' ('Bundesverband der deutschen Gaswirtschaft') object874 to the 
FCO proceedings on the following grounds: 
- BGW views such proceedings as a substantial restriction of the key principle 
of contractual freedom and points out that contractual freedom is a substantial 
factor in securing future investments. 
- The solutions proposed by the FCO would lead to paradoxical results, since 
they would prevent customers from staying with the same cheap supplier for a 
period in excess of two years. In addition, customers would not have the 
option of securing their energy supplies in a reliable way for the long-term. 
This would, in particular, be unjustified during periods of increasing prices. 
- BGW also claims that the FCO proceedings would undermine the provisions 
for reliable and secure supplies. The reason for this is that future long-term 
supply agreements, which are indispensable for ensuring a reliable and secure 
supply within the EU, would be moved by countries requiring gas to markets 
outside the EU, if they were able to ensure a reliable and secure supply by 
doing so. 
c) Evaluation under competition law of the Federal Cartel Office proceedings 
The next section will examine in more detail the FCO proceedings, as well as the 
various positions presented, taken as a whole. This examination will primarily look at 
whether or not the solutions proposed by the FCO actually would increase 
competition and lead to lower gas prices. 
g74 Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW), Kartellrechtliche 
Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 21.02.2005, <http: //www. bgw. de>. 
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aa) Problems faced by the FCO 
The FCO is in a difficult position in relation to its initiation of the proceedings under 
competition law because of the following: 
- On the one hand, the FCO considers itself subject to increasing political 
pressure, due to continuously increasing gas prices in 2004-2005, 'as well as 
the prevalent opinion that there was no effective competition in the German 
gas market; 
- On the other hand, the FCO was forced to make a substantial intervention in 
the private sector, as well as in existing - and for decades established (i. e. with 
regard to the provision of a reliable and secure supply) - structures within the 
gas industry. 
Against this background, this survey believes that the FCO faced a difficult task in 
proposing solutions in which the interests of all parties would be served to an equal 
degree. 
bb) Appropriate solution proposals? 
This survey finds that the solution proposals outlined above would have the following 
effects in relation to competition and prices: 
- First, it must be observed that the solutions proposed by the FCO cannot be 
applied to existing long-term agreements. This is because of existing legal 
protections for confidentiality, as well as the maintenance of agreements 
currently in place. Insofar as none of the contractual parties require 
termination of such agreements, such agreements will remain in place. This 
position is based on the fact that the contractual parties - in particular gas 
redistributors/local municipals - may have deliberately entered into such long- 
term agreements so as to limit any price risks as far as possible, as well as to 
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ensure reliable and secure long-term supplies. Agreements entered into prior 
to 2005, may have been entered into at much more favourable (price) 
conditions than would currently be possible. As a result, terminating such 
agreements at present would be counterproductive from the point of view of 
price calculation. In addition, gas importers have committed themselves to gas 
exporters for the long-term, so that immediate termination would lead to 
significant risks for all parties involved, which this survey believes would be 
adversely reflected in gas prices; 
- This survey is also of the view that gas redistributors/local municipals should 
be allowed to enter into their own agreements with gas suppliers. The 
invariable percentage-based division proposed by the FCO would result 
automatically in further price increases, since customers would be forced to 
buy their gas from more expensive next-in-line suppliers if they were to act in 
compliance with the solutions proposed by FCO. Instead, customers would 
rather be given the option of shorter terms in gas supply agreements, as well as 
being able to split volumes between multiple gas suppliers; 
- The FCO's risk guidelines include suggestions that could lead to a planned 
economy. It should be up to the parties themselves to decide how the 
distribution of risks should be assigned. The suggestion that main suppliers 
should carry some of the risks faced by next-in-line suppliers cannot be 
supported. This proposal would result in price increases, since main suppliers 
would include such transfer of risks in the price they charge to their end 
customers; 
- In addition, the solutions proposed by the FCO fail to take into account an 
important factor, namely the right of access to gas network capacities. Without 
access to capacity rights, next-in-line delivery cannot take place. Currently, 
many capacity rights have already been assigned on a long-term basis. The 
resale of capacity rights that have already been assigned would in all 
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likelihood also increase prices for end users, since current holders of capacity 
rights would make such resale 'worthwhile'; 
- The exclusion of what are referred to as 'English clauses' as well as automatic 
renewal clauses should be upheld, since such clauses are in effect in breach of 
competition law. 
In conclusion, the following points can be made: 
- From this survey's point of view, the solutions proposed by the FCO would 
lead to increased competition on the German market, since it allows new 
suppliers to enter the market. However, this would lead to (significant) gas 
price increases, since competition would then take place on the basis of a 
planned economy; 
- Furthermore, the solutions proposed by the FCO did not take into account the 
transfer of capacity rights, which is a significant omission in terms of 
competition law. 
S. Provisional results 
In summarising the above and answering the question regarding whether or not the 
2005 German Energy Act and the actions of the German Federal Cartel authority will 
bring greater competition and harmonisation to the German Gas market the following 
must be said: 
(1. ) 2005 German Energy Act: 
- The requirement placed on all transmission system operators to establish an 
entry-exit system has to be welcomed. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether 
establishment of multi entry-exit systems within one market will actually 
result in a greater degree of competition and market harmonisation. In this 
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respect it would have made sense, for instance, to include or to combine the 
considerable small network systems of regional and local transmission system 
operators with the supra-regional networks. This would have created 
significantly fewer entry-exit zones, which could have improved the overall 
harmonisation and the competition. 
- In some ways the new regime will still be transaction based as it will be 
impossible - if at least two different transportation companies are involved - 
to combine the two exit and entry points without checking whether there is a 
possible transportation route for the on and off-take gas of the network user. 
This argument is based on the fact that many network operators are involved 
in the management of entry-exit zones within the German gas market. 
- The rules for cooperation on the transmission system operators have to be 
welcomed. Nevertheless it is doubtful how the new access regime and the 
duties on operators will actually work in practice. Therefore the rules leave 
some uncertainty for all parties involved. 
- It is also questionable whether the network operator will be able to implement 
all the requirements of the law before the deadline of 1 February 2006. It is not 
clear what will happen after the deadline has passed. In this respect all 
involved parties face significant regulatory risks as it is not clear what access 
regime will apply. 
(2. ) The investigation by the Federal Cartel Office: 
- The investigation by the Cartel Authority seems politically motivated as 
wholesale energy prices have been significantly driven by the large energy 
companies who are partly blamed for the price increases. However, the Cartel 
Authority leaves a number of issues unanswered. This refers to how long-term 
price planning, contractual freedom and the access to the necessary pipeline 
capacity will be handled under the proposals suggested by the Authority. 
- This survey further believes that wholesale prices will not decrease under the 
proposed model and are in fact more likely increase. 
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However, the desired aim to allow more players to enter the market will most likely 
be fulfilled, however only if wholesale prices rise owing to the fact that the Cartel 
Authority made no suggestions as to how the issue of pipeline capacities should be 
solved. 
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IV. Summary 
Although it will be subject to detail analysis of the subsequent Chapter E 
(Conclusions) this survey will very briefly sumarise the case study findings. 
(1. ) The implementation of the EU energy (gas) legislation and guidelines set some 
form of similar legal and market framework within the Dutch, Austrian and 
German gas markets. This can be seen as a positive improvement for overall 
market harmonisation and possibly gas market competition. 
(2. ) Nevertheless it also is clear that all of the gas markets developed different 
approaches - none of them significantly move towards more EU-wide market 
harmonisation. This comment refers in particular to the following three important 
areas: 
- Unbundling: In contrast to the German and Austrian unbundling 
regimes the Dutch legislature chose a more drastic unbundling 
approach. This will influence the equality (or otherwise) of treatment 
of energy companies within the EU. This also has consequences with 
respect to the development of fair competition as some players will 
find it easier to access the Dutch gas market as opposed to their home 
markets because of the less stringent unbundling rules. 
- Regulatory authorities: It becomes apparent that the Dutch regulatory 
authority seems to have the most decisive influence over gas market 
` development - particularly with respect to competition. By contrast, 
the Austrian authorities' powers seemed to be significantly restricted 
when it comes to transit access issues. Whether the German regulatory 
body will have a significant influence is difficult to foresee. It is, 
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however, clear that the development of the BNA is at least two years 
behind that seen in other Member State regulatory bodies. 
- Third party access: There are also a wide variety of third party access 
rules within the aforementioned markets, which have not been 
coordinated among the different Member States. Each Member State 
still operates an access regime without aiming to integrate it with 
another gas markets. However, the rules of the Dutch gas market, 
which have promoted in many ways competition and domestic Dutch 
market harmonisation, are an outstanding example. The experiences 
within the Austrian gas market have shown that important transit lines 
have been removed from competition rules. Whether the current break 
down within the German gas market will be resolved by the 2005 
access rules remains to be seen but in many ways - as analysed above 
- this seems unrealistic. 
- Attempts to combine gas markets, for instance, via the EuroHub 
GmbH have failed. There are few, if any, incentives for the players 
involved to undertake such an important integration mechanism, which 
would have created greater gas market harmonisation and a significant 
impetus for competition. 
(3. ) These considerable differences in market and legal/regulatory structures have 
negative influences on the further attempts to harmonise and liberalise 
Europe's gas markets. 
(4. ) They also illustrate that further steps need to be undertake to reach the aim of 
a (more) harmonised and competitive EU gas market. This will be partly be 
subject to the analysis of the final chapter of this survey. 
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required for the creation of a harmonised, 
liberalised and secure European las market 
The analysis of EU legislation, guidelines and decisions and the implementation 
process within the Dutch, Austrian and German gas markets have proven that 
numerous shortfalls and barriers still exist before a fully competitive and harmonised 
EU gas market can realistically emerge. However, the previous chapters' analysis also 
provide valuable and useful concepts about how the markets should or should not be 
structured. On this basis this thesis now addresses the final three questions of this 
survey: 
- What has been learnt from the analysis? 
- What conditions are required to create a harmonised and liberalised EU gas 
market, and 
- what is the way forward? 
These three question will be the subject of the final chapter of this survey. The main 
aim of this survey has been to outline recommendations and/or courses of action that 
will bring about a more harmonised and liberalised EU gas market that also addresses 
security of supply issues. 
The above questions will be addressed in the following way: 
(I. ) Firstly, it will be debated how security of supply can be enhanced in the 
context of a constantly changing industry structure and regulatory 
environment. This discussion is of considerable importance as it became clear 
through the above discussion that the introduction of market liberalisation and 
harmonisation cannot be disconnected from the issue of security of supply. 
Therefore this survey believes that the issue of EU wide security of supply 
cannot be forgotten when discussing the overall aim of creating a more 
harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
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(2. ) This thesis will then debate how overall third party access can be improved. 
This analysis is also of considerable importance to this survey, as it has 
become clear that the third party access regimes within most EU Member 
States are either insufficient to improve competition or harmonisation 
between Member States' gas markets. 
(3. ) How the position and responsibilities of the national and EU regulatory bodies 
can be enhanced will then be discussed. This discussion is highly relevant as 
it becomes obvious how important regulatory bodies are in the process of 
creating a more harmonised and liberalised EU gas market. 
(4. ) A view on the issue of unbundling will be given which will provide some 
practical solutions on how the unbundling process could be supported. 
(5. ) Finally, this survey will discuss how the above recommendations could be 
enacted. 
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1. Security of supply: How to improve EU security of supply standards in 
changing and non-harmonised EU gas markets? 
The previous analysis of the challenges, risks, implementation difficulties and security 
of gas supply issues in changing, not fully liberalised and non-harmonised EU gas 
markets illustrates the enormous structural weaknesses within the EU and also marks 
the future challenges for the EU and all market players; this refers in particular to 
long-term security planning, short-term security and reliability as well as the future 
for the EU gas market structure. It further illustrates that different, non-harmonised 
market structures as well as non-existent security of supply standards across all 
Member States could eventually be dangerous for the supply situation across Europe. 
It also has to be acknowledged that a single energy policy approach by each Member 
State can lead not only to the instability of the entire security of supply situation in the 
European energy market, but also to the failure of further energy policy targets of the 
Commission, such as the full liberalisation and integration of Europe's gas and power 
markets. In this respect the Commission 2004 benchmark report correctly states, "due 
to the strong dependency on gas imports and transit, the gas market requires 
harmonised solutions on cross border issues in order to efficiently satisfy the national 
demand in EU Countries. "875 
The above argument could also lead to the conclusion that the overall introduction of 
liberalisation measures has created a great deal of supply uncertainty and endangers 
the'necessary investments in the future. However, in this context some argue876 that 
the advantages of a liberalised energy market would lie in the creation of physical and 
financial trading exchanges, that allow a range of price signals for gas and 
transportation capacity allocation in the case of a supply emergency. This would also 
875 European Commission, Third Benchmarking Report on the implementation of the internal 
electricity and gas market, 01. March 2004, p. 6. 
87° International Energy Agency, Energy Policy ofIEA Countries, 2002 Review, p. 56; IEA , Security 
of Gas supply in Open Markets - LNG and Power at a turning point, 2004, p. 34. 
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create liquid wholesale gas markets, which are important because investors would "be 
more encouraged to make the required investments to import gas to Europe, if there is 
always a liquid wholesale market into which gas can be sold in the absence of a 
specific buyer. , 877One could further argue that trading increases overall security of 
supply because traders seek various options and alternatives to source and transport 
gas and are not dependent on a few long-term supply contracts as some (former) 
incumbents are. This view is supported and is further argued878 that a (fully) 
liberalised market will mean greater opportunities to ship gas more easily across 
borders and hence limit security of supply risks. In this respect - as analysed before - 
it has to be noted and concluded that at this stage, Europe's gas markets are far from 
being sufficiently harmonised, liberalised to provide efficient security of supply tools. 
Therefore the above-made arguments cannot be fully supported at this stage of the 
market development. 
Henceforth this survey is of the opinion that an essential starting point for reaching a 
more secure, more liberalised and harmonised market is that that the roles and 
responsibilities, not only in respect of security of supply but also for the entire market 
organisation, need to be redefined. This is particularly - as concluded before - 
necessary in the transition period from non-liberalised to fully-liberalised markets. 
Therefore this survey partly agrees with the argument, which was made above, that 
during a transition phase the roles of market players in security of supply have to be 
clearly defined, otherwise no one will take the responsibility and the likelihood of 
accidents, mistakes and disasters increases. This is particularly true - as pointed out879 
- for companies (especially former incumbent operators) that cannot or are not willing 
to pay for assets and contractual relationships that have no or little profitability and 
will only be used in the event of supply emergencies. As a result, companies and 
877 European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the Report from 
the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004)863 
final, SEC(2004)1720, Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 33. 
$'s National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Security in Gas and Electricity Markets, Final 
report for the Department of Trade and Industry, 21 October 2002, p. 16, <http: //www. dti. gov. org. uk>. 
379 Stern, J., supra note, p. 24. 
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former incumbent operators are no longer willing to keep in reserve unnecessary 
volumes of gas and unused transportation capacity unless it is economically feasible 
to do so, or they can pass extra incurred costs through to the market and consumers. 
But it also has to be mentioned in this context, that liberalisation measures have not 
stopped European gas companies from investing in multi-billion Euro gas pipeline 
infrastructures, as has been claimed in part. 880 However, more precise definitions of 
responsibilities and duties will support and enhance investment plans, because they 
will increase certainties for all involved parties, in particular for new market players 
and/or investors. 
A clear definition of who is responsible for security of supply is also absolutely 
necessary for resolving the legal and commercial aftermath of a security of supply 
incident. 881 Legally it will be more difficult and costly to find liable companies when 
there are no definitions in the energy legislation as to who is responsible and liable for 
what. As discussed above, the cost of a supply incident can be substantial but without 
a clear definition the (end-) customers will, most likely, have to carry the burden of 
the supply interruption. 882 Therefore it must be concluded that the Commission and 
Member States have a primary duty in defining the roles and responsibilities of all the 
market players. 
This survey has further to conclude that the greatest danger to security of supply 
occurs during a transition period from a non liberalised to a fully liberalised market. 
Open and liberalised markets, with true competitive elements need a clear definition 
of the roles of market players and Governments, particularly when it comes to 
810 See above. 
881 See for negative impacts on the aftermath of a security of supply incident. Rooney, G.; Albano, Of 
Blackouts and Lawsuits, Class-action claims for widespread utility service interruptions are a growing 
trend, Public Utilities Fortnightly, July 2004, p. 36-41; Handelsblatt, Millionen Moskauer ohne Strom, 
25. Mai 2005; also American Power Conversion, The Problem with Power, 
<http//: www. apc. com/power/problems. cfm>, p. 2; The Guardian, Heatwave brings power cuts in 
Spain, June 30,2004, <http: //www. guardian. co. uk/spain>; EL Mundo, Los tortes en Fracia y el record 
de demanda djaan la red electrica al limite, 29 June 2004; Utility Week, Damhead sparks major row, 
Utility Week 15 October 2004, p. 5. 
882 Ibid. 
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security of supply. But this cannot materialise with the current Community legislation 
as outlined in the above analysis. 
However, the broad terms and conditions of the Council Directive concerning 
measures to safeguard security of gas supply together with the Commission's Green 
Paper, the Second Gas Directive and the not (fully) ratified EU Constitution could 
potentially work in an ideal and fully harmonised and liberalised market - such as in 
the UK - where one company is in charge of the network and other market players 
use this network. Such a system might lead to a single and competitive European 
energy market that ensures a full and comprehensive service, which supports security 
of supply. 
But whilst the roles need to be re-defined, it is also crucial that the liberalisation 
processes in all Member States are consistent and follow the Directives fully, 
otherwise the chances of an unstable system would increase with possible threats to 
security of supply. Examples of a poorly designed liberalised energy market can be 
found in California883 and in the benchmark reports on the implementation of the first 
Gas and Electricity Directives. 884 As the Commission correctly summarises, a "failure 
to adopt adequate measures in one Member State can have serious consequences 
regarding the operation of the internal market throughout the European Union. "885 
The Commission states further that, in a functioning market it is necessary for more 
interconnection between the energy markets because it plays a fundamental role in 
supply flexibility. Beyond this, the Barcelona Presidency conclusion886 highlighted 
correctly the fact that the existence of an adequate and effective network of energy 
893 Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), Beyond Californias's Power Crisis: Impact, 
Solutions, and Lessons, 2001, <http: //www. cera. com>; for more detail discussion on the impacts of the 
California energy crisis see Flippen, E.; Mitchel, A. K., Electricity Utility Restructuring After 
California, JENRL 21/2003, p. 1-18. 
884 European Commission, Second benchmarking report on the implementation of the internal 
electricity and gas market, SEC(2003) 448. 
885 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament concerning measures to 
safeguard security of natural gas, COM(2002) 488final, p. 44. 
886 The so-called "Barcelona Conclusion" are the outcome of the European Council meeting on 15/16 
of March 2002in Barcelona/Spain. Part of the debate was the energy policy in the EU. 
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infrastructure will ensure a proper functioning of the internal market, while at the 
same time guaranteeing security of supply. 887 
This view is supported by others888 who also put forward that EU Member States need 
to work more closely together and engage with gas producing countries such as 
Russia. 
Consequently there is an even greater need on an EU and Member State level, to 
harmonise EU gas markets. The re-definition of roles with regard to security of supply 
and proper implementation of the requirements, as laid out in the Gas Directives 889 $ 
must be ensured otherwise market failures like we have seen in North-America could 
become inevitable. 
Only greater harmonisation and liberalisation can deliver true competition, security of 
supply, network reliability and efficiency and create a single European Gas market. 
Such a market will produce synergies in terms of optimising national strategic reserve 
supplies, whilst at the same time achieving overall security at far lower costs then is 
currently the case. 
Aside from these factors, the harmonisation of cross-border and domestic 
transportation and trading rules and laws will bring with it more competition to the 
EU. Increased competition will also result in higher levels of investment that will in 
turn lead to new sources of supply, greater flexibility, potentially lower energy prices 
and increased security of supply. 
A way to achieve greater security of supply could be reached by amending Council 
Directive 2004/67/EC, concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas 
supply, in a way that overall security of supply is increased whilst ensuring that the 
proper functioning of the competitive internal energy market is not endangered. 
In this respect, the objectives (Article 1) of the Directive should stress that only 
common and harmonised measures to safeguard security are important. This will limit 
887 European Council - Presidency Conclusion, Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 March 2002, 
Part. I No. 36-38, Part III. No. 27. 
891 See Butler, N., Energy Security: A new Agenda for Europe, October/November 2004 - CER 
Bulletin, Issue 38, p. 2, <http: //www. cer. org. uk>. 
88' 1. e. first and Second Gas Directives (98/30/EC; 2003/55/EC). 
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the risk that the security of supply situation in one Member State does not endanger 
other Member State. It also eliminates many market uncertainties about who is 
responsible for what. 890 
The Definitions in Article 2 should be extended in such a way that a security of 
supply incident needs to be seen, not only on an EU level, but also on a single 
Member State level where security of supply can have an impact on neighbouring 
countries. It should also take a certain time-period of a supply interruption into 
account. Beside that, Article 2 should state what "supply disruption" means. This 
definition is important for clarity reasons that the Member State Governments know 
when to report supply losses that could lead to a supply disruption. 891 
Furthermore, Article 2 needs to define what transmission and distribution system 
operators are, because this clarifies who falls into this group and who does not. In this 
respect, it should be the same definition as laid down in Art. 2 No 4 and 6 of the 2nd 
Gas Directive 2003/55/EC. By defining transmission and distribution system operator 
in the same way as in the Gas Directive, legal consistency is achieved. 
In Article 3- policies for securing gas supply - it should be stressed that all Member 
States have the same obligations in respect to security of supply and that investment 
incentives shall be created by implementing and supporting robust and liquid 
wholesale gas supply markets. 892 It should also be highlighted in this Article that 
S90 This survey suggests to change Art. I in the following way [changes to the original text in italics/bold 
and deletions are highlighted with (... )] "This Directive establishes harmonised and common measures to 
safeguard an adequate level for the security of gas supply across the European Union. [... ]. It establishes a 
harmonised and common framework for all Member States. (... ) Member States shall define (... ) transparent and 
non-discriminatory security of supply policies compatible with the requirements of a competitive internal gas 
market that do not endanger the security of supply situation in another Afember State. Member States define on 
an EU-wide common and harmonised basis the (... ) roles and responsibilities of the different market players and 
implement specific, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures to safeguard security of gas supply. " 
891 Art. 2 should be supplemented by the following new sections No. 2. "(a) 'major supply disruption' 
shall mean a situation when one or more Member States declare that they are at risk of losing more 
than 20% of their gas supplies for a period exceeding one month (... ). " 
(b) (new)" `supply disruption' shall mean a situation when one or more Member States declares that 
they are at risk of losing necessary gas supplies. " 
892 Art. 3 should be changed in the following way: No. 1"In establishing their general policies with 
respect to ensuring adequate levels of security of gas supply Member States shall ensure a high level 
of security of gas supply by creating a stable investment climate for infrastructure and a robust and 
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neighbouring Member States may have different needs and market organisation when 
it comes to security of supply issues that affect not only one Member State but also its 
neighbouring country. In such cases, neighbouring countries should agree on an 
individual basis, how to deal with security of supply incidents. The Gas Coordination 
Group (Art. 7) will ensure that the individual agreements do not endanger other 
Member States' security of supply arrangements. 893 It should also be mentioned in a 
new subparagraph that transparent operational standards are needed to ensure 
interoperability. These standards shall be based not only on the exchange of 
information but also necessary technical adjustments. 894 
Apart from this, a new Article 3a should be inserted that defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the transmission and distribution system operator with respect to 
security of supply. Only the operators are able to ensure overall security of supply in 
their networks. 895 In a supply incident, the network should immediately inform all its 
network users as well as the competent authorities and should make its planned 
counter actions available. 896 Furthermore, all interconnected network operators should 
agree common measures on how they would respond to a security of supply 
liquid wholesale market for gas supplies. Member States shall define according to this Directive in 
the same and harmonised way the different roles of gas market players in achieving these policies, and 
specify adequate (... ) security of supply standards that must be complied with by the players on the gas 
market of the Member State in question. [... ]. " 
893 Article 7 should supplement with a new No. 4, which states: "After two years of implementation of 
this Directive, neighbouring Member States that have interconnecting gas pipelines engage and 
agree individual and common procedures on how to deal with a security of supply incident. They 
ensure that these procedures are transparent, non-discriminatory and publicly available. The agreed 
procedures have to be reported and approved by the Gas Coordination Group (Article 7. ) In the case 
that Member States cannot agree on common procedures the Gas Coordination Group will mediate 
between the parties. " 
894 A new No 5 should be added in Art. 3, that states: "Member States, in consultation with their 
neighbouring countries, shall ensure that operational standards on network security are sufficiently 
harmonised to ensure technical interoperability, avoid market distortions and are observed by all 
transmission and distribution system operators, including operators of interconnectors. There shall 
be effective exchange of information between all interconnected transmission and distribution 
system operators. " 
895 A new Article 3a No. I should be inserted that states as following. "In accordance with this 
Directive, Transmission System Operator and Distribution System Operator are responsible for the 
operation of, maintenance of and ensuring securing security of supply within their network system. " 
8 Art. 3a No. 2 (new) "In a case of supply interruption the affected Transmission system operator 
and/or Distribution System Operator informs immediately the competent authority as well as its 
network users about the incident and its planned counter actions. It also publishes on its website that 
an incident had occurred. " 
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incident. 897 In this respect the first priority shall be given to firm capacity booking 
holders, essential facilities (such as gas fired power station, hospitals etc. ) and the 
end-customers as defined in Art. 4 of this Directive. The publication of these 
measures would increase overall transparency and seek to avoid measures, which are 
counterproductive. Apart from this, network operators must be entitled to claim any 
costs that are incurred by setting up new security of supply standards or undertaking 
preventing measures against system failure. Such costs and how they are calculated 
should be a task for the Gas Coordination Group, Member State Governments, the 
European Commission and representatives of the European gas industry. 898 Finally, 
network operators shall publish investment plans on how to increase pipeline security 
and reduce pipeline congestion. 899 
These legal suggestions will bring, from this survey's point of view, particularly 
during the transition period from non to fully harmonised and liberalised gas markets, 
enhanced conditions for overall security of supply in Europe's gas markets. 
897 Art. 3a No. 3 (new) should state: "Transmission and Distribution System Operators should agree 
in the first year after implementation of this Directive, in accordance with the competent national 
authority, on common and harmonised measures on how to overcome a security of supply incident 
with its neighbouring Transmission and Distribution System Operators. In this respect the first 
priority shall be given to firm capacity bookings, essential facilities and those groups defined in Art. 
4 of this Directive. These measures shall be published on their websites. " 
8"' In this respect a new No. 4 should be inserted in Art. 3a (new): "Transmission and Distribution 
System Operators are allowed to be reimbursed for any new security of supply measures that arrive 
due to the implementation of this Directive. The Gas Coordination Group, the Commission, Member 
States and representatives of the European Gas Industry shall develop non-discriminatory and 
transparent funds and procedures that lay down the reclaim procedures and amounts " 
B" A new No. 5 should be inserted that states as following: "Transmission and Distribution System 
Operators must submit a published investment plan setting out their intentions for investment in 
their network to the competent authority. The investment plan must cover at least five calendar years 
and shall take account of and report on a) existing and/or new pipeline capacities; b) on how 
pipeline congestion shall be avoided; 
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2. Network access: How to improve overall third party access to Europe's gas 
networks 
The above analysis also highlighted the fact that one of the most decisive factors in 
the success of a harmonised and competitive EU gas market are the rules for third 
party access to European gas networks. 
However, the dilemma that legislators and policy makers face in this context is 
finding the right balance between the interests of the network operators - to allow 
them to maintain the secure operation of their gas network systems at a fair rate-of- 
return - and third parties to access the networks paying efficiently incurred costs, on 
non-discriminatory and fair grounds. 
The previous analysis of third party access rules in the EU energy legislation as well 
as access conditions within the Dutch, Austrian and German gas markets also proves 
the following: 
- EU legislation on third party access provides only some basic elements. 
Numerous important elements are missed and/or left open to Member States' 
interpretation or implementation. Often - as discussed before - this has 
happened in an unsatisfactory way. 
- Furthermore, the different implementation approaches have created third party 
access conditions where each Member States has - often without any 
coordination with other Member States - established their own network access 
regimes. 
- This inconsistent application of third party access rules by Member States 
illustrates the fact that the aim of creating a single, harmonised and 
competitive EU gas market is far from being reached. 
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Therefore, the following discussion will outline what market elements should be 
created or improved to bring about better and more harmonised market conditions, 
that also improve the overall competitiveness of Europe's gas markets. 
a) The establishment of an entry-exit regime 
All of the aforementioned gas markets share they common factor of requiring the 
implementation of already legislated entry-exit third party access regimes, something 
that is not required by the Second Gas Directive nor by the Gas Transmission 
Regulation. One could therefore argue that the prerequisite of an entry-exit regime 
should be codified in both of the aforementioned pieces of EU legislation. On the 
contrary, one could say that this is not necessary because the vast majority of Member 
States have established entry-exit regimes. 90° Nevertheless, this survey believes that 
the requirement of an entry-exit regime should be codified in EU legislation as all 
Member States should be obliged to introduce such a system. 901 
Codification is also important because some Member States, such as Austria, 
differentiate between domestic and cross-border gas transportation, whereby cross- 
border transportation is not integrated in the national entry-exit access regime. The 
analysis above has proven that there is no justifiable reason for such separation. 902 
Furthermore, next to the codification of the access regime it is also necessary - as the 
implementation process within the above-described Member States has proven - that 
further basic requirements to the access regime are necessary to avoid disharmonised 
900 See European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to the Report 
from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, 
COM(2004)863 final, SEC(2004)1720, Brussels, 5.1.2005, p. 28. 
901 In this respect Art. 18 (1. ) of the Second Gas Directive should be changed as following: "1. Member 
States shall ensure the implementation of an entry-exit third party access regime to the transmission 
(... ]. " Art. 4 of the Gas Transmission Regulation could be extended by requiring transmission system 
operators: (a) to introduce an entry-exit third party access regime that does not differentiate 
between domestic and cross-border gas transportation. 
902 Therefore Art. 4 of the Gas Transmission Regulation could be extended by requiring transmission 
system operators: (a) to introduce an entry-exit third party access regime that does not 
differentiate between domestic and cross-border gas transportation. 
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access regimes among Member States and would henceforth avoid any unnecessary 
barriers to competition and market entry. 
In this context one could argue that such a claim would be in breach of the principle 
of `subsidiarity'. This survey, however, believes that there is no breach of this 
principle because only basic (minimum) requirements and guidelines for the 
establishment of such a regime will be suggested. The detailed implementation of 
such a system is left to each Member State. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
Electricity Regulation has proven that the EU legislator was indeed able to launch 
more precise market rules without infringing the principle of subsidiarity. 
Therefore, this survey will discuss in the following paragraphs some of the basic 
principles, of which an entry-exit system should consist: 
aa) Prerequisite for the creation of entry-exit zones 
Claims were - in particular with reference to the German market - made that there 
should be as few entry-exit zones as possible. Whereby from this survey's point of 
view, the objective of establishing entry-exit zones must be that the maximum 
available capacity is used. 903 Often, as described before, the introduction of entry-exit 
systems has caused the loss of actual capacities and it is difficult or sometimes even 
impossible for the network operator to establish how much capacity is needed at 
either the entry and/or the exit point. This problem becomes more significant as more 
gas pipeline systems fall within the entry-exit zones. Therefore the right balance 
needs to be found when establishing the size of an entry-exit zone. This, however, has 
always been subject to controversial discussions between network operators, 
regulatory bodies and network users 904 
903 Therefore Art. 18 (la) (new) of the Second Gas Directive should highlight the following: "When 
implementing an entry-exit regime, transmission and distribution operators should avoid the 
establishment of any unnecessary entry-exit zones and make the maximum capacity available for 
the market. " 
"4 Schuler, B; v. Hammerstein, C., Vorschlag eines Nezzugangsmodells für die deutsche 
Gaswirtschaft, ZfE 2/2004, p. 94. 
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From the previous chapter's analysis, it becomes clear that entry-exit zones should 
first of all be established at least on the following grounds: 
- Different gas qualities; and 
- when technically and economically necessary. 
905 
Secondly, entry-exit zones should be established within the high-pressure network 
systems of each transmission operator. Distribution or local networks should - if 
technically and economically feasible - be included in these zones or at least have 
access to at least one of these entry-exit zones 906 Sub-entry-exit zones should only be 
established within the high-pressure grids and between the distribution networks if 
this is technically and economically necessary. Experience in the Austrian and Dutch 
gas markets has shown that it is not only technically but also economically possible to 
have a relatively large entry-exit zone that primarily consists of transmission 
infrastructure and partially of distribution and local networks. `Technically necessary' 
means that, for instance, gas quality differences and network security do not allow the 
establishment of one entry-exit zone. `Economically necessary' means that, for 
instance, the costs and the loss of capacity do not justify the establishment of one 
entry-exit zone. However, the application of both terms and their implementation 
shall be monitored by the relevant national authority and be coordinated by EU 
legislators. 
Furthermore, the regulatory authority in cooperation with the transmission and 
distribution companies should assess - after a certain period after implementation of 
the entry-exit regime - the overall market situation and decide whether a reduction or 
a change in the current layout of the entry-exit zones is required and/or possible. 
"s Art. 18 (la) (new) should state further. "The establishment of different entry-exit zones within 
one network shall be based on different gas qualities and when this is technical and economical 
necessary. The relevant national regulatory authority in conjunction with the ERGEG shall 
monitor and regulate the application and implementation of the terms `technical and economical 
necessary'. " 
I* Art. 18 (la) should express further: "Transmission system operators shall avoid the 
establishment of many entry-exit zones within their network system and shall undertake the best 
endeavours to include distribution systems within their entry-exit zones. " 
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Similar remedies where made as part of the previously discussed Marathon settlement 
procedures where, for instance, E. ON Ruhrgas had agreed to include subsidiary 
companies in its overall entry-exit zone `portfolio'. This has been proven to be 
practical and therefore should be undertaken with all network operators. 907 
bb) Congestion management within the access regime 
The above analysis has also proven that there is a considerable problem with 
congestion, as many European gas networks are subject to long-term congestion. In 
this context the following questions arise: 
- Should the access regime give priority to long-term contracts that were signed 
before network congestion occurred? 
- Which procedures should be applied when congestion occurs? 
These questions will be addressed in the following section. 
(i) Long-term capacity bookings 
One of the most significant problems is the question of how should long-term 
capacity bookings be dealt with if network congestion occurs. As discussed 
previously, not only the German Cartel Office but also the Gas Transmission 
Regulation dealt with this issue only partially and even then mostly unsatisfactorily. 
Nevertheless, this survey believes, that long-term contracts should be given priority, 
when congestion occurs, if the capacity bookings are actually needed. If not, then the 
capacity should be released on an interruptible basis. This indirectly implies the much 
discussed lose-it-or-use-it-principle. But if, however, the initial capacity holder needs 
its `released' capacity back, the buyer of the interruptible capacity loses its capacity 
rights. This statement is based on experiences within the UK and Dutch network 
W Art. 18 (4) (new) should state in this respect: "After two years of implementation of an entry-exit 
system the national regulatory authority will engage with the transmission and distribution 
system operators and review the size and lay-out of the establishment of the entry-exit zones. The 
regulatory authority can reduce or rearrange the entry-exit zones of the operator in question. 
The operator in question has the right to appeal against this decision. " 
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access schemes where similar rules are applied. 908 The described principle is, from 
this survey's point of view, fair to the initial capacity holder as he took on, on a long- 
term basis, certain risks that are acknowledged by the fact that he can claim his initial 
capacity back, if he indeed needs it. But it also limits the possibility of capacity 
hoarding. Therefore the Gas Transmission Regulation should be changed 
accordingly. 909 
(ii) Procedures applied when congestion occurs 
As has been discussed before, there are different approaches to dealing with 
congestion (i. e. which congestion management rules shall apply if many shippers 
want to access limited capacities). 910 Some Member States' transmission system 
operators assign the free capacity on a first-come-first-served basis, others on a pro 
rata or on an auction basis. There are many positive and negative aspects of the 
aforementioned congestion management schemes. But this survey believes, as 
mentioned before, that the auction procedure has the most advantages for the market, 
as long as it is guaranteed that the profits made from the auctions are used to extend 
the network, and therefore limit future congestion. The auction procedure also is the 
most transparent one, as it is usually conducted on an online-basis. Therefore this 
survey's suggestion is to change the existing legislation to reflect these statements 91 1 
9°s Transco, Network Code - Summary, 2002; see also Bense, A., Gasmarktregulierung in Europa: 
Ansätze, Erfahrungen und mögliche Implikationen für das deutsche Regulierungsmodell, WIK - 
Diskussionsbeiträge, March 2005, p. 22. 
9'9 Art. 5 of the Gas Transmission Regulation should include a further paragraph that states as 
following: "If contractual and physical congestion occurs, first priority should be given to long- 
term capacity bookings that were signed before this Regulation came into force. The long-tern 
capacity holder loses its capacity if he does not use his capacity. In this case this capacity shall be 
released on an interruptible basis as long as the initial capacity holder does not claim his capacity 
back. The initial capacity holder has to provide sufficient evidence to the network operator that 
he needs his capacity. " 
910 It has already made clear that existing (long-term) bookings should be dealt in accordance with what 
has been said before. 
9" Art. 5 of the Gas Transmission Regulation should state the following: "If congestion occurs the 
available capacity should be auctioned on a web-based procedures. Any profits made by the 
auction must be used for the removal of any future congestions. " 
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(iii) Rucksack principle 
The positive implication of the rucksack principle has been described above and it has 
been stressed that in particular during congestion periods, this principle shall be 
applied. However, it is also essential there should not be any derogation from this 
principle, as long as the change of supplier happens in the same network system, 
where the rucksack principle is applied. This means, for instance, that a new supplier 
can use the network capacity of the old supplier, if he can prove that he is using the 
same or equivalent in-take point from which the customer in question is supplied. 
However, in the case where the new supplier wants to supply the customer via an in- 
take gas point that has technically no interconnection with the network connected to 
the customer in question, then the rucksack principle shall not apply. This argument is 
based on the fact that the new supplier wants to feed in gas at a point, from where it is 
technically impossible to supply the customer. If there is only one 
transmission/distribution system operator operating in the entire supply area, then a 
swap of gas and pipeline capacity would be theoretically possible. However, if more 
operators are involved this could become an impossible task. 912 
(iv) Future capacity bookings 
It has been discussed several times above that one of the problems for the 
development of a competitive European gas market is the issue of long-term capacity 
bookings for several years, which make either third party access impossible or very 
difficult. Discussion around the open-season approach in The Netherlands highlighted 
the fact that transmission system operators need a certain degree of clarity from 
network users about how long they are interested in booking capacity for in their 
networks. If this is not guaranteed, network operators often have little, if any, 
912 In this respect the Gas Transmission Regulation should include a new paragraph that introduces the 
rucksack principle in the following way: "In the case of a change of supplier the new supplier has 
the right to take over immediately the in- and off-take capacities of the former supplier 
('rucksack principle'). This principle shall not apply in the case that the new supplier wants to 
feed in the gas, which is designated for its new customer, at an in-take point that is not 
technically connected to network system where the customer is located in. " 
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incentive to either extend their networks or implement strict principles such as the 
use-it-or-lose-it principle. Nevertheless, the system operators need to allow a certain 
degree of short-term bookings (i. e. yearly, monthly, daily). This could allow a certain 
level of pipeline capacity trading as well as short-term gas trading, which then in turn 
could lead to higher gas liquidity and possibly increasing gas wholesale trading. For 
instance, in the UK the transmission system operator - National Grid - has to provide 
10% of total capacity on an interruptible basis. 913 As described above, the Dutch 
capacity booking system also allows - depending on the time of year and with certain 
exemptions on total volumes - monthly and daily bookings. Again, these procedures 
have to be welcomed because they produce similar results for gas liquidity and 
capacity trading as previously described. Therefore the Gas Transmission Regulation 
should be changed to reflect this. 14 However, in this context, it should be borne in 
mind that these capacities should be sold on a first-come-first-served basis to avoid 
long delays in capacity bookings. 
cc) Transparency requirements 
It has been stressed several times before that detailed transparency requirements 
regarding, for instance, pipeline availability, is a crucial factor for third party access. 
The above-made analysis of the Gas Transmission Regulation as well as the different 
transparency requirements within the Dutch, Austrian and German gas markets raises 
two issues with regard to transparency: 
- What market information shall be made available by the network operators, 
and 
- at which network points should this data be available? 
The following discussion is structured around these two questions. 
913Transco, Network Code - Summary, 2002. 
914 Therefore the Gas Transmission Regulation should be amended by adding an new article. "The 
transmission system operators have to make available at least a prefix of 10% of the total 
available capacity in their network system on interruptible basis. These capacities can be booked 
on a first-come-first-served basis either monthly or daily. " 
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(i) Type of market information and data 
There is much discussion about what market data should be made available. Some 
new entrants' representatives request significant amounts of market information and 
data to be released by the transmission and distribution system operators. 915 However, 
it is often stressed916, that for confidentiality reasons, the system operators cannot and 
do not want to release certain market information and/or data. 
In this respect, this survey is of the opinion that market data and information that has 
relevance for (potential) third party network users should always be made available, 
though on an aggregated basis. In this way, the confidentiality issues cannot be 
breached as from aggregated market data, it is either impossible or very difficult to 
draw concrete conclusions on, for instance, which third parties use the network and 
how. 
However, this prerequisite does not answer the question of what data should be made 
available. In this respect, this survey comes back to what has been said about the 
transparency requirements of the Gas Transmission Regulation and Dutch market 
transparency requirements. Art. 3.3. (1) of the Regulation's Guidelines already 
introduced some important transparency requirements but this should be 
supplemented by some of the transparency requirements in the Dutch transmission 
system. 917 This refers particularly to the following points: 
- Nominations of firm and interruptible capacities; 
- Firm and interruptible used capacities; 
- Backhaul918 available, recorded and nominated; 
gis See for instance, EFET, Gas Market Information Requirements, May 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
916 See in this respect, for instance, the discussion about Art. 6 (5. ) of the Gas Transmission Regulation, 
D. 111.2. d) cc). 
917 See D. 111.2. d) bb); and see Appendix 6. 
918 `ßackhaul' means the transportation of gas in a direction opposite to the aggregated physical 
flow of gas in the pipeline. Typically achieved when the transporting pipeline redelivers gas at a 
point upstream from the point of receipt. A backhaul condition will exist as long as the aggregate 
backhaul transactions are lesser in volume that the aggregated forward haul transactions. A 
backhaul transaction can result in a delivery by reduction of physical flow at the delivery point. 
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- And quality conversion available, recorded and used. 
919 
From this survey's point of view, these supplements would significantly improve the 
overall transparency of the market. However, it also becomes clear that publication of 
certain information should be made, for instance for nomination data, on an hourly 
basis. The other information should be released - at least - on a daily basis. 
920 
(ii) Points of market transparency 
Much discussion has been made regarding at which points the above market 
transparency requirements shall be made available. The Gas Transmission Regulation 
states in this respect that this shall be done at `all relevant and essential points'. As 
said above this is not satisfactory as it is not very clear what is meant by this. This 
survey is of the opinion that all entry and exit points within a network system should 
provide this data. Obviously if a certain service, for instance backhaul, cannot be 
provided for technical reasons then there is no need to provide this information. Also, 
if the network operator believes that the costs of providing such information are much 
higher than the actual benefit to the market then he should consult with the regulatory 
authority and discuss whether there should be a derogation from the above-listed 
92 transparency requirements ' 
dd) Balancing 
It also became clear that another important point for a proper third party access 
regime is the rules on balancing. It has been highlighted above that there are different 
approaches on how a balancing regime should be structured; whereby probably one of 
the worst examples of how a balancing regime should not be structured is the TAG 
9i9 Therefore the Gas Transmission Regulation's Guidelines - here 3.3. (1) - should be amended by 
adding these transparency requirements. 
920 Again, this should be incorporated by the Gas Transmission Regulations Guidelines. 
921 In this respect the Gas Transmission Regulation's Guidelines - here 3.2. - should be amended in the 
following way: "The in 3.3. (1. ) listed transparency requirements shall be published at all entry 
and exit points of the network. Network operators can consult with their national regulatory 
authority and ask for exemptions of publication of transparency requirements. " 
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balancing regime. However, some good improvements have to be identified in the 
Dutch GTS system or, as a result of the Marathon procedure in the E. ON Ruhrgas 
transportation system. Nevertheless, as also indicated by the CEER922, transmission 
system operators "should ensure compatibility of balancing regimes (tolerances, 
imbalance charges etc) in order to facilitate gas trade across borders of different TSO 
systems. " As discussed before, this has not happened and it is still to be proven 
whether Art. 7 of the EU Gas Transmission Regulation will indeed bring more 
harmonisation in the field of `balancing' across Europe's gas networks. Therefore this 
survey asks the question, which core requirements are essential for a proper balancing 
regime? 
First of all, this survey agrees with a statement made by the CEER923, where it is said 
that "Balancing rules and incentives should be designed to ensure that there are strong 
commercial incentives on network users to balance their own inputs and offlakes over 
the relevant period. The TSO, however, retains the overall responsibility for the 
economic and efficient operation of its system and therefore should retain a residual 
role in maintaining the physical balance to ensure the efficient and safe operation of 
the system. " Further to this fundamental and important remark it became clear that the 
balancing regimes of Europe's gas markets must include the following requirements: 
- An online information system that allows shippers to check the flow of their 
gas volumes at the system's entry and exit points. This will enable them to 
undertake any counteractions if they are out of balance. 
-A virtual trading point where they can buy any extra gas needed in order to 
avoid being out of balance. 
This point has been partly taken onboard by Art. 7 (6. ) of the Gas Transmission 
Regulation nevertheless it does not take into account the real-time element and that all 
922 James, K., Principles for balancing rules, Progress Report on behalf of CEER, July 2003, 
<http: //www. ceer-eu. org>, p. 3. 
923 Ibid., P. 1. 
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balancing information shall be made available at all entry and exit points where 
shippers are active. 924 
(i) Tolerance limits 
A further difficultly subject to significant discussion between network users and 
transporters is the question of balance tolerance limits which differ between 
individual Member States. In some cases, e. g. in Great Britain and The Netherlands, 
the tolerance levels that apply in respect of balancing are very low or non-existent. 
The extent of out-of-balance penalties also plays a significant part in determining 
tolerance limits. These also differ between the various Member Countries. For 
instance, these penalties range between 2 and 13% in The Netherlands, whereas in 
Great Britain they depend on the gas market price prevailing on the day in question. 
From this survey's point of view, the following shall apply when a low tolerance limit 
is set (i. e. < 2%): 
- The penalties should be set only on the basis of the applicable market prices, 
as happens in Great Britain. 
- This argument is justified, since network users have to bear only the costs that 
they would have incurred in any case, if they had acquired additional gas on 
the spot market on the day on which the imbalance occurred. 
- Network operators should also be recompensed for the costs incurred in 
calculating the imbalance and the purchase of spot gas. 
(ii) Balance periods 
As has been shown925, the extent of available linepack and storage units is a key 
determining factor for the selection of balance period (hourly / daily / monthly). Since 
924 Therefore Art. 7 (6. ) of the Gas Transmission Regulation should be changed as following: 
"Transmission system operators establish a real-time online information system where they shall 
provide detail information on the balancing status of the network user. " 
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this differs from country to country, this survey cannot make any firm statements 
regarding how balance periods should be structured in general; this must be 
determined in the individual countries based on the circumstances applying to each 
network. 
b) Regulation of network charges 
The above discussion about network access also makes it clear that the level of 
network access charges are also very important for developments in upstream and 
downstream market levels, in addition to non-discriminatory network access. Whilst it 
must be noted that the implementation of a functioning network access model 
appropriate to the market is a key task for the gas sector in the first instance, in the 
next stage the level of network user charges and corresponding calculation methods 
are highly relevant if genuine competition and extensive market harmonisation are to 
be achieved. 
All Member States practise ex ante regulation of network charges, which should be 
welcomed as a matter of course. However, there remains the question as to how this 
will be managed in the future, particularly with a large number of network operators. 
From this perspective, regulatory authorities can proceed only on the basis of random 
samples in some instances, which mean that some amount of unequal treatment 
between the network operators will be inevitable. 
As discussed to a certain extent above, Member Countries have adopted various 
approaches for charging models. While Great Britain, The Netherlands and Italy, for 
example, have implemented incentive-based charging models, France and Austria set 
network charges on a `cost-plus' basis. 
925 Ilense, A., Gasmarktregulierung in Europa: Ansätze, Erfahrungen und mögliche Implikationen für 
das deutsche Regulierungsmodell, WIK - Diskussionsbeiträge, March 2005, p. 21. 
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This survey is convinced that incentive-based regulation best reflects both the 
interests of the network user, end customer and the network operators, which leads to 
the specific question of how the incentive-based model should be structured. A range 
of approaches are being discussed in this regard. 926 As has been proposed, 927 the 
following points in particular are important when it comes to structuring an incentive- 
based regulation system928: 
- Incentive-based regulation is a further development of purely cost-based 
regulation. In the latter case, network operators' revenues are established on 
the basis of their actual costs, with an appropriate return on investments. This 
ensures that the companies can invest to a sufficient extent in the network 
infrastructure to guarantee security and reliability of supply. A purely cost- 
based regulation system on the other hand offers no direct incentive for 
productivity increases and the resultant cost reductions. 
- Incentive-based regulation is different: its goal is precisely to give companies 
incentives of this nature. To achieve this, the companies are set upper limits 
caps for their revenues (or prices) over a period of several years, i. e. they are 
given a budget to perform their services. The caps decreases during the 
regulatory period in accordance with a predefined rate of productivity 
increase. In this way, the customers benefit in all cases from the specified 
increase in productivity. Individual network operators have an incentive to 
increase their productivity beyond the specified value, since the additional 
productivity increases are for their own benefit if they succeed. 
- The problem with incentive-based regulation lies in setting the correct 
incentives. Experience with incentive-based regulation shows that this is a 
difficult balancing act. In many cases, companies have been able to achieve 
926 1lemphill, R. C. et al, Incentive Regulation in Network Industries: Experience and Prospects in the 
U. S. Telecommunications, Electricity, and Natural Gas Industries, Review of Network Economics, 
Vol. 2, Issue 4- December 2003. 
927 E. ON Corporate, E. ONproposes incentive regulation model, I1 July 2005. The following 
arguments are based on the E. ON model. 
928 The following arguments are based on the E. ON market model on incentive regulation. 
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the required cost reduction only by postponing and neglecting necessary 
investments. While customers get to enjoy lower prices in the short term in 
this way, this is often at the expense of security and reliability of supply. In the 
longer term, delayed investment in the neglected assets results in higher costs 
to the customers and economic damage. 
- Specific mechanisms for capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating 
expenditure (OPEX) must be provided to avoid these risks on the one hand 
and to make it possible to pass the specified productivity increases on to the 
users on the other. This reflects the particular importance of capital 
expenditure in quality of supply. 
- Upper limits for capital expenditure have to be set on the basis of individual 
company investment budgets to this end. Network operators should submit an 
investment plan to the regulatory authority at the start of a regulatory period 
which is then checked by comparing key parameters (e. g. specific costs per 
connection). The checking process should focus on granting an investment 
budget rather than checking individual investment projects. Network operators 
would then be free to decide which specific investment project they wanted to 
implement, and when and where they wished to do so. They would have the 
certainty that the costs of their investments were being fully taken into account 
in the charging calculation, as long as they did not exceed the investment 
budget. This provides investment and planning security for the network 
operators, and thus an appropriate investment incentive overall. Specifying an 
investment budget makes it possible to create the necessary incentives to 
increase productivity, at the same time as providing a reward for not 
exhausting the budget whilst achieving the agreed investment goals. 
- The upper limits for OPEX decrease in line with the average increase in 
productivity for all structurally comparable network operators. This gives 
individual network operators an incentive to increase their productivity by 
more than the average, since they keep any surpluses generated by exceeding 
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productivity targets. Competition develops between network operators to 
achieve the greatest possible increase in productivity, which causes average 
productivity growth to accelerate. All productivity growth is passed on to 
network users. At the same time, measures are put in place to prevent the 
sector from becoming overstretched by unrealistically high productivity 
targets and being forced into asset reductions. Not all companies are equally 
efficient at the start of the incentive-based regulation process. Those that have 
already implemented extensive measures to increase productivity and already 
demonstrate a high level of productivity may not be disadvantaged as a 
consequence. For this reason, higher individual productivity targets must be 
set for the less efficient companies during a limited transitional stage. This 
gives them a chance to catch up with companies that are already more 
efficient. To implement the necessary adaptation, the productivity of 
structurally comparable network operators is compared at the start of the 
regulatory process. It is important that only those companies whose supply 
tasks are actually comparable are compared with each other. There are a range 
of methods to compare productivity. Several procedures must be applied in 
parallel to obtain the most robust result possible. The companies are then 
given individual productivity targets based on the productivity comparison. 
The companies that are already efficient are given a reduced productivity 
target, adjusted to allow the less efficient companies to catch up. At the end of 
the adaptation stage, which may run for several regulatory periods if 
appropriate, all companies will be set the average productivity increase value 
as a target. Efficiency comparisons will be performed again at the end of the 
regulation period. The goal is to check the quality of the initial benchmarking 
against a database that has been improved in the meantime and either to 
confirm the productivity targets derived from it or to adjust it for future 
application. To avoid compromising incentives for productivity increases, 
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savings in operating expenditure that exceed the productivity targets must 
remain with the network operators. 
This survey believes that the above points can be used as the basis for a reasonable 
incentive-based regulation system that can provide network security in particular, and 
the lowest possible network charges as well. 
3. The roles and responsibilities of regulatory bodies within changing and non- 
harmonised EU gas markets 
The above analysis also stressed the importance of regulatory bodies in markets not 
yet fully liberalised or harmonised with other EU gas markets. Nevertheless, this 
survey has to identify four main areas where there are considerable shortfalls in this 
respect: 
(1. ) Firstly, the EU legislation on energy regulatory bodies is missing a number of 
important elements and therefore has laid down an unsatisfactory basis for the 
implementation process. 
(2. ) Furthermore, the EU regulatory body ERGEG is not equipped with 
sophisticated powers to drive forward the harmonised and liberalisation 
process across the EU. 
(3. ) Most Member States have different perspectives about what the role and 
responsibilities of their national regulatory bodies should be. 
(4. ) Finally, as the majority of national regulatory authorities are bound by their 
national legal framework of duties and powers, most regulatory authorities 
think only on a national level and are less interested in the creation of a 
harmonised and liberalised European gas market. 
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Against the background of these observations, this survey believes that improvements 
should be made in the following areas: 
a) The avoidance of multiple regulatory bodies 
The analysis above showed that some Member States, such as Germany and Austria, 
allow the establishment of Federal State regulatory authorities next to the national 
regulatory body. Although this is in line with the second EU Directive and the 
relevant national law, it has become clear that this development is often not in the 
interest of market harmonisation and liberalisation. This argument is based on the fact 
that the more regulatory bodies involved, the more difficult it is to have a common 
approach on how to deal with (sometimes complex) regulatory issues that might not 
be favoured by all the relevant stakeholders. In this respect, it has to be kept in mind 
that energy markets have become global markets, which - from this survey's point of 
view - often do not allow a limited view of a few single Federal States. Therefore, 
this thesis believes that the rights and obligations of the Federal regulatory authorities 
should be restricted as much as possible. In this respect, the German energy 
legislation provided a few positive elements, which referred in particular to when 
Federal regulatory bodies shall have ruling powers over energy companies and issues. 
Nevertheless, only the national regulatory bodies should have the right to outline 
legally binding guidelines on how to deal with regulatory issues, such as the 
monitoring and investigation of the activities of market players. The Federal State 
regulatory institution must provide all information and market data they obtain to the 
national regulatory body; this will considerably improve the position of the national 
regulatory body as it will be able to observe the entire market. This is of particular 
importance in the field of security of supply as well as when investigating market 
dominance abuses. Therefore this survey suggests that Art. 25 of the Second Gas 
Directive should be amended according] Y. 929 
929 Amendment of Art. 25 (1. ): "Member States shall designate one or more competent bodies with the 
function of regulatory authorities. If a Member States establishes more than one regulatory body 
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b) Independence of the regulatory authority 
There has been much debate in this thesis about how independent the regulatory 
authority should be from other authorities such as the Government. 
The thesis has identified that there is no definition and common understanding of 
what the term `independent' should mean. 
We recall that the Second Gas Directive only states that the regulatory authority 
should be "independent of the interests of the gas industry". However, this wording 
left room for possible interference by governmental bodies. Furthermore, this thesis 
has recognised that Member States have all kinds of structures for the energy 
regulatory bodies. 
This survey is of the opinion that indeed a common, basic definition and 
understanding of what `independent' should mean is crucial. In this respect, this thesis 
believes that above all the regulatory authority should at first be free from external 
control and constraints. However, these words still leave room for governmental 
involvement and the question of how much influence government authorities should 
have on regulatory bodies is yet to be answered. 
From this survey's point of view, the experiences of the UK regulatory system are 
exemplary in this respect. In the UK, the regulatory body OFGEM operates under the 
direction and governance of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (hereinafter 
`authority'), which makes all major decisions and sets policy priorities for 
OFGEM. 930 The authority's role in the management of OFGEM is set-out in its rules 
of procedure. 93 1 However, the members of the authority are appointed by the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry (hereinafter `Dti'). Although the Dti keeps the right 
then the national regulatory authority shall have the obligation to constitute binding guidelines 
on how the energy market shall be organised accordingly to the subsequent paragraphs. All other 
regulatory bodies next to the national regulatory authority shall be obliged to provide the 
national regulatory authority with all relevant market data. [... ]. " 
930 For more information see <http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/>. 
931 Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, Rules of Procedure of the Gas and Electricity Markets 
Authority, 21 July 2005, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
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to appoint the authority, there is only an indirect linkage - via the authority - between 
the ministry and the regulatory body. This ensures - from this survey's point of view 
- that the ministry is kept out of the day-to-day business of the regulatory body and 
ensures that the authority and the regulatory body achieves common policy, which is 
not influenced by direct political interference. 
The founding of such an authority can only be a recommendation for EU legislation 
and Member States, as codification within EU energy legislation would be in breach 
of the principle of `subsidiarity'. This is based on the fact that EU legislation cannot 
prescribe in detail how regulatory bodies should be created, it can only require that in 
general a regulatory body is established. 
c) Cooperation between the national regulatory authority and the competition body 
Another possible area of conflict resulting from the current lack of EU wide market 
harmonisation, was identified as being the insufficient distinction between the powers 
and duties of the regulatory and competition authorities. In this respect, one could 
question having two authorities to govern over a field, which are very much related. 
This argument is based on the grounds that if, for instance, the competition authority 
makes a decision in the field of energy, this will most likely have an immediate 
impact on the regulated energy industry. 932 In this context, one could say that it is not 
necessary to create one `super' regulatory body that deals with both regulation and 
competition matters. This argument is based on the fact that in reality sometimes 
regulatory issues do not necessarily become competition matters. 
However, this survey believes that there is a need for greater cooperation and 
coordination between both institutions. This creates more synergy and therefore 
productivity, from which the market will benefit greatly. This also relates to setting up 
a Committee that coordinates both activities and will also seek solutions when 
932 A good example was the above-described investigation by the German FCO into the long-term 
supply contracts. This survey is of the opinion that the entire investigation and its outcomes will have 
also considerable consequences for the regulated industry and therefore should have coordinated 
between the regulatory and competition authorities. 
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dealing with possible disagreements between the bodies. This will create greater 
market certainty and fewer regulatory risks for companies, which might be targeted 
by the aforementioned authorities. These companies would receive a common and 
consistent decision from both institutions and therefore the EU legislation should be 
changed accordingly. 933 Nevertheless, the detail of the cooperation and coordination is 
again left open to the principle of subsidiarity and therefore some of the previous 
comments must be understood as poor recommendations. 
d) Cooperation of national regulatory bodies - the role of ERGEG 
This thesis illustrated the fact that there is a need for national regulatory bodies to 
work together. This view is supported by ERGEG934, which inter alia stresses that 
"Within a wider regional (or European) market, there needs to be strong co-operation 
between regulatory authorities to ensure the mutual compatibility of national 
arrangements within the wider market, and to ensure that the aims of the wider market 
are realised as well as the aims of the national market. In essence, this means that the 
regulatory framework, involving regulators, TSOs and market participants must take 
full account of cross-border trade. " This survey fully agrees with this statement as it is 
clear that not only domestic regulatory decisions, but also conflicts, arising through 
the transportation of gas across many borders, can have an influence on the gas 
markets in many Member States. In this respect, this survey illustrated that there are a 
number of legal and regulatory gaps. In this context, ERGEG935 argues that "Where 
there are regulatory gaps, regulatory co-operation may be insufficient to fill the gaps 
in absence of legal competence to do so, and to allow decisions relating to cross- 
933 Art. 25 should be extended in the following way: "In the case Member States have established an 
competition authority that has also powers over the energy industry, the regulatory and 
competition authority shall cooperate and coordinate their work and decisions as much as 
r3 ossible. " 
4 ERGEG, Roadmap for a competitive single gas market in Europe, An ERGEG Discussion Paper for 
Public Consultation, 21 November 2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org>, p. 19. 
935 Ibid. 
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border issues to be enforced. If this proves to be the case, action at EU or national 
level will be needed to complete the legislative framework. " As highlighted above, 
this survey sees a particular need for greater cooperation between the national 
regulatory bodies in the areas of cross-border trade and mitigation of security of 
supply incidents. The issue of security of supply has been already addressed above. 
However, in the field of cross-border trade the following main aspects have to be 
addressed by national regulatory bodies: 
- Congestion management; 
- Cross-border conflict; 
- and communication between regulatory bodies. 
aa) Congestion management and the role of regulators 
It has been stressed before that congestion management is an area where significant 
improvements must be made in order to allow gas competition to flourish. However, 
in this respect, the description of the role and responsibilities of the regulators is 
rather weak and needs, from this survey's point of view, improvement. 
Art. 25 (1. ) (b) of the Second Gas Directive only stresses that regulatory bodies shall 
become involved if congestion occurs "within the national gas system. " But it does 
not refer to cross-border congestion matters. 
Furthermore, the Gas Transmission Regulation does not deal with this issue at all. 
Therefore, this survey believes, that either the Gas Directive or the Gas Transmission 
Regulation should be changed. Although it seems more logical to change the 
Regulation, as it is meant to also deal with cross-border transportation issues 936 
It has been said before, that one way to deal with congestion is by initiating auctions 
of capacity at (cross-border) congestion points. In this respect, regulatory bodies can 
play a significant role. For instance, in the electricity sector numerous Member State 
936 Art. 5 of the Gas Transmission Regulation should be supplemented by the following paragraph: "In 
the event of a congestion at a cross-border point national regulatory authorities shall co-operate 
in order to find, after consultation with the network operators and the industry, common 
solutions to deal with the congestion. " 
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regulatory bodies have worked together and established draft rules for capacity 
auctions at cross-border points. 37 The legal basis for this cooperation has been 
codified in the Annex to the Electricity Regulation where it is said that "The explicit 
auction procedures shall be prepared in close collaboration between the national 
regulatory authority and the TSO concerned and designed in such a way as to allow 
bidders to participate also in the daily sessions of any organised market (i. e. power 
exchange) in the countries involved. " 
From this survey's point of view, a similar legislative text should be included in the 
Gas Transmission Regulation. 938 This would encourage improved conditions for the 
access to rare capacities at cross-border points, supporting the development of 
enhanced competitive market elements. 
bb) Cross-border conflicts 
The thesis has highlighted that when it comes to cross-border conflicts, existing 
regulation is lacking. As stated above, Art. 25 (10. ) of the Second Gas Directive 
proved not to be very useful in this respect. Furthermore, the Gas Transmission 
Regulation does not deal with this issue. 
This legislative shortfall is also identified by ERGEG and it is further said939 that "A 
market participant, or a TSO, may be able to take an action in one jurisdiction, which 
has an impact on consumers in a second jurisdiction, in relation to which the 
regulatory authorities in the second jurisdiction would have no authority to act. In 
such instances, the regulatory authorities in the first jurisdiction should act, but this 
will also require effective cooperation to ensure that the first regulator accords the 
937 Bundesnetzagentur, Common Position of the Regulatory Authorities of the CEE Region on the 
Draft Auction Rules for 2006 and the TSO Agreement for 2006, 
<http: //www. bundesnetzagentur. de/media/archive/4174. pdf>. 
938 Art. 5 of the Gas Transmission Regulation should be extended as following: "In the event of 
congestion at a cross border point the transmission system operator concerned and the national 
regulatory authorities shall prepare explicit auction procedures. The procedures shall be 
designed in such a way as to allow bidders to participate also in the daily sessions of any 
organised market in the countries involved. " 
939 ERGEG, supra note, p. 35. 
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issue appropriate priority. In the absence of effective regulatory cooperation, the risk 
of regulatory gaps causing problems [... ] is worsened. " 
Therefore, this thesis believes that more cooperation tools and rules on how to deal 
with cross-border disputes should be established. Art. 25 (10. ) of the Second Gas 
Directive must be amended in such a way that the regulatory authorities which are 
directly affected by cross border conflict should be involved. The authorities shall 
seek in accordance with their national legislation - in consultation with the companies 
in question -a common solution, which then should be enacted by the relevant 
regulatory bodies within their national jurisdiction. A possible way this could be 
codified in the Second Gas Directive is to amend Art. 25 (10. ) in the following way: 
"In the event of cross-border disputes, the regulatory authorities for the transmission 
systems affected by the conflict, shall find, after consultation with the transmission 
system operators in question, a common solution on how the conflict shall be solved. 
The decision shall be enforced by the national regulatory authority within their own 
area of jurisdiction, in respect to the system operator, which refuses the use of, or 
access to, the system. " However, this amendment could be seen as an infringement 
on the individual rights of the Member States and in breach with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Therefore, it would need further agreements and legislation between all 
Member States on how cross-border conflicts should be resolved. 
cc) Communication between national regulatory bodies 
As EU gas markets start to compete within a global gas market, Member States need 
to communicate more with each other. This refers in particular to security of supply 
but also other market developments. In this respect, the establishment of ERGEG has 
to be seen as a positive step forward as it appears to be a good platform where these 
issues can be properly addressed. Nevertheless, this survey believes that there should 
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be codification within the Second Gas Directive where this general obligation of 
exchange information should take place. 940 
dd) The role of ERGEG 
The more the EU Commission and certain Member States, such as the UK, push for 
greater market harmonisation and liberalisation, the more the role and duties of 
ERGEG becomes important. In some ways, it can replace the need for the 
establishment of a super regulatory body that deals with all European regulatory 
matters. However, the powers and responsibilities of ERGEG need to be strengthened 
as it is clear that they are still an institution with no real powers. Nevertheless, 
ERGEG has shown some good progress, mainly in the electricity sector, where they 
have found the right balance between the EU and Member States. However, to give 
ERGEG more decision making powers, a new regulation would be necessary, which 
ultimately could be seen as an infringement of Member State rights. 
However, this survey will only address the core areas where ERGEG should acquire 
some decision making powers, referring inter alia to the following areas: 
- security of supply; 
- cross-border disputes; 
- cross-border trade and congestion; 
- legal standards and conditions for gas transportation across borders. 
4. Unbundling 
This thesis has identified how important unbundling is within the establishment of 
liberalised and harmonised gas markets. It has been further illustrated that existing EU 
legislation on unbundling is not sufficient to support the creation of a fully liberalised 
Sao Art. 25 should be supplemented by the following paragraph: "National regulatory bodies shall 
exchange on a regular basis underlying supply and market data with their neighbouring Member 
States. ERGEG should facilitate common and standardised formats on which basis these 
information shall be made available. " 
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EU gas market. Apart from that, it has become clear that Member States have chosen 
all kinds of different unbundling approaches. For example, The Netherlands has 
chosen, from this survey's point of view, the most drastic approach by partial 
implementation of ownership unbundling. However, this survey believes that strict 
ownership unbundling is not in the interests of the EU gas markets. This argument is 
based on the fact that many Member States have to protect the ownership rights of the 
existing companies for constitutional reasons. Furthermore, the EU is a free market 
where Governments should not take such drastic approaches as the dispossession of a 
company network facility. The now privately owned network companies would have 
to be reimbursed for the loss of the property, which would cost the public millions of 
Euros. Apart from the fact that this money is often not available, it should rather be 
invested in the implementation of unbundling provisions. The proper enforcement and 
coherent application of unbundling should be the first step before any other measures 
are introduced. Additionally, this survey does not consider that full ownership 
separation is a prerequisite for establishing efficient regional markets across 
Europe. The UK, for example, has established effective internal separation 
arrangements between trading and network businesses in both its electricity and gas 
markets. These include robust arrangements to prevent the transfer of commercially 
sensitive information between sister companies in a company group. UK examples 
include organisational separation of electricity distribution from supply since 1998 
separation of gas distribution from supply since 2004 following the sale of 4 gas 
distribution networks by National Grid and Centrica Storage whose activities are `ring 
fenced' from its sister company's trading and supply businesses. 
In any case, this survey believes that it should be up to the national and EU regulatory 
bodies to ensure that a vertically integrated company does not take unjustified 
advantage of its powerful position if it owns a transportation company. Nevertheless, 
some practical improvements to the existing EU rules can made, which are the subject 
of the following points: 
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- In practice it has been proven that a relocation (i. e. a physical move) of the 
different entities of a vertically integrated company can have a considerable 
positive effect on the adherence to the unbundling provisions. This argument 
is based on the fact that it will be more difficult to involve all the different 
parts of the company on a day-to-day-basis, as people will find it more 
difficult to communicate with each other. 
- Furthermore, the management of the mother company should not be allowed 
to sit on the board of the transportation company. This will provide the 
transportation company with more `freedom' and will make it more difficult 
for the mother company to have a direct influence on the day-to-day decisions 
of the transportation company. 
These basic suggestions, however, cannot be implemented by EU law as they can 
only, from this survey's point of view, be enacted on the basis of Member State 
legislation. This argument is based on the fact that the principle of subsidiarity has to 
be obeyed by EU legislation. 
5. The way forward: Which steps are the necessary steps to be taken? 
The final issue to be addressed in answering the research question of this thesis is 
which steps could be taken to improve cooperation and harmonisation between 
Member States. It has become apparent that at this stage it is unrealistic to have fully 
harmonised markets with the same standards, conditions and rules within all Member 
States. This argument is based on the analysis above, which proved that the 
development within and between Member States varies - sometimes significantly. 
Therefore a step-by-step approach is necessary. 
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a) The establishment of regional gas markets 
A first step is the establishment of regional gas markets which can address the specific 
characteristics of each market much better than an approach, which covers all 
Member States at once. This argument is even more pertinent as new Member States 
will join the European Union in the future with their own, different, market structures. 
As said before the official establishment of regional gas markets by ERGEG would be 
welcomed and was identified as being an absolute necessity. This argument is based 
on the fact that at this stage of the overall market development within and between 
Member States, only the establishment of regional markets will lead to practical 
solutions, creating more harmonised market conditions, improving overall 
competitiveness as well as security of supply. Partly in contrast to the above described 
approach of ERGEG on regional markets, this survey is of the opinion that concerning 
the countries, which were analysed previously, the establishment of regional markets 
should be developed in the following way941: 
-A regional market between Austria and Germany, should be set up, whereby 
the main focus should be on the interconnection of both countries with respect 
to integrating and coordinating their network access regimes as well as their 
security of supply standards. This would also allow in future the Baumgarten 
gas hub to develop further, as an important gas sourcing point for new market 
players in the south-east of Europe. 
- Similar arguments apply for the establishment of a regional market between 
Austria and Italy. In contrast to the German gas market, the Italian gas market 
is significantly dependent on gas imports via Austria and therefore cross- 
border access rules need to be coordinated and brought in-line with each other. 
In this respect, the TAG operator needs to cooperate and establish a fair and 
non-discriminatory access regime which is in line with the national access 
regimes of Austria and Italy. Differentiation between domestic and cross- 
941 It is noteworthy that the Member States can be members in more than one regional market group. 
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border transportation should not be made, as it is a regional market which does 
not recognise borders, network operators or Member States. 
- Furthermore, a regional market should be established between The 
Netherlands and Germany. Mostly this refers to the creation of similar 
network access regimes, particularly for the neighbouring transmission system 
operators. This would also create a regional market, where the German as well 
as the Dutch gas market could be one of the most significant gas exchanges 
and hubs in Europe. This argument is based on the fact that the `Dutch- 
German-regional-market' consists of one of the most significant, and 
strategically important, gas fields (Groningen) within Continental and that 
both countries are significant landing points for gas pipelines from non-EU 
gas producing countries. Furthermore, both countries are well connected and 
have highly sophisticated domestic gas networks. 
- The `Dutch-German-regional-market' could also include the UK market as the 
UK will be - via the BBL-line in 2006/07 - significantly interconnected with 
both markets and could benefit considerably from the further liberalisation and 
harmonisation of the Dutch and German gas markets. 
b) A third legislative package? 
The suggestions on how to improve the existing regulatory and legislative rules and 
laws on market harmonisation and liberalisation raise the issue of how these proposals 
should be transferred into national law. This survey believes that the EU legislators as 
well as Member State Governments should indeed prepare a third legislative energy 
package, which includes the above suggestions. However, before the new legislative 
initiative is taken, Member States, national regulatory authorities and the Commission 
should allow in particular transmission system operators to implement the existing 
legislation properly and give at least a year long transition period before any new EU 
energy (gas) legislation is launched. Realistically, the year 2006 should be used to 
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implement the regional markets as described above, then the above suggestions can be 
discussed. The years 2007 and 2008 should be used to implement further legislation. 
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Definitions and explanations used in this survey: 
`Ancillary services' means all services necessary for access to and the operation of 
transmission and/or distribution networks and/or LNG facilities and/or storage 
facilities including load balancing and blending, but excluding facilities reserved 
exclusively for transmission system operators carrying out their functions. (Art 2. 
(14. ) Gas Directive)942 
`Auctions' The base mechanism for several congestion management methods. In all 
cases, each market participant offers a price for use of the net transfer capacity. The 
bids of the participants are stacked with the highest bids first until the capacity is 
completely used. (P. D. Cameron) 943 
`Available capacity' means the part of the technical capacity that is not allocated and 
is still available to the system at that moment. (Gas Transmission Regulation Art. 2 
(1) No. 2O)944 
`Backhaul' means the transportation of gas in a direction opposite the aggregate 
physical flow of gas in the pipeline. Typical achieved when the transporting pipeline 
redelivers gas at a point upstream from the point of receipt. A backhaul condition will 
exist as long as the aggregate backhaul transactions are lesser in volume that the 
aggregate forward haul transactions. A backhaul transaction can result in a delivery 
by reduction of physical flow at the delivery point. 
`Balancing' means the process of physically regulating quantities of gas in a pipeline 
system by making injections to or withdrawals from the system equal to a 
predetermined volume. Balancing may be required on an hourly, daily, monthly or 
seasonal basis, with penalties often imposed on shippers not operating within the 
required balancing thresholds. For more information and analysis on the issue of 
balancing, 
`Capacity' means the maximum flow, expressed in normal cubic meters per time unit 
or in energy unit per time unit, to which the network user is entitled in accordance 
with the provisions of the transportation contract. (Gas Transmission Regulation Art. 
2 (1) No. 3) 
'Chinese Wall' A mechanism for the separation of transmission from supply and 
other functions within a vertically-integrated undertaking to preserve the 
confidentiality of commercially sensitive information obtained by a system operator 
942 All definition that refer to `Gas Directive' are taken from the Directive 2003/55/EC (OJL 176/57) of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC. 
943 All definition that refer to `P. D. Cameron' are taken from Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU 
]Energy-Re gulation - Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe. 
944 All definitions that refer to `Gas Transmission Regulation' are taken from the Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks, 
COM(2003) 741 final, 2003/0302 (COD), 2005. 
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when carrying out its business, especially with respect to taking decisions on network 
access. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Committed flow rate' means that a shipper informs the transmission system 
operator that he will deliver a pre-defined quantity of gas at a pre-defined intake 
point, from where the transmission system operator shall undertake the transportation 
of the gas to its final destination. 
`Congestion' A situation in which the transmission line linking transmission 
networks cannot accommodate all scheduled or intended transactions due to lack of 
capacity. (P. D. Cameron) 
'Congestion management' means management of the capacity portfolio of the 
transmission system operator with a view to optimal and maximum use of the 
technical capacity and the timely detection of future congestion and saturation points. 
(Gas Transmission Regulation Art. 2 (1) No. 5) 
`Contractual congestion' means a situation where the level of firm capacity demand 
exceeds the technical capacity. (Gas transmission regulation Art. 2 (1) No. 21) 
'Cost-reflective' means that transmission system operators are obliged to set tariffs 
that reflect efficiently incurred costs of network operation rather than costs actually 
incurred. 
`Cross-border Transmission' means the transmission service provided by a 
transmission system operator, resulting from all physical flows across borders, 
including imports, exports, and transit. (P. D. Cameron) 
'Customers' means wholesale and final customers of natural gas and natural gas 
undertakings which purchase natural gas. (Art. 2 (24. ) Gas Directive) 
`Destination clauses' contains a contractual obligation on the gas purchaser 
forbidding them to resell the gas outside of its supply territory. At the same time the 
gas seller is obliged to seek the permission of the gas buyer if he wants to re-sell the 
purchased gas to a third party located in his supply territory. 
`Direct line' means a natural gas pipeline complementary to the interconnected 
system. (Art. 2 (18. ) Gas Directive) 
'Distribution' means the transport of natural gas through local or regional pipeline 
networks with a view to its delivery to customers, but not including supply. (Art. 2 
(5. ) Gas Directive) 
'Distribution system operator' means a natural or legal person who carries out the 
function of distribution and is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of, 
and, if necessary, developing the distribution system in a given area and, where 
applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term 
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution of gas. (Art. 2 
(6. ) Gas Directive) 
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`Downstream' Those activities related to natural gas which involve transmission and 
distribution. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Eligible customers' means customers who are free to purchase gas from the supplier 
of their choice, within the meaning of Article 23 of this Directive. (Art. 2 (28. ) Gas 
Directive) 
`Entry-Exit access regime' means that the third party network user only has to book 
an entry and an exit capacity - without an actual transportation pathway - in order to 
reach his customer. It is up to the transmission system operator to combine the entry 
and exit point. The total transportation charge is the sum of separate charges for the 
entry and exit capacity. Therefore the network user does not have to pay for the actual 
route on which the gas flows. He only has to pay for the entry and respective exit 
capacity. 
`Final customers' means customers purchasing natural gas for their own use. (Art. 2 
(27. ) Gas Directive) 
`Firm capacity' means gas transmission capacity contractually guaranteed as 
uninterruptible by the transmission system operator. (Gas Transmission Regulation 
Art. 2 (1) No. 16) 
`First Come, First Served' A method of capacity reservation in which the first 
reservation made for a given period of time has priority over the subsequent 
reservations; leaves little room for short-term trading. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Gas Hub' means where major interconnections of natural gas pipelines meet and 
where many buyers and sellers trade natural gas. 
`Horizontally integrated undertaking' means an undertaking performing at least 
one of the functions of production, transmission, distribution, supply or storage of 
natural gas, and a non-gas activity. (Art. 2 (21. ) Gas Directive) 
`Household customers' means customers purchasing natural gas for their own 
household consumption. (Art. 2 (25. ) Gas Directive) 
`Incumbent' A company holding a monopolistic position by law prior to market 
liberalization. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Integrated natural gas undertaking' means a vertically or horizontally integrated 
undertaking. (Art. 2 (19. ) Gas Directive) 
`Interruptible' Gas supply terms that include specific rights of curtailment of supply 
by vendor. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Interruptible capacity' means gas transmission capacity that can be interrupted by 
the transmission system operator according to the conditions stipulated in the 
transportation contract. (Art. 2 (1) No. 13, Gas Transmission Regulation) 
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`Interruptible services' means services offered by the transmission system operator 
in relation to interruptible capacity. (Art. 2 (1) No. 12, Gas Transmission Regulation) 
`Interconnected system' means a number of systems which are linked with each 
other. (Art. 2 (16. ) Gas Directive) 
'Interconnector' means a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between 
Member States for the sole purpose of connecting the national transmission systems 
of these Member States. (Art. 2 (17. ) Gas Directive) 
`Linepack' means the storage of gas by compression in gas transmission and 
distribution systems, but excluding facilities reserved for transmission system 
operators carrying out their functions. (Art. 2 (15. ) Gas Directive) 
`LNG facility' means a terminal which is used for the liquefaction of natural gas or 
the importation, offloading, and re-gasification of LNG, and shall include ancillary 
services and temporary storage necessary for the re-gasification process and 
subsequent delivery to the transmission system, but shall not include any part of LNG 
terminals used for storage. (Art. 2 (11. ) Gas Directive) 
`LNG system operator' means a natural or legal person who carries out the function 
of liquefaction of natural gas, or the importation, offloading, and re-gasification of 
LNG and is responsible for operating a LNG facility. (Art. 2 (12. ) Gas Directive) 
`Matching of gas nominations' means that transmissions system operators counter 
check the nominations they have received from a specific shipper who wants to ship a 
certain quantity of gas within their gas networks. 
`Natural gas undertaking' means any natural or legal person carrying out at least 
one of the following functions: production, transmission, distribution, supply, 
purchase or storage of natural gas, including LNG, which is responsible for the 
commercial, technical and/or maintenance tasks related to those functions, but shall 
not include final customers. (Art. 2 (1. ) Gas Directive) 
`Non-household customers' means customers purchasing natural gas which is not for 
their own household use. (Art. 2 (26. ) Gas Directive) 
`Natural Monopoly' Where average costs of the new entrant exceed the marginal 
costs of the existing supplier (i. e. situation where the market is most efficient 
economically if there is only one provider). (P. D. Cameron) 
`Negotiated TPA' Third party access in which tariffs and conditions are the result of 
negotiations. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Network User' A person who is either seeking, or has gained, access to the network. 
(P. D. Cameron) 
`Nomination' means the prior reporting by the network user to the transmission 
system operator of the actual flow that he wishes to inject into or withdraw from the 
system. (Art. 2 (1) No. 7 Gas Transmission Regulation) 
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'physical congestion' means a situation where the level of demand for actual 
deliveries exceeds the technical capacity at some point in time. (Gas Transmission 
Regulation Art. 2 (1) No. 23) 
`Postage-stamp System' A system of transmission pricing in which the same unit 
price is charged for transmission, irrespective of how far the energy is transported. 
(P. D. Cameron) 
`Regulated TPA' Third party access in which tariffs and conditions are approved or 
determined by the regulator. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Related undertakings' means affiliated undertakings, within the meaning of Article 
41 of the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 
44(2)(g) (*) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts (2), and/or associated 
undertakings, within the meaning of Article 33(1) thereof, and/or undertakings which 
belong to the same shareholders. (Art. 2 (22. ) Gas Directive) 
`Re-nomination' means the subsequent reporting of a corrected nomination; Art. 2 
(1) No. 8 Gas transmission regulation 
`Rucksack principle' means that a new supplier has the right of capacity transferral 
from the former supplier in order to undertake the supply of his new customer. 
`Shipper' means a third party network user that uses a pipeline network in order to 
`ship' his gas from one point to another point. 
`Secondary market' means the market of the capacity traded otherwise than on the 
primary market. (Art. 2 (1) No. 6 Gas Transmission Regulation) 
`Spot Market' The gas market in which contracts are struck for forward delivery 
normally where delivery is to take place within a very short period after the contract is 
struck. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Storage facility' means a facility used for the stocking of natural gas and owned 
and/or operated by a natural gas undertaking, including the part of LNG facilities used 
for storage but excluding the portion used for production operations, and excluding 
facilities reserved exclusively for transmission system operators in carrying out their 
functions. (Art. 2 (9. ) Gas Directive) 
`Storage system operator' means a natural or legal person who carries out the 
function of storage and is responsible for operating a storage facility. (Art. 2 (10. ) Gas 
Directive) 
`Supply' means the sale, including resale, of natural gas, including LNG, to 
customers. (Art. 2 (7. ) Gas Directive) 
'Supply undertaking' means any natural or legal person who carries out the function 
of supply. (Art. 2 (8. ) Gas Directive) 
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`Swing field' means that the field will only be used during times when the network 
and/or customers need more gas than was originally planned for. This refers 
particularly to the winter when unexpected cold days require the quick withdrawal of 
more gas. 
`System' means any transmission networks, distribution networks, LNG facilities 
and/or storage facilities owned and/or operated by a natural gas undertaking, 
including linepack and its facilities supplying ancillary services and those of related 
undertakings necessary for providing access to transmission, distribution and LNG. 
(Art. 2 (13. ) Gas Directive) 
`System users' means any natural or legal persons supplying to, or being supplied by, 
the system. (Art. 2 (23. ) Gas Directive) 
'Take-or-pay' In relation to gas contracts a provision (which entitles the buyer either 
to pay for the quantity of gas contracted to be taken in a specified period (e. g. day, 
month, quarter/year) or, if it does not take delivery of that quantity or only part of it, 
to pay for the quantity not taken. ) (P. D. Cameron) 
`Title Transfer Facility or `TTF' means the virtual location, serving as an entry 
point and/or an exit point, [... ]. (Transmission Service Conditions 2005-2, Gts945) 
`Transmission' means the transport of natural gas through a high pressure pipeline 
network other than an upstream pipeline network with a view to its delivery to 
customers, but not including supply. (Art. 2 (3. ) Gas Directive) 
`Transmission system operator' means a natural or legal person who carries out the 
function of transmission and is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance 
of, and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where 
applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term 
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transportation of gas. (Art. 2 
(4. ) Gas Directive) 
`Unbundling' The process of separating the function of transporting gas through a 
pipeline system from the function of purchasing, trading, marketing, and selling gas. 
This process separates the commodity `gas' from the means of delivering this 
commodity to consumers. (P. D. Cameron) 
`Unused capacity' means firm capacity which a network user has acquired under a 
transportation contract but which that user has not nominated by the deadline 
specified in the contract. (Art. 2 (1) No. 4 Gas Transmission Regulation) 
`Upstream pipeline network' means any pipeline or network of pipelines operated 
and/or constructed as part of an oil or gas production project, or used to convey 
natural gas from one or more such projects to a processing plant or terminal or final 
coastal landing terminal. (Art. 2 (2. ) Gas Directive) 
945 Gas Transport Services, Transmission Service Conditions 2005-2 - Standard Conditions concerning 
the Transmission of Natural Gas and the Performance of related services according to Agreement 
between Gas Transport Services B. V. and Customer, 1 November 2004, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
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`Vertically integrated undertaking' means a natural gas undertaking or a group of 
undertakings whose mutual relationships are defined in Article 3(3) of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (1) and where the undertaking/group concerned is performing 
at least one of the functions of transmission, distribution, LNG or storage, and at least 




Appendix 1: European Gas Market 
IULGARI, 
Source: GTE, <http: //www. gte2. be/download/gridmap/GRIDMAP_8july2004. pdf> 
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Appendix 2: Structure of security of supply . 
Understanding interactions in security of supply: 
Short-term electricity model - influence diagram 
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Appendix 3: Connections of the Austrian, Italian and 
German gas market 
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Source: GTE, <http: //www. gte2. be/download/gridmap/GRIDMAP_8july2OO4. pdf> 
Appendix 
Appendix 4: The Dutch Gas infrastructure and on- and 
offshore gas fields 
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Appendix 5: Transparency requirements in the Dutch 
transmission System 
Type of information Past Future Period 
Firm total 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Firm available 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Firm recorded 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Firm nominated All nominations 1 hour 
Firm used 3 years 1 hour 
Interruptible recorded 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Interruptible nominated All nominations 1 hour 
Interruptible used 3 years 1 hour 
Backhaul total 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Backhaul available 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Backhaul recorded 3 years 5 years 1 day 
Backhaul nominated All nominations 1 hour 
Backhaul used 3 years 1 hour 
Quality Conversion: 
available 
3 years 5 years I day 
Quality Conversion: 
recorded 
3 years 5 years 1 day 
Quality Conversion: used 3 years 1 day 
Source: Office of Energy Regulation, Guidelines for Gas Transmission 2005,10 June 
2005, <http: //www. dte. nl>. 
Appendix 6: Gas Hubs in the European Gas Market 
Trading Counter-Parties at Europe's Emerging Gas Hubs 
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Appendix 7: EuroHub location 
Norpipe 
EuroHub 
Batton f_ BBL 




mam K1fK*M R" 1 Germany 




Source: Kager, P., EuroHub, IEA Eurogas Joint Workshop, Paris, 13 June 2005, 




Bundesregierung, Energiepolitik fir das vereinte Deutschland, 11 December 1991, 
Bundestags Drucksache 12/1799. 
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, COM(2006) 105 final, Brussels, 
8.3.2006. 
Common Position (EC) No6/2003 adopted by the Council on 3 February with a view 
to the adoption of the Directive 2003/... /EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC (2003/C 50 E/03). 
Council Directive, Amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards the rules on the place 
of supply of electricity and gas, COM (2002) 0688,5 December 2002. 
Council Directive 2004/67/EC, Concerning measures to safeguard security of natural 
gas supply, 26.04.2004 (OJL 127/92). 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395,30.12.1989, The Regulation as last 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 (OJ L 180,9.7.1997). 
Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002on the implementation of the 
rules and competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 
04.01.2003. 
Council of the European Union, Common position adopted by the Council with a 
view to the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, 11652/04, ENER 
190, CODEC 934,25. October 2004. 
Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 23/24 March 2006, 
7775/06, Brussels, 24 March 2006. 
Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 adopting a multi annual programme for action in the field of energy, "Intelligent 
Energy - Europe" (2003 -2006) (OJL 176/29). 
Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down a series of guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing 
Decision No I 254/96/EC, (OJL 176/11). 
Decision No 1230/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 laying down a series of guidelines for trans-European energy networks and 
repealing Decision No 1254/96/EC (OJL 176/11). 
407 
Bibliography 
Directive 96/92/EC (OJL 27/21) of the European Parliament and of the council 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. 
Directive 98/30/EC (OJL 204/1) of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 
Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC. 
Directive 2003/55/EC (OJL 176/57) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and 
repealing Directive 98/30/EC. 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Directives 
96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning rules for the internal markets in electricity and 
natural gas, COM (2002) 304 final. 
Commission Directive 95/49/EEC of 11 November 1994 updating the list of entities 
covered by Council Directive 91/296/EEC on the transit of natural gas through grids. 
Energie-Regulierungsbehördengesetz - E-RBG, BGBl. I Nr. 121/2000 in der Form 
BGB1.1 Nr. 148/2002. 
Energielenkungsgesetz 1982, BGBl. 1 Nr. 545/1982. 
Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents, October 1996, 
<http: //www. encharter. org>. 
European Commission, Commission notice of 2 March 1998, OJ [1998] C66/5. 
European Commission, Commission Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003 on 
establishing the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, OJL 296/34. 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions - Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 
March 2002, D/02/8. 
European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council decision - 
amending Decision No 1254/96/EC laying down a series of Guidelines for trans- 
European energy networks, 18 December 2001. 
European Commission, Guidelines for good practice - gas TPA - compliance 
overview, prepared by DGTREN of the European Commission for discussion at the 
6`h meeting of the Madrid Forum on 30-31 October 2002,1 s` draft of 12 September 




European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the development of Energy Policy for the enlarged European 
Union, its neighbors and partner countries, 13 May 2003, COM (2003) 262 final. 
European Commission, Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of 
Energy Supply, 29 November 2000, COM (2000) 769, followed by the final 
Commission report, 26 June 2002, COM (2002) 321 final, Technical Document. 
European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity and natural gas, 13 March 2001, COM (2001) 125 
final. 
European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council decision amending Decision No 1254/96/EC laying down a series of 
Guidelines for trans-European energy networks, 18 December 2001. 
European Commission, Energy, Let us overcome our dependence, 2002. 
European Commission, The next steps towards completion of the Internal Market for 
Gas -a draft Strategy Paper for discussion, 28 February 2000, 
DGTREN/A2/KG/D(00) 2216. 
European Commission, The internal market in energy: Coordination measures on the 
security of energy on supply, 11 September 2002, COM (2002) 0488. 
European Commission, First report on the implementation of the internal electricity 
and gas market, 3 December 2001, SEC (2001)1957. 
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning rules for the 
internal markets in electricity and natural gas, 13 March 2001, COM (2001) 125 final. 
European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning rules for 
the internal markets in electricity and natural gas, 7 June 2002, COM (2002) 304 
final. 
European Commission, Communication From the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, The internal market in energy: Coordinated measures on 
the security of energy supply, COM(2002) 488 final, Brussels, 11.9.2002; 
2002/0219(COD), 2002/0220 (COD), 2002/0221 (CNS), Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and the Council concerning measures to safeguard security 
of natural gas. 
European Commission, Amended proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity, 7 June 2002, COM (2002) 304 final. 
409 
Bibliography 
European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks, 10.12.2003, 
COM (2003) 304 final. 
European Commission, Commission staff working paper, Second Benchmarking 
Report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market, 7 April 2003, 
SEC (2003) 741 final, 2003/0302 (COD). 
European Commission, Commission staff working paper, Completing the internal 
energy market, 12 March 2001, SEC(2001) 438. 
European Commission, Second Benchmarking Report on the implementation of the 
internal electricity and gas market, 2 October 2002, SEC (2002) 1038. 
European Commission, Third Benchmarking Report on the implementation of the 
internal electricity and gas market, 01.03.2004. 
European Commission, Report from the Commission, annual report on the 
Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market, COM(2004) 863 final, 
SEC(2004) 1720, Brussels, 5.1.2005. 
European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to 
the Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity 
Internal Market, COM(2004)863 final, SEC(2004)1720, Brussels, 5.1.2005. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity 
market, November 2005. 
European Commission, Commission staff working document, Technical Annexes to 
the report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity 
Internal Market, SEC(2005), 30 September 2005. 
European Commission, Enery Sector Inquiry - Issues Paper, Non-Confidential 
Version, 15 November 2005. 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The 
unbundling regime, 16.1.2004. 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, Third party 
access to storage facilities, 16.1.2004. 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, Exemptions 
from certain provisions of the third party access regime, 16.1.2004. 
410 
Bibliography 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, The role of 
the regulatory authorities, 16.1.2004. 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in the electricity and natural gas, Public 
Service Obligations, 16.1.2004. 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in electricity and natural gas - security of 
supply provisions for gas, 16.01.2004. 
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
on the implementation of the guidelines for Trans-European Energy Networks in the 
period 1996-2001,14 December 2001. 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Energy Dialogue with 
Russia - Update on progress, SEC(2004) 114,28.1.2004. 
European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council adopting a multi annual programme for action in the field of energy: 
"Intelligent Energy for Europe" Programme (2003-2006), 23 April 2002, COM (2002) 
0162 final. 
European Commission, Communication by Ms. Neelie Kroes in agreement with Mr 
Piebalgs, Sector inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC in the 
European electricity and gas markets, COMPS-1/39172 (electricity sector inquiry) 
and COMPS-1/39173 (gas sector inquiry). 
European Commission, Sector Inquiry under Art 17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas and 
electricity markets, 16 February 2006. 
European Commission, DG Energy and Transport working paper, strategy paper, 
Medium Term vision for the internal electricity market, Brussels, 01.03.2004. 
European Parliament, II recommendation for second reading on the Council common 
position on common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC, 28 April 2003, Final A5-0135/2003, Rapporteur: Bernhard 
Rapkay. 
Gas-Systemnutzungstarife-Verordnung, (GSNT-VO 2004), Verordnung der Energie- 
Control Kommission, mit der die Tarife für die Systemnutzung in der Gaswitschaft 
bestimmt werden, in der Fassung des Bundesgesetzes BGBl. I Nr. 148/2002. 
Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (GWG), 121 Bundesgesetz: Energieliberal isierungsgesetz, 
Jahrgang 2000, ausgegeben am 1. Dezember 2000, Teil 1. 
Gaswirtschaftsgesetz (GWG II), 148. Bundesgesetz: Gaswirtschaftsgesetz-Novelle 
2002, ausgegeben am 23. August 2002, Teil 1. 
411 
Bibliography 
Zweites Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 7. Juli 2005, 
BGBl. Jahrgang 2005 Teil 1 Nr. 42, ausgegeben zu Bonn am 12. Juli 2005. 
Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts vom 24. April 1998, BGB1. 
1998 1739, BGBl. 2001 I 2785; mit Begruendung BT-Drucksache 13/7274, II. 4. zu 
Paragraph 1. 
Gesetz zur Sicherung der Energieversorgung bei Gefährdung oder Störung der 
Einfuhr von Erdöl, Erdölerzeugnissen oder Erdgas (Energiesicherungsgesetz 1975), 
vom 20. Dezember 1975, BGGI. 1974 I 3681; zul. geändert durch das 
Änderungsgesetz vom 9.1.2002 (BGBl. 1 S. 361). 
Gesetz über die Sicherstellung von Leistungen auf dem Gebiet der gesetzlichen 
Wirtschaft sowie des Geld- und Kapitalverkehrs - Wirtschaftssicherstellungsgesetz 
(WiSG) - vom 24.8.1965 (BGBl. I S. 920) i. d. F. Bekanntmachung vom 3.10.1968 
(BGBl. I S. 1069), zul. geänd. d. V. v. 29.10.2001 (BGBl. I S. 2785). 
Gesetz über die Erhebung von Meldungen in der Mineralölwirtschaft - 
Mineralöldatengesetz (MinÖlDatG), vom 20.12.1988 (BGBl. 0 S. 2353), zul. 
geändert durch das Gesetz vom 10.11.2001 (BGBl. 12992). 
Grenzübergreifende Transport Verordnung - GTVO, Verordnung der Energie-Control 
Kommission mit welcher ein Systemnutzungsentgelt für die Durchführung von 
grenzüberschreitend Transport von Erdgas aus inländischer Produktion festgesetzt 
wird, BGBl. 1 Nr. 121/2000 in der Fassung des Bundesgesetz BGBl. I Nr. 148/2002. 
Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, September 
2002; <http: //www. unfccc. de>. 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity (OJL 176/1). 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to 
the gas transmission networks, COM(2003) 741 final, 2003/0302 (COD), 2005. 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/1,16.12.2004 
Treaty on the European Union, Maastrich (Germany: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, 1992). 
Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on the European Union, The Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (Germany: Office for 
Official Publications for the European Communities, 1997). 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (England, London: 
Fanfare Press, 1951). 
412 
Bibliography 
Wet van 22 junie 2000, houdened regels omtrent het transport en de levering van gas 
(Gaswet), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargant 2000,305. (Dutch 
Gas Act 2000). 
Wet van 22 junie 2000, houdened regels omtrent het transport en de levering van gas 
(Gaswet), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Jaargant 2000,305. Tekst 
geldend op 20-07-2004. (Dutch amended Gas Act 2004). 
Books 
Arentsen, M. J., Künneke, R. W., (eds. ), National Reforms in European Gas, (Oxford, 
England, Elsevier, 2003). 
Bechthold, R., (ed. ), Kartellgesetz - Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 2nd 
edition (Munich, Germany, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1999). 
Birche, B., Die Elektrizitätswirtschaft in der Europäische Union, (Baden-Baden, 
Nomos Verlag, 1997). 
Braband, G., Strompreise zwischen Privatoutonomie und staatlicher Kontrolle, 
(Munich, Germany, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2003). 
Büdenbender, U., Schwerpunkte der Energierechtsreform 1998, (Cologne, Germany, 
RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum, 1999). 
Cameron, P. D. (ed. ), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation - Implementing the 
New Directives on Electricity and Gas Across Europe, (Oxford, England, Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
Corino, C., Energy Law in Germany, 1st edition (Munich, Germany, C. H. Beck 
Verlag, 2003) 
Dannischewski, J., Unbundling im Energierecht, (Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003) 
Däuper, 0., Gaspreisbildung und europäisches Kartellrecht (Munich, Germany, C. H. 
Beck Verlag, 2004). 
Doerr, G. B.; Gattinger, M., Power Switch - Energy Regulatory Governance in the 
Twenty-First Century, (Toronto, Canada, University of Toronto Press, 2003). 
Dore, J.; De Bauw, R.; The Energy Charter Treaty - Origins, Aims and Prospects, 
(London, England, Chameleon Press Ltd., 1995). 
Energiewirtschaftliches Institut Köln, Konzentration und Wettbewerb in der 
deutschen Energiewirtschaft, (Munich, Germany, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998). 




Geradin, D., (ed. ), The Liberalization of Electricity and Natural Gas in the European 
Union, (The Netherlands, The Hague, 2001) 
Glachant, J. -M.; Finon, D., (eds. ), Competition in European Electricity Markets -A 
Cross-country Comparison, (Cheltehnham, England, Edward Elgar, 2003). 
Gloeckler, G., (ed. ), Guide to EU Policies, (London, United Kingdom, 1998). 
Helm, D. (ed. ), Towards an Energy Policy, (United Kingdom, Oxford, 2002). 
Jones, C., EU Energy - The Internal Energy Market, Volume 1, (Leuven, Belgium, 
Claeys & Casteels, 2004). 
Klag, N. D., Die Liberalisierung des Gasmarktes in Deutschland, (Marburg, Germany, 
Tectum Verlag 2003). 
Kraus, M., Lexikon der Energiewirtschaft, (Cologne, Germany, Wolters Kluwer, 
2004) 
Kühling, J., Sektorspezifische Regulierung in den Netzwirtschaften, (Munich, 
Germany, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2004). 
Lippert, M. (ed. ), Energiewirtschaftsrecht: Gesamtdarstellung für Wissenschaft und 
Praxis (Coigne, Germany, 2002). 
Lyons, P. K. (ed. ), EU Energy Policy towards the 2151 Century (Surrey, United 
Kingdom, 1998). 
Mabro, R.; Wybrew-Bond, I., (eds. ), Gas to Europe - The Strategies of Four Major 
Suppliers, (Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
MacAvoy, P., The Natural Gas Market: Sixty Years of Regulation and Deregulation 
(New Haven, USA, Yale University Press, 2001). 
Matlary, J. H., (ed. ), Energy Policy in the European Union (London, England, 
MacMillan Press, 1997). 
McEldowney, J., (ed. ), Electricity Industry Handbook: Law and Practice, (London, 
England, Chancery Law Publishing, 1992). 
Medici, M., The Natural Gas Industry, (Bath, England, Butterworth & Co, 1974. 
Mestmaecker, E. J., (ed. ), Natural Gas in the internal Market -A Review of Energy 
Policy (Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993). 
Midttun, A., (ed. ), European Electricity System in Transition, A Comparative 




O'Neill, D., Regulated Industries: The UK Gas Industry, (London, England, CRI 
1996). 
Pielow, J. -C. (ed. ), Grundsatzfragen der Energiemarktre lgu ierung, (Stuttgart, 
Germany, Boorberg Verlag). 
Rittner, F., (ed. ), Wettbewerbs und Kartellrecht, 6th edition (Heidelberg, Germany, 
C. F. Müller Verlag, 1999). 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), The Regulation of Power Exchanges in 
Europe, (Antwerp, Belgium; Oxford, England, Salter's Boat Yard, 2005) 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report I, 
(Antwerp, Belgium; Oxford, England, Intersentia, 2004). 
Roggenkamp, M. M.; Boisseleau, R., (eds. ), European Energy Law - Report II, 
(Antwerp, Belgium; Oxford, England, Intersentia, 2005). 
Robinson, C., (ed. ), Competition and Regulation in Utility Markets (Cheltenham, 
England, Nothahmpton, USA, Edward Elgar, 2003). 
Säcker, F. J., (ed. ), Neues Energierecht, 2nd edition (Heidelberg, Germany, 2003). 
Säcker, F. J., (ed. ), Reform des Energierechts, (Heidelberg, Germany, 2003). 
Schneider, J. -P., (ed. ), Liberalisierung der Stromwirtschaft durch regulative 
Marktorganisation (Liberalisation of the electricity supply industry by a regulatory 
market structure), (Baden-Baden, Germany, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999). 
Schneider, J. -P.; Theobald, C., (eds. ), Handbuch zum Recht der Energiewirtschaft, 
(Munich, Germany, C. H. Beck Verlag, 2003). 
Shy, 0., (ed. ), The Economics of Network Industries, (Cambridge, England, 
Cambridge University Press 2001). 
Soyk, S., (ed. ), Mineralöl- und Stromsteuerrecht, 2°d edition (Munich, Germany, 
Verlag C. H. Beck, 2000). 
Stem, J. P., (ed. ), Third Party Access in the European Gas Industries - Regulation- 
driven or Market-led? (London, England, Chameleon Press, 1993). 
Tettinger, P. J., (ed. ), Strukturen der Versorgungswirtschaft in Europa (Structure of the 
electricity supply industry in Europe), (Stuttgart, Munich, Hanover, Berlin, Weimar, 
Dresden, Germany, Richard Boorberg Verlag, 1995). 
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, The Future of Natural Gas In 
The World Energy Market. (London, New York, 2001). 
415 
Bibliography 
Theobald, C.; Zenke, I., Grundlagen der Strom- und Gasdurchleitung, Die aktuellen 
Rechtsprobleme (Basics of Electricity and Gas third party access), (Munich, 
Germany: C. H. Beck Verlag, British Acadamey Press, 2001). 
Vaitilingahm, R., (ed. ), A European Market For Electricity?. (London, England, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1999). 
Voss, P., The Development of Energy Regulation -A Collection of Reviews, (Bath, 
England, University of Bath, 1998). 
Vrolijk, C., (ed. ), Climate Change and Power - Economic Instruments for European 
Electricity (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England, Chameleon 
Press, 2002). 
v. Weizsäcker, C. C.; Schulz, H. K.; Schneider, H. K.; Schmitt, D., (eds. ), Erdgas im 
Europäischen Binnenmarkt, (Munich, Germany, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990). 
Zenke, I.; Ellwanger, N., Handel mit Energiederivaten, (Munich, Germany, C. H. Beck 
Verlag 2003): 
Articles 
Adolf, J., Erdgas: Energieträger des 21. Jahrhunderts - Schlussfolgerungen für die 
deutsche Energiepolitik, ZfE 29 (2005) 3. 
Bannikov, M., Energy Regulators in the Emerging Markets, I. E. L. T. R. 8/2000 
Becker, P., Zum Rechtsweg gegen die Entscheidung der REGTP: Ab ins Desaster, 
ZNER 2/2004. 
Britz, G., Erweiterung des Instrumentariums administrativer Normsetzung zur 
Realisierung gemeinschaftsrecthlicher Regulierungsaufträge, EuZW 15/2004. 
Brown, C., Keep the home fires burning, Utility week, 11 June 2004. 
Ajodhia V. et al, Quality, Regulation and Benchmarking - An Application to an 
Electricity Distribution Network, ZfE 2/2004. 
Bündenbender, U., Das deutsche Energierecht nach der Energierechtsreform 2005, 
Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 2005, Hefl 9. 
Cavill, H., The development of the UK Gas Market, ZfE 27/2003. 
Conte, G. et al, EDP/ENI/GDP: the Commission prohibits a merger between gas and 
electricity national incumbents, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1,2005. 
Comot-Gandolphe, S., Natural gas supply and demand in Europe - the importance 
and changing nature offlexibility, ZfE 27/2003. 
Defilla, S., Energy Trade under the ECT and Accession to the iVTO, JENRL 21/2004. 
416 
Bibliography 
Eder, J.; de Wyl, C., et al, Der Entwurfeines neuen En WG, ZNER 1/2004. 
Ehricke, U., Vermerke der Kommission zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien, EuZW 
12/2004. 
Fernandez Salas, M. et al, Access to gas pipelines: lesson learnt from the Marathon 
case, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2,2004. 
Flippen, E.; Mitchel, A. K., Electricity Utility Restructuring After California. JENRL 
21/2003. 
Grave, C.; Trafkowski, A., Sektorenuntersuchung durch die Kartellbehörden - 
Rechtsgrundlagen, Ermittlungsbefugnis und Konsequenzen, RdE 9/2005. 
Gunst, A. J., Energy Trade in the European Common Market - Free Movement, 
Exceptions and Regulatory Inaction, ZENRL 21/2003. 
v. Hammerstein, C.; Langfristige Lieferverträge /Bundeskartellamt, emw 1/05. 
Hemphill, R. C. et al, Incentive Regulation in Network Industries: Experience and 
Prospects in the U. S. Telecommunications, Electricity, and Natural Gas Industries, 
Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 4- December 2003. 
Hense, A., Europaweite Tendenzen der nationalen Gasmarktregulierung, 
Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 55. Jg. (2005). 
Hussain, M.; Riechmann, C., Netzzugang in der Gaswirtschaft - Anforderungen aus 
der Sicht von Gashändler, GWF 143(2002) Nr. 6. 
Just, C., Aktuelle wettbewerbsrechtliche Problemfelder in der Energiewirtschaft, RdE 
3/2004. 
Mom, A. M, Effects of Deregulation Policies on Electricity Competition in the EU, 15 
JENRL 1-22 (1997). 
Koenig, C. et al, Versorgungssicherheit im Wettbewerb - Ein Vergleich der 
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen, französischen und deutschen Energierechtsordnungen, 
ZNER 1/2003. 
Koenig, C.; Rasbach, W., Netzeigentumsübergreifendes Regelzonenmodell auf dem 
verfassungsrechtlichen Prüfstand, N&R 2/2004. 
Kühling, J., Eckpunkte der Entgeltregulierung in einem künftigen 
Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, N&R 1/2004. 
Lausegger, G., Die Öffnung des österreichischen Elektrizitätsmarktes - Das 
Energieliberalisierungsgesetz 2000, RdE 6/2001. 
417 
Bibliography 
Lecheler, H.; Püstow, M., Die Liberalisierung des französischen Gasmarktes, RdE 
6/2003. 
Lecheler, H.; Gundel, J.; Ein weiterer Schritt zur Vollendung des Energie- 
Binnenmarktes: Die Beschleunigungs-Rechtsakte für den Binnenmarkt für Strom und 
Gas, EuZW 20/2003. 
Lieb-Doczy, E. et al, Who Secures the Security of Supply? European Perspectives on 
Security, Competition and Liability, The Electricity Journal 2003. 
Moen, K. B.; The Gas Directive and Third Party Transport rights - What Pipeline 
Volumes are Available?, JENRL 21/2004. 
Mombaur, P. M.; Balke, J., EU-Binnenmarkt für Strom und Gas: Ursprung und 
wirklicher Inhalt des jetzt verabschiedeten neuen Gemeinschaftsrechts, RdE 7/2003. 
Mombaur, P. M., Vertikale Beteiligungen bei Strom- und Gasfirmen: Abwehr von 
Wettbewerb? Oder: Wie könnte der Wettbewerb/der Verbraucher geschützt werden?, 
RdE 2/2003. 
Mullerat, R.; et al, Legal Framework for Natural Gas in Spain, JENRL 22/2004. 
Neveling, S.; Theobald, C.; Aktuelle Entwicklungen des europäischen 
Energiehandels: Die Vorschläge der EG-Kommission zur Anpassung der Strom- und 
Gasrichtlinien, EuZW 4/2002. 
Nyssens, H. et al, The territorial restrictions case in the gas sector: a state of play, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1,2004. 
Nyssens, H.; Osborne, I., Profit splitting mechanisms in a liberalised gas market: the 
devil lies in the detail, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1,2005. 
Renner-Loquenz, B.; Boeshertz, D., State aid: key elements for the agreement in the 
Council on energy taxation, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3,2003. 
Riechmann, C., Notwendige Bausteine für die Gaslieberalisierung in Deutschland, 
Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 51. Jg (2001). 
Roggenkamp, M. M., The Gas Directive and the Implication for Offshore Pipelines in 
the North Sea, I. E. L. T. R. 6/2001. 
Rooney, G.; Albano, N., Of Blackouts and Lawsuits - Class-action claims for 
widespread utility service interruptions are growing trend, Public Utilities 
Fortnightly, July 2004. 
Ruhle, E. 0.; Schuster, F., Lehren für die EnWG-Novelle - Parallelen und 
Erfahrungen aus der Regulierung der Telekommunikation, ZfE 2/2004. 




Säcker, F. J., Der Referentenentwurf zum Energiewirtschaftsgesetz - 
ordnungspolitische und rechtsdogmatische Grundsatzbemerkungen, N&R 2/2004. 
Salje, P., Die Transformation der Binnenmarktrichtlinie Erdgas in deutsches Recht - 
Gasnovelle 2003, RdE 8/2003. 
Schmidl, J.; Harrich, K., Die Energielandschaften der Mittel- und Osteuropäischen 
Länder im Lichte der österreichischen Energiepartnerschaften, ZfE 2/2004. 
Schneider, J. -P.; Prater, J., Das europäische Energierecht im Wandel -Die Vorgaben 
der EG für die Reform des En WG, RdE 3/2004. 
Schnichels, D.; Marktabschottung durch langfristige Gaslieferverträge, EuZW 
6/2003. 
Schnichels, D.; Valli, F., Vertical and horizontal restraints in the European gas sector 
- lessons from the DUC DUNG case, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2, 
2003 
Scholten, C., Die Energiecharta - Bedeutung, aktuelle Herausforderungen und 
gemeinsame Handlungsoptionen mit ihren Partnern, RdE 4-5/2004. 
Scholz, U.; Krohs, C., KWK-Förderung in Deutschland und EG-rechtliche 
Warenverkehrsfreiheit, RdE 1/2003. 
Schuler, B; v. Hammerstein, C., Vorschlag eines Netzzugangsmodells für die deutsche 
Gaswirtschaft, ZfE 2/2004. 
Schütz, R.; Tüngler, S., Die geplante Novelle des EU-Energierechts - Inhalt und 
Umsetzungsbedarf, RdE 4-5/2003. 
Smith, S., Game over?, Utility Week 12 November 2004. 
Steeg, H., Risiken in der Energieversorgungssicherheit - Ursachen und Strategien zu 
ihrer Minderung, RdE 9/2002. 
Stein, S. W., Introduction to the Financing of Cross-Border Gas Pipelines in 
Emerging Markets, JENRL 21/2003. 
Stern, J., UK gas security: time to get serious, Energy Policy 32 (2004) 1967-1979. 
Tettinger, P. J.; Pielow, J. -C., Zum neuen Regulator für den Netzzugang in der 
Energiewirtschaft aus Sicht des öffentlichen Rechts, RdE 12/2003. 
Tettinger, P. J., Zum Thema Sicherheit" im Energierecht, RdE 9/2002. 
Toh, K. -H., The Impact of Convergence of the Gas and Electricity Industries: Trends 
and Policy Implications, <http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>. 
419 
Bibliography 
Theobald, C., Competition in the German Electricity and Gas Industries, JENRL 
22/2004. 
Theobald, C.; Hummel, K., Entgeltregulierung in Netzwirtschaft, N&R 1/2004. 
Thiemann, U., Die Allgemeinen Versorgungsbedingungen der Niederlanden und ihre 
Grundlagen, RdE 6/2004. 
Ocana, C., Trends in the management of regulation: A comparison of Energy 
Regulators in OECD Member Countries, <http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>. 
Vasconcelos, J.; et al, Transmission and Trade of Electricity in Europe, O. G. L. T. R. 
1999. 
Waern, K. P., Transit Provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter 
Protocol on Transit, JENRL 20/2002. 
Wolf, D., Energierechtsnovelle, 24 BBI (1998). 
Won-Woo, L., US Lessons for energy industry restructuring: based on natural gas 
and California electricity incidences, Energy Policy 32 (2004). 
Zenke, I., Germany's Electricity and Gas Markets Stand Alone: Negotiated Third 
Party Access, JENRL 21/2003. 
Other 
Austrian Ferngas GmbH, Geschäftsbericht 2001, Wien 2001. 
Appert, 0., Concluding Remarks, Cross-border Gas Trade Conference, Paris, France, 
26-27 March 2002, <http: //www. iea. org>; 
Andersen, S. S., European Integration and the Changing Paradigm of Energy Policy - 
The case of natural gas liberalisation, December 1999, 
<http: //www. arena. uio. no/publications/wp00_13. htm>. 
American Power Conversion, The Problem with Power, 2 July 2004, 
<http: //www. apc. com/power/problems. cfm. 
Argus, Power in Europe, What if Russia cut exports?, Vol. IV, 9,20 May 2004. 
Arthur D Little, Appendix - West European gas transmission tariff comparisons, 
paper commissioned by Gastransport Services, May 2003, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm>. 
Arthur D Little, West European gas transmission tariff' comparisons, paper 
commissioned by Gastransport Services, May 2003, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm>. 
420 
Bibliography 
Austvik, O. G., Security-of-gas supply; Norway, Russia and the EU, November 2001, 
<http: //www. kaldor. no/energy/berlin20011105. html>. 
Austvik, O. G., Security-of-gas supply; Norway, Russia and the EU, June 2002, 
<http: //www. kaldor. no/energy/berlin2002O618. html>. 
BBC News, Poll shows opposition to nuclear power, 16 May 2005, 
<http: //www. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/Programmes/newsnight/4552177. stm>. 
BBC News, Nuclear protest hits Blair speech, 29 November 2005, 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk> 
BBC News, EU seeks to solve Russia gas row, 3 January 2006, 
<http: //newsvote. bbc. co. uk/>. 
BBC News, EU agrees to energy co-operation, 24 March 2006 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/business/4839950. stm>. 
Beurskens, L. W. M.; de Noord, M., Offshore wind power developments - an overview 
of realisations and planned projects, ECN Energy Research Foundation Policy 
Studies, July 2003, <http: //www. ecn. nl/library/reports/2003/cO3058. html>. 
BMWA, Erläuterungen zur Novelle GWG 2002,26.04.2002. 
Böheim, M., Wettbewerb und Wettbewerbspolitik auf dem österreichischen 
Strommarkt, WIFO Monatsbericht 9/2005. 
Borowka, J.; Mö1ler, A., Zander, W.; Koischwitz, S., Technical study gas storage, 
Büro für Energiewirtschaft und technische Planung GmbH, May 2001. 
Börsen-Zeitung, Eon attackiert das Bundeskartellamt -, Sichere Gasversorgung wird 
gefährdet', 14 October 2005. 
Brattle Group, Base line analysis of the European Gas System - Convergence of non- 
discriminatory tari cation systems of access to the gas system and congestion 
management across Europe, submitted by Jacobs Consultancy Nederland B. V., July 
2002. 
Brattle Group, International balancing regimes, March 2003, in the Annex 6.2 to 
Christoph, P., Beurteilung der Funktionsfähigkeit des österreichischen 
Ausgleichsenergiemarketes in der Regelzone Ost, Gutachten, Vienna, 15 May 2005 
Bundeskartellamt, Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen 
Gasverträgen, 8. Beschlussabteilung, B8- 113/03, Bonn, 25 Januar 2005, 
<http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
Bundeskartellamt, Langfristige Gasverträge, Bonn, 6 April 2005, 
<http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
421 
Bibliography 
Bundeskartellamt, Keine Einigung mit E. ON Ruhrgas zur Öffnung der langfristigen 
Gaslieferverträge, Press release, 27 September 2005, 
<http: //www. bundeskartellamt. de>. 
Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt zur Verhinderung einer BGH-Entscheidung zu 
langfristigen Energie-Lieferverträgen, Press release, 7 November 2003. 
Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt macht Ankündigung wahr und mahnt E. ON 
Ruhrgas wegen langfristiger Gasverträge ab, Pressemeldung 13 December 2005. 
Bundesnetzagentur, Common Position of the Regulatory Authorities of the CEE 
Region on the Draft Auction Rules for 2006 and the TSO Agreement for 2006, 
<http: //www. bundesnetzagentur. de/media/archive/4174. pdf>. 
Bundesregierung, Perspektiven für Deutschland - Unsere Strategien für eine 
nachhaltige Entwicklung, 
<http: //www. bundesregierung. de/Anlage658805/Gesamtentwurf pdfl. 
Bundesregierung, Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den 
Energieversorgungsunternehmen vom 14. Juni 2000, 
<http: //www. bundesregierung. de>. 
Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW), Kartellrechtliche 
Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 21.02.2005, 
<http: //www. bgw. de>. 
Burgenland, Wahrnehmung des Rechungshofes, Teilgebiete der Gebarung des Landes 
Burgenland, Rechnungshof ZI 001.501/076-El/04, <http; //www. rechnungshof. gv. at>. 
Butler, N, Energy Security: A new Agenda for Europe, October/November 2004 - 
CER Bulletin, Issue 38, <http: //www. cer. org. uk>. 
Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), Beyond California's Power Crisis: 
Impact, Solutions, and Lessons, Massachusetts, 2001, <http: //www. cera. com>. 
Carnevalini, R., Third party access to storage and flexibility, Progress Report on 
behalf of CEER, July 2003, <http: //www. ceer. org>. 
Carpenter, P; Chang, J.; Wharton, J., Stranded cost recovery: International experience 
in gas and electricity markets, The Brattle Group, <http: //www. brattle. com>. 
Cayrade, P., Investments in gas pipelines and LNG infrastructure which impact on 
security of supply, An address to the Workshop on Insuring against Disruptions of 
Energy Supply, 6`h/7th May 2003. 
Central European Gas Hub GmbH, OMVHub Baumgarten, IEA Workshop, Paris, 13 
June 2005, <http: //www. iea. org>. 
Christoph, P., Beurteilung der Funktionsfdhigkeit des österreichischen 
Ausgleichsenergiemarketes in der Regelzone Ost, Gutachten, Vienna, 15 May 2005. 
422 
Bibliography 
Conclusions of the Ist meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 
September 30`h and October 1St, 1999, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 2nd meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 11 
and 12 May 2000, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 3rd meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 26- 
27 October 2000, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 4th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 2-3 
July 2001, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 5th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 7-8 
February 2002, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 6`h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 30-31 
October 2002, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 7`h meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 
July 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 8th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 8-9 
July 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions of the 10th meeting of the European Gas Regulatory Forum, Madrid, 15- 
16 September 2005, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions, Eleventh Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum, Rome, 
16-17 September 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Conclusions, Twelfth Meeting of the European Electricity Regulatory Forum, 
Florence, 1-2 September 2004, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Coquet, P.; Lewwiner, C., Gas deregulation in Europe, Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, 
2002. 
Costantini, V.; Gracceva, F., Social Costs of Energy Disruptions, INDES Working 
Paper No. 6, March 2004, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), Completing the Internal Energy 
Market: The missing steps, 6 October 2003, p. 2-4, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Council of European Energy Regulators, Press Release, Guidelines for Good Practice 
for Gas Storage System Operators delayed, 9. December 2004, <http: //www. ceer- 
eu. org>. 
Czernie, W., Common European space - new challenges for the energy Sector, UN 
de Vivies, P., The development of gas hubs and trading centres in Europe, Progress 
Report on behalf of CEER, February 2003, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
423 
Bibliography 
de Jong, J., The `Regional Approach' in Establishing the Internal Electricity Market, 
Clingendael International Energy Programme, December 2004. 
de Vries, L. J.; Hakvoort, R. A., The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalized 
Electricity Markets, INDES Working Paper No. 5, March 2004, 
<http: //www. ceps. be>. 
Deloite & Touche, Flame 2003 and 2004 Delegate Survey Results. 
Deutsche Energie-Agentur (dena), Energiewirtschaftliche Planung für die 
Netzintegration von Windenergie in Deutschland an Land und Offshore bis zum Jahre 
2020, Berlin 23.02.2005. 
Dickel, R., International Energy Agency, The global position of coal 2000-2030 - 
some results of WEO 2002, November 2002, <http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>. 
Dow Jones & Reuters, EU/Energy: Commission urges Member States to do more to 
open energy markets, 11 January 2005, 
<http: //global. factiva. com/en/arch/Print-results. asp>. 
Dow Jones, E. ON sees new UK nuclear power far in the future, 23 August 2005. 
Dow Jones, Naftogaz Ukrainy stoppt Gasexporte nach Deutschland, 07 September 
2005. 
Dow Jones Trade News Energy, Spätestens 2007/2008 steigt Gasbedarf. Bedrohliche 
Engpässe im österreichischen Ferngasnetz, 22 September 2005. 
Drenth, D. J. H., Structural and legal framework of the energy market in The 
Netherlands, presented to E-world, February 2003. 
DRI-WEFA, Austria - country analysis, 2001/2002, <http: //www. dri-wefa. com>. 
DRI-WEFA, European gas storage study highlights surplus supply capacity, 2002, 
<http: //www. dri-wefa. com>. 
DRI-WEFA, Executive Summary - European Natural Gas Service 2001/2002, 
<http: //www. dri-wefa. com>. 
DRI-WEFA, Executive Summary - The 2002 European gas storage study,, 
<http: //www. dri-wefa. com>. 
DRI-WEFA, Germany - European Natural Gas Service 2001/2002, <http: //www. dri- 
wefa. com>. 
DRI-WEFA, Netherlands - country analysis, 2001/2002, <http: //www. dri- 
wefa. com>. 
Dte, Wholesale Market for Gas Functions Inadequately, 17 March 2005, 
<http: //www. dte. nl>. 
424 
Bibliography 
Dte, Onderzoek Ontwikkeling Gasmarkt, 2004, <http: //www. dte. nl>. 
Dte, Richtlijnen Gasops 2003,30 August 2002, <http: //www. dte. nl>. 
Dti, Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon Economy, 
July 2003, <http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/whitepaper/index. shtml#wp>. 
Dti, Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS), Fourth report, May 2004, 
<http: //www. ofgem. gove. uk/temp/ofgem/cache/crosattach/7366_j essreport4_j uneO4. p 
dfl. 
Dti, Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group (JESS), November 2003, 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/jess>. 
Dti, Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group, First Report, June 2002, para. 
24, <http//www. dti. gov. uk/energy/jess/jessreportl. pdf>. 
Dti, Social, Environmental and Security of Supply Policies in a Competitive Energy 
Market -A Review of Delivery Mechanisms in the United Kingdom, May 2001, 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk>. 
Dti, The Energy Review, Cabinet Office, Performance and Innovation Unit Report, 
February 2002. 
Dti, Energy Review -A secure and clean energy future, 29 November 2005, 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/energy_yeview_press-notice. pdf>; 
ECE Working Party on Gas, Jannuary 2003. 
EconGas, Neuer europäischer Gasanbieter aus Österreich, Press release 19.12.2002, 
<http: //www. econgas. com>. 
E-Control, Erdgasversorgungssicherheit in Österreich - Rahmenbedingungen und 
Handlungsempfehlungen, November 2003, <http: //www. e-control. at>. 
E-Control, Methodik der Erdgasbilanz, Erdgasbilanz 2003, Analyse und Diskussion 
von Datenmodell und Ergebnissen, Wien, September 2004, <http: //www. e- 
control. at>. 
E-Control, Versorgunssicherheit - Wie sicher ist die Stromversorgung in 
Oesterreich?, E-Control GmbH 2004, <http: //www. e-control. at>. 
E-Control, Annual Report 2004, E-Control GmbH 2004, <http: //www. e-control. at>. 
E-Control, Jahresbericht 2001, E-Control GmbH 2001, <http: //www. e-control. at>. 




E-Control, Zusammenschlus OMV/EnergieAlianz/OOF - "ECONGAS - Zusagen der 
beteiligten Unternehmen, Nicht vertrauliche Fassung, 9 October 2002. 
EFET, Access to Transit Lines, September 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
EFET, Gas Market Information Requirements, May 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
EFET, Guidance on unbundling Transmission Operators for European Gas Market 
Development, June 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
EFET, Principles for European Gas Market Developments, October 2002, 
<http: //www. efet. org>. 
EFET, Second Reading of the Gas Transmission Regulation (COM (2003) 741 - C5- 
0644/2003 - 2003/0302 (COD)) - European Federation of Energy Traders View, 19 
November 2004, <http: //www. efet. org>. 
EFET, The implementation of the single market in natural gas, EFET position paper, 
September 1999, <http: //www. efet. org>, 
EFET, The Past and Future of Energy Trading, 2005. 
EFET, Views on the EU Commission proposal of 11/09/02 for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council concerning measures to the safeguard security 
of gas supply, October 2002, <http//www. efet. org>. 
EFET, TTFAppendix, June 2004, <http//www. efet. org>. 
Egenhofer, C. et al, Insuring Against Disruptions of Energy Supplies -A Market- 
Compatible Approach to Making Security of Supply Operational, INDES Working 
Paper No. 1, March 2004, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 
Egenhofer, C. et al, Market-based Options for Security of Energy Supply, Summary 
and Conclusions, INDES Working Paper No. 1, March 2004, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 
Egenhofer, C., Gialoglou, K., Rethinking the EU Regulatory Strategy for the Internal 
Energy Market, Report of a CEPS Task Force, Report No. 52, December 2004. 
EIA, The Basics of Underground Natural Gas Storage, August 2004, 
<http: //www. eia. doe. gov/pub/oil gas/natural_gas/analysis- 
publ ications/stro ageb asi cs/>. 
EIA, U. S. -Canada Power Outage Task Force, 19 November 2003, 
<http: //www. eia. doe. gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/at_a_glance/states/statesny. html>. 
EL Mundo, Los tortes en Fracia y el record de demanda djaan la red electrica al 
limite, 29 June 2004. 
426 
Bibliography 
Energie-Cites, For a new type of Directive that puts into effect sustainable energy 
policy objectives, Energie-Cites' opinion on the proposal of Directive amending 
Directives 96/93/EC and 98/30/CE, <http: //www. energie-cites. org/opinion>. 
Energy Economist, TAG expansion starts in fall, 1 July 2005. 
Energieraad, Gas for tomorrow, Advice of the Energy Council on policy options for 
The Netherlands in a changing global and European gas market, January 2005. 
Energy Markets, Slow Pace of Reform is Costing European Gas Consumers £15 
billion a year, 2004, <http: //www. energymarketes. eu. com/BrianPressRelease. php>. 
Enervis Energy Advisors GmbH, Gutachten zur Zulässigkeit einer Ministererlaubnis 
für das Fusionsvorhaben E. on - Ruhrgas, paper prepared Enervis, Becker, Büttner, 
Held on behalf of Fortum Oil and Gas OY, June 2002. 
E. ON, E. ON and Gazprom deepen business relationship, July 8,2004, 
<http: //www. eon-ag. com/eon4721062104>. 
E. ON Corporate, E. ONproposes incentive regulation model, 11 July 2005. The 
following arguments are based on the E. ON model. 
Erdölbevorratungsverband Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts, Bekanntmachung 
der Neufassung des Erdölbevorratungsgesetzes vom 6. April 1998, <http: //www. ebv- 
oil. org>. 
Euracative, Gas crisis resolved but lack of EU energy policy remains problem, 4 
January 2006, <http: //www. euractiv. com/Article? tcmuri=tcm: 29-151227- 
16&type=News>. 
Euroelectric, Comments on the Proposal for a Directive concerning measures to 
safeguard security of supply and Comments on the Proposal for a Directive 
concerning the alignment of measures with regard to security of supply for petroleum 
products, <http//www. euroelectirc. org>. 
Euroelectric, Eurelectric calls for cautious approach to introducing extensive rules on 
gas and oil supply security, press release, <http: //eurelectric. org>. 
Euroelectric, Security of Supply in Liberalised Electricity Markets, Eurelectric Annual 
Convention (June 2002), <http: //eurelectric. org>. 
Eurogas, Eurogas position on use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) principles, April 2003, 
<http: //www. eurogas. org>. 
Eurogas, Proposal by Eurogas for title and revised text for guidelines for good 
practice section 8, April 2003, <http: //www. eurogas. org>. 
Eurogas, Response to the questionnaire on transit, <http: //eurogas. org> 
427 
Bibliography 
Eurogas, Security of energy supply - minimum stocks of crude oil and natural gas, 
public hearing (April 2003), <http: //www. eurogas. org>. 
Eurogas, Security of Supply of Natural Gas in Western Europe, December 1997. 
European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), 
Background, <http: //www. easee-gas. org/background/>. 
European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), 
Madrid Forum 8/9 July 2004, <http: //www. easee-gas. org/>. 
European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), 
Common Business practice - Harmonisation of Units, 27 August 2003 
<http: //www. easee-gas. org/>. 
European Association for Streamlining of Energy Exchange Gas (EASEE-gas), 
Common Business practice - Harmonisation of Natural Gas Quality, 3 February 
2005, <http: //www. easee-gas. orgl>. 
European Commission Press Release, Commission's report indicates that 
governments should do more to implement energy market opening measures, 
IP/05/11, Brussels 7 January 2005, 
<http: //europa. eu. int/comm/energy/gas/benchmarking/index en. htm>. 
European Commission, Commission reaches breakthrough with Gazprom and ENI on 
territorial restriction clauses, Press Release IP/03/1345,06 October 2003. 
European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with BEB, Press Release 
IP/03/1129,29 July 2003. 
European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Gas de France and 
Ruhrgas, Press Release IP/04/573,30 April 2004. 
European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Gasunie, Press 
Release IP/03/547,16 April 2003. 
European Commission, Commission settles Marathon case with Thyssengas, Press 
Release IP/03/1641,23 November 2001. 
European Commission, Competition: Commission opens sector inquiry into gas and 
electricity, Press Release IP/05/716,13 June 2005. 
European Commission, Infrastructure: The energy dimension, DGTREN, December 
2001. 
European Commission, Note of DG Energy & Transport on Directives 2003/54/EC 
and 2003/55/EC on the internal market in electricity and natural gas - security of 
supply provisions for gas, 16.01.2004. 
European Commission, Opening up to choice - launching the single European gas 
market, July 2000, <http: //europa. eu. int/comm/dgs/energy-transport/index-en. html>. 
428 
Bibliography 
European Commission, Press Release, European Commission reaches breakthrough 
with GAZPROM and ENI on territorial restriction clauses, 6 October 2003, 
<http: //www. delrus. cec. eu. int/en/news_101. htm>. 
European Commission, The European Energy Market - Legislative Framework, 
European Energy Markets Conference, September 2002. 
European Commission, The internal energy market: Improving the security of energy 
supplies - gas and oil stocks, Memorandum (2002), 
<http: //europa. eu. int/comm/dgs/energy/home/internal_market/oil_gas/doc/memo2002 
_eu. 
pdf>. 
European Commission, Transit of Electricity and Gas, 
<http: //europa. eu. int/eu/dgl 7/transit. html. >, 
European Energy and Transport Forum, Proposals for Commission Priorities in the 
Field of Energy and Transport (2005-2009), Contributions from Forum Members, 
<http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/forum/works/doc/2004_04_27 
_contributions_final_en 
jdf . 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good 
TPA Practice for Storage Operators (GGPSSO), <http: //www. ergeg. org>. 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good 
TPA Practice for Storage Operators (GGPSSO) - Summary of responses, I 
December 2004, <http: //www. ergeg. org>. 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Guidelines for Good 
TPA Practice for Storage System Operators (GGPSSO), 23 March 2005. 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Developing a roadmap 
towards a single competitive European Gas Market, An introductory paper from 
ERGEG for the Madrid Forum, 09.09.2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org>. 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Work Programme 
2005,2 March 2005. 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Cover note to ERGEG 
public consultation, The Creation of Regional Electricity Markets: an ERGEG 
Discussion paper, 8 June 2005 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Developing a roadmap 
towards a single competitive European Gas Market, An introductory paper from 
ERGEG for the Madrid Forum, 09.09.2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org>. 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), Roadmap for a 
competitive single gas market in Europe, An ERGEG Discussion Paper for Public 
Consultation, 21 November 2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org/>. 
429 
Bibliography 
Financial Times, Problems that could restrict flow of gas, 23 November 2005. 
Financial Times Deutschland, Risiken für Energieversorgung wachsen, 27 October 
2004. 
Financial Times, Biggest wind farm could power one in four London homes, 8 June 
2005. 
Financial Times, Blair hits back on need for reform with debating tour de force, 24 
June 2005. 
Financial Times, Brussels to probe energy market liberalisation, 23 February 2005. 
Financial Times, Deutsche Bank advises Gazprom to take oil companies into state 
control, 30. November 2004. 
Financial Times, Gazprom to bid for production unit of Yukos, 1 December 2004. 
Financial Times, Gazprom attacks EU gas market plans, 26 April 2006. 
Financial Times Deutschland, Gasprom droth Europa im Energiesektor, 20. April 
2006. 
Fluxys, Press release - Information complementaire sur base de la conference de 
presse du 31 juillet 2004 concernant l'accident de Ghislenghien, 01.08.2004, 
<http. www. fluxys. net>. 
Fluxys, Expansion of transit capacity through Belgium, Information Memorandum, 
June 2005. 
Focus, Rotierende Schwerter, 23/2005. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Wir können Kohle ohne Staatshilfe fördern, 
12 June 2005. 
Frontier Economics, Objections to the BP-E. ON deal, Strategy document for 
statement of objections to the Eon Ruhrgas takeover, August 2001. 
Frontier Economics, Research into Flexibility Services - Final Report, A report 
prepared for Dte, March 2005. 
Gas Matters, European Commission closes investigation on gas supply contracts 
between OMV and Gazprom, 21 February 2005. 
Gas Transport Services, European Gas Transmission Tarif Comparisons, paper 
prepared by PA Consulting Group for Gastransport Services, March 2002, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm>. 
Gas Transport Services, Gas Carriage and Third Party Transmission Tariffs in 
Europe, paper prepared by PA Consulting Group for Gastransport Services, May 
2001, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl/en/f publications. htm>. 
430 
Bibliography 
Gastransport Services, BBL - Balgzand (The Netherlands) Bacton (UK) - Pipeline 
Project, September 18 2003, <http: //gastransportservices. nl>. 
Gas Transport Services, Legal split of N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie, I July 2005, 
<http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
Gas Transport Services, Open season - Northeast and southwest hi-cal entries and 
exits, I January 2005, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
Gas Transport Services, Capacity Release Quality Conversion Capacity 2007,2008 
and 2009,15 July 2005, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
Gas Transport Services, Transmission Service Conditions 2005-2 - Standard 
Conditions concerning the Transmission of Natural Gas and the Performance of 
related services according to Agreement between Gas Transport Services B. V. and 
Customer, 1 November 2004, <http: //www. gastransportservices. nl>. 
Gasunie, Facts and Figures, <http: //www. gasunie. nl>. 
Glachant, J. -M.; Leveque, F., Electricity Internal Market in the European Union, 
What to do next?, SESSA, <http: //sessa. eu. com>. 
Groen, B., Energy Brief - The Netherlands, February 2002, 
<http: //www. buyusa. gov/netherlands/en/pagel 67. html>. 
GTE, GTE/EGSO Guidelines for Good TPA Practice for Storage System Operators, 
20 December 2004. 
v. Hammerstein, C., Schriftliche Stellungnahme zur öffentlichen Anhörung von 
Sachverständigen am 15. Dezember 2004 zum Thema Novelle des 
Energiewirtschaftsrechts unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Gasnetzengetlkalkulation, 
Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschussdrucksache 15(9) 1599,13 November 2004. 
Handelsblatt, Energiewirtschaft setzt stärker auf Erdgas, 16. /17. Januar 2004. 
Handelsblatt, Gasversorger läuten Preiserhöhungsrunde ein, 27. /28. /29. August 
2004. 
Handelsblatt, Millionen Moskauer ohne Strom, 25 May 2005. 
Handelsblatt, Yukos kündigt Drosselung der Fördermengen an, 2 September 2004. 
Handelsblatt, Pipelineprojekt mit Iran ist in Gefahr, 25 August 2005. 
Handelsblatt, Gashändler klagen über viele Hürden, 16 September 2005. 
Harris, D.; Lapuerta, C., Wholesale gas competition in The Netherlands and 
implications for phase III customers, paper commissioned by DTE (June 2003). 
431 
Bibliography 
Haubrich, H. -J; Fritz, W., Audit of the process of determination of a available cross- 
border electricity transmission capacity in The Netherlands, paper commissioned by 
Dte, February 2001. 
Hense, A., Gasmarktregulierung in Europa: Ansätze, Erfahrungen und mögliche 
Implikationen für das deutsche Regulierungsmodell, WIK - Diskussionsbeiträge, 
March 2005. 
Heren Energy, Russian Gazprom stops flows to Belarus, European Gas Markets Issue 
11.02.2,27.02.2004, p. 1,6, <http//: www. heren. com>. 
Hobohm, J.; et al; Europäische Vergleich der Netzzugentgelte auf der überregionalen 
Fern gasgesellschaften in Deutschland, Berlin, September 2004. 
House of Lords, Gas: Liberalized Markets and Security of Supply, Reports with 
Evidence, 17`h Report of Session 2003-04,24 June 2003. 
House of Lords, Gas: Liberalized Markets and Security of Supply, 17`h Report of 
Session 2003-04, Report with Evidence, London, 24 June 2004. 
House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, Energy supply: How 
secure are we?, Session 2001-02 14th Report, 12 February 2002. 
HubCo, New Impulses for a strong European Gas Trading Hub, 27 April 2004, 
<http: //www. nwehub. com>. 
IFIEC Europe, European Parliament - Committee on industry, external trade, 
research and energy, Public hearing - security of energy supply, April 2003, 
<http: //www. ifiec-europe. be>. 
IFIEC Europe, IFIEC Europe comments in respect of the Brattle Group Report, April 
2000, <http: //www. ifiec-europe. be/natural4. htm>. 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), Enlarged EU/EEA gas 
supply and the policy framework, An updated analysis of EU/EEA gas production 
potential and external gas resources and their relationship to the policy and regulatory 
framework, April 2003. 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP)/European Petroleum 
Industry Association (EUROPEA), Supplementary comments on the Security of 
Supply Green Paper, <http: //www. ogp. org. uk>. 
International Chamber of Commerce, Liberalization and privatization of the energy 
sector, Executive summary and recommendation, Paris, September 1998. 
International Energy Agency, An opportunity to diversify European Gas supply, 
Conference on natural gas transit and storage in Southeast Europe (May/June 2002), 
<http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>. 
432 
Bibliography 
International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA countries - The Netherlands 
2000 Review, Paris 2000. 
International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries - The Netherlands, 
2004 Review, OECD 2004. 
International Energy Agency, Flexibility in natural gas supply and demand, Paris 
2002. 
International Energy Agency, Kew world energy statistics 2000, 
<http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>. 
International Energy Agency, Regulatory Reform: European Gas, Energy Market 
Reform, Paris, OECD 2002. 
International Energy Agency, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets - LNG and 
Power at a turning point, OECD/IEA, 2004. 
International Energy Agency, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets - LNG and 
Power at a turning point, Annexes - Governments and other Stakeholders' view, 
OECD/IEA 2004. 
International Energy Agency, Security of Gas Supply, Meeting of the Governing 
Board at the ministerial level (April 2003), <http: //www. iea. org/public/index. htm>. 
International Energy Agency, The IEA Natural Gas Security Study, Paris, OECD 
1995. 
James, K., Principles for balancing rules, Progress Report on behalf of CEER, July 
2003, <http: //www. ceer-eu. org>. 
Johnston, A., The EC Energy Law 1999: Reciprocity and the Gas and Electricity 
Directive, The CEPMLP Journal, Volume 4-9, 
<http: //www. dundee. ac. uk/cepmlp/main/html/articl4-9. htm>. 
Kager, P., EuroHub, lEA Eurogas Joint Workshop, Paris, 13 June 2005, 
<http: //www. iea. org>. 
Kager, P., TTF - The Dutch Balancing Point, lEA Eurogas Joint Workshop, Paris, 13 
June 2005, <http: //www. iea. org>. 
Khaleej Times, Iranian pipeline gas to diversify Europe supply, 24 August 2004, 
<http: //www. khal eej times. com/Displ ayArticl. asp? xfile=data/business/2004/business> 
Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Convergence of non-discriminatory tariff and congestion 
management systems in the European gas sector, paper commissioned by GTE, 
September 2002. 
Lapuerta, C.; Moselle, B., Third-Party access to natural gas networks in the EU, 
paper commissioned by EFET, March 2001. 
433 
Bibliography 
Le Monde, Dix-sept morts, don't trois Francais, dan 1'explosion dun gadoduc en 
Belgique, 31.07.2004, <http: //www. lemonde. fr>. 
Luciani, G., Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets - What is it and what is it 
not?, INDES Working Papers No. 2, March 2004, <http: //www. ceps. be>. 
Lyle, C., Gas Trading in the UK, 13 June 2005, <http: //www. iea. org>. 
Madrid Forum Joint Working Group, Minutes (Discussion on Guidelines for Good 
TPA Practice for Storage Operators - GGPSSO), Brussels, 18 March 2005. 
Mogg, J., Letter to Philip Low Esq, Competition Directorate General, 25 November 
2005, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
NMa, Annual Report of The Netherlands Office of Energy Regulation (DTe) to the 
European Commission, 10 August 2005, <http: //www. ergeg. org>, 
National Economic Research Associates ("NERA"), Network access conditions and 
gas markets in North America, a report for Gas Transmission Europe (GTE).?? 
National Economic Research Associates ("NERA"), Security in gas and electricity 
markets, paper commissioned by DTI, October 2002. 
National Grid, Gas Transportation Ten Year Statement 2005, 
<http: //nationalgrid. com>. 
Netherlands Competition Authority, NMA and Dte Annual Report 1999, 
<http: //www. nma. de>. 
OECD, OECD-Prüfungen im Bereich Regulierungsreform, Deutschland, 
Konsolidierung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Erneuerung, Paris 2004. 
Office of Energy Regulation, Guidelines for Gas Transmission 2005,10 June 2005, 
<http: //www. dte. nl>. 
Ofgem, Annual Report 2002-2003, <http: //ofgem. gov. uk>. 
Ofgem, Securing Britain's gas supply, 5 December 2003, <http: //ofgem. gov. uk>. 
Ofgem, Security of supply April to September 2003 - Six month retrospective report, 
February 2004, <http: //ofgem. gov. uk>. 
Ofgem, Letter to Grain LNG, 21 November 2005, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
Ofgem, Wholesale gas prices rises explained, <http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
Ofgem, Winter 200/2006 - Experience to date, 21 March 2006, 
<http: //www. ofgem. gov. uk>. 
434 
Bibliography 
Piebalgs, A., EU Energy Commissioner, Speaking Notes welcoming the agreement 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz, Brussels, 4 January 2006, <http: //europa. eu. int/>. 
Platts, Algerian LNG blast kills 27, slashes export, International Gas Report, Issue 
492,30.01.2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, Germany: 1EA warns German against reliance on Russian gas, EU Energy, 
Issue 96,3 December 2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, Italy: GRTN, ETRANS continue to differ, Issue 413,10.11.2003, Power in 
Europe<http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, Prices set to fall in years of plenty after 2007, Issue 257,19.04.2004, 
<http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, Sweden, Denmark hit by massive blackout, Issue 69,26.09.2003, EU Energy, 
<http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, The Netherlands: Blast prompts review of underground transmission systems, 
EU Energy, Issue 96,3 December 2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, UK-Norway/Trade-Companies: Centrica/Shell ink flexi deal, Issue 497, 
08/04/2004, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, USA-Canada/Power-Politics, Blackouts spotlights energy bill, Issue 482, 
12.09.2003, International Gas Reports, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, Dutch energy firms vow to fight on as legal unbundling approved, 18 March 
2005, <http: //www. platts. com>. 
Platts, Closed European gas market could cost UK $ 18-bil in 2006 - study, 5 
September 2005. 
Platts, UK's National Grid fears delays to pipeline build are growing, 5. September 
2005. 
Powell, W., Gas liberalization in Europe - An empty promise?, Global Energy 
Business, January/February 2002. 
Royal Academy of Engineering, Response to the House of Commons select 
Committee for Trade and Industry - Inquiry into Energy Policy - Security of Supply, 
Memorandum (October 2002). 
Ruhrgas, Einigung mit der EU-Kommission im Marathon-Verfahren, 
Pressemitteilung, 30 April 2004, <http//: www. ruhrgas. com>. 
Ruperez Micola, A.; Bunn, D. W.; Two Markets and a Weak Link, Presentation at the 




Scheepers, M. J. J., Energy market Trends in The Netherlands 2001, ECN Energy 
Research Foundation Policy Studies, 
<http: //www. ecn. nl/library/reports/2001/pOl 014. html>. 
Scheepers, M. J. J.; Wals, A. F.; Rijkers, F. A. M., Position of large power producers in 
electricity markets in North-western Europe, Report for the Dutch Energy Council on 
the Electricity Markets in Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands, ECN 
Energy Research Foundation Policy Studies, April 2003, 
<http: //www. ecn. nl/library/reports/2003/cO3OO3. html>. 
Schuppe, T.; Nolden, A., Markt- und Unternehmensstrukturen im Europäischen 
Strom und Gasmarkt, EWI Working Paper 99/1, Stand 09/1999. 
Seeliger, A., Die Europäische Erdgasversorgung im Wandel, EWI-Working Paper Nr. 
04-02, Stand: Februar 2004. 
Seelinger, A., Angebotsoptionen für den europäischen Erdgasmarkt: Ausgewählte 
Ergebnisse des Modells EUGAS bis 2025, EWI-Workingpaper 1/2003. 
Schmidt, W., Die Ausgestalltung des Zugangs zu den Gasversorgungsnetzen durch § 
20 Abs. lb EnWG und die GasNZV, 06 October 2005, 
<http: //www. bundesnetzagentur. de>. 
Stern, J., Security of European natural gas supplies - the impact of import 
dependence and liberalization, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2002. 
Stern, J., Security of Natural Gas Supply, Response to consultation Document: energy 
Policy: Key Issues for Consultation, DEFRA, dti, DTLR, May 2002, 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk/energy/developep/royal_ins_of int affairs. pdf>. 
Stern, J.; Honore, A.; Large Scale Investments in Liberalized Gas Markets: The Case 
of UK, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies - Gas Research Programme, CGEMP - 
OME Workshop, 16 June 2004, working paper, 
<http: //www. oxfordenergy. org/gasprog. shtml>. 
Stern, J.; Honore, A.; Large Scale Investments in Liberalized Gas Markets: The Case 
of UK, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies - Gas Research Programme, CGEMP - 
OME Workshop, 16 June 2004, presentation, 
<http: //www. oxfordenergy. org/gasprog. shtml>. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Allianz der Kassierer, 2 September 2004. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Weiter Wirbel um die Windenergie, 25 February 2005. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Heimlicher Triumphfür deutsche Gas-Manager, 22 November 
2005 
The Economist, Energy - Europe's power struggle, 3 July 2004. 
436 
Bibliography 
The Economist, Still holding customers over a barrel, Special report OPEC, October 
25`h 2003. 
The Guardian, Heat wave brings power cuts in Spain, June 30,2004, 
<http: //www. guardian. co. uk/spain>. 
The Guardian, Pipeline opens new oil route to west, 26 May 2005, 
<http: //www. guardian. co. uk/oil>. 
The Guardian, Power cuts spark Putin attack, 26 May 2005. 
The Guardian, Wind power 'a must' to beat climate change, 19 May 2005, 
<http: //www. guardian. co. uk/renewable>. 
The Heren Report, Belgian explosion coincided with increase in Finepipe volumes - 
Fluxys, ESGM 10.148, p. 9. 
The Heren Report, Explosion on Belgium. to France transit pipelines leaves several 
dead, ESGM 10.147, p. 9. 
The Heren Report, Ukraine proposes transit hige, EGM 12.03.2,31 March 2005. 
The Times, Surge in gas price forces further factory cuts, 22 November 2005. 
Troesch, J-A., The future organization of the European gas market, ERRA seminar, 
April 2003. 
Trans Austrian Gasleitung GmbH, Standard Transportation Contract between Trans 
Austria Gasleitung GmbH and [name of shipper], updated 16 August 2004, 
<http: //www. taggmbh. at>. 
Transco, Network Code - Summary, 2002. 
UNECE, European gas transportation system developments in the 21" century, press 
release (January 2002), <http: //www. unece. org/prss/pr2002/02ene01 e. htm>. 
Utility Week, Damhead sparks major row, Utility Week 15 October 2004. 
van Gent, C., Energy regulation - "the Dutch case". presentation by Dte, September 
2002. 
van Nieuwland, A. J. F. M, Practical experience and recent developments with UGS 
TPA in The Netherlands, presented to EnergyWise, April 2003. 
Verbändevereinbarung bei Erdgas (VV Erdgas II) zwischen den Verbänden 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Verband der Industriellen Energie- 
und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft 
(BGW), Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU), 4. Juli 2000. 
437 
Bibliography 
Verbändevereinbarung bei Erdgas (VV Erdgas II) zwischen den Verbänden 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Verband der Industriellen Energie- 
und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft 
(BGW), Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU), 3. Mai 2002. 
Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK), Stellungnahme zu den 
Kartellrechtlichen Beurteilungsgrundsätzen zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, 
28.02.2005, <http: //www. vik. de>; 
de Volkskrant, Brinkhorst: 'Splitsing energiebedijven in 2007', 31 March 2004. 
Vorbach, S.; Schneider, R., Die Liberalisierung des österreichischen Energiemarktes, 
May 2000, <http: //www. kfunigraz. ac. at>. 
Welt, Deutsche Energiepolitik kommt vor Gericht, 28 February 2005. 
Welt, Transkaukasische Pipeline nimmt Betrieb auf, 25 Mai 2005. 
Welt, Subventionsabbau kommt kaum voran, 18 August 2005. 
Wirtschafts Woche, Energiepolitik, Vol. 36,26. August 2004. 
Wood Mackenzie, Pushing the Boundaries - the future dynamics of European gas 
pricing, January 2003. 
438 
